Federal Open Market Committee Structure and Decisions
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-1984
Description
This paper examines the dissents of Federal Open Market Committee members regarding the domestic monetary policy directive. It shows that, on balance, governors appointed by Democratic U.S. presidents dissented significantly on the easier side, while governors appointed by Republican U.S. presidents dissented significantly on the tighter side. The pattern of dissents for the Reserve Bank presidents was like that of Republican appointees to the Board of Governors. The Bank presidents' voting did not reflect regional points of view. Furthermore, the timing of the dissents by both the governors and presidents did not seem to be associated with the onset of Congressional or presidential elections.
Citation Information
Puckett, Richard H.. 1984. Federal Open Market Committee Structure and Decisions. Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol.14(1). 97-104. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(84)90029-1 ISSN: 0304-3932