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Exclusion vs. Inclusion: American and Turkish Foreign Policy in the

Middle East

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Abstract

Why do countries engage in democracy promotion around the world? Why is the principle component of U.S. foreign policy abroad assistance with democratization? One answer is the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) (also known as “Liberal Peace”). Accordingly, DPT states, as its basic tenant, democracies behave differently with one another than they do non-democracies, especially in relation to military altercations.

Why are some countries more successful than others in promoting democratic ideals around the world? In order to partly explain this question, I examine American and Turkish foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East from a comparative perspective. The United States of America and the Republic of Turkey both reflect the basic tenant of the Democratic Peace Theory in their foreign policies. Each maintains policies that promote the establishment of democracies and the perpetuation of democratic ideals in the Middle East region. Differences in policies are observable when consideration is placed on the principles of inclusion and exclusion in negotiating, nation building, and the promotion of national interests in foreign affairs. The United States maintains bureaucratic rigidity while Turkey exemplifies an open policy when negotiating with interested parties. An analysis of nuclear proliferation in Iran, the two invasions of Iraq since 1990, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reveals an increase and advancement of Turkey’s influence in the spread of democracy in the Middle East and a corresponding decline in that of the U.S. This approach might have strengthened Turkish strategic leverage in the region with comparatively greater (than the United States) ability to promote democratic ideals in the Middle East region through the continued building of
partnerships and a dedication to stability of the region, the balancing of internal political ideologies, and the stability of Turkish international relations above all else.
Section I: Introduction

The creation of democracies is of interest to democratic states around the world, which subscribe to key principles of the Democratic Peace Theory. There exists a basic ideology that democracies behave differently to one another than non-democratic states (Layne, 1994). Beyond basic ideologies there also exist real-world implications for Democratic Peace Theory. For example, democratic states such as the United States and Turkey have brokered peace, participated in armed conflict, nurtured young democracies, and established foreign policies around Democratic Peace Theory.

The Democratic Peace Theory is used to explain the relatively minute amount of armed conflicts between democratic states around the world as compared to those who are ruled by dictators or aristocratic hierarchies. However, there is a significant amount of war and unrest in non-democratic states. For example, the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been fought for nearly a decade in some cases. Afghanistan was ruled by the Taliban – a repressive regime made up of Islamic extremists – and Iraq was ruled by a dictator who was renowned for his brutality and lack of commitment to the safety of his people. These wars were fought against ruling tyrannical regimes under the guise of removing terrorist threats, disarming a potential nuclear Iraq, and creating a safer and more peaceful region. Democratic Peace Theory has been the foundation of U.S. foreign policy during the post-Cold War era (Layne, 1994). This model has existed because democracy has long been viewed as a key to stability. Stability is the absence of violence or a threat of violence against others either domestically or internationally as a method of foreign engagement. It is also used to succinctly describe a peaceful existence among
peoples living within politically defined borders of the state in question. It is paramount that the reader understands that discourse and disagreement are not excluded under this definition of stability, but that stability and non-stability are dependent upon political transitions and the use of force domestically and abroad. For example, although the U.S. Congress is polarized and non-functioning in the eyes of many Americans, the U.S. is viewed as stable due to the holding of elections and a respect for the democratic voice of the people. It is also important to recognize the limitations of DPT when explaining the foreign policy of the United States and Turkey. For example, the U.S. never criticized the Mubarak regime of Egypt before civil unrest and a demand of the people for a regime change in 2011 even though his rule was indisputably autocratic and repressive. The answer is because of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Washington. As DPT is used to explain many actions throughout this analysis, it is important to note that its power of explanation is limited, just as all theories are in application.

This proclivity toward stability has led to somewhat loose interpretations as to what democracy can look like in these fostered democratic states. As Kennan put it in his essay *Morality and Foreign Policy*, “there are parts of the world where the main requirement of American security is not an unnatural imitation of the American model but sheer stability, and this last is not always assured by a government of what appears to be popular acclaim” (Kennan, 1985). However, there has been increased pressure under recent United States administrations and the Department of State’s defined foreign policy to actively pursue the U.S. model for democratic reform. This pressure has come with arguably mixed results.
While the United States has taken a somewhat aggressive role in democracy-building across the Middle East region over the course of the last two decades, the Republic of Turkey has fostered democratization more cautiously with hesitation to become involved in powder keg foreign relations. The Turkish government has become an advocate for stabilization at home while keeping a multilateral approach to policy abroad – that is, Turkey rarely takes action without international support and a consensus at home (Robins, 2004). This multilateral approach and remarkable leverage which Turkey wields has come from the unique geographic location of the global power as well as its vested interests in the West, particularly the United States, the Middle East (its home region), and the East including Russia. This is because stability leads to positive relationships among neighbors. Authoritarian regimes do not possess the same promise as guarantors of stability as they did under such successful endeavors as the Roman Empire. However, democracies have proven less successful in a climate in which religious fundamentalism tends to dominate the political landscape as is the case in the Middle East region. The United States and Turkey – the models of democracy for this argument – are secular states in which there is a line of separation of church and state. Although political conservatives in the United States and the current Turkish Prime Minister are followers of a particular religion, tolerance and peaceful engagement are valued above religious ideologies in the political realm. Often, generally anti-Western ideologues are sometimes swept into power in open elections in countries of the Arab World. Kennan (1985) argued for individual interests in a country to be useful for the perpetuation of stability, even if those where at sometimes out of line with official recognized policies. This is the case in Turkey as the official policy is one of hesitation.
and preservation of relationships for the national interest above all else, but individual political parties and their members frequently advocate for swift action to propagate their interests whether they be religious, cultural, or otherwise. (Ozel and Ozcan, 2011). Kennan said, “What is being said here [relating to the promotion of democracy and human rights] does not relate to the reactions of individual Americans, of private organizations in this country, or of the media, to the situations in question. All these may think and say what they like” (Kennan, 1985). To expand upon this quote, it is believed by Kennan (1985) that individuals may think or believe what they like. However, it is when these principles of quick action are elevated to the policy level that they become problematic.

With different approaches to the implementation of democracy promotion relating to the Democratic Peace Theory, it is the purpose of this paper to focus on issues of inclusive or exclusive principles in foreign policy interactions in the Middle East region. Placing aside arguments for and against Democratic Peace Theory (although there are voluminous arguments for either side), the primary investigation will be ideas of inclusive negotiations including all parties involved or an exclusion of groups due to foreign policy principles. Examples of exclusion and inclusion will be examined later as specific situations are examined. I hypothesize that increased inclusion and willingness to bring affected parties to the table will serve to improve the image, reputation, and impact of the mediating nation in the region, thus providing for a more effective position from which democracy promotion may proceed.

Although many nation states could be used, the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey are used due to notable differences, varying regional perceptions, and
contemporary interest among academics and politicians in each state as the U.S. is a key world player and Turkey moves to become a member of the European Union. Additionally, Turkey is a strategic ally of the United States, the only mature democracy in the Muslim world, and is expanding regional influence toward that of a major power. Three situations will be analyzed with specific focus on each nation’s response to a situation in the Middle East region. These will include: nuclear proliferation in Iran, the invasion of Iraq, and the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. There are differing approaches of each nation to these dynamic and varied crises. This paper will focus on the relational outcome with regional stakeholders and through what lens Turkey and the United States are viewed in the world’s eye. While each nation state has been involved in the multitude of these conflicts, they enjoy different perceptive attitudes in the region - attitudes toward the U.S. declining and Turkey’s reputation on the rise. While Turkey has become a preferred source of intervention and mediation the United States has come to be viewed as a meddler and outside agitator (Robins, 2004).

Regardless of whether inclusivity or exclusivity are used, the path to a democratic Middle East is, indeed, and difficult one to create. There have been numerous failures of parliamentary models such as those under British and French League of Nations in the early twentieth century (Avineri, 2002). These were followed quickly with fascism and Marxism in the mid twentieth century until there was a systematic reversion to traditional Islamic ideals. Also of interest is that all Middle Eastern states (sans Turkey and Iran) were colonies until the 1950s and 60s and, even once independence was achieve, they were ruled by dictators. These ideals leave little room for democratic ideals with the prospects of movement toward democratization on their own highly unlikely.
This return to Islamic roots has led to the characterization of the Middle East as homogenous by western powers. This is not supported by empirical research and based more in ignorance than fact. There are rural and urban areas, those rich with natural resources and those, which are all but devoid of such resources, and there are theocracies and military dictatorships (Avineri, 2002). In short, there exists a unique situation in each country and, therefore, a blanket foreign policy may not be the best route on a path of encouraging peace in the region. These specific principles and their implementation will be vetted later as the reactions and policy views evolve and are put into action across the Middle East.
Section II: Iran Nuclear Proliferation and Weaponization

The viewing of any international news source will reveal the fact that Iran has worked toward uranium enrichment. There exists a lengthy debate on whether the enrichment activities are for peaceful purposes or for the development of a nuclear warhead or other weapon development of a nuclear type. While Iran has asserted that it is developing such technologies for peaceful purposes, it has not been open to inspections of nuclear research facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Shenna, 2010). This has led to a suspicion of the Iranian regime by Western powers, which is not completely baseless as Iran has acted in such a manner for no less than eighteen years (Shenna, 2010). While there are serious concerns from Western powers, there are serious concerns and interests in ongoing negotiations among regional states also have a vested interest as the stability of the region is at stake. The vested interest in stability is why the United States and Turkey along with other parties have participated heavily in finding an answer to the Iranian nuclear question.

The United States has maintained an interest section at the Swiss embassy in Tehran since 1980 after the United States embassy was closed after the 1979 hostage crisis in which Iranian students seized a number of U.S. workers in a highly publicized hostage situation. Since that time, the relationship between Tehran and Washington has been viewed as strained by the most optimistic among political analysts and outright hostile by more realistic reviewers (Bahgat, 2007). Since that time, until the 2003 invasion of Iraq by a multinational force led by the United States, Washington’s foreign
policy for the Middle East included a counterbalancing of monetary and military power between Iran and Iraq. As the Iran-Iraq War had resulted in enormous casualties for both sides of the conflict, the United States counted on the mutual threat of each country to the other to keep any hostilities or power grabs in the region to a relative minimum.

This policy of maintaining military balance between Iran and Iraq remained in effect until President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney greatly accelerated the idea of forced democratization into the Middle East region following the terrorist attacks in the cities of New York and Washington in the United States on September 11, 2001. At this time, the *de facto* policy of the U.S. Government became one of preemptive strikes of purported enemy states or nations which harbored terrorists or organizations that are “black listed” or viewed as unfavorable or unfriendly by the U.S. government. At this time, Iran became a legitimate target for the United States because it is not democratic, it is governed by Islamic fundamentalists, and aids radical Arab groups many of which the U.S. has labeled terrorist organizations (Cannistraro, 2007). This view by Iranians that their nation had become a legitimate target was fortified by the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. This, coupled with increased saber rattling in Washington, would lead any reasonable government to see that its similarities and isolation from the aggressor could and well may lead to an invasion of its sovereign territory for the purposes of a regime change.

Facing increased military pressures in the region from a combination of Western powers, Iran offered to go to the table to discuss its uranium enrichment programs, the prospects of nuclear development, and its ties to so-called terrorist organizations. However, with the lack of success faced by the U.S. military in Afghanistan to quell
insurgency and unite the nation, and the increase of sectarian violence in Iraq that was, by some media accounts, leading to a potential civil war. Iran saw the inability of the United States to achieve definitive military success on either front and talks quickly broke down (Bahgat, 2007).

After talks broke down, broad-based threats, accusatory statements, and military exercises increased from Washington and Tehran. The situation was further intensified by pressures for an armed engagement from neoconservative ideologues, including Vice President Cheney, in the U.S. and the lack of commitment to cooperation with Western powers by President Ahmadinejad. The U.S. military was ordered to be ready to respond with force from any Iranian threat within twelve hours. The situation was further aggravated by Israeli lobbying for a United States bombing campaign to prevent the weaponization of nuclear material by Iran (Cannistraro, 2007).

With the drum of war beating a familiar tune in the eyes of the world, The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. John Bolton, began calling for a U.N. bombing of Iran nuclear sites before weaponization could occur. Further escalation occurred when Vice President Cheney spoke from the deck of the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. John C. Stennis, in 2007 saying, “With two carrier strike groups in the [Persian] Gulf, we’re sending messages to friends and adversaries alike” (Cannistraro, 2007). The United States’ commitment to escalation and exclusion coupled with its intimate relationship with Israel has further isolated Iran and made the prospects of cooperation from Tehran a distant thought at the time.

With neither side willing to come to the negotiation table, Western powers have flatly refused to allow Iran the ability to develop uranium enrichment for peaceful
purposes. This is called the “zero enrichment demand,” and the U.S. government keeps this demand as a matter of policy even though enrichment for peaceful purposes, including energy production, is allowed under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Shenna, 2010). These interferences in the Iranian energy market and international trade are viewed as unreasonable in the eyes of Tehran and have led to the current situation.

In 2010, Turkey and Brazil successfully negotiated with Iran for an exchange of low enriched Uranium for a smaller amount of radioactive material for its medical research reactor. The deal was hailed around the world as a major breakthrough and was praised as a potential solution (Reinl, 2010). However, the United States and four other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council scrubbed the deal and called for additional sanctions against Iran calling the reached deal a “sideshow.” A representative from the Foreign Relations Council was quoted as saying, “The central thrust of U.S. diplomacy has been that Iran is not trustworthy, that Iranian intentions regarding weaponization are clear and the deal isn’t as good as the Turks and the Brazilians were making it out to be” (Reinl, 2010). With Western engagement at a dead-end due to exclusivity, the extinguishing of diplomatic relations some three decades ago, and the constant use of inflammatory language from both Iran and the U.S., there appears to be no viable U.S. resolution to the Iran question. The United States continues to offer no solution except for increased sanctions or a military strike – both of which have shown to further isolate the Iranian government and provide justification for Iran to completely withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty causing the loss of what little control of their actions remains (Shenna, 2010). This is the case even though a constructive engagement with Iran, including open talks and negotiations regarding nuclear
proliferation and the harboring and supporting of Islamic extremist organization which are black listed by the U.S. government as terrorist organizations, could serve as a vehicle to successfully defuse situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and the West Bank (Bahgat, 2007).

While the United States has dead-ended most of its bargaining power with Tehran over its nuclear ambitions – peaceful or otherwise – Turkey has come to the forefront as a regional partner with Iran. Perhaps it is the fact that both states are Muslim (although Turkey is Sunni and Iran is Shi’ite), or that Prime Minister Erdogan was the first person to congratulate President Ahmadinejad on his election victory in 2009. Turkey is a key economic partner for Iran, In addition, Turkey is very powerful and a major power broker in the region. Iran does not have many allies in the region because of its Shi’ite regime. As a result, Turkey remains a great hope in the successful diplomatic solution for Iran (Shenna, 2010).

Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey has made it abundantly clear that he wants a diplomatic relationship with Tehran in which sanctions are not present. This may be due largely to the Turkish economy. Iran is Turkey’s fifth largest trading partner and its largest neighbor in the region (Shenna, 2010). Turkey sits directly to the west of Iran and the two nations share a long border. Therefore, the remaining stabilization of Iran is of extreme security importance to Turkey as it emerges as a regional and world power.

Ankara has been absolutely clear that it opposes the development of a nuclear weapon by Tehran. Even though Iran has not initiated a regional conflict in over two centuries, Turkish officials remain hesitant about the enrichment of weapons grade Uranium (Bahgat, 2007). Turkey has been accused of wanting both a strong economic
relationship with Iran, protection from nuclear threats from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even going so far as to host U.S. manned defensive missiles in the south of the country (Bahgat, 2007). This contradiction in policy is a result of tension in Turkish domestic politics. The Kemalist establishment consisting of the military, secularists, and nationalists fear Turkey will become the second Iran with increased religious influence and a disregard for human rights. However, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) consists of liberals, center-rights, and religious leaders who want to maintain economic ties with Iran even though each state has starkly different religious viewpoints (Sunni vs. Shi’ite). Still, somehow, there manages to be positive diplomatic relations between Ankara and Tehran as well as Ankara and Washington (Shenna, 2010).

Regardless of internal politics and interest groups, Turkey has managed to successfully negotiate a deal with Iran in the past (scrapped by UNSC) and can, likely, do the same in the future. The work of Turkey to negotiate Iran’s admission into the NPT as a non-nuclear-state-party such as Brazil or Japan, and, thus, allow for the enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes such as energy production, would allow for the dispelling of anti-Western sentiments and, possibly, a better diplomatic relationship between the West and Iran (Shenna, 2010).

In this situation, Turkey holds the key the United States simply will not. This is due to the Turkish commitment to preserving relationships with regional partners in order to grow the economy at home while maintaining positive interactions abroad. The United States has forced itself into the region on military exercises and destabilized the nations which it occupies. This has led to a distrust of the American government by many of the
nations of the Middle East and unwillingness to strike deals and work out problems. In this long and complicated situation, there remains a hope for a diplomatic solution, but the one who has been at the table has the opportunity to accomplish the task at hand while the one that has refused to bargain, give, or compromise is left waiting on the next inflammatory remark.
Section III: Iraq and Operations Desert Storm, Desert Shield and Iraqi Freedom

Iraq has been a source of conflict in the Middle East for the past two decades. Beginning with Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and continuing with Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, two major conflicts have brought world military force to the region countering the regime of Saddam Hussein. This led to the toppling of the Hussein regime after the 2003 invasion led by United States military forces. The Turkish and U.S. responses were varied in each conflict. It will be best for this analysis to separate the two for further investigation.

Media reports about the Gulf War -- as Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm were and are collectively referred to in colloquium – indentified the military operations as “Bush’s War.” However, published accounts suggest Bush wanted to threaten war but not actually participate in military engagement (Holland, 1999). This is demonstrative of a changing U.S. foreign policy of increased flexing of U.S. military muscle to accomplish foreign interests. This emerged from the Ronald Reagan administration and the building up of U.S. military might following the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, Bush may not have wanted an actual military engagement in the end, but early decisions favored an active engagement with the Iraqis following their invasion of Kuwait. These actions included the deployment of U.S. troops to the region, the taking of an offensive posture, and refusing to negotiate with Saddam Hussein until Iraqi forces had vacated the sovereign territory of Kuwait. This refusal to negotiate is known as “bureaucratic rigidity” throughout academia (Holland, 1999). This dogmatic commitment to an issue,
which is a non-starter in negotiations, served to derail pre-war negotiations in this case as well as many other regional events as mentioned previously and that will be revisited.

In the run up to the air and ground operations from military forces, the United States had enjoyed a fifteen year policy of not jeopardizing U.S.-Iraqi relations by avoiding participation in inter-Arab conflicts (Holland, 1999). Instead the U.S. had played an offshore balancing power role by such actions as balancing Iraq and Iran against one another to maintain peace in the region by infusing each country with money, military hardware, and communication equipment. Due to this official U.S. policy, Washington and Baghdad had enjoyed a conciliatory relationship which served to bolster the stability of the region and the U.S. oil market. This is demonstrated by communications of April Glaspie, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, with the Iraqi government in which she said, “I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship…not it the spirit of confrontation regarding your intentions [with deploying Iraqi troops to the Kuwaiti border]” (Holland, 1999).

As a result of its permanent role on the U.N. Security Council and its humanitarian and economic aid initiatives with many of the nations involved, the United States took a leading and disproportionate role in coordinating the global response when Iraq invaded Kuwaiti territory compared to other member states of the United Nations. The United States was willing to assume such a role as its geo-economic, strategic, and commercial interests in the region were directly threatened by a destabilization of the area by the Iraqi invasion (Holland, 1999). While the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. moved for a United Nations Security Council resolution, U.S. bureaucratic forces at home slowed the response. This safeguard, which causes U.S. civil and military
leadership to coordinate on military operations, was and is in place to prevent U.S. politicians from going to war on a whim or for politically advantageous reasons. This system worked in 1990 and resulted in a stronger United States response to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict as part of a multinational force. At the end of the conflict Saddam Hussein remained in power, but was removed from Kuwait. It was counted as a success from the world community and U.S. leadership. The region remained relatively stable and the U.S. withdrew.

Turkey’s response to the impending invasion of Iraqi territory in 1990 was one of aiding the U.S. military action and imposing an embargo on Iraq with the closure of the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline. This came at a great cost to the Turkish government as Iraq was one of Turkey’s top trading partners (Makovsky, 1999). Much like the United States, the Iraqi conflict was a symptom of a changing foreign policy shift in a government facing increasing pressures from interest groups at home and a need to exert regional influence in the region. This action, although logical by a policy of foreign activism, caught many Turkish experts by surprise, as it was the first interventionist action taken by Turkey in a long time. However, the indications where there as Turkey doubled military expenditures to over 6 billion U.S. dollars annually during the decade that encapsulated the 1990 Gulf War. This strengthening came at a time when every other NATO nation with the exception of Greece decreased military budgets by at least twenty-five percent (Makovsky, 1999).

There exist three theories as to why Ankara departed from a traditional foreign policy of insularism into one of taboo adventurism into international and regional affairs. Two major issues that explain the Turkish action on this issue include the desire of the
Turkish regime to occupy once Turkish-controlled Northern provinces. This is highlighted by Prime Minister Ozal’s remarks which included, “This time we want to be at the table, not on the menu” (Makovsky, 1999). This is derived from Turkish concerns that occurred at the dissolution of the former British and French colonial influences at which point Turkey was left without the traditional territories which had been controlled into antiquity. The second issue was the influence of the United States and NATO membership. The invasion was spearheaded by U.S. military forces and Turkey was in need of U.S. support economically through cash and subsidized loans (Makovsky, 1999).

Thirdly, Kurdistan’s Workers Party (PKK) (terrorist organization as defined by Turkey) safe havens were located in Northern Iraq. This led to the desire of Turkey to have some influence over the shaping of Iraq especially in the North. Perhaps the most plausible explanation is some combination of the three ideas enumerated above which would lead to an expression of Turkey as an emerging power with increased military strength at home and abroad especially after the influence of Cold War enemy, Russia, was gone and its influence as a stabilizing power in the region (Makovsky, 1999).

There is no question that the Turkish joining of coalition forces was a break in long-standing foreign policy which had served Turkey well in keeping domestic peace by focusing on the development of a market-based economy at home as well as stabilizing the political climate among ethnic factions domestically. However, the joining of the coalition did not seem to be a singular occurrence. This is supported by President Ozal’s declaration at a press conference a year after Turkish involvement in military action within Iraq. He declared Turkey should “leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in active foreign policy” (Makovsky, 1999). These actions signaled a
departure, maybe permanently, from the policies which had led to the cultivation of a
democracy in the Arab world. This action was also an indication that Turkey was no
longer interested in the development of regional stability but rather increasing
partnerships with Western allies such as European superpowers and the United States.
The Turks began to realize a need for extended partnerships in trade and protection as the
dynamic within the region began to shift.

However, when the U.S. began preparation for the invasion of Iraq in 2003,
Turkey was no longer a “yes man” for its most influential Western ally. Public opinion
within Turkey had shifted and concerns about refugees, Kurdish autonomy, and concerns
about the legitimacy of American action. These concerns led to a harder bargain for U.S.
officials when they approached the Turkish government for support for military
operations focusing on a regime change in Baghdad. A price tag for involvement set at
20 to 24 billion U.S. dollars in loans and debt forgiveness was discussed (MacMillan,
2005). However, negotiations stalled pending elaboration of concerns expressed above
and the Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA) blocked the usage of the Turkish
border for an invasion of Iraq across its northern border.

Laying U.S. influence aside, Turkish officials chose to take a position more inline
with most of Europe as it opposed an American invasion of a U.N. member nation
without a resolution by the UNSC. Without such a resolution, Turkey viewed military
action in Iraq as illegal. President Sezer affirmed there would be no use of Turkish forces
without a UNSC resolution. This was further supported by public opinion among the
Turkish people being against a U.S. invasion (MacMillan, 2005).
Further concerns about Kurds in Turkey and Iraq were a source of major hesitation with Turkey. If there was a splitting of ethnic factions after the toppling of the Hussein regime, it was extremely likely that the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq would become autonomous and lead to a secession of the densely Kurdish Southeastern region of Turkey (MacMillan, 2005). This would be a nightmare scenario for Turkey as it would lead to problems domestically that would destabilize the national economy and the development of the maturing democracy. Terrorism was deeply engrained in the minds of Turkish leaders and not because the U.S. had waged a war on terror. Instead, it was caused by the classification of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization until there was a unilateral ceasefire in 2002 (MacMillan, 2005). With an influx of Kurdish refugees from Iraq, peace could be lost and the terrorist PKK could be revitalized and cause further problems including violence in the homeland. Even though the GNA would approve the use of Turkish troops in Iraq in November 2003, by that time the Iraqi National Council had rejected the use of Turkish soldiers in the Northern region of the country.

The hesitation of the Turkish government to commit to military action in Iraq signaled a shift back to the traditional foreign policy, which had been abandoned in the Gulf War in 1990. This policy was one of placing nationalistic interest and domestic development above the interest of foreign entities. This is exemplified by the bargaining for tens of billions of dollars for loans for economic development and fortification of the Turkish economy, which would outweigh negative implications caused by a foreign military intervention. This return to the nurturing of its democratic society has led to the further development of the stature of Turkey in the region.
The invasion of Iraq by U.S. military forces in 2003 under the guise of forcing compliance with international nuclear inspectors was later dismissed as a farce due to the lack of weapons of mass destruction. There is now wide consensus among political scholars that the original intent was nation building and the elimination of Saddam Hussein. However, faced with this reality, President George W. Bush said, “It wasn’t a mistake to go into Iraq. It was the right decision to make…We are in Iraq today because our goal has always been more than the removal of a brutal dictator; it is to leave a free and democratic Iraq in its place” (Layne, 2007). This was not a reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 2001 in the United States. This was a continuation of a U.S. global democratization plan in overdrive in the last decade of the twentieth century. The American government had attempted democratization in Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo with little success (Layne, 2007). This spanned both Republican and Democratic leaders in the White House eliminating accusations that hyper-democratization had gone beyond neoconservative principle and become more of an American value. With the evolution of the American democracy toward one of expansion and propagation, there came an increased investment in the principles of the Democratic Peace Theory (Byman, 2003).

However, lessons were not learned by leaders in Washington in the almost a half-dozen attempts at forming democracies around the globe in the last decade. Although the toppling of Hussein’s regime came quickly and relatively easily, it became increasingly apparent that the United States had not adequately accounted for how the situation in Iraq would play out (Byman, 2003). While there was not planning, there was a clearly defined goal of success: leaving a functioning democracy in Iraq (Feaver, 2011). The
mission would be exponentially hard due to the lack of criteria being met for Iraq to become a functioning democratic entity. Each of these criteria was developed by transitionologists and includes: a modern, market-based economy, absence of ethnic divisions, a vibrant civil society, and a culture hospitable to democratic development (Layne, 2007). Although Iraq is relatively wealthy due to tillable land and massive amounts of fossil fuels and has a large educated class, which was developed before Hussein ascended to power, Chris Sanders, a specialist on the Middle East, states, “There isn’t a society in Iraq to turn into a democracy” (Byman, 2003). A cursory reading of this quote would suggest that neither Turkish nor U.S. approaches would be successful if there is no field in which to plant the seeds of democracy. However, this concern is absolved once the Turkish approach leads to cooperation and the building of a society which models Turkey and uses its principles as a model. This is achieved through a positive view of Iraqis in relation to the Turkish society.

After the ouster of Hussein, the U.S. attention turned to an increasing insurgent threat and a rise in sectarian violence, which threatened the establishment of a democracy in Iraq. As a result, President Bush announced a surge of an additional thirty thousand U.S. troops for an accelerated training and transition mission on January 10, 2007 (Feaver, 2011). This was initiated by the belief that the mission could still be successful if the United States would stay the course and bear the burden of a lengthy mission while the democracy grew roots and began to mature (Byman, 2003). Iraq needed massive U.S. assistance due to interference by neighbors including Iran and a lack of democratic perspective by the native population (Byman, 2003). There was also a fear that Iraq would descend into civil war if the U.S. withdrew due to an ever-increasing insurgent
activity and pattern of sectarian violence. A U.S. withdrawal would lead to a destabilization and possible fragmentation of Iraq, which would be acquired by larger regional powers. If this occurred, the U.S. would have won the war but have lost the peace (Layne, 2007). While if the U.S. stayed the course, democracy could give factions a voice with Shi’a opposition leaders being controlled to prevent the majority from trampling the rights of the minorities’ rights (Byman, 2003).

To view the military invasion of Iraq as an isolated event is to take an overly simplistic view of U.S. interference in the Middle East. Officials in the Bush administration have spoken as to the larger worldview of those in power. Richard Perle, a top strategist, said, “Saddam’s replacement by a decent Iraqi regime would open the way to a far more stable and peaceful region.” This, when coupled by James Woosley’s (former CIA Director) words, “[A regime change in Iraq] could be a golden opportunity to begin to change the face of the Arab world.” It is highly important that all key components of DPT must be better understood before it can be effectively implemented. Some actors seem to have forgotten a major component of the Democratic Peace Theory is a transitional period. The establishment of a democracy is accompanied by an immediate destabilization that exists until the democracy matures – a period of years in most cases (Byman, 2003). This is prolonged in states in which ethnic divisions exist. Examples of this division and destabilization are shown in Azerbaijan-Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikstan (Byman, 2003).

Instead of persistent military involvement to force “modernization” of the Middle East, the United States would be well served by using the immense economic leverage the vast American economy can wield with regional partners to influence the region
(Layne, 2007). This would lead to a more civilian-controlled bureaucratic response as opposed to a military-dominated one. This process would be more gradual, slow, and allow for a more controlled transition in the Middle East region. Operation Iraqi Freedom tried to establish a democracy in Iraq, but we don’t know what the final chapter of this war will be. At least, perhaps, we can say that a path to a possible democratization has been established, but it is hard to predict what will happen in Iran in the near future. However, it is only functioning under an immense foreign military presence in order to control sectarian violence and insurgency. This is not the Iraq Washington had envisioned before the decision was made to invade the nation and topple the Hussein regime in 2003. It has become an experiment in unintended consequences due to the promotion of democracy at the tip of a sword.
Section IV: The Israeli Question

There is perhaps no more pertinent question when considering peace and cooperation in the Middle East than that of Israel and, particularly, the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. The creating of the nation of Israel in the Middle East following the conclusion of World War II has led to over a half century of tension, negotiation, and international interest and influence in the region. With the majority of the Arab world viewing Israel through varying lenses from acceptance, to tolerance, to outright hostility, the two nations of focus in this analysis are left in a unique position of maintaining regional influence and credibility while working with the government in Jerusalem and the Palestinian Authority to achieve a working and lasting peace initiative.

Turkey has long maintained diplomatic relations with Israel and has been a broker of peace in the Israeli-Palestinian question. This can be tracked to nearly the genesis of the nation of Israel. Turkey became the first Muslim country to recognize the legitimacy of Israel in 1949 (Walker, 2006). While Israel is a predominately Jewish state and most Turkish people having a religious orientation toward Islam, each are secular democracies who find extreme value in their respective relationships with the American government. While the value of the Turkish-Israeli relationship has often been secret or obscured by Israel and Turkey as a method of preserving the interests of each nation in the region, it has survived tumultuous times to become what it is today.

Beginning with the Cold War and its effect on relationships among nations in the Arab world, Turkey was under the umbrella of the NATO alliance and took a de facto positive view of relations with the ruling government in Jerusalem. It is of value to note
that while this was a favorable relationship, Ankara never gave Jerusalem ally status.

The United States played a dominant role in the relational development of the day as the superpower challenging the Soviet Union and providing military security for allied states in the region. The Turkish-Israeli relationship was enjoyed by each side until the 1970s.

After twenty years of U.S. influences Turkish-Israeli influenced cordial interaction, Turkey condemned Israel’s actions against Palestinians and began a period of voting with Arab nations in the United Nations (Walker, 2006). This was part of an effort by Turkey to strengthen its Arab ties as it moved to assert itself toward a regional power player. However, in traditional Turkish fashion, Ankara never fully severed ties with Jerusalem due to the interests of trade and the preservation of regional relationships. Diplomatic ties were simply moved from the front window to the back room by Jerusalem and Ankara. Diplomatic exchanges continued in secret for two decades before the run up to the Gulf War at the turn of the decade in 1990 (Walker, 2006).

Beginning in 1990, both Israel and Turkey re-subscribed to the principle of “shared otherness” that both countries shared (Walker, 2006). Shared otherness is the idea that Israeli and Turkey are united by their common realities which include being viewed as secular democracies in a region dominated by totalitarian Islamic states. This led to the opening of embassies in each nation as a show of a rapidly strengthening diplomatic relationship that was now on full display for all to see in the Arab world. In addition to this “common sense of otherness in the region (Walker, 2006),” each also shared a common threat perception from Islamic extremists, terrorist organizations, and regional neighbors (Walker, 2006). Since the 1991 Madrid Conference, Turkey has eagerly accepted its role as a neutral third party negotiator and mediator in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. Such an opportunity was afforded due to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the ruling Israeli government sharing a trust and general respect for the leadership in Ankara (Altunisik & Cuhadar, 2010).

Facing increasing pressure from Israel and the United States to take a position of “democratic role model” model in the Arab world, Turkey has continued a role of mediator despite tensions caused by the balancing of Hamas-Palestinian interests. This has led to tense exchanges between Ankara and Jerusalem as the latter has labeled Hamas a terrorist organization (Walker, 2006). Even though there have been numerous hiccups - - one of the most interesting being the popular election of devout Muslim Erdogan as Turkey’s Prime Minister in 2002 – the process to finding a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement has proceeded with Turkey at the helm. Turkey attempted to meet with the elected leadership of the PA, but was stopped by Israel because many of the elected officials’ ties were to Hamas.

As Erdogan has swept to power in Turkey and continues to gain immense popularity among its citizenry, he has insisted that Ankara cannot be a bystander in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as violence has once again become the normal circumstance (Walker, 2006). Prime Minister Erdogan has reiterated time and again that the successful reaching of a peace agreement between the PA and Jerusalem is the key to deeper relationships with Ankara. Erdogan’s insistence in involvement in negotiations is at odds with public opinion at home as the Turkish population strongly favors Palestine. Even as Turkish officials become increasingly involved in a mediating role between Israel and Palestine, domestic actions by Turkish civilians have complicated the issue (Altunisik & Cuhadar, 2010). This is best exemplified by the interception of a Turkish humanitarian
aid flotilla, which set sail to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza and the West Bank, which was intercepted by the Israeli navy. During the halting of the blockade-runners, the Israeli military killed nine Turkish civilians leading to Turkish public outcry at home (Walker, 2006). Despite complications, Erdogan’s Turkey has continued the active seeking of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

American relations, much like Turkish ones, with Israel have seen distant, cool times and close, almost intimate ones. However, unlike Turkey, the United States seems to have reached the peak of its influence in ongoing peace negotiations with Israel and Palestine. As Palestinian trust of the U.S. government has declined so has the ability of the Americans to serve as third party mediators (Zunes, 2001).

Beginning with the establishment of the Israeli state at the conclusion of World War II, U.S. Presidents have pledged unqualified support for the Jewish nation of six million that sits halfway across the globe. Israel is not a regional partner to the U.S. as it is with Turkey. It is instead an anchor, a democratic state in a sea of dictatorship and authoritarianism that dominates the Arab world. It is important to note that the assumption by the majority of American people that a treaty between the U.S. and Israel exists is false. There is not formal declaration of partnership between Washington and Jerusalem (Lewis, 1999). Instead, there is a major Jewish influence and donor base involved in American politics. When this is coupled with the Christian right’s Biblical view of a need for Jewish control of the Holy Land, it is then easy to deduce why American public opinion and, indeed, public policy so strongly favors this otherwise inconsequential nation half a world away. This is an evolved position of public policy. By looking at the strength of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, today, one might draw the
reasonable conclusion that this is how it has always been. Of course, this would be the simple answer, and simple answers are generally misguided, misinformed, or wrong.

The 1950s and 1960s saw an American government, which strongly desired Arab-Israeli peace and displayed policies, which favored a third party role in mediation. Indeed, no U.S. President would receive an Israeli Ambassador in Washington until Lyndon Baines Johnson occupied the White House (Lewis, 1999). This cool and distant relationship was the diplomatic norm until the 1960s began to fade into the 1970s.

1967 saw a United States that was ready to become more involved in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Israel (Lewis, 1999). By the time the Yom Kippur War occurred in 1973, the United States was beginning to deepen diplomatic relations with Jerusalem. Providing the carrot of security in a hostile Arab World, the U.S. began to leverage the Israelis into territory withdrawals and negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). This provided an excellent opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate its ability as third party negotiator. However, this opportunity was quickly sunk when the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, precluded negotiations with the PLO in 1975 as part of his Memo of Understanding (Lewis, 1999).

This exclusion of negotiation with the PLO continued until 1988 when the U.S. finally came to the table with the PLO in exchange for a commitment to seek peace with Israel. This set into motion an ever-increasing U.S. role in the peace process. President George H.W. Bush laid the groundwork for further strengthening and President Clinton hosted the famous Arafat-Rabin handshake at the U.S. Executive Mansion (Lewis, 1999). This is seen as the peak of U.S. success in the peace process.
In 1996, U.S. involvement became more intense when the PLO and Israel relationship became a violent one with increased suicide bombings (Lewis, 1999). As Ariel Sharon ascended to the leadership of the Israeli government, the United States reinforced its commitment to providing security for Israel from its Arab enemies. This was the beginning of the end for U.S. viability in the peace process. While the U.S. has committed to protection of Israel, the backing of Sharon’s government endangers Israel and is counter to the policy established by the U.S. government. This, when viewed in the scope of Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton calling UNSC resolutions calling for peace and establishing specific withdrawal criterion invalid – giving Palestinians virtually no negotiating power --, can be judged as a one hundred eighty degree reversal of the policy of Washington related to the peace process (Zunes, 2001). Further degradation to negotiating power has been achieved by the U.S. military engagement – often described as a “raping” in Arab media – in Iraq (Ben-Meir, 2009).

You can see this cannot be blamed on neoconservative American politicians as members of the U.S. Democratic Party tend to do, but it is an American policy, generally embraced by both parties at the time action was taken. This is highlighted by both Democratic and Republican controlled Congresses refusing to tie Israeli humanitarian and military aid to adherence to international law, human rights standards, and the making of peace (Zunes, 2001).

As a result of this lack of commitment to the advancement of the human condition on behalf of the U.S. government, leaders in Washington have abandoned years of peace and peacemaking for support of Israeli forces to occupy portions of the West Bank and Gaza for settlement (Zunes, 2001). This view, shared by many states in the Arab world
and others around the globe, has led to the lost of the respect of the United States negotiating position in the eyes of Palestinians who see the American government as a nation married to Israel and its policies. This is shown by the failure of the U.S. government to recognize the elected leadership of the PA due to most of the officials’ ties being to Hamas.

The American position and opportunity has not completely evaporated. President Obama has a chance to revive American respect in the region. However, he must be willing to take an active role with all sides. However, this could be hard when one considers this means recognizing Hamas – a group labeled as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government – as legitimate enough so as to negotiate. Above all, the current U.S. President cannot coddle Israel as previous administrations have done (Ben-Meir, 2009). However, if there is even an appearance of favoritism toward Israel, the American position may be sunk permanently.
Section V: Conclusions

The United States and Turkey have reacted differently to each situation described in the preceding pages. Each nation has achieved specifically different results. However, there are thematic elements and results that can be discerned. The trend in Middle East relations is one of a degrading of respect for the United States and a growing distrust of the American government as seen in Figure one below and demonstrated in the May 17, 2011 report of the Pew Research Institute entitled *Arab Spring Fails to Improve U.S. Image* (Arab spring fails, 2011). This distrust is a direct result of the way U.S. involvement is handled when crises arise or are ongoing in the Middle East region.

Figure 1: Views of the United States

Pew Research Center collected data March 21 – April 26, 2011. For each category \(n \geq 825\) and margin of error is between 3% and 5%. Information collected through face to face interviews. Graphic courtesy of Pew Research Center.

Turkey, on the other hand, has seen a growing reputation in the region as a “go to” nation in the event of a regional crisis. Perhaps the most important reason for this is Erdogan’s willingness to break lockstep with Washington. This is exemplified in the
situations described in the preceding pages. This Arab democracy has taken a leadership role in the region while keeping domestic interests and national issues at the forefront of policy decisions. Turkey’s favorability in the region has soared and is at high levels, currently. This is shown in polls of the Arab world regarding Turkey and its leader, Prime Minister Erdogan. These marks are shown in Figures 2 and 3 as published by the Pew Research Center in June 2011 (“On eve of,” 2011).

*Figure 2: Confidence in Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>A lot/Some confidence</th>
<th>Not too much/No confidence</th>
<th>DK/Refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palest. ter.</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Graphic courtesy of Pew Research Center. Number of participants for each nation is greater than 750 (n≥750). The margin of error is less than or equal to 4.5%. Information collected by telephone or face to face interview.)
For each nation, it is important to note that neither nation created the situation they are currently in overnight. Contemporary ideologies and policies in the Middle East are dependent upon the evolution of thought and action that has taken place since the Cold War. Relationships formed during this period have formed the basic groundwork for the issues and relationships that are observable in the Arab World, today.

The United States has a rigid foreign policy that is based on key demands. This is seen time and again throughout this review including: a zero enrichment policy regarding Iran’s nuclear development strategy, a “for us or against us” policy in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a threatening posture assumed by the U.S. military, a flat out refusal to negotiate with Saddam Hussein until Iraqi forces had vacated Kuwait, a refusal to negotiate on weapons inspectors in Iraq in 2003, a full scale
military assault to topple Saddam Hussein the same year, unqualified support for Israel regardless of human rights record or violations of international law, and a refusal to negotiate with groups which have been blacklisted as terrorist organizations. This policy has been the genesis for the lack of direct negotiation between Tehran and Washington regarding nuclear development in the region, two invasions of Iraq over a decade period, and the breakdown of the American role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. In short, the dogmatic principles of the U.S. government to make certain issues a prerequisite for negotiation has cost American dollars, American lives, and, most importantly, the American reputation among several Arab states.

As the U.S. takes on democracy promotion in the region, having established two fledgling, volatile and highly unpredictable democracies (in transition) in Iraq and Afghanistan, there exist real questions as to whether democracy promoting strategies works in the manner the U.S. has attempted. If it does not, the U.S. foreign policy needs to be revisited and American democracy promotion policies will be re-evaluated. While mature democracies tend to subscribe to the basic tenant of non-violence against other democracies as described in the Democratic Peace Theory, there is no account for a young democracy. When a regime is forcibly removed, nations are temporarily thrown into a state of chaos due to a sudden upheaval in governance. This leads to the establishment of a new government often assembled hastily. The situation is further complicated when two or more traditionally ethnically divided populations occupy the same nation – as is the case in many Arab nations.

The severe impediment to democratic success in the Middle East is rooted in geography and ideology. Unlike Turkey, which enjoys a position straddling two
continents and a Muslim heritage, the United States is located half a world away and contains a majority Christian population. Turkey simply has a better footing on which to begin than the American government. While the U.S. and Turkey both look out for national interest in foreign policy, Turkey’s concerns are, to some extent, the region’s concerns while U.S. involvement is generally viewed as meddling and interference.

This, coupled with a hesitant, cautious, calculated, and overtly nationalistic foreign and domestic policies of Turkey, has provided an opportunity for Turkey to take a trusted leadership role in the Middle East. This is demonstrated in Ankara’s preservation of a working relationship with Tehran, a limited role in the Gulf War, minimal to no involvement in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 except for the preservation of national interests, and the growing commitment to and involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Turkey has evolved to take an international role more readily than its traditional policies once allowed, but these are generally only after they have invited to do so by directly involved parties.

This commitment to the preservation of domestic stability and the promotion of regional calm has led to Turkey becoming a much more effective promoter of peace and democratic values in the region. Just as individuals are more likely to listen to those they have come to know and respect, nations desire to enter into relationships with nations who have demonstrated a commitment to clearly defined values. Even when vast cultural divisions have existed as in the case of Israel and Turkey or when there have been severe national security and economic concerns as in the case with relations with Iran, Turkey has prevailed as a figure of respect and modeling in the region. Turkey has become the
shining example that a nation can have productive relationships with the West, Middle East, and East that benefit all economically and otherwise.

Using the current state of affairs for the United States and Turkey as comparative examples, it is clear that a flexible foreign policy, a commitment to negotiation above all else, and cautious, deliberate action have served the Republic of Turkey much better than the policies of bureaucratic rigidity have served the United States of America. As the U.S. works to rebuild its reputation in the Arab World, Turkey is enjoying the fruits of regional partnerships, domestic stability, and international trade. As a result of these varying outcomes, Turkey now serves as a regional role model for democracy and a beacon of light by which democracy can be shone into the Middle East. As it turns out, you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar or, as in this case, you build more stable democracies and climates suitable to democracy with inclusion rather than exclusion.


