Freedom with Causation
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
4-1-2017
Description
Our actions have causes, some of which are beyond our control. Of that there can be no serious doubt. Some worry that this fact undermines the commonsense view that we perform free actions for which we are morally responsible. My aim in this article is to show that such worries are unfounded and, consequently, that pure non-causal theories of free action, according to which free actions must be entirely uncaused, are false. My argument for this conclusion doesn’t presuppose the cogency of existing objections to non-causal theories of free agency.
Citation Information
Capes, Justin A.. 2017. Freedom with Causation. Erkenntnis. Vol.82(2). 327-338. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9819-5 ISSN: 0165-0106