Constitutional Fidelity and Extra-Legal Discretion: Justifying Executive Prerogative and Disobedient Disclosure

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In this article, I defend the justifiability of both concealed uses of executive prerogative as consistent with the end of self-preservation for which government is constituted by the people and its disobedient disclosure as consistent with the rational interest of the citizens of the constitutional state in non-subordination. Indeed, I argue both prerogative and disclosure are justifiable, despite the latter clearly operating at cross-purposes with the former. I also contend that disobedient disclosure aligns more closely with the justificatory conditions of executive prerogative than more traditions forms of civil disobedience. My discussion is limited to the question of justification, highlighting the normative stakes of delegitimizing either mode of extra-legal discretionary judgment by executive or disclosers respectively.