Deep Trouble for the Deep Self
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
10-1-2012
Description
Chandra Sripada's (2010) Deep Self Concordance Account aims to explain various asymmetries in people's judgments of intentional action. On this account, people distinguish between an agent's active and deep self; attitude attributions to the agent's deep self are then presumed to play a causal role in people's intentionality ascriptions. Two judgments are supposed to play a role in these attributions-a judgment that specifies the attitude at issue and one that indicates that the attitude is robust (Sripada & Konrath, 2011). In this article, we show that the Deep Self Concordance Account, as it is currently articulated, is unacceptable.
Citation Information
Rose, David; Livengood, Jonathan; Sytsma, Justin; and Machery, Edouard. 2012. Deep Trouble for the Deep Self. Philosophical Psychology. Vol.25(5). 629-646. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.622438 ISSN: 0951-5089