Protecting the Open Future: A Defense of Feinberg's Account of Children's Rights

Abstract

The tension between protecting children and respecting their emerging autonomy lies at the center of contemporary debates in moral and political philosophy. Joel Feinberg's theory of children's rights, especially his concept of the "right to an open future," remains one of the most influential attempts to reconcile child protection with respect for future autonomy. This paper defends Feinberg against common criticisms that his framework is excessively future oriented, culturally biased, or dismissive of parental authority. I argue that Feinberg's theory, understood properly, identifies a morally significant class of irreversible decisions that unjustly constrain future autonomy, while leaving room for parental guidance and cultural formation. By clarifying the scope and limits of of the open future principle, this paper demonstrates the Feinberg provides a defensible and normatively attractive account of children's rights.

Start Time

15-4-2026 9:00 AM

End Time

16-4-2026 10:00 AM

Room Number

252

Presentation Type

Oral Presentation

Presentation Subtype

UG Orals

Presentation Category

Arts and Humanities

Student Type

Undergraduate

Faculty Mentor

Allen Coates

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Apr 15th, 9:00 AM Apr 16th, 10:00 AM

Protecting the Open Future: A Defense of Feinberg's Account of Children's Rights

252

The tension between protecting children and respecting their emerging autonomy lies at the center of contemporary debates in moral and political philosophy. Joel Feinberg's theory of children's rights, especially his concept of the "right to an open future," remains one of the most influential attempts to reconcile child protection with respect for future autonomy. This paper defends Feinberg against common criticisms that his framework is excessively future oriented, culturally biased, or dismissive of parental authority. I argue that Feinberg's theory, understood properly, identifies a morally significant class of irreversible decisions that unjustly constrain future autonomy, while leaving room for parental guidance and cultural formation. By clarifying the scope and limits of of the open future principle, this paper demonstrates the Feinberg provides a defensible and normatively attractive account of children's rights.