Degree Name

MS (Master of Science)

Program

Mathematical Sciences

Date of Award

8-2018

Committee Chair or Co-Chairs

Michele Joyner

Committee Members

Jeff Knisley, Robert Price

Abstract

In business-to-business logistical sourcing events, companies regularly use a bidding process known as tendering in the procurement of transportation services from third-party providers. Usually in the form of an auction involving a single buyer and one or more sellers, the buyer must make decisions regarding with which suppliers to partner and how to distribute the transportation lanes and volume among its suppliers; this is equivalent to solving the optimization problem commonly referred to as the Winner Determination Problem. In order to take into account the complexities inherent to the procurement problem, such as considering a supplier’s network, economies of scope, and the inclusion of business rules and preferences on the behalf of the buyer, we present the development of a mixed-integer linear program to model the reverse combinatorial auction for logistical tenders.

Document Type

Thesis - Open Access

Copyright

Copyright by the authors.

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