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The Words of War: A Content Analysis of Republican Presidential Speeches from Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Richard M. Nixon, George W. Bush, and Donald J. Trump

A thesis

presented to

the faculty of the Department of Media and Communication

East Tennessee State University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts in Brand and Media Strategy

by

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May 2018

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Keywords: Political Communication, Content Analysis, Framing Theory, Agenda Setting Theory

ABSTRACT

The Words of War: A Content Analysis of Republican Presidential Speeches from Dwight D.

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In this analysis of public speeches from four American presidents from the Republican party, the ways in which those presidents discuss and position American defense activities and stances are examined, to track the progression from the 1960s to the present. Presidents from one party were chosen, who presided over a period of active armed conflict or cold war. The addresses analyzed comprised public addresses to Congress or the American people. The analysis groups recurring frames--conceptually developed based on framing and agenda setting theories--into thematic categories for each president. Some frames were more salient for certain presidents than for others. Other frames were common and pervaded the presidents' remarks to Congress and the public. America's struggle against a faceless enemy, American military might as a guarantor of, and the importance of the United States' commitments to its international partners were all prevailing frames which emerged in the analysis.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all those whose unwavering support has seen me through to academic milestones I feared would never be, and without whom those milestones surely never would have been.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To the entire faculty of the Department of Media and Communications—past and present—I extend my most sincere gratitude. Their instruction and guidance over the past six years have been invaluable and culminated in this work.

To the office staff of the Department of Media and Communication I express deep thanks; the minutiae of administrative tasks and paperwork for an entire graduate cohort is surely a massive job.

To Drs. Melanie Richards, Andrew Dunn, and Stephen Marshall I extend a great gratitude for comprising the committee tasked with reviewing this work.

I would like to express special thanks to Dr. Andrew Dunn, whose guidance as my adviser for this work has proven instrumental in its completion.

Great thanks are due to my cohort in the Brand and Media Strategy program, whose companionship has surely made the last two years exponentially easier.

To my fiancée, Hannah, I give deep thanks. Her support, encouragement, and commiseration have been the cure for every ailment inherent in this process.

To the taxpaying citizens of these United States, to whom I owe a great debt, both emotionally and financially, I extend my thanks. Their contributions have allowed me to pursue my academic aspirations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
DEDICATION	4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	5
Chapter	
1. INTRODUCTION	9
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	12
Relevant Theoretical Framework	12
Agenda Setting Effects	12
Framing Effects	14
Rhetoric	18
Political rhetoric	19
3. METHODS	22
Grounded Theory Method	22
Examined Addresses	23
Thematic Coding	24
Difficulties	24
4. FINDINGS	27
Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1953-1961	27
Military Readiness	27

Peace.....	31
Commitment to Allies	34
The Cost of Defense	38
Nuclear Weapons.....	41
Communism as an Enemy	44
The Nixon Doctrine	46
A Lasting Peace	50
Peace Negotiations	54
George W. Bush: 2001-2009.....	58
The War on Terror.....	59
Weapons of Mass Destruction.....	64
Sowing Democracy.....	69
American Commitments Abroad.....	72
Donald J. Trump: 2017-Present	76
5. DISCUSSION.....	81
Research Question 1	81
A Better World	81
A Great Enemy	82
A Firm Friend.....	83
Research Question 2.....	85

Eisenhower’s Just Peace.....	85
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction.....	86
Democracy.....	87
Research Question 3.....	88
Brutal Language	88
Research Question 4.....	89
6. CONCLUSION.....	90
REFERENCES	92
APPENDICES	103
Appendix A: List of Presidential Addresses Analyzed.....	103
Appendix B: A Note on Richard Nixon’s Speeches	105
Appendix C: Dwight D. Eisenhower Thematic Rubric.....	107
Appendix D: Richard M. Nixon Thematic Rubric.....	108
Appendix E: George W. Bush Thematic Rubric.....	109
Appendix F: Donald J. Trump Thematic Rubric.....	110
VITA.....	111

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In July 2017, fewer than six months into his first year as president, in an ABC News and Washington Post poll, 70 percent of respondents indicated that they found President Donald Trump's actions unpresidential (Langer, 2017). In August of 2017, Trump twice threatened to meet North Korea's nuclear ambitions with "fire and fury" (Hennigan, Cloud, & Bierman, 2017, para. 1), leading the Los Angeles times to proclaim that the president was using "bellicose rhetoric usually associated with the rulers in Pyongyang" (Hennigan, Cloud, & Bierman, 2017, para. 1). Descriptors such as "unpresidential" and "bellicose" are strong, unequivocal terms by which to describe a world leader. Trump, however, is not alone in these dubious distinctions.

Trump's Republican predecessor, George W. Bush garnered the same label (Blair, 2008; Napoleoni, 2003), even admitting himself that he had spoken too brashly about the war in Iraq (Blair, 2008). Other Republican presidents presiding over armed conflict have received the same treatment. Nixon was accused of playing a "death game" (Greenberg, 2004, p. 91) and was referred to as a "war criminal" (Greenberg, 2004, p. 91). Even Conservative hero Dwight D. Eisenhower does not escape the label of warmonger, even though he is traditionally seen as a stabilizing and moderating presence in Republican foreign policy (Broadhead, 2009).

What then, is the reality? What is the truth of how these presidents—four men of the same office, from the same party, from the same wartime circumstances—speak about war? Is the "fire and fury" rhetoric of Donald Trump the normal state of Republican defense discussions? I designed this study to examine the frames and contexts in which American presidents—specifically modern Republican presidents—discuss the country's defense situation, and to track the progression and divergence of those messages. The messaging that the president and his

speechwriters craft regarding one of the most fundamental components of governance at the federal level is a fascinating area of study, with no shortage of source material. The words used, the phrases repeated and reiterated throughout the whole of an eight-year presidency, and the larger, macro-level frames presented across an enormous corpus of presidential addresses can illuminate a great deal about how a country—and in this case a single political party—thinks about its defense.

In 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized the obfuscation and careful crafting involved in talking about security and defense issues. The way we talk, the words we use, and the frames into which we place our discussions of fundamental issues, Eisenhower said, matter:

We live, moreover, in a sea of semantic disorder in which old labels no longer faithfully describe. Police states are called "people's democracies." Armed conquest of free people is called "liberation." Such slippery slogans make more difficult the problem of communicating true faith, facts, and beliefs. We must make clear our peaceful intentions, our aspirations for better principles. So doing, we must use language to enlighten the mind, not as the instrument of the studied innuendo and distorter of truth. And we must live by what we say. (2018f)

While studying presidential speeches is an intrinsically political undertaking—simply by virtue of studying an innately political subject—this study was not intended to reveal truths of American political life, advocate or oppose policy positions, or lionize or vilify any president, party, or ideology. This study was designed to discover the frames that four American presidents from the same party use to talk about the way the United States conducts war, pursues peace, protects its territories and interests, and positions itself in matters of grave importance to the whole of humanity. This study was also not designed to be an exposition of military history or

the history of American foreign policy. While the subject matter is inherently historical, this study was intended to discover thematic patterns—if there were any to discover.

The primary question at hand is this: How has the Republican discussion and framing of American war making evolved, if indeed it has at all? This analysis, then, concerns the following research questions:

RQ1: Are there common frames which Republican presidents use to discuss the defense activities of the United States?

RQ2: Are there frames which Republican presidents use to discuss defense which are prevalent in the addresses of some presidents, but less salient in the addresses of other presidents?

RQ3: Do certain frames decrease or increase in prevalence over time?

RQ4: Is Donald Trump's approach to defense discussions in his national addresses typical of modern wartime Republican presidents?

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Relevant Theoretical Framework

Agenda Setting Effects

Built upon the notion that the public's access to a set of issues or ideas controls the salience of that issue in the public agenda (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009), agenda setting theory has its roots in the 1920s work of Walter Lippmann, though he did not use that language to describe what he observed. Lippmann (1922/1997) theorized that rather than responding to the true reality of the environment, public opinion responded to the environment created by the news media. Lippmann asserted that one's perceptions of events and circumstances are controlled by the images of things they form in their minds:

We shall assume that what each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him.... The way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do.... It determines their effort, their feelings, their hopes, . (Lippmann, 1922/1997, p. 16)

In 1972, McCombs and Shaw (as cited in McCombs & Reynolds, 2009) hypothesized that the media coverage of an issue directly controlled that issue's salience in the public agenda:

Their central hypothesis was that the mass media set the agenda of issues for a political campaign by influencing the salience of issues among voters. Those issues emphasized in the news come to be regarded over time by members of the public. McCombs and Shaw called this hypothesized influence agenda setting. (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009, p. 2)

Brosius and Kepplinger's 1990 study of German media coverage of public issues demonstrates the effect that agenda setting can have. Analyzing news coverage of five public issues in 1986, Brosius and Kepplinger noted that the coverage had an effect on the public's opinion on the issues. The pair also noted that as news coverage of one issue in particular, the country's energy supply increased sharply in May, the salience of that issue in the public agenda increased as well (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1990). As the news coverage declined, so too did the salience of the issue in the public agenda.

McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver (1997) describe a two-level approach to agenda setting theory. The first level is the agenda of objects, with the object satisfying the position of the policy, issue, or other communication at hand. McCombs et al. (1997) note that as objects inherently have attributes, there must be a second layer of the agenda. Thus, agenda-setting theory is divided into two related levels: the agenda of objects and the agenda of attributes. It is this agenda of attributes, this second layer, which is the primary concern of this analysis.

The agenda setting process as McCombs et al. (1997) describe it functions with traditional agenda setting characteristics at the top—that is, the salience of issues themselves. What comes next in the agenda setting hierarchy, this agenda of attributes, describes the salience of the characteristics of the issue at hand. And here we see the formation of the notion of framing (McCombs et al., 1997). The line between agenda setting and framing effects, however, is not well defined:

Explication of attribute agenda setting also links the theory with the concept of framing. Both framing and attribute agenda setting call attention to the perspectives used by communicators and their audiences to picture topics on the daily news. However, because

of the large number of definitions for framing, comparisons of the two approaches range from substantial overlap to total dissimilarity. (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009, p. 7)

Framing Effects

In the view of some, including McCombs et al. (1997), the notion of framing is simply the second-level of the agenda setting process:

The core theoretical idea is the same for agendas of attributes as it is for agendas of objects: The salience of elements, objects or attributes, on the media agenda influences the salience influences the salience of those elements on the public agenda.... At the first level of agenda setting are agendas of objects.... At the second level of agenda setting are agendas of attributes. (McCombs et al., 1997, p. x)

Much of the research on framing jumps between seeing framing as a subset of agenda setting and being considered its own discreet field of study (Maher, 2001; Scheufele, 1999; Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009) The scholarship on the issue has yet to come to a firm consensus on whether the two are separate views of the same approach, or their own areas, each worthy of its own research.

Much of the work of deciphering the basis of how framing functions is based on the work of Erving Goffman (1974), who claimed that people build broad schema by which to interpret information, called “primary frameworks” (p. 24). It is these categorizations, these frameworks that form the bedrock of framing theory. Much of our communication is marked by different presentations, geared toward these specific frameworks, in order to influence a desired interpretation (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009).

Framing theory rests on the notion that an issue can be received and interpreted in different ways by different audiences, depending on the way in which the information is presented (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Entman (1993) describes framing as a matter of controlling the salience of certain issues in a message, saying that “to frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). Framing can also be seen as placing information into “interpretive packages” (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009, p. 22) or sets of schema by which related concepts may be grouped together. Frames guide the recipients of the message toward the communicator’s desired interpretation: “At their most powerful, frames invite people to think about an issue in particular ways” (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009, p. 19).

Gamson and Modigliani (as cited in Gross, 2008) note that a frame is “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events weaving connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (Gross, 2008, p. 170). The frames by which issues are presented have a marked effect on shaping opinions on related issues (Gross, 2008). Framing is, in essence, placing information into a specific and carefully chosen context “so that certain elements of the issue get a greater allocation of an individual's cognitive resources” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 57)

The emphasis framing effect, described by Druckman (2001), will be useful to keep in mind while engaging the findings of this study. Druckman describes the effect this way:

[Emphasis framing] shows that by emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker can lead individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions. For example, when a candidate frames a campaign in

economic terms, it may cause voters to evaluate candidates based on their economic policies. (2001, p. 230)

This seems to echo Entman's (1993) assertion that the root of framing is the process of emphasizing the salience of some information in order to steer the perception of the issue toward a desired interpretation. This is also displayed in the concept of "reference dependency," born from the work of Kahneman and Tversky (as cited in Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). Reference dependency "assumes that a given piece of information will be interpreted differently, depending on which interpretive schema an individual applies" (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009, p. 18).

Emphasis framing in the context of political messaging— significant for the purposes of this study—said Borah, "usually refers to 'characterizations' of a course of action where a central idea provides meaning to the event" (2011, p. 248)

In her study of episodic and thematic framing, which built upon Iyengar's 1991 work, Gross (2008) explains the distinction between the two, a distinction that will be important to note when reading this analysis. She notes:

Episodic frames present an issue by offering a specific example, case study, or event oriented report (e.g., covering unemployment by presenting a story on the plight of a particular unemployed person). Thematic frames, on the other hand, place issues into a broader context (e.g., covering unemployment by reporting on the latest unemployment figures and offering commentary by economists or public officials on the impact of the economy on unemployment). (p. 171)

As will be discussed later, the wide majority of the discussions of defense issues taken on by the presidential speeches analyzed in this study follow a thematic framing construct. Each

president discusses American defense activities within the constructs of fighting for peace and democracy, disarming nuclear regimes, and standing together with allies. Notably, however, Nixon and Bush relate stories of individual soldiers and Marines in their speeches.

Research by Gross (2008) suggests that these episodic frames—as opposed to the broader thematic frames—were likely to have been more effective at eliciting emotional response. Episodic frames, in general, tend to lead to little change in opinion, Gross (2008) found—unless the episodic anecdote is particularly compelling:

Episodic frames appear to minimize attitude change by focusing on individual rather than societal forces (Iyengar, 1991). However, episodic frames can actually increase persuasion if the individual’s story is compelling enough to generate intense emotional reactions from a significant portion of the audience. (p. 184)

In the context of political communication, Jacoby (2000) notes that political elites—presidents, for example—have a great deal of control over the frames used to present issues, and therefore a pronounced effect on the perception of the issues at hand by the intended audience:

But issues arise from complex problems that are separate and remote from the direct experiences of most citizens (Cobb & Elder, 1983). Therefore, information about these problems must be communicated to and at least partially interpreted for the public, before an issue can truly be said to exist in the first place. Political elites usually have quite a bit of latitude in defining policy issues for the mass public. Therefore, they do so in ways that shine the best possible light on their own preferred courses of action. (p. 751)

Rhetoric

The elites Jacoby (2000) speaks of have powerful influence over the dissemination and presentation of information and can, as Jacoby notes, alter that presentation as they see fit to suit their interests. Vatz (1973) notes a similar idea, asserting that rhetoric is powerless absent the meaning assigned to it by the speaker:

Fortunately, or unfortunately, meaning is not intrinsic in events, facts, people, or "situations" nor are facts "publicly observable." Except for those situations which directly confront our own empirical reality, we learn of facts and events through someone's communicating them to us. (p. 156)

Vatz (1973) also notes that "No situation can have a nature independent of the perception of its interpreter or independent of the rhetoric with which he chooses to characterize it". The speaker, Vatz, said, chooses the meaning for the listener: "Any [speaker] is involved in this sifting and choosing, whether it be the newspaper editor choosing front-page stories versus comic-page stories or the speaker highlighting facts about a person in a eulogy" (p. 156), It is, Vatz said, at the pleasure of the speaker that meaning is granted to a delivered message:

We have "leaders" or "bosses," "organizations" or "machines," and "education" or "propaganda" not according to the situation's reality, but according to the rhetor's arbitrary choice of Characterization. No theory of the relationship between situations and rhetoric can neglect to take account of the initial linguistic depiction of the situation. (p. 157)

Vatz makes it clear, then, that akin to framing theory, the way that the speaker chooses to relay the information at hand has a great deal to do with how the information is intended to be received, processed, and acted upon by the audience.

Political rhetoric

Where political rhetoric is concerned, the concept of political rhetorical coercion is introduced (Krebs & Jackson, 2007). This coercion model essentially states that rather than simply rely on the inherent efficacy of a claimant's argument, the claimant attempts to remove the basis by which an opponent may craft a reasonable and socially acceptable rebuttal. While presented by Krebs and Jackson as a contest between a claimant and an opposition, coercion's component parts—framing and implications—play a major role in the following study. The presidents included in this analysis function inside this model as the claimant, pitted against what in this case is a nebulous opposition: public opinion about the defense policies of the United States. These presidents and their administrations repeatedly lay out their vision for defense policies and proceed to argue cases for why the public ought to readily accept that characterization.

Cohen (1995) also studied the effects of a politically-inclined claimant—the President of the United States, in this case—on the perceptions of issues by the audience. Presidents, Cohen notes, have an effect on the public's policy agenda: “By controlling the agenda, the president may secure success with Congress. He may be able to keep issues that he dislikes from the agenda, while advancing those that he favors” (Cohen, 1995, p. 88). Cohen also notes that the public is primed, by virtue of the influence of his position, to accept presidential leadership on policy issues, making the demands exacted upon his rhetorical performance less than they otherwise may be.

In his study Cohen (1995) operates from the assumption that “presidents give greater space to those policy areas that are more important to them” (p. 91). Presidents must contend for public attention in an environment in which the public already pay very little attention to politics (Cohen, 1995). So rhetoric for its own art will not be an effective tool. Much like the burden incumbent upon the claimant in the rhetorical coercion model (Krebs & Jackson, 2007), Cohen (1995) asserts that substantive cases must be made for the president’s policy decisions. By having to provide reasoning for his policy positions, the president is forced to spend extra time on concepts and policies, which increases their salience.

Cohen’s (1995) work clearly displays that the president’s attention to an issue, particularly within his State of the Union addresses does, in fact, increase the salience of that issue in the public policy agenda. And while substantive discussion of a particular policy point is important, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary to trigger public policy agenda effects: “The president does not have to convince the public that a policy problem is important by offering substantive positions. Merely mentioning a problem to the public heightens public concern with the policy problem” (Cohen, 1995, p. 102).

It should be noted, too, that Cohen’s (1995) findings echo those of previous studies; presidential effect on public policy agenda is fleeting. Of note, however is the one policy area in which Cohen found that this effect was not present: foreign policy. While presidential influence in other areas of public policy waxed and waned, the president’s effect on the salience of foreign policy—including defense concerns—was longer lasting (Cohen, 1995).

Not only can presidents influence the public policy agenda with their speeches, some research has found that presidents do not have full control over their policy issues; sometimes

those policy issues control the president. In a counterpoint to Cohen's research, Ragsdale found that:

...even with the effects of speechmaking, it is plain that presidents cannot talk their way out of short-term and long-term political problems facing the nation. Presidents' popularity among the groups significantly declines with difficulties in the economy, negative events, disintegrating wars and scandals. In addition, they also benefit from positive events and favorable economic news with which they may or may not have had anything to do. (Ragsdale, 1987, p. 732)

General rhetorical research (Vatz, 1973) as well as more focused political rhetorical research (Cohen, 1995; Hill, 1998; Jacoby, 2000; Krebs & Jackson, 2007; Ragsdale, 1987) has found that speakers—and in a more narrowly-tailored sense, presidents—have an effect on the salience of issues based on how they present those issues.

CHAPTER 3

METHODS

This study examined the prepared and delivered remarks of four Republican presidents of the United States regarding the country's defense positioning. The criteria by which the subjects were selected is as follows: presidents were chosen who had presided over protracted armed conflict or a period of cold war, and, to track the progression of one party's rhetoric surrounding United States defense policies, the subjects were limited to presidents from the Republican Party. Thus, the subjects chosen were Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard M. Nixon, George W. Bush, and Donald J. Trump.

Grounded Theory Method

This analysis was carried out using the Grounded Theory Method (Heath & Cowley, 2004) Specifically, this analysis was performed in the tradition of the inductive branch of Grounded Theory Method espoused by Glaser, in which constant comparison of the data allows theory to emerge from the data and fade away, rather than entering the research with fully-formed theories: "it must be emphasized that integration of the theory is best when it emerges, like the concepts. The theory should never just be put together" (Glaser & Strauss, as cited in Heath & Crowley, p. 146). Heath and Crowley (2004) note that "the endless possibilities allow the theory to be discovered rather than constructed around a predetermined framework. Rather than demanding details, parsimony, scope and modifiability are stressed" (Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 147). This method of grounded theory places emphasis on the emergence of concepts and theory from the body of the data, rather than a predetermined boy of theories.

Examined Addresses

To give the study as much consistency as possible, the speeches chosen for analysis were restricted to public speeches to both houses of Congress or to public addresses to the American people. Thus, speeches included in the analysis are inaugural addresses, State of the Union addresses, Addresses to Joint Sessions of Congress—which sometimes take the place of the State of the Union address in a president’s first year in office—and farewell addresses.

In the case of Richard Nixon’s presidency, a wildly unpredictable mixture exists of written and public messages, and separate defense-related messages supplementing a dearth of defense discussion in annual State of the Union addresses (see Appendix B.) As such, in Nixon’s case, for years in which he gave a State of the Union speech to a joint session, and that speech included defense-related discussion, that speech has been included in the analysis. The supplemental addresses given to inform the public of the state of the war in Vietnam have also been analyzed. Written messages and reports to congress were not included as this is an analysis of presidential speeches.

Given the above criteria, the addresses chosen for analysis in this study are as follows (see also Appendix A): Dwight D. Eisenhower’s first and second inaugural addresses, nine State of the Union addresses, and farewell address; Richard M. Nixon’s first and second inaugural addresses, three State of the Union addresses, and six other addresses to the nation regarding the state of the war in Vietnam; George W. Bush’s first and second inaugural addresses, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, seven State of the Union addresses, and farewell address; and Donald J. Trump’s inaugural address, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, and the 2018 State of the Union address.

Transcripts of these speeches were copied from the University of Virginia's Miller Center and the University of California at Santa Barbara's American Presidency Project. The copied transcripts were converted to text documents and compiled for each president. Each president's collection of addresses was read and examined for recurring frames surrounding the United States' defense actions and policies. Passages containing identified persistent frames were highlighted and marked with a shorthand code (see Appendix B) to designate which frame or frames the passage contained. Across the whole of a president's material, occurrences of frames were totaled to discover the prevalence of frames across the addresses.

Thematic Coding

After examining each president's addresses for recurring thematic elements, the totals of those frames were compared to determine which frames were common to all presidents contained in the analysis, and which frames were specific to a single president. It will be useful to note that the tallies referenced later in the paper and listed in the appendices do not equate to simple keyword counts. The frames identified in this study encompass broader concepts as opposed to keywords, and thus a single frame may contain several keywords underneath its umbrella; a brief description of what is contained in each thematic category appears in Appendix C. The numbers referenced, unless explicitly noted as a keyword count, reference the number of larger passages which concern the frame referenced.

Difficulties

A persistent difficulty during this study has been disentangling the concepts of foreign policy and defense. While very closely related, this study is intended to discover how modern Republican presidents have discussed matters of defense, specifically. Undoubtedly, in some instances, the two concepts have become conflated. I have, however, attempted to focus as

closely as possible on references—both explicit and implicit—to the United States’ defense situation, as it regards external and internal threats to the nation, preparedness for military action, actual armed conflict, and other prevailing themes regarding the United States’ defense.

For example, Eisenhower frequently discussed the theme of communism as the enemy of peace: “The calculated pressures of aggressive communism have forced us, instead, to live in a world of turmoil,” Eisenhower said (2018b). Eisenhower also spoke of Communism as a threat both internally and externally, concerning himself with “Communist aggression from without or subversion within” (The American Presidency Project, 2018b). Both Eisenhower and Nixon frame global communism as a threat to the safety, security, and stability of not only the United States, but the world, and thus incompatible with peace.

Eisenhower went so far in 1958 as to cast away all doubt as to his belief that Communism was the greatest threat to American and world safety and stability (Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union). Thus, there are myriad instances in which the frame of “Communism as an enemy” is categorized as a defense concern, rather than simply a public policy or foreign policy concern for the purposes of this study.

At the same time, in the same State of the Union address (2018d), Eisenhower frames communism’s evil as not simply a defense issue, but an economic issue, saying that the Soviets were waging economic war against the United States. While presenting communism as the enemy, just as above, Eisenhower’s frame in this instance is more closely related to economic policy and foreign relations, rather than being a primarily defense-related concern. As such, those passages have been exempted from this analysis of defense issues.

Many such subjective categorizations have been made during this study and are representative of the relatively subjective nature of qualitative content analysis. Direct quotations and contextual information are provided for instances in which the identified presence of a frame could be questioned regarding its proper characterization as a defense issue as opposed to a foreign policy issue.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1953-1961

Military Readiness

Eisenhower speaks both early and often of the need for America to be prepared for military action to ensure American safety. In the first of his addresses to the American people, his 1953 inaugural address, Eisenhower states that a ready military is a high calling for the nation, appealing to the national pride saying, “Patriotism means equipped forces and a prepared citizenry.” He sets the tone for a constant discussion of what emerges as his most prevalent frame. Across all of Eisenhower’s addresses subject to analysis for this study, military readiness is the most predominant frame. Across his addresses, there are 48 references that illuminate Eisenhower’s preoccupation with the state of preparedness of the American military. Some of those passages, as in his 1958 State of the Union Address, span the entire middle portion of the address.

In a telling passage in his farewell address, Eisenhower recalls the worrying state of ad hoc mustering of might in which the American military found itself at the outset of the second world war, and lays out a proud contrast between that position of disarray and the grand state of the American defense establishment in his final days:

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense

establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations. (2018k)

He claimed that even the very success of the peace efforts ongoing in the Korean peninsula as Eisenhower's administration began hinged on that same readiness to fight, saying "Our labor for peace in Korea and in the world imperatively demands the maintenance by the United States of a strong fighting service ready for any contingency" (The American Presidency Project, 2018b). A year later in his second State of the Union address, that concept is reiterated with Eisenhower declaring "We are prepared to meet any renewal of armed aggression in Korea" (2018h).

Eisenhower's discussion of the importance of military readiness across all the examined addresses is framed most predominantly as a matter of deterrence rather than a means of first-strike aggression. In the 1953 inaugural address, Eisenhower states that developing the ability to dissuade aggressors and thereby avoid war, by sheer presence of a powerful retaliatory force, will be his new administration's first task:

Abhorring war as a chosen way to balk the purposes of those who threaten us, we hold it to be the first task of statesmanship to develop the strength that will deter the forces of aggression and promote the conditions of peace. (The American Presidency Project, 2018l)

In 1954, Eisenhower again states America's intent to be powerfully prepared, if only for the sake of avoiding war: "...we maintain powerful military forces because there is no present alternative--forces designed for deterrent and defensive purposes alone but able instantly to strike

back with destructive power in response to an attack” (Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union).

As will be discussed further in the examination of Eisenhower’s thematic discussions of peace, he is always quick to note that the countries of the world need not be afraid of the new president’s insistence that America’s military capabilities be shored up and ready at all times. Prolifically, Eisenhower discusses military readiness in this way. In 1954 (Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union), Eisenhower both boasts of America’s rising military might and attempts to assuage the potential fears of the world of American aggression:

As we enter this new year, our military power continues to grow. This power is for our own defense and to deter aggression. We shall not be aggressors, but we and our allies have and will maintain a massive capability to strike back.

The same kind of posturing boast—followed by reassurance that America’s renewed focus on military might exists solely as a potent deterrent to armed conflict—appears in the fifth State of the Union address:

Another truth is that our survival in today's world requires modern, adequate, dependable military strength. Our Nation has made great strides in assuring a modern defense, so armed in new weapons, so deployed, so equipped, that today our security force is the most powerful in our peacetime history. It can punish heavily any enemy who undertakes to attack us. It is a major deterrent to war. (The American Presidency Project, 2018c)

In the next year’s State of the Union, Eisenhower repeats the same refrain, in the same format. He boasts in what he considers to be the renowned superiority of America’s defense

establishment—bolstered by a focus on nuclear capabilities—and pledges that the preventive power of such a force, rather than the preemptive power, is the true value:

As of today: our defensive shield comprehends a vast complex of ground, sea, and air units, superbly equipped and strategically deployed around the world. The most powerful deterrent to war in the world today lies in the retaliatory power of our Strategic Air Command and the aircraft of our Navy. They present to any potential attacker who would unleash war upon the world the prospect of virtual annihilation of his own country...Every informed government knows this. It is no secret. (The American Presidency Project, 2018d)

For all Eisenhower's pride in the condition of the United States' defense, one of his last declarations as president is a warning. While the readiness of the American military is of utmost importance, Eisenhower counsels against allowing the development of military power to overtake other national priorities and achieve undue authority in national affairs, urging balance:

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. (The American Presidency Project, 2018k)

Peace

42 times in the examined addresses Eisenhower presents passages concerned with peace. In his first inaugural address, in 1953, he states that it is in the ultimate service of peace that America goes to war, saying “Seeking to secure peace in the world, we have had to fight through the forests of the Argonne to the shores of Iwo Jima, and to the cold mountains of Korea.” In his 1958 State of the Union address, he turns to speak to the people of the world, proclaiming that peace is the only way forward:

Our greatest hope for success lies in a universal fact: the people of the world, as people, have always wanted peace and want peace now. The problem, then, is to find a way of translating this universal desire into action. This will require more than words of peace. It requires works of peace. (The American Presidency Project, 2018d)

It is no accident that the frame most often discussed in Eisenhower’s addresses after that of military readiness is the cause of peace; the two are kindred concepts in his mind. Often Eisenhower’s discussion of military readiness serving as a deterrent to war and outside aggression is framed in the context of such power guaranteeing peace:

A government can sincerely strive for peace, as ours is striving, and ask its people to make sacrifices for the sake of peace. But no government can place peace in the hearts of foreign rulers. It is our duty then to ourselves and to freedom itself to remain strong in all those ways--spiritual, economic, military--that will give us maximum safety against the possibility of aggressive action by others. (The American Presidency Project, 2018h)

It is this buildup of strength, Eisenhower asserts, that will be the guarantor required to foster the necessary conditions for peace. In order to realize its ambitions for a world marked by

peace and freedom, America will require assurance that its strength acts as a disincentive to war. Eisenhower notes that “The international and defense policies which I have outlined will enable us to negotiate from a position of strength as we hold our resolute course toward a peaceful world” (The American Presidency Project, 2018h)

After discussing the terrifying nuclear arsenals being developed in the world at the time, Eisenhower uses the fear associated with that power to assure the world that the United States has only peace in mind. “Possession of such capabilities helps create world suspicion and tension. We, on our part, know that we seek only a just peace for all, with aggressive designs against no one” (The American Presidency Project, 2018e), he said.

Eisenhower said the same in 1956. Again, the cause of peace is set as America’s highest aim, and again that peace will only be secured, Eisenhower said, by way of an accumulation of military might: “Because peace is the keystone of our national policy, our defense program emphasizes an effective flexible type of power calculated to deter or repulse any aggression and to preserve the peace.”

The pursuit of peace itself, Eisenhower points out, can be its own potent weapon in the countering of foreign aggression. In 1958, he levels an accusation at the Soviet Union, saying:

...what makes the Soviet threat unique in history is its all-inclusiveness. Every human activity is pressed into service as a weapon of expansion. Trade, economic development, military power, arts, science, education, the whole world of ideas--all are harnessed to this same chariot of expansion. The Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war. (Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union)

He then announces the American answer to the Soviet waging of a total cold war:

The only answer to a regime that wages total cold war is to wage total peace. This means bringing to bear every asset of our personal and national lives upon the task of building the conditions in which security and peace can grow. (The American Presidency Project, 2018d)

The high ideal of the pursuit of peace, Eisenhower said, will be the ultimate counter to the Soviets' imperial ambitions.

Eisenhower's lofty hopes for peace bookend his administration. In his first inaugural address, he sets out his belief that peace is the highest and noblest aim of the American people, doing so with a great air of hopeful idealism: "...an earth of peace may become not a vision but a fact. This hope—this supreme aspiration—must rule the way we live" (The American Presidency Project, 2018l). He continues later in the same address:

The peace we seek, then, is nothing less than the practice and fulfillment of our whole faith among ourselves and in our dealings with others. This signifies more than the stilling of guns, casing the sorrow of war. More than escape from death, it is a way of life. (The American Presidency Project, 2018l)

That high hope, that idealism and belief that peace is on the horizon given enough dedication and perseverance from the American people wanes to the point of what seems like despair by the end of his time in office. His farewell address tells a tale of a president who has seen the realities of a rapidly-evolving nuclear world facing the ever-present threat of communist aggression—another frame he speaks of often. The tone in one of his final remarks as president is markedly different than the hopeful chord struck eight years prior:

Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war--as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years—I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight. (The American Presidency Project, 2018k)

He will, however, continue to work for peace as a private citizen, he notes, intimating that his hope has not disappeared entirely. (The American Presidency Project, 2018k)

Commitment to Allies

Only marginally less pervasive than the matter of peace in Eisenhower's addresses, is the frame of a commitment to one's allies. He broaches the subject of honoring these agreements 40 times in the analyzed works. Having served as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in the second World War (Ambrose, 2010) and having emerged from a war in Korea in which the United States kept a close alliance with the United Nations (Lee, 2013), Eisenhower knew well the importance of a nation's maintenance of strong ties to its allies. With that knowledge, he spoke frequently of how crucial a commitment to allies was.

That commitment to allies was so important to Eisenhower that it is one of the few defense and security-related frames that appear in his first inaugural address, where he notes that:

Assessing realistically the needs and capacities of proven friends of freedom, we shall strive to help them to achieve their own security and well-being. Likewise, we shall count

upon them to assume, within the limits of their resources, their full and just burdens in the common defense of freedom. (2018l)

Another very important aspect of alliances emerges in that passage: the idea of mutual responsibility. Eisenhower reassures the world that the United States will not forget its friends, and in the next breath reminds those friends that alliances are not one-sided. He continues the frame two weeks later:

Mutual security means effective mutual cooperation. For the United States, this means that, as a matter of common sense and national interest, we shall give help to other nations in the measure that they strive earnestly to do their full share of the common task. (2018l)

Eisenhower reasserts several times his belief that global security is predicated on strong alliances in which each nation does its due work to ensure stability, including this passage:

Our own vast strength is only a part of that required for dependable security. Because of this we have joined with nearly 50 other nations in collective security arrangements. In these common undertakings each nation is expected to contribute what it can in sharing the heavy load. Each supplies part of a strategic deployment to protect the forward boundaries of freedom. (The American Presidency Project, 2018e)

The second State of the Union address is rife with references to the deep importance of remaining committed to friendly forces around the world. Eisenhower lays out a laundry list of instances in which the United States is committed to its allies around the world:

In the Far East, we retain our vital interest in Korea. We have negotiated with the Republic of Korea a mutual security pact, which develops our security system for the

Pacific and which I shall promptly submit to the Senate for its consent to ratification. We are prepared to meet any renewal of armed aggression in Korea. We shall maintain indefinitely our bases in Okinawa...We shall also continue military and economic aid to the Nationalist Government of China. (2018h)

He continues, applauding the people of South Asia for daring to take their security into their own hands, and promises to reward such initiative with American help, saying “In these continuing efforts, the free peoples of South Asia can be assured of the support of the United States” (The American Presidency Project, 2018h). He resumes his tour of global reaffirmation of America’s fidelity in the Middle East: “In the Middle East, where tensions and serious problems exist, we will show sympathetic and impartial friendship.” His laudatory discussion of the virtue of alliances in the address concludes with an affirmation of the United States’ dedication to the United Nations:

It is a place where the nations of the world can, if they have the will, take collective action for peace and justice. It is a place where the guilt can be squarely assigned to those who fail to take all necessary steps to keep the peace. The United Nations deserves our continued firm support. (The American Presidency Project, 2018h)

So strong is Eisenhower’s insistence that America must be the faithful friend of the free nations of the world, that he explicitly cautions against isolationism, again extoling the virtues of reaching out the hand of help to those nations struggling to win their security and noting the country’s record of doing so:

There can be no such thing as Fortress America. If ever we were reduced to the isolation implied by that term, we would occupy a prison, not a fortress. The question whether we

can afford to help other nations that want to defend their freedom but cannot fully do so from their own means, has only one answer: we can and we must, we have been doing so since 1947. (The American Presidency Project, 2018e)

Eisenhower's devotion to the idea of friendship has an attached motive rooted in the fear of the growing communist influence of the period. If America does not offer its help to struggling nations, those nations may be driven into the all-too-open arms of less desirable partners. Eisenhower remarks:

We and our friends are, of course, concerned with self-defense. Growing out of this concern is the realization that all people of the Free World have a great stake in the progress, in freedom, of the uncommitted and newly emerging nations. These peoples, desperately hoping to lift themselves to decent levels of living must not, by our neglect, be forced to seek help from, and finally become virtual satellites of, those who proclaim their hostility to freedom.

In his final treatise on the state of America's alliances Eisenhower boasts in strength, and declares that the country's allies—with America's help—have made the world a far better and more secure place, and it is only by that continued support that the bulwark against tyranny that is the American system of alliances may continue to guard true freedom and stability:

The defense forces of our Allies now number five million men, several thousand combatant ships, and over 25,000 aircraft. Programs to strengthen these allies have been consistently supported by the Administration. U.S. military assistance goes almost exclusively to friendly nations on the rim of the communist world. This American contribution to nations who have the will to defend their freedom, but insufficient means,

should be vigorously continued. Combined with our Allies, the free world now has a far stronger shield than we could provide alone. (2018g)

The Cost of Defense

It is unsurprising that in a body of addresses comprising predominately State of the Union addresses, the president's remarks should turn to budgetary concerns. Eisenhower is no exception, and the country's defense situation was of particular fiscal concern for him. In all, 38 passages involve the staggering cost of maintaining a high state of readiness, exponentially expanding firepower, and manpower numbers. During his first administration, Eisenhower focused on the cost of defense often in his first four State of the Union addresses (see Appendix C).

In his first State of the Union address, Eisenhower calls for both military power and sound fiscal practices, saying, "...the Secretary of Defense must take the initiative and assume the responsibility for developing plans to give our Nation *maximum safety at minimum cost* (emphasis added)" (2018b). He states in the same address that the task before the nation is one of a balance between battlefield efficacy and balance-sheet efficiency:

Our problem is to achieve adequate military strength within the limits of endurable strain upon our economy. To amass military power without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another. Both military and economic objectives demand a single national military policy, proper coordination of our armed services, and effective consolidation of certain logistics activities...We must eliminate waste and duplication of effort in the armed services. (The American Presidency Project, 2018b)

The next year, he notes that progress has been made in the quest to maintain the equilibrium between force and finance, saying “The cost of armaments becomes less oppressive as we near our defense goals; yet we are militarily stronger every day” (The American Presidency Project, 2018h).

In his 1955 State of the Union address, Eisenhower again states that military power has been added, while costs have been decreased, saying:

Our many efforts to build a better world include the maintenance of our military strength. This is a vast undertaking. Major national security programs consume two-thirds of the entire Federal budget. Over four million Americans--servicemen and civilians--are on the rolls of the defense establishment. During the past two years, by eliminating duplication and overstaffing, by improved procurement and inventory controls, and by concentrating on the essentials, many billions of dollars have been saved in our defense activities.

In the next year’s address, he sounds the same refrain, noting, “Our defenses have been reinforced at sharply reduced costs. (The American Presidency Project, 2018j) However, he seems to mention the reduction in costs to soften the blow later in the speech, suggesting that military expenditures will continue to consume a great deal of financial resources. “The maintenance of this strong military capability for the indefinite future will continue to call for a large share of our national budget. Our military programs must meet the needs of today” (The American Presidency Project, 2018j)

As nuclear weapons and nuclear power become an increasing focus for Eisenhower’s defense policies, however, the focus on saving money seems to become less and less

predominant. He seems to boast about the amount spent on America's nuclear arsenal, rather than calling for restraint in spending:

Only a brief time back, we were spending at the rate of only about one million dollars a year on long range ballistic missiles. In 1957 we spent more than one billion dollars on the Arias, Titan, Thor, Jupiter, and Polaris programs alone. But I repeat, gratifying though this rate of progress is, we must still do more! (The American Presidency Project, 2018d)

In fact, Eisenhower notes that he expects spending on the nuclear portion defense to increase by around \$4 billion in the next year, saying:

In the 1959 budget, increased expenditures for missiles, nuclear ships, atomic energy, research and development, science and education, a special contingency fund to deal with possible new technological discoveries and increases in pay and incentives to obtain and retain competent manpower add up to a total increase over the comparable figures in the 1957 budget of about \$4 billion. (The American Presidency Project, 2018d)

The next year, however, Eisenhower returns to calls for balancing nuclear power with financial responsibility, acknowledging the huge costs associated with developing, maintaining, and constantly improving the country's nuclear capabilities:

...we must remember that these imposing armaments are purchased at great cost.

National Security programs account for nearly sixty percent of the entire Federal budget for this coming fiscal year. Modern weapons are exceedingly expensive. The overall cost of introducing ATLAS into our armed forces will average \$35 million per missile on the firing line. This year we are investing an aggregate of close to \$7 billion in missile

programs alone. Other billions go for research, development, test and evaluation of new weapons systems...These sums are tremendous, even when compared with the marvelous resiliency and capacity of our economy. Such expenditures demand both balance and perspective in our planning for defense. At every turn, we must weigh, judge and select. Needless duplication of weapons and forces must be avoided.

By expounding on the staggering cost of these weapons and in the next breath extoling their virtues, Eisenhower makes clear that the cost of these armaments is worth every penny. All at once Eisenhower warns of needless defense spending and boasts about the amount spent on nuclear arms. It is clear, then, that he considers them a necessary and welcomed expenditure.

Nuclear Weapons

“Science,” Eisenhower said, “seems ready to confer upon us, as its final gift, the power to erase human life from this planet” (2018l) With this statement early in his first inaugural address, in the first moments of his presidency, Eisenhower recognizes the terrible power of nuclear weapons. He takes time to discuss nuclear weaponry and the arms race brewing with the Soviet Union 36 times across these addresses. In fact, he is not long in framing the Soviet possession of those weapons as a grave peril to American security as he declares the need for robust civil preparedness, saying “Because we have incontrovertible evidence that Soviet Russia possesses atomic weapons, this kind of protection becomes sheer necessity” (The American Presidency Project, 2018b)

In fact, in many discussions of nuclear weapons, Eisenhower’s address is set against the backdrop of the evil of the Soviet Union, as in his 1955 State of the Union address:

The massive military machines and ambitions of the Soviet-Communist bloc still create uneasiness in the world.... Their steadily growing power includes an increasing strength in nuclear weapons. This power, combined with the proclaimed intentions of the Communist leaders to communize the world, is the threat confronting us today.

The only fortification against the rising Soviet nuclear specter, Eisenhower states—using incredibly intense language—is the Soviet knowledge of the United States’ possession of and willingness to unleash a nuclear arsenal:

To protect our nations and our peoples from the catastrophe of a nuclear holocaust, free nations must maintain countervailing military power to persuade the Communists of the futility of seeking their ends through aggression (The American Presidency Project, 2018i)

As with many defense concepts—as previously discussed—Eisenhower situates American nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, and a guarantor of peace, as well as taking the opportunity to remind a would-be aggressor of the power at his disposal. In in his second State of the Union address he said:

First, while determined to use atomic power to serve the usages of peace, we take into full account our great and growing number of nuclear weapons and the most effective means of using them against an aggressor if they are needed to preserve our freedom. (The American Presidency Project, 2018h)

Eisenhower exhibits a dual mind toward nuclear weaponry and its use. Understanding the terrible power that nuclear superpowers wield, he discusses the need for disarmament, while at

the same time clinging tightly to America's nuclear arsenal. In his third State of the Union address, in 1955, Eisenhower gives an example of this nuclear dichotomy:

...pending a world agreement on armament limitation, we must continue to improve and expand our supplies of nuclear weapons for our land, naval and air forces, while, at the same time, continuing our encouraging progress in the peaceful use of atomic power.

That passage is telling. Eisenhower said that the United States is ready to discuss nuclear disarmament, but only given the presupposition that all other nations are under the same arms limitation obligation. So long as there is an extant nuclear threat from other nuclear-equipped nations, Eisenhower said, America will continue to bolster its nuclear deterrent power.

In the latter half of Eisenhower's presidency, his focus on nuclear warfare and nuclear weapons increases, with passages concerning nuclear issues increasing in the sixth and eighth State of the Union addresses (see appendix C). Again, Eisenhower comes down on the side of disarmament in 1958, saying "The world must stop the present plunge toward increasingly destructive weapons of war, and turn the corner that will start our steps firmly on the path toward lasting peace." He continues later in the address declaring that "of all the works of peace, none is more needed now than a real first step toward disarmament." The Soviets, however, will not cooperate with the United States and the United Nations for disarmament (The American Presidency Project, 2018d), characteristic of his denigration of the Soviets—this will be discussed later.

Just two years later, however, the Soviet attitude toward nuclear disarmament seems to have changed, as Eisenhower said:

Over the past year the Soviet Union has expressed an interest in measures to reduce the common peril of war. While neither we nor any other Free World nation can permit ourselves to be misled by pleasant promises until they are tested by performance, yet we approach this apparently new opportunity with the utmost seriousness. We must strive to break the calamitous cycle of frustrations and crises which, if unchecked, could spiral into nuclear disaster; the ultimate insanity.

Characteristic, however, of what seems to be his vacillation on the issue of nuclear weapons, his 1961 State of the Union address returns to braggadocio, enumerating the financial cost and the staggering power of America's nuclear arsenal in great detail.

Eisenhower leaves his view of the state of the nuclear environment uncertain, but with a glimmer of hope that common ground can be found, saying "Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose" (The American Presidency Project, 2018k)

Communism as an Enemy

There are myriad places in this study in which analysis can happen only after subtext and veiled implication have been examined and rendered more clearly. On the frame of communism as the enemy of peace and security, however, no such work is needed in the case of Eisenhower. In his sixth State of the Union address, delivered in 1958, Eisenhower said quite early in the address that there will only be two topics addressed in the speech, one of which is ensuring American safety: "There are two tasks confronting us that so far outweigh all other that I shall devote this year's message entirely to them. The first is to ensure our safety through strength" (The American Presidency Project, 2018i). Eisenhower is not long in unequivocally stating what he believes most aggressively places that safety in peril: "The threat to our safety, and to the

hope of a peaceful world, can be simply stated. It is communist imperialism” (The American Presidency Project, 2018b).

Eisenhower expresses disappointment and disillusionment in the post-war years, contrasting the hopes for peace with the reality of tension, which he blames on communism: “We anticipated a world of peace and cooperation. The calculated pressures of aggressive communism have forced us, instead, to live in a world of turmoil” (The American Presidency Project, 2018b). In his 1954 State of the Union address, Eisenhower said that communism is the primary barrier to freedom, saying “American freedom is threatened so long as the world Communist conspiracy exists in its present scope, power, and hostility.”

It is not only the threat of global militant communism that worries Eisenhower. The threat of infiltration of influence of communist agents and communist ideals in the ranks of the American government press on Eisenhower’s mind in his 1945 State of the Union address:

The subversive character of the Communist Party in the United States has been clearly demonstrated in many ways, including court proceedings. We should recognize by law a fact that is plain to all thoughtful citizens—that we are dealing here with actions akin to treason--that when a citizen knowingly participates in the Communist conspiracy he no longer holds allegiance to the United States.

He repeats this concern the next year in the 1955 State of the Union address, saying “We must not only deter aggression; we must also frustrate the effort of Communists to gain their goals by subversion.” Eisenhower also places emphasis on the need to protect allies from the same subversion; “In Asia, we shall continue to give help to nations struggling to maintain their

freedom against the threat of Communist coercion or subversion” (The American Presidency Project, 2018j).

Richard M. Nixon: 1969-1974

A 2003 analysis (Jacobs, Page, Burns, McAvoy, & Ostermeir) yielded many of the same results as this study did. Namely, the prevalence with which Nixon discussed key defense issues by way of a few broad frames. Jacobs et al. found that of the most heavily recurrent policy frames that Nixon discussed, five were directly defense related. Four of those five were predominate in the addresses analyzed here: détente and arms control, peace in Vietnam, Military action against north Vietnam, defense spending, and troop withdrawal. Of those policy frames, only defense spending was not a heavy focus of Nixon’s analyzed addresses for this study (Jacobs, Page, Burns, McAvoy, & Ostermeir, 2003).

The Nixon Doctrine

While as its own thematic category, the Nixon Doctrine is not a predominant frame throughout the speeches included in this analysis (see Appendix A), its constituent parts very much are. Several individual frames identified for the purpose of this study make up the larger whole of the Nixon Doctrine.

After announcing the policy on Guam at a July 25, 1969 press conference (Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization, 2007), Nixon lays out this new posture toward Asia in his 1969 “Address to the Nation on the war in Vietnam,” by giving context reminiscent of Eisenhower’s earlier insistence that American partners pull their weight. Nixon begins, “In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men

to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.”

Nixon goes on to explain the three primary tenets of the Nixon Doctrine:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. (2017u)

The frames which might fall under the larger umbrella of the Nixon Doctrine, then, include commitments to allies and nuclear weapons. As it concerns the purpose of this analysis, however, the most prominent of those three tenets, the one most often associated with the Nixon Doctrine, and the one Nixon most often speaks about is the third: so-called ‘Vietnamization’ (Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization, 2007). 16 times in these addresses Nixon discusses Vietnamization—the training of South Vietnamese forces by American forces, or the transfer of responsibility from the United States to South Vietnam. When Vietnamization is viewed in concert with Nixon’s heavy discussion of America’s commitments to its allies—a separate frame falling under the auspices of the Nixon Doctrine—the policy position warrants its own discussion as a predominant frame in Nixon’s speeches.

America has, for too long, Nixon said, assumed undue responsibility for the safety and security of other nations:

The defense of freedom is everybody's business—not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace. (2017u)

Americanizing the war in Vietnam, as Nixon phrases it, not only disproportionately burdens American resources and manpower, it leaves the allied nation unable to help itself without American intervention. Nixon notes:

The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left. (2017u)

Nixon sums up the concept tidily, saying “Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam” (2017u).

Vietnamization is so crucial to Nixon’s plan in Vietnam, that he hinges the success of the U.S. withdrawal upon the progress of the program, saying:

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater. (2017u)

Withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. The frame of withdrawal of troops, in the context of Nixon and the war in Vietnam, is best expressed as a subframe of the larger frame of the Nixon Doctrine. Nixon talks a great deal about the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, but almost always in the context of the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization, and to a lesser extent as a corollary to discussions of the peace negotiations, discussed in more detail later.

However, the frame of withdrawal of troop warrants examination—if a brief examination—as Nixon references the drawdown of troops some 25 times over the course of his addresses. The bulk of those references to withdrawal come in two addresses: his Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam (2017u) and the 1970 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia. In those speeches, he discusses troop withdrawal 11 times and nine times, respectively.

Often Nixon frames withdrawal in terms of the certain disaster that would result from withdrawing too early, before Vietnamization has reached a sustainable, and self-sufficient threshold. He notes that, “For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude” (The Miller Center, 2017u). Premature withdrawal would, Nixon said, cause the collapse of South Vietnam, and send a message to American allies that the United States has forsaken them, violating the first tenet of the Nixon Doctrine. “For these reasons,” Nixon said, “I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces” (The Miller Center, 2017u). He continues later, noting that because Vietnamization has been successful, some American troops have been able to leave Vietnam:

Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 percent. And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam... we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam including 20 percent of all of our combat forces. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops. (2017u).

The increasing strength and facility of the South Vietnamese forces is a prerequisite for the continued escalation of American withdrawals, Nixon said: "As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater" (2017u).

A Lasting Peace

By a wide margin, the most persistent single frame of the whole of Nixon's discussions of defense and national security is the pursuit of peace. This is unsurprising for a president presiding over "America's longest war" (Herring, 1979). Nixon broaches the subject of peace 55 times. He does so very early on, minutes into his presidency. "For the first time, because the people of the world want peace, and the leaders of the world are afraid of war, the times are on the side of peace," Nixon (2018m) said in his first inaugural address.

By the time of his inauguration in 1969, the United States had been wrapped up in Vietnam since 1950 (Herring, 1979). After 19 years of involvement in a foreign country, Americans were ready for peace: "We are caught in war, wanting peace," he said (The American Presidency Project, 2018m). He firmly settles the cause of peace as the highest that a nation can strive toward, saying:

The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker. This honor now beckons America--the chance to help lead the world at last out of the valley of turmoil and onto that high ground of peace that man has dreamed of since the dawn of civilization. If we succeed, generations to come will say of us now living that we mastered our moment, that we helped make the world safe for mankind. This is our summons to greatness.

(2018m)

Nixon issues similar language asserting the United States' commitment to bringing peace to a troubled world in his first State of the Union address a year later: "When we speak of America's priorities the first priority must always be peace for America and the world" (2017k).

Nixon, like Eisenhower, speaks even of America's military power as an instrument of peace in the world, rather than a force for aggression. In his first address as president, in 1969, Nixon declares that:

The peace we seek--the peace we seek to win--is not victory over any other people, but the peace that comes "with healing in its wings"; with compassion for those who have suffered; with understanding for those who have opposed us; with the opportunity for all the peoples of this earth to choose their own destiny.

He later states that "Strong military defenses are not the enemy of peace; they are the guardians of peace" (The Miller Center, 2017f). In the same State of the Union Address, Nixon goes on to remind the world that "We have fought four wars in this century, but our power has never been used to break the peace, only to keep it; never been used to destroy freedom, only to defend it." His second inaugural address includes that same assertion, with Nixon saying:

Let us be proud that in each of the four wars in which we have been engaged in this century, including the one we are now bringing to an end, we have fought not for our selfish advantage, but to help others resist aggression. (2017g)

Introducing what will come to be a continuous subframe in his speeches, Nixon declares in his inaugural address, “Let us take as our goal: Where peace is unknown, make it welcome; where peace is fragile, make it strong; where peace is temporary, make it permanent” (2018m). Nixon calls for not simply peace in the current conflict, but peace that will *last*. Repeatedly, he brings forth the notion of a lasting peace, a peace that will endure. Calling back to Woodrow Wilson’s ambitious hope that the first World War would be the end of strife, Nixon reaffirmed the hope that the peace following the war in Vietnam would be a lasting one:

Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated—the goal of a just and lasting peace. (2017u)

When speaking of that end, the cessation of fighting in Vietnam, Nixon expresses his desire that the coming peace would free future Americans from the same chains of war binding their fathers and brothers, saying, “...I want to end it [the war] in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world” (2017u). That peace will be hard won, Nixon acknowledges in his first State of the Union (2017k), but he reiterates his hope that future Americans will not suffer the same fate, again making mention of a durable and lasting peace:

I would be the last to suggest that the road to peace is not difficult and dangerous, but I believe our new policies have contributed to the prospect that America may have the best chance since World War II to enjoy a generation of uninterrupted peace.

In expressing his desire for such a peace, Nixon presses on the nation's war-weariness, noting that the country has been at war for nearly the whole of the 20th century, saying "No goal could be greater than to make the next generation the first in this century in which America was at peace with every nation in the world" (2017k). Again, and again, Nixon strikes this chord. In his 1972 State of the Union address he expresses the same hope for lasting peace, noting, "We now have within our reach the goal of insuring that the next generation can be the first generation in this century to be spared the scourges of war."

In 1971, while apprising the nation of the status of the war (April 7, 1971: Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia), Nixon tells the story of posthumous Medal of Honor recipient Sergeant Karl Taylor, whose assault of a machine gun position saved the lives of several United States Marines while costing Taylor his own. Nixon uses the opportunity to invoke Taylor's sons, Karl, Jr., and Kevin, to again express the desire that future Americans might live in peace, saying:

My fellow Americans, I want to end this war in a way that is worthy of the sacrifice of Karl Taylor, and I think he would want me to end it in a way that would increase the chances that Kevin and Karl, and all those children like them here and around the world, could grow up in a world where none of them would have to die in war; that would increase the chance for America to have what it has not had in this century—a full generation of peace.

In his second inaugural address in 1973, three days before his announcement of the end of the Vietnam war, Nixon reaffirms the desire, saying “The peace we seek in the world is not the flimsy peace which is merely an interlude between wars, but a peace which can endure for generations to come.” Later in the same address he exhorts the American people to join him in this hope:

Let us be proud that by our bold, new initiatives, and by our steadfastness for peace with honor, we have made a breakthrough toward creating in the world what the world has not known before—a structure of peace that can last, not merely for our time, but for generations to come. (The Miller Center, 2017g)

In his final State of the Union address before the Watergate Scandal cut his presidency short, Nixon gives a final reminder of his highest goal as president, saying:

Throughout the 5 years that I have served as your President, I have had one overriding aim, and that was to establish a new structure of peace in the world that can free future generations of the scourge of war.... This has been and this will remain my first priority and the chief legacy I hope to leave from the 8 years of my Presidency. (The Miller Center, 2017q)

Peace Negotiations

While in many cases, the frames of peace itself and the negotiations which lead to peace might justifiably be combined, Nixon devotes so much time to the negotiations for peace during the war in Vietnam, that it becomes prudent to discuss each as its own frame. Nixon devotes time to the negotiations ongoing with the communist government in Hanoi 39 times over these 11 addresses. It seems a natural progression that a wartime president so preoccupied with peace, and

so with ending the war, would also allocate a disproportionate amount of his discussion of the war to the frame of peace talks.

To serve that end, to bring about the enduring peace to which Nixon devotes so much time in his speeches, and overseeing a nation worn down by war, he turns to the work of peace. To usher in the peace he seeks, Nixon begins calls for negotiations to end the war in his first address, announcing:

After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation. Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication will be open.... We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy.
(2018m)

He continues, "I know that peace does not come through wishing for it--that there is no substitute for days and even years of patient and prolonged diplomacy" (2018m). In 1971, while recounting his foreign policy report to Congress, Nixon expresses his belief that "Negotiation remains the best and quickest way to end the war in a way that will not only end U.S. involvement and casualties but will mean an end to the fighting between North and South Vietnamese."

Nixon was so bold as to send a letter to Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, urging that peace negotiations be taken seriously. In his November 1969 Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, Nixon relays the text of that letter, in which he urges his North Vietnamese counterpart toward negotiations:

The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this

critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war. (The Miller Center, 2017u)

Of interest for the purposes of this study, is that Nixon's most frequent frame by which to discuss the topic of peace talks, is that of North Vietnam's obstinacy. Nixon speaks in somewhat general terms about his hopes for a peaceful settlement, but he speaks at great length about the United States' generous offers of force reduction and prisoner exchange, and the refusal of the North Vietnamese government to accept those terms.

A large proportion of the 1970 "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia" is dedicated to enumerating American concessions and North Vietnamese refusals:

We have stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have cut air operations by over 20 percent. We have announced withdrawal of over 250,000 of our men. We have offered to withdraw all of our men if they will withdraw theirs. We have offered to negotiate all issues with only one condition—and that is that the future of South Vietnam be determined not by North Vietnam, and not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves. The answer of the enemy has been intransigence at the conference table, belligerence in Hanoi, massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia, and stepped-up attacks in South Vietnam, designed to increase American casualties. This attitude has become intolerable.

America has, Nixon asserts, been more than willing to bargain, concede, withdraw, and make deals. It is the obduracy of the Hanoi government which is stalling peace efforts wholesale, Nixon pleads. He notes that he sent Henry Kissinger—then his national security adviser (Herring, 1979)—to negotiate with the hostile government.:

I authorized Dr. Kissinger to meet privately with the top North Vietnamese negotiator, Le Duc Tho, on Tuesday, May 2, in Paris.... I authorized Dr. Kissinger to talk about every conceivable avenue toward peace. The North Vietnamese flatly refused to consider any of these approaches. They refused to offer any new approach of their own. Instead, they simply read verbatim their previous public demands. (Nixon, 1972)

Nixon continues in the 1972 “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia:”

Here is what over 3 years of public and private negotiations with Hanoi has come down to: The United States, with the full concurrence of our South Vietnamese allies, has offered the maximum of what any President of the United States could offer.... They have flatly and arrogantly refused to negotiate an end to the war and bring peace. Their answer to every peace offer we have made has been to escalate the war.

Again, in the same address, Nixon reiterates his point:

The problem is, as you all know, it takes two to negotiate and now, as throughout the past four years, the North Vietnamese arrogantly refuse to negotiate anything but an imposition, an ultimatum that the United States impose a Communist regime on 17 million people in South Vietnam who do not want a Communist government. (2017t)

The North Vietnamese refusal to accept and agree to what Nixon frames as very generous constantly vexes him. However, a mere eight months after his remarks in May 1972, Nixon announces an agreement to end the war. Nixon, in that announcement (2017l) admits, in a very brief explanation, that many of the efforts leading to a successful resolution have been secret in the weeks leading up to the settlement. In his address, Nixon speaks directly to the leaders of the once-implacable North Vietnamese government, saying:

To the leaders of North Vietnam: As we have ended the war through negotiations, let us now build a peace of reconciliation. For our part, we are prepared to make a major effort to help achieve that goal. But just as reciprocity was needed to end the war, so too will it be needed to build and strengthen the peace. (2017l)

George W. Bush: 2001-2009

George W. Bush's addresses are replete—like Nixon's—with discussions of the security of the United States, and its defense initiatives abroad. That is unsurprising, given the climate of most of Bush's tenure as president, marked by the attacks of September 11, 2001. Bush's rhetoric on defense is heavily marked by the nebulous "Global War on Terror" (The Miller Center, 2017c, 2017h, 2017n, 2017p). Terrorism, its roots, its enablers, its tactics, and its necessary defeat dominate Bush's addresses to the nation regarding the country's defense. Terrorism as a threat to the American way of life is the foremost frame Bush uses.

Weapons of mass destruction, which Bush closely relates to terrorism--and which contains under its umbrella the specter of nuclear weapons discussed by Eisenhower—is another theme which pervades Bush's defense concerns (The Miller Center, 2017c, 2017h, 2017n, 2017p). He speaks often of the dangers of allowing rogue states including the "Axis of Evil" (The Miller Center, 2017p)—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—to have access to these weapons. Nuclear weapons are a part of the broader category, though biological and chemical weapons are also an area of emphasis. Bush uses this frame of weapons of mass destruction to lay a basis for his case for war with Iraq. He, at length, makes a substantive case against Saddam Hussein's intransigence and belligerence regarding weapons of mass destruction, devoting a great deal of speaking time to the subject (The Miller Center, 2017n).

Bush also frames America's military involvement in the Middle East as necessary for the establishment of democracy. Bush lays a foundation in his addresses--much the same way that other presidents have--that American might and the war making that accompany it are all in service of the establishment of a safe zone for self-determination for all peoples, never for the building of empires as in days past.

Building again on the emerging tradition of his contemporaries in this study, Bush uses his speeches to reassert America's unwavering commitment to its allies. Bush notes the broad support of a coalition of nations for the military actions undertaken by the United States. He transitions—while remaining in the frame of American alliances—into the transfer of responsibility to local forces in the United States areas of operations, much like Nixon's plan of Vietnamization in the 1970s.

The War on Terror.

In his first address to Congress, George W. Bush describes an America “full of blessings” and among those blessings includes that he has been elected to govern a nation “at peace with its neighbors...” In those nascent days of his first administration, Bush does not present an appraisal of an America in danger. His presentation of the dangers of the world are more general, acknowledging that bad actors exist, and America must be prepared to aid the world in combating them, saying

Our Nation...needs a clear strategy to confront the threats of the 21st century, threats that are more widespread and less certain. They range from terrorists who threaten with bombs to tyrants in rogue nations intent upon developing weapons of mass destruction.
(2018a)

After that statement—which includes what will turn out to be prescient references to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction—Bush moves on to economic issues and does not revisit defense concerns for the remainder of the address, except in the most general of terms. In the closing passages, Bush again notes that “America is a nation at peace...” (2018a).

The next year’s address to Congress was markedly different. “As we gather tonight,” Bush begins, “our nation is at war; our economy is in recession, and the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers” (2017p). The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the combat actions that resulted from those attacks serve as the backdrop for all George W. Bush’s addresses to the Congress and the nation—at least as far as the addresses included in this study are concerned.

Bush begins his seven-year discussion of an America at war with terrorism, on a triumphant note. “Thanks to [American troops],” Bush boldly declares, “we are winning the war on terror” (2017p). He then presents a protracted list of the tactical victories won against terrorist adversaries since September of the previous year:

In four short months, our nation has comforted the victims, begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression. The American flag flies again over our embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay. And terrorist leaders who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their own.... The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today women are free and are part of Afghanistan's new government. (2017p)

Bush continues by noting the preponderance of worldwide terrorist activity, including massive networks of training camps, that have been discovered, saying “Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking timebombs, set to go off without warning” (2017p). Terrorists have infiltrated every corner of the globe, Bush notes, listing Afghanistan, the Philippines, Bosnia, Somalia, and Pakistan as merely a few of the places terrorists have taken up bases of operations (2017p).

Bush then makes a statement which tidily summarizes his belief that, much like Eisenhower’s vendetta against communism, the existence of terrorists anywhere in the world is incompatible with the existence of a free society: “These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk” (2017p).

That statement is the thesis of all Bush’s discussions of the battle in which America finds itself in the early days of his presidency. Terrorism, its enablers, and its practitioners preoccupy his discussions of defense for the remainder of his time in office.

Those enablers Bush references are rogue states all over the world, led by what he famously refers to as an “Axis of Evil” (2017p). Comprising this triumvirate are Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, three of the most preeminent state sponsors of terrorism:

North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.... States like these and their terrorist allies

constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.

Bush often speaks of terrorism not as a nebulous specter, menacing the United States and the rest of the free world, against which we must simply keep a watchful eye. Terrorism is, Bush often remarks, a very real and very active threat at all times. He frequently notes the activities of terrorists around the globe, often identifying specific foiled plots. The constant peril of terrorist attack is a foundation of many of these speeches. In his 2002 State of the Union address he describes one such thwarted terrorist plot:

A few days before Christmas, an airline flight attendant spotted a passenger lighting a match. The crew and passengers quickly subdued the man, who had been trained by Al Qaeda and was armed with explosives. The people on that plane were alert and, as a result, likely saved nearly 200 lives.

In the following year's address, he notes others, saying:

America and coalition countries have uncovered and stopped terrorist conspiracies targeting the embassy in Yemen, the American embassy in Singapore, a Saudi military base, ships in the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Gibraltar. (The Miller Center, 2017n)

To ignore the ever-present menace of terrorism is foolish, Bush notes in his 2004 State of the Union address, saying:

We have faced serious challenges together, and now we face a choice: We can go forward with confidence and resolve, or we can turn back to the dangerous illusion that terrorists are not plotting and outlaw regimes are no threat to us.

He continues:

Twenty-eight months have passed since September 11, 2001—over two years without an attack on American soil. And it is tempting to believe that the danger is behind us. That hope is understandable, comforting—and false. The killing has continued in Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca, Riyadh, Mombasa, Jerusalem, Istanbul, and Baghdad. The terrorists continue to plot against America and the civilized world. (The Miller Center, 2017h)

Bush repeatedly impresses upon the congress and the American people just how grave and unyielding the threat remains. Again and again, he repeats that America and the rest of the free world remain targets for terrorists. In his 2005 State of the Union, he notes that “Our country is still the target of terrorists who want to kill many, and intimidate us all....” The 2006 address again reinforces America’s status as a target for terrorists. Bush remarks, “Terrorists like [Osama] bin Laden are serious about mass murder.... Their aim is to seize power in Iraq and use it as a safe haven to launch attacks against America and the world.”

He notes that the true measure of success in the war on terror are the terrorists’ failures. Stopping these plots is how America and the free world can be assured that they are charting a path toward victory against the forces of global terror. Bush remarks:

Our success in this war is often measured by the things that did not happen. We cannot know the full extent of the attacks that we and our allies have prevented, but here is some of what we do know. We stopped an Al Qaeda plot to fly a hijacked airplane into the

tallest building on the west coast. We broke up a Southeast Asian terror cell grooming operatives for attacks inside the United States. We uncovered an Al Qaeda cell developing anthrax to be used in attacks against America. And just last August, British authorities uncovered a plot to blow up passenger planes bound for America over the Atlantic Ocean. (2017m)

In one of his final remarks, and one of his final reminders of America's place as a perpetual target for the likes of Al Qaeda, Bush reveals that "Al Qaeda's top commander in Iraq declared that they will not rest until they have attacked us here in Washington. My fellow Americans, we will not rest either. We will not rest until this enemy has been defeated" (2017o).

Weapons of Mass Destruction

One of the most prevalent frames Bush uses to discuss the threats facing the United States during this period is the context of what Bush refers to as "weapons of mass destruction." While in some instances in these addresses the two are closely related, the frames of the broader war on terror and the use of weapons of mass destruction warrant their own separate discussions. Bush devotes a great deal of time to discussing these weapons as one of the most serious threats facing America over the course of these addresses. He said as much, framing the weapons as the chief threat in the conflict, saying:

Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation. (The Miller Center, 2017n)

Between isolated talk of nuclear weapons and broader discussions of weapons of mass destruction, Bush dedicates 40 passages across 10 addresses to the danger they pose. Again and again, he returns to remind the people about the threat they pose. These weapons are so concerning to Bush that his first mention of them is on the day of his inauguration, when he remarks “We will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest weakness invite challenge. We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new horrors” (The American Presidency Project, 2018n). He later restates the gravity with which his administration will approach the issue, declaring:

I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. (The Miller Center, 2017p)

It will be useful in this analysis to define what Bush most often refers to when he discusses these weapons. While earlier in this study—most notably in the analysis of Eisenhower’s addresses—nuclear weapons have been discussed, Bush’s references to nuclear weapons almost always come packaged as a composite part of the larger concept of weapons of mass destruction.

Early in his first administration Bush makes reference to what he means by the term, saying “...we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world” (The Miller Center, 2017p). The threat from these weapons is serious, Bush notes, and he talks frankly about the possibility of a biological attack on American soil, remarking:

The budget I send you will propose almost \$6 billion to quickly make available effective vaccines and treatments against agents like anthrax, botulinum toxin, Ebola, and plague.

We must assume that our enemies would use these diseases as weapons, and we must act before the dangers are upon us. (The Miller Center, 2017n)

Those enemies Bush references are rogue states all over the world, led at the forefront by what he famously refers to as an “Axis of Evil” (2017p). Comprising this triumvirate are Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, three of the most preeminent state sponsors of terrorism:

North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.... States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. (The Miller Center, 2017p)

The most grievous offender and the one most often tied to Bush’s discussions of these weapons is Iraq, which Bush calls out 168 times across these 10 addresses. A great portion of his 2003 State of the Union address is devoted to enumerating the crimes and wanton refusal of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who Bush calls “A brutal dictator, with a history of reckless aggression, with ties to terrorism, with great potential wealth...” (2017n) to comply with international demands to disarm his regime and noting:

Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda. Secretly and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists or help them develop their own. (The Miller Center, 2017n)

The case that Bush lays out against Iraq and the Hussein regime is long and filled with violations of international good faith. He reads off a list of grievances against the dictator in his first State of the Union address, which turns out to only be a preview of what is to come. He notes:

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections, then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. (The Miller Center, 2017p)

It is in 2003 that Bush truly lays his case against Iraq and Saddam Hussein before the congress and the people. Following the Gulf War, Bush said, Hussein had been ordered to cease and desist his weapons programs by the United Nations (The Miller Center, 2017n). Hussein, he argues, shirked that responsibility. Bush claims that “For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country” (The Miller Center, 2017n).

What follows is a list of charges alleging that Hussein has at best, neglected, and at worst avoided the duties imposed upon him by the United Nations. Bush repeats assertions that

Hussein has not complied, has not acted, has not shown evidence of disarmament, has not accounted for volatile materials. At every turn, Bush raises a charge, and presents Hussein as having failed to meet the burden of proof in the matter.

To the charge that Iraq must destroy its existing stockpiles, Bush notes: “It is up to Iraq to show exactly where it is hiding its banned weapons, lay those weapons out for the world to see, and destroy them as directed. Nothing like this has happened” (2017n). In the matter of 25,000 liters of anthrax Bush charges “He hasn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it” (2017n). Regarding 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin he repeats the same, saying “He hasn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it” (2017n). Bush repeats the same refrain, over and over for sarin, mustard, and VX nerve agents, 30,000 chemical weapons-ready munitions, and mobile biological weapons labs. The point to be driven home is clear: Saddam Hussein is not to be trusted and is quite likely still in possession of weapons of mass destruction, and this is the context for much of George W. Bush’s remarks on these terrible weapons.

Over and over, again and again, Bush reiterates and reinforces that Hussein is a danger to the United States, principally by virtue of his probable possession of weapons of mass destruction. He plainly states his case later in the address:

Year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent enormous sums, taken great risks to build and keep weapons of mass destruction. But why? The only possible explanation, the only possible use he could have for those weapons, is to dominate, intimidate, or attack. (2017n)

Bush uses the closing passages of the 2003 State of the Union address to deliver an unequivocal message, predicated on Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction: "If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him." That statement is the lynchpin upon which most of Bush's talk of weapons of mass destruction hinges. Hussein is a dangerous despot with tremendous and terrible weapons, and those weapons necessitate action. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the United States to act.

Sowing Democracy

Another frame by which Bush enters discussions of the ongoing war in the Middle East, is to position America's role in the fighting as a catalyst for democracy in the region. Among Bush's addresses, 32 passages relate to the United States' fight for the right of others to self-determination. Bush sums up the American commitment to worldwide democracy in his farewell address, declaring:

The battles waged by our troops are part of a broader struggle between two dramatically different systems. Under one, a small band of fanatics demands total obedience to an oppressive ideology, condemns women to subservience, and marks unbelievers for murder. The other system is based on the conviction that freedom is the universal gift of Almighty God, and that liberty and justice light the path to peace.... When people live in freedom, they do not willingly choose leaders who pursue campaigns of terror. When people have hope in the future, they will not cede their lives to violence and extremism. (2017e)

In his second inaugural address, Bush states boldly that democracy taking root worldwide is vital to American safety, saying:

Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government, because no one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of our nation's security, and the calling of our time. So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. (2017i)

Bush makes mention of the necessity of democracy in several addresses, but in none more heavily than in his 2005 State of the Union address. A large proportion of this address is dedicated to the concept of democracy, and the nobility of America's fight to create the conditions for it to thrive. He states in that address that:

The only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom. Our enemies know this, and that is why the terrorist Zarqawi recently declared war on what he called the "evil principle" of democracy. And we have declared our own intention: America will stand with the allies of freedom to support democratic movements in the Middle East and beyond, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. (2017c)

Repeatedly, Bush declares the United States' intention to install or, at the very least, catalyze democracies in places where tyranny is the rule of law. "Our aim," Bush claims, "is to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures" (2017c) He proudly lists the places in which democracy is taking hold in the world, supported by American diplomatic and military involvement. The advance of freedom, he said, is "shown by women voting in Afghanistan, and

Palestinians choosing a new direction, and the people of Ukraine asserting their democratic rights and electing a President” (2017c).

Bush again frames the worldwide democratic movement as a seed which America is planting. American aid and involvement are driving forces behind the tide of self-determination. Regarding negotiations between Israel and Palestine in the hopes that Palestine will reject the way of extremist rule he said:

To promote this democracy, I will ask Congress for \$350 million to support Palestinian political, economic, and security reforms. The goal of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace is within reach—and America will help them achieve that goal.

In 2006, Bush describes how installing democracies is essential for the American safety, another way that he positions and justifies American involvement. He said:

Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their citizens and their neighbors, and join the fight against terror. Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer, so we will act boldly in freedom's cause.

Bush also situates the United States as a member of a proud community of those ruled by their own sovereign wills alone, and America, he said, is dedicated to lending a hand to further that community:

In 1945, there were about two dozen lonely democracies in the world. Today, there are 122. And we're writing a new chapter in the story of self-government—with women lining up to vote in Afghanistan, and millions of Iraqis marking their liberty with purple

ink, and men and women from Lebanon to Egypt debating the rights of individuals and the necessity of freedom.

Perhaps most telling in the 2005 State of the Union address, is a passage which sums up Bush's positioning of America's involvement in the Middle East as a democratic exercise. He asserts that "We are in Iraq to achieve a result: A country that is democratic, representative of all its people, at peace with its neighbors, and able to defend itself" (2005b). No more explicit frame for America's presence in Iraq is needed, so far as it concerns the purpose of this study. Bush outlines American troops in Iraq as being in the country to achieve an overriding goal: Democracy.

American Commitments Abroad

In his first inaugural address in 2001, George W. Bush delivers a line that sounds as if it were pulled straight from the Nixon Doctrine: "We will defend our allies and our interests." 26 times in all, Bush returns to America's commitments to its regional partners, reinforcing and reiterating the idea that America will hold up its responsibilities in the defense and liberation of the middle east, and especially Iraq. And, much like Nixon's Vietnamization plan, Bush's discussion of America's relationships with its partners in the region—most notably the Iraqi security forces—is at turns framed around the idea of America's diminishing involvement as local forces become better trained to take responsibility for their own security.

In his address to congress a few weeks later, he returns to echo that commitment saying "We will work with our allies and friends to be a force for good and a champion of freedom" (The American Presidency Project, 2018a). It is interesting to note that countries to which the United States sends large contingents of troops to conduct operations, Bush then proudly calls allies in the fight against terrorism. "America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror," he

said. “We'll be partners in rebuilding that country” (2017p). Addressing the President of the Iraqi Governing Council, Bush states “Sir, America stands with you and the Iraqi people as you build a free and peaceful nation” (2017h)

The allies to which Bush seems to refer most often when he uses the word ‘allies,’ are catalogued in the 2004 State of the Union address. This coalition, to which Bush refers at times, seems to provide international insurance of sorts, shielding the United States from criticism of unilateral action. Bush addresses this saying:

Some critics have said our duties in Iraq must be internationalized. This particular criticism is hard to explain to our partners in Britain, Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Hungary, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, the Netherlands, Norway, El Salvador, and the 17 other countries that have committed troops to Iraq. (2017h)

Continuing, Bush declares that working with allies to rid the region and the world of tyranny and terrorism have always been America’s plan saying “From the beginning, America has sought international support for our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and we have gained much support” (2017h). He cautions, however, that the mere presence of a coalition will not hinder America from executing what it considers the necessary plan. “There is a difference, however,” Bush cautions,” between leading a coalition of many nations and submitting to the objections of a few. America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country” (2017h).

The next year, however, Bush reaffirms America’s commitment to work within the coalitions strategies, and act in accordance with their advisement. He notes:

...all the allies of the United States can know: we honor your friendship, we rely on your counsel, and we depend on your help. Division among free nations is a primary goal of freedom's enemies. The concerted effort of free nations to promote democracy is a prelude to our enemies' defeat. (The Miller Center, 2017i)

In the 2005 counterpart to Nixon's Vietnamization, as the Bush administration settles in to its second act, much of Bush's talk of alliances is focused on the transfer of responsibilities to local Iraqi security forces. He paints a picture of a people eager to take responsibility for their own defense:

As Prime Minister Allawi said in his speech to Congress last September, "Ordinary Iraqis are anxious ... to shoulder all the security burdens of our country as quickly as possible." This is the natural desire of an independent nation, and it also is the stated mission of our coalition in Iraq. (The Miller Center, 2017c)

U.S. advisers will work alongside Iraqi forces to prepare them to take over, Bush said. He then notes that:

As those forces become more self-reliant and take on greater security responsibilities, America and its coalition partners will increasingly be in a supporting role. In the end, Iraqis must be able to defend their own country—and we will help that proud, new nation secure its liberty. (The Miller Center, 2017c)

Bush takes on tones of Nixon's warnings against leaving the country before the local forces were ready to provide for their own defense. Like Nixon, he cautions that not only would America's premature exodus cause a collapse, it would damage America's honor as an ally:

A sudden withdrawal of our forces from Iraq would abandon our Iraqi allies to death and prison, would put men like bin Laden and Zarqawi in charge of a strategic country, and show that a pledge from America means little. (The Miller Center, 2017s)

Again echoing Nixonian strains in the next year's address, Bush again cautions that precipitate withdrawal of American troops will lead to a deterioration in the region. He said:

If American forces step back before Baghdad is secure, the Iraqi government would be overrun by extremists on all sides.... A contagion of violence could spill out across the country, and in time, the entire region could be drawn into the conflict. For America, this is a nightmare scenario; for the enemy, this is the objective. (The Miller Center, 2017m)

America, Bush assures all who are listening, friend and foe alike, will not abandon its duties and its commitments. He declares:

...by leaving an assaulted world to fend for itself, we would signal to all that we no longer believe in our own ideals or even in our own courage. But our enemies and our friends can be certain: The United States will not retreat from the world, and we will never surrender to evil. (The Miller Center, 2017s)

Donald J. Trump: 2017-Present

As of the writing of this analysis, Donald J. Trump is the sitting president of the United States, having been elected in November 2016, and inaugurated in January 2018. Because of Trump's short time in office as of this analysis, the body of speeches available for study is small, compared to that of a two-term president such as Eisenhower or Bush, or even that of—ostensibly—a single-term president such as Nixon. Only three addresses delivered by Trump to date fit the criteria for inclusion in this analysis. As such, the insight into patterns and frames used by Trump to set the tone of defense discussions is limited. Still, I felt it prudent to include Trump in this analysis.

Another confounding aspect in the analysis of Trump's framing of American defense postures, is that some (Houghton, 2017; Lin, 2017) have called Trump an isolationist: "The preferred trajectory of president-elect Trump, hardball isolationism and nationalism, runs counter to the American tradition of global leadership and liberal interventionism" (Lin, 2017, p. 4). Perhaps because of Trump's ideologies, less time is dedicated to defense and foreign policy concerns than other presidents of comparable circumstances may have deemed appropriate.

Of the small body of speeches qualified to be included in this analysis, Trump's defense-related focus seems to be primarily on the danger of terrorism. In his 2017 inaugural address, the lone discussion of defense is a reference to terrorism, and "radical Islamic terrorism" specifically. Trump hangs American troubles on many foreign economic enemies, but in this address only makes mention of the country's defense situation once, and takes the opportunity to warn of the dangers of terrorism, and reinforce—much like his Republican predecessors—America's commitment to honoring its allies: "We will reinforce old alliances and form new ones – and unite the civilized world against Radical Islamic Terrorism, which we will eradicate

completely from the face of the Earth” (The Miller Center, 2017j). Trump strikes a strong tone, the same tone on which he campaigned. He projects American strength and resolve, most noticeably with the promise to eradicate radical Islamic terrorism.

In the 2017 address to the joint session of Congress, Trump devotes a slightly larger portion of the address to defense concerns. It is noteworthy, however, that his defense discussion in this address is still markedly shorter than those of his contemporaries in this analysis, even in their first address to the nation. He does, however, give more time to the matter. Again, his primary concern is terrorism. And, again, he frames that concern in terms of “radical Islamic terrorism” (The Miller Center, 2017d).

He continues with his finger pointed squarely at religious extremism, saying “we cannot allow our Nation to become a sanctuary for extremists” (The Miller Center, 2017d). Trump’s condemnation of fundamentalist movements as an existential threat to America and the world continues as he, with brutally unequivocal language, describes the Islamic State group as “a network of lawless savages that have slaughtered Muslims and Christians, and men, women, and children of all faiths and beliefs” (The Miller Center, 2017d).

Trump also uses his second address, following in the grand tradition, to affirm a commitment to America’s partners. And, in that same tradition, to reaffirm the American insistence that each country take its equal share of the burden:

We strongly support NATO, an alliance forged through the bonds of two World Wars that dethroned fascism, and a Cold War that defeated communism. But our partners must meet their financial obligations. And now, based on our very strong and frank discussions, they are beginning to do just that. We expect our partners—whether in

NATO, in the Middle East, or the Pacific—to take a direct and meaningful role in both strategic and military operations and pay their fair share of the cost. (The Miller Center, 2017d)

Of note in this address—and in his discussions of American defense as a function of strong alliances—is that Trump belies his image as an isolationist, saying “Our foreign policy calls for a direct, robust and meaningful engagement with the world” (The Miller Center, 2017d). “America is willing to find new friends,” Trump continues, “and to forge new partnerships, where shared interests align” (The Miller Center, 2017d). This certainly is not the language of a president who sees little value in involving the American defense establishment in the affairs of the world. Yet, he devotes remarkably little time in these addresses to foreign policy and defense concerns.

So prevalent in the speeches of his predecessors, Trump makes little mention of peace in his second address, noting only that, “We want peace, wherever peace can be found” (The Miller Center, 2017d). This is a stark departure from his contemporaries in this analysis, who devote swaths of their addresses to America’s desire for peace.

Remaining constant in his relative dearth of defense discussion in these addresses, Trump again devotes little time to defense in his 2018 State of the Union address. He returns to perennial concerns—terrorism and America’s commitment to its allies—but adds new frames for his administration: nuclear weapons and military readiness as a deterrent. Terrorism is couched in familiar terms for Trump in this address, calling them “evil,” promising to “annihilate them,” and to “extinguish them,” (The Miller Center, 2017r). He again positions the Islamic State group as America’s adversary *du jour*, and in this discussion focuses his efforts on the detention and treatment of captured enemy fighters noting that American forces must have latitude to detain and deal with enemy combatants as they see fit, noting that prior administrations have not been

as tough on enemy fighters as is necessary. That discussion of terrorism is also partly couched in the recurrent frame of a commitment to alliances. The advances against the Islamic State group, Trump notes, have been a result of working with allies in the region:

Last year, I also pledged that we would work with our allies to extinguish ISIS from the face of the Earth. One year later, I am proud to report that the coalition to defeat ISIS has liberated almost 100 percent of the territory once held by these killers in Iraq and Syria. (The Miller Center, 2017r)

In a new area of concern to the Trump administration, the nuclear weapons frame so predominant in the addresses of Eisenhower—and to a lesser extent, Bush—surfaces in this address. In a statement reminiscent of Eisenhower’s wary hopes for disarmament which were set against the reality of the prolific Soviet nuclear program, Trump states:

As part of our defense, we must modernize and rebuild our nuclear arsenal, hopefully never having to use it, but making it so strong and powerful that it will deter any acts of aggression. Perhaps someday in the future there will be a magical moment when the countries of the world will get together to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, we are not there yet. (The Miller Center, 2017r)

He positions North Korea as another of America’s most adversarial world neighbors and sounds a refrain of nuclear fear regarding the country:

North Korea’s reckless pursuit of nuclear missiles could very soon threaten our homeland.... We need only look at the depraved character of the North Korean regime to understand the nature of the nuclear threat it could pose to America and our allies. (The Miller Center, 2017d)

Donald Trump's defense discussions in these addresses, as noted earlier, are a departure from the lengthy foreign policy missives of his contemporaries. His supposed isolationism could play a role in that, though he does, as noted earlier, assert his desire to build partnerships. Those discussions he does engage in sound familiar refrains, reinforcing frames found repeatedly in this analysis: terrorism (a frequent frame for Bush), American commitments to its allies, and the threat of nuclear war.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

Research Question 1

This study sought to answer several questions, the most crucial of which concerned the existence of shared frames American presidents—or at the very least Republican presidents—use when they apprise the nation and the congress of the country’s defense efforts. The study yielded an unequivocal answer to that question: a resounding yes. The following are three ways in which the four presidents included in this analysis all frame their discussions of warfare, defense, and security.

A Better World

Each president included in this analysis makes America’s military action and policies a precursor to peace, stability, democracy, or freedom. Over the course of the addresses studied, each of the speakers addresses the ways in which America must go to war in order to ensure a more peaceful world. 102 passages over the addresses in this study concern peace. 45 passages concern détente. 41 passages concern America’s role in establishing democracy around the world.

Taken as a whole, it becomes clear that these presidents want American military actions, and those in which it is involved via coalition agreements, to be seen as serving the purpose of securing a better world. This world, they assert time and again, will be more peaceful. This world will be marked by a cessation of armed conflicts. This world will be fairer. This world will be marked by the right of all people to self-determination. Eisenhower (2018d) notes that peace is the great aim of all the peoples of the world, and that action must be taken to secure that peace. He declares that America abhors war, and it is only in the service of peace that America must

maintain indomitable military power (2018l). Nixon declares that no greater honor can be bestowed on a country than the title of peacemaker (2018m) and repeatedly expresses his wishes that the American generation succeeding his will be the first to never face the scourge of war (1970b, 1972, 1973, 1974). Bush sings the praises of the establishment of burgeoning democracies all over the Middle East and frames American involvement as the catalyst by which they take root and expand. Even in Trump's scant few mentions of defense he declares that he wants peace wherever it can be found (2017r).

The presidents studied here use their addresses to guide their audiences toward a vision of an America dedicated to using its military power and potent defense establishment not for imperial aims, but in the service of a more peaceful, free, and fair world. America, they boldly declare, is the guardian and the harbinger of a better world.

A Great Enemy

Also shared among the speeches of all presidents in this study is the existence of a great foe against which America is fighting for its way of life, its safety, and its continued prosperity. Some adversary against which the full weight of American resolve must be thrown—both militarily and ideologically—is common to all four presidents analyzed for this study. For some presidents that enemy is faceless, as is the case in Eisenhower's discourses on communism, and Bush and Trump's treatises on terrorism. These anonymous phantoms hover over America and strike fear into the hearts of the people. Terrorism and communism have no state, no flag, and no

anthem. They are everyone and they are everywhere—though Eisenhower used “communism” as a byword for the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower, Bush, and Trump’s great monsters are ideologies rather than established, definable states. Nixon, on the other hand, had an established nation-state on which to focus America’s military might. The North Vietnamese army and their Viet Cong contemporaries provided Nixon a living, breathing, well-defined foe to fight. However, Nixon also focused on the threat of communism to all that Americans hold dear, though to a lesser degree, certainly, than Eisenhower did.

Eisenhower notes that communism’s imperialist aims are the greatest threat not only to America but to the success and safety of the better world he hopes for (2018d). With great persistence, Nixon laments the belligerence and intransigence of America’s North Vietnamese enemy, painting a picture of a state hellbent on the destruction and humiliation of America. Bush speaks of untold hordes of trained terrorists always waiting in the shadows to unleash violence on America and the whole of the civilized world. Trump cautions that terrorism in general, and specifically the Islamic State group threatens America, her allies, and the whole of humanity.

A Firm Friend

The third common thread woven among all the addresses in this study, is the constant affirmation of the United States’ firm commitments to its allies. Even in cases where the underlying tone is one of insisting that American partners abroad shoulder more of the burden of their own defense, the presidents in this study are quick to remind America’s allies that the country will honor its pledges.

Eisenhower lauds the United Nations and the United States place in the coalition, declaring it an essential building block of the better world, and deserving of the United States' full support and cooperation (2018h). He cautions against "Fortress America" (2018e) and insists that honoring American commitments abroad is an imperative, rather than an option. He warns that an American neglect of any of its partners could lead neophyte nations to seek help from countries less in line with American ideals and interests (2018f). Nixon so values American commitments to allied nations that he makes that pledge the focus of the Nixon Doctrine. Nixon assures the world that America will honor its treaties, provide a nuclear shield for its allies, and will provide a conventional military shield in the event of any other type of non-nuclear aggression (The Miller Center, 2017u).

Bush praises the coalition against global terrorism, declaring that the alliance is necessary to secure peace and freedom in the world, and affirming America's resolute commitment (The American Presidency Project, 2018a). In 2004, Bush addresses the a leader in charge of rebuilding Iraq in the wake of the American invasion directly in his State of the Union address, declaring that the country now has a steadfast friend in the United States. American alliances are so crucial to Bush that he catalogs a list of the countries standing by America's side in the global war on terror, proudly naming 34 nations in league with the United States in the fight against terrorism. Donald Trump sings the praises of robust global defense partnerships (The Miller Center, 2017d) and praises NATO and the coalition against the Islamic State group. (The Miller Center, 2017d)

Research Question 2

Eisenhower's Just Peace

In his discussions of the pursuit of peace—a frame common to all the presidential speeches studied here—Dwight Eisenhower leans heavily not only on the idea of peace, but on the subtheme of a “just peace” or a “peace with justice.” This concept exists under the auspices of the better world frame discussed above—though it is salient only in Eisenhower’s addresses. Other presidents make passing mention of just peace, but Eisenhower uses the phrase repeatedly. The most daunting issue with this idea, is that it seems to be a purely rhetorical device, void of real substance. When it is used, no concrete context is given to give an indication as to what the president intends to accomplish by expressing his desire for a “just peace.” It is quite clear that the aim is peace, at a macro level, but the justice component of this nebulous idea escapes definition, at least where it concerns this analysis.

It is possible that this notion of a “just peace” is intended to undergird the assertions from Eisenhower that American power will not be used to subjugate or usher in a new age of American imperialism. Eisenhower may seek to express his desire not only for peace, but peace not bought by betraying American values—or at least those values that the United States wishes the world to see as quintessentially American. Perhaps he intends to reassure the world that the United States seeks peace, but that peace will be won by holding fast to the principles of democracy, the right to self-determination, the proper carrying out of armed conflict based on international rules of war.

This just peace concept, then, becomes a matter of military history, military policy, and just war theory, and supposes at least a cursory familiarity with those areas in order to be an idea fully grasped. This *jus post bellum* philosophy (Williams & Caldwell, 2006) has rich roots in

those areas but is not one the average American without studied exposure to the concept would be likely to understand. Even the scholarship on *jus post bellum* is inconclusive on exactly what constitutes a just peace:

...*jus post bellum* is “the least developed part of just war theory,” as Walzer (2004:161) notes. In spite of the many studies that have appeared concerning war crimes tribunals, truth commissions, and other strategies for achieving justice in the aftermath of conflict, general principles of justice such as those embodied in the just war tradition are absent. (Williams & Caldwell, 2006, p. 311)

Thus, it is not too great a supposition that for Eisenhower, the use of the notions of just peace and peace with justice are meant to serve no greater aim than to instill an indefinable and not-too-closely-questioned confidence in the moral probity of the country’s commander-in-chief.

Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Eisenhower devotes quite a bit of time in his addresses to the dangers of nuclear war, at turns calling for disarmament, and in the next breath declaring—with uncharacteristic bravado—that America will not relinquish its nuclear weapons while other nations retain theirs. Trump echoes that statement nearly 60 years later, asserting nearly the exact same thing: a wish for a nuclear-free world, rooted in the reality of a world marked by proliferation rather than arms limitation. Bush frames much of America’s defense activities as a bulwark against the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, which comprise not only nuclear weapons, but chemical and biological weapons. As previously noted in the analysis of Bush’s speeches, he devotes large portions of his addresses to explicating the dangers of these weapons.

The outlier, then, is Nixon. While he does discuss nuclear weapons in some capacity, they are by no means a focus of his efforts to frame defense. Aside from being a part of the second tenet of the Nixon Doctrine, nuclear arms play a surprisingly small role in the Nixonian defense priorities. He simply does not devote much of his addresses to the cataclysm of nuclear weapons.

Democracy

George W. Bush constantly frames American military action as a prerequisite for the successful germination of democracy in the world. He also positions the presence of democracy in other parts of the world as being of vital concern to American safety and security, both at home and abroad. While Nixon and Eisenhower do broach the subject of the importance of democracy around the world, they do not dedicate nearly as much time to the idea as Bush does. Even when they do, the underlying idea in their discussions of democracy seems to be as a juxtaposition against communism, rather than pursuing the ideology for its own sake, and thus the topic is relegated to passing statements.

Research Question 3

Brutal Language

The framing of American defense activities remains remarkably similar from Eisenhower to Nixon. Peace is the major concern of both men. Neither truly use language centered around vanquishing a foe. Bush begins to speak about pursuing terrorists with relentless resolve (The Miller Center, 2017p). Even so, Bush's language is conceptual, portraying the American strategy as one of determined persistence rather than brutality (The Miller Center, 2017h; 2017p). Trump's promises to "annihilate" and "extinguish" (The Miller Center, 2017r) America's enemies represent the first real, appreciable evolution in the way that these presidents talk about war. Prior to these statements, which could rightly justify the bellicose label (Hennigan, Cloud, & Bierman, 2017), the words from the White House had been relatively measured. Trump's language changes that entirely.

Communism and Terrorism

There are a few areas contained within the great enemy frame common to all presidents analyzed here, which when viewed with greater specificity break out into smaller subthemes unique to one or two presidents. These are typically functions of the age in which these presidents' administrations occurred. In the 2000s, global communism is a much less menacing concern than in the epoch of Eisenhower and Nixon. Likewise, terrorism, while present in Eisenhower and Nixon's period, was of less crucial concern than in the post-September 11 world in which the Bush and Trump presidencies are positioned.

Emblematic of the political landscape of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, the concern of Communism's designs on the world's power structures factors heavily into the addresses of Eisenhower and Nixon. Eisenhower frames Communism as perhaps the greatest existential threat

to American ideals and the practical safety of American territory and American interests. The Soviet Union is the menace Eisenhower most often references in terms of Communism, though he acknowledges communism's corrupting influence in other parts of the world. Nixon's concern with communism does, at turns, focus on the Soviet Union. His primary concern in regards to communism, however, is its influence in Southeast Asia. Given his supervision of the American war in Vietnam, this is to be expected.

Bush and Trump's concern in the 2000s with terrorism is an updated rendering of the great enemy frame represented in Eisenhower and Nixon's speeches by Communism. Bush concerns himself with terrorism constantly, as seen in the analysis of his addresses. Trump, in the few mentions he makes of defense issues in his addresses, talks mainly of terrorism. Both presidents frame the faceless menace of terrorism as America's chief defense concern in these addresses.

Research Question 4

This question can be answered in two ways. Trump's addresses lack a depth of discussion of defense-related issues. In that sense his approach to defense is atypical in comparison to that of his contemporaries. As noted above, he dedicates a substantially smaller proportion of his addresses. What time Trump does dedicate to defense in these addresses, however, leverages the same frames as his predecessors: the great enemy, the need for peace, and America's commitment to its allies.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

As noted in the introductory section of this study, examining four Republican presidents allows us to discover similarities and differences across time for a particular political ideology. To that end, I asked four questions. The answers to those four questions provide a clear picture. Across four men, elected to seven presidential terms spanning 22 years in office and 65 years of United States history, and each presiding over a period of active armed conflict, the broad frames which American presidents use to discuss defense are the same: They galvanize the country and the congress against a great foe; they proclaim that the virtue of American military action lies in its service of a more just and peaceful world; and they make strident pronouncements of commitment to American pledges and alliances the world over. Four men's speeches were analyzed, and four men's speeches were marked by these three frames, repeatedly.

There are also frames which appear or disappear entirely based on the time period in which a given president governed and based on the world's temperament and the state of larger American foreign policy at the time. Some presidents, such as Donald Trump, use markedly more bombastic language than others. Not surprisingly, owing to the vacillations of turmoil and peace that have marked American society and the global defense climate in the years since Dwight D. Eisenhower's election, there are frames used by some presidents that are either altogether absent or discussed only in cursory terms.

The utility of this study lies in its ability to gauge the consistency or the change in the way that Americans are informed about their country's defense. Elites, such as presidents, have a marked effect on the salience of issues in the public agenda (Jacoby, 2000) and that effect is even

more pronounced when the subject at hand is related to foreign policy (Cohen, 1995). It is useful, then, to have a sense of what the country's chief executive and commander-in-chief tell the citizens about how and why the nation conducts war in the way that it does.

It may well be that these frames reflect true perennial concerns for the American defense establishment, and thus deserve constant affirmation and attention from the nation's highest office. American citizens would also do well, however, to recognize the power that the speaker holds over the interpretation of the message. Until the speaker deems the object worthy of exposition, and imbues it with his chosen attributes (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 1997) the message has no meaning (Vatz, 1973).

If anything, the inquiry that served as the catalyst for this research, the question of the normality of Donald Trump's war rhetoric, is answered in the absence of defense talk from the sitting president. The larger frames, however, remain the same across the whole corpus of these addresses. Perhaps the short duration of Trump's administration to the present influences the amount of time he dedicates to the topic in his national addresses. Though, with ongoing American involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2017) and a nuclear standoff with North Korea (Lamothe, 20017), the expectation would be a greater dedication to defense matters in public addresses by Trump.

From Eisenhower's inauguration in 1953 to the closing words of Donald Trump's 2018 Address to the Nation on the State of the Union, the way that modern wartime Republican presidents have talked about war is remarkably similar. This study brings into focus a clear picture of the reality of the public defense agenda flowing from the office of modern Republican president: the messenger may change, but the message will remain the same.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: List of Presidential Addresses Analyzed

Dwight D. Eisenhower

- Inaugural Address: Delivered Jan. 20, 1953
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Feb. 2, 1953
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 7, 1954
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 6, 1955
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 5, 1956
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 1, 1957
- Second Inaugural Address: Delivered Jan. 21, 1957
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 9, 1958
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 9, 1959
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 7, 1960
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 12, 1961
- Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People: Delivered Jan. 17, 1961

Richard M. Nixon

- First Inaugural Address: Delivered Jan. 20, 1969
- Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam: Delivered Nov. 3, 1969
- Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 22, 1970
- Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia: Delivered April 30, 1970
- Radio Address About Second Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress: Delivered Feb. 25, 1971
- Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia: Delivered April 7, 1971
- Address on the State of the Union Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress: Delivered Jan. 20, 1972
- Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia: Delivered May 8, 1972
- Second Inaugural Address: Delivered Jan. 20, 1973
- Address to the Nation Announcing an Agreement on Ending the War in Vietnam: Delivered Jan. 23, 1973
- Address on the State of the Union Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress: Delivered Jan. 30, 1974

George W. Bush

- Inaugural Address: Delivered Jan. 30, 2001
- Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals: Delivered Feb. 27, 2001
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 29, 2002
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 28, 2003
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 20, 2004
- Second Inaugural Address: Delivered Jan. 20, 2005
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Feb. 2, 2005

- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 31, 2006
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 23, 2007
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 28, 2008
- Farewell Address to the Nation: Delivered Jan 15, 2009

Donald J. Trump

- Inaugural Address: Delivered Jan. 20, 2017
- Address to a Joint Session of Congress: Delivered, Jan. 28, 2017
- Address to the Nation on the State of the Union: Delivered Jan. 30, 2018

Appendix B: A Note on Richard Nixon's Speeches

Richard Nixon's speeches did not follow what could be considered the normal pattern. Many of his publicly-delivered State of the Union addresses did not deeply examine defense issues, with Nixon instead opting to give separate addresses on the state of affairs in Southeast Asia, typically in the spring of each year. Those public addresses are included in this analysis.

Nixon delivered neither a State of the Union Address nor an Address to a Joint Session of Congress in 1969; his first State of the Union address was delivered as a speech to a joint session of Congress in January 1970.

Nixon's second State of the Union address, in 1971, did not discuss defense issues. He sent a foreign policy report to Congress in February of that year and relayed a radio address to the public about the contents of that report to congress. That radio address is included in this analysis.

In 1972, Nixon delivered a State of the Union address as a speech to a joint session of congress; he also sent a separate, written State of the Union message to the congress that year. The delivered speech, rather than the written message to Congress is included in this analysis.

In 1973, Nixon in effect delivered 11 State of the Union messages, in written and speech form. He delivered an overview address on February 2, 1973 wherein he announced that he would give series of messages, each focusing on different public policy issues. He proceeded to send five written messages to congress, in conjunction with five radio addresses summarizing each of the messages sent to congress. None of those addresses, however, discuss defense issues. As such, no State of the Union address has been included in this analysis for 1973.

In 1974, Nixon delivered a State of the Union speech to a joint session of the congress, in addition to sending a written message to Congress. Only the speech, delivered on January 30, 1974 is included in this analysis.

Each year from 1969 to 1973, Nixon delivered an address apprising the nation of the current state of the war in Southeast Asia, including an address announcing the end of the war in Vietnam in January 1973. As those speeches effectively served in place of more robust defense and national security sections of the traditional State of the Union addresses, I have chosen to include those four speeches in this analysis to supplement the dearth of defense discussion in the president's annual addresses.

Appendix C: Dwight D. Eisenhower Thematic Rubric

		ING 1	SOT U 1	SOT U 2	SOT U 3	SOT U 4	ING 2	SOT U 5	SOT U 6	SOT U 7	SOT U 8	SOT U 9	FW	Theme Total
America as a global leader	AL	1	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	6
Commitment to Allies	CA	1	5	13	2	2	2	3	2	5	3	2	0	40
Communism as Evil	CE	0	5	3	3	3	1	0	1	2	1	7	1	26
Defense Costs	DC	0	6	5	7	7	1	2	3	4	1	2	0	38
Democracy	DE	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Freedom	FR	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	6
Homeland Security	HS	0	3	3	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	10
Humanitarian	HU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
Justice	JU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Readiness	MR	2	5	7	12	2	0	1	8	2	2	4	3	45
Military Superiority	MS	0	4	3	2	1	0	0	2	0	0	6	0	18
Nuclear Weapons	NW	1	1	3	4	4	0	1	7	3	7	4	1	35
Peace	PE	0	2	5	3	5	3	3	5	4	5	4	3	39
Peace Talks	PT	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	5
Russia	RU	0	1	1	1	2	0	1	3	1	3	1	0	14
Stability in Region	SR	0	4	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	8
		1953	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1961	

Appendix D: Richard M. Nixon Thematic Rubric

		ING 1	WIV	SOTU 1	SSA	FPA	SSA	SOTU 3	SSA	ING 2	WIV	SOTU 5	Theme Total
America as a global leader	AL	1	1	0		2		2		1		1	8
Battlefield Situation	BS						1						1
Casualties	CS		7		5		1						13
Commitment to Allies	CA	0	3	3	3	11	3	2		2	2	1	30
Communism as Evil	CE	0	7	1	2	0	5	0		0		1	16
Defense Costs	DC	1		2		1		1		0			5
Democracy	DE	1	2	0	3	0	1	0		0	1		8
Freedom	FR	0		0		0		0		0			0
Homeland Security	HS	0		0		0		0		0			0
Humanitarian	HU	0	3	0	1	0		0		0			4
Justice	JU	0		0		0		0		0			0
Military Readiness	MR	0		0		2		2		0		2	6
Military Superiority	MS	0		0		0	1	0		0			1
Nuclear Weapons	NW	0		1		2		2		1		1	7
Peace	PE	7	10	6	4	3	5	3		5	7	5	55
Peace Talks	PT	2	16	2	2	0	12	0		0	3	2	39
Russia	RU	0	2	1		1	3	1		0		3	11
Stability in Region	SR	0		0		0		0		0			0
Troop Numbers	TN		4		3		2						9
Vietnamization	VZ		10		5		1						16
Withdrawal	WD		11		9		4				1		25

Appendix E: George W. Bush Thematic Rubric

		ING 1	AJSC	SOTU 1	SOTU 2	SOTU 3	ING 2	SOTU 4	SOTU 5	SOTU 6	SOTU 7	FW	Theme Total
America as a global leader	AL					1			1				2
Commitment to Allies	CA	1	1	4	1	4	1	4	4	6			26
Communism as Evil	CE												0
Defense Costs	DC		2	4	1								7
Democracy	DE					5	1	9	6	7	2	2	32
Extremism	EX									4	1	2	7
Freedom	FR												0
Homeland Security	HS			5	1	3			1	1		1	12
Humanitarian	HU			1	2	1							4
Intelligence	IT				1	1					1	1	4
Justice	JU			1	1	2							4
Justice	JU												0
Military Readiness	MR	1	2		1								4
Military Superiority	MS												0
Nuclear Weapons	NW		1		1	1		1	1		1		6
Peace	PE		2		1	2		2		1			8
Peace Talks	PT					1							1
Resolve	RE				1	3	1	2	1	3	1		12
Russia	RU			1									1
Stability in Region	SR												0
State Sponsors of Terrorism	ST			1	3			3	1		1		9
Terrorism	TR	1	1	13	6	5		3	1	2	4	1	37
Weapons of Mass Destruction	WMD	1	1	9	14	2		2	3		2		34

Appendix F: Donald J. Trump Thematic Rubric

		ING 1	AJSC	SOTU 1	Theme Total
America as a global leader	AL				0
Commitment to Allies	CA	1	4	2	7
Communism as Evil	CE			1	1
Defense Costs	DC				0
Democracy	DE			1	1
Extremism	EX				0
Freedom	FR				0
Homeland Security	HS				0
Humanitarian	HU		1		1
Intelligence	IT				0
Justice	JU				0
Justice	JU				0
Military Readiness	MR		1		1
Military Superiority	MS				0
Nuclear Weapons	NW		1	3	4
Peace	PE		1		1
Peace Talks	PT				0
Resolve	RE				0
Russia	RU				0
Stability in Region	SR				0
State Sponsors of Terrorism	ST				0
Terrorism	TR		4	3	7

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