Moral Rationalism and Psychopathy: Affective Responses to Reason
Evidence suggests that psychopaths’ notoriously immoral behavior is due to affective rather than rational deficits. This evidence could be taken to show that, contrary to moral rationalism, moral norms are not norms of reason. Rationalists could reply either that psychopaths’ behavior is in fact primarily due to rational deficits or that affects are involved in responding to rational norms. Drawing on the work of Antonio Damasio and colleagues, I argue the latter is the better defense of moral rationalism.
Coates, Allen. 2017. Moral Rationalism and Psychopathy: Affective Responses to Reason. Philosophical Psychology. Vol.30(7). 855-877. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1318207 ISSN: 0951-5089