Local Law Enforcement’s Counter Terrorism Capabilities

A thesis
presented to
the faculty of the Department of Criminal Justice
East Tennessee State University

In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts of Criminal Justice and Criminology

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December  2008

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Keywords: Law Enforcement, Counter-Terrorism, Terrorism
ABSTRACT

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by

J. Ryan Presnell

The purpose of this study was to analyze local law enforcement’s counter-terrorism capabilities as it relates to the varying size of United States local law enforcement agencies. Data for the study came from a study entitled “Impact of Terrorism on State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Criminal Justice Systems in the United States, 2004.” Statistical analysis revealed that there are large disparities in the allocation of resources to intelligence gathering, analyzing, and sharing between smaller local law enforcement agencies and their larger counterparts. Furthermore, smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner consistent with the interactions between larger agencies and federal authorities. However, the study did reveal officers in smaller local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the duties of homeland security on a level commensurate with those in larger local law enforcement agencies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

To best protect the American people, homeland security must be a responsibility shared across our entire Nation. As we further develop a national culture of preparedness, our local, Tribal, State, and Federal governments, faith-based and community organizations, and businesses must be partners in securing the Homeland.

*President George W. Bush, 2007 National Strategy of Homeland Security*

**Background of the Problem**

The face of terror has changed dramatically since 9/11. Attacks across the world have shown that Al-Qaeda was and still is still capable of carrying out attacks both large and small. While the War on Terror has taken a toll on their operational capability, they continue to adapt in order to globally survive (United States of America State Department, n.d.).

While many applaud the fact there have been no attacks in the United States since 9/11, is local law enforcement nationwide still making the appropriate changes to successfully meet the demands of a changing threat? Researchers have shown that Al-Qaeda continues to move towards a ‘wave attack’ mentality consisting of several simple attacks rather than one spectacular, complicated attack, as exhibited by the three coordinated London Transportation System bombings (Gips, 2005). It seems the terror threat may have moved from spectacular and complicated airliner hijackings to lone suicide bombers. When researchers evaluate the terror caused by a single suicide bomber and then extrapolate this evaluation to 10 suicide bombings being executed on a weekly basis for over 2 months, the terror caused by this ‘wave’ approach is easy to see. With such an approach being taken by the enemy, one must understand that a suicide
bomber or lone sniper is just as effective in a small area such as a Sheboygan, Wisconsin mall as they are at a larger scale like Times Square. Thus, local law enforcement must be readily able to thwart and respond to such an attack in every city and town, not just in the larger metropolitan areas.

In order to effectively combat this threat, there must be several areas where local law enforcement agencies are well versed. This study focuses on three of these areas: intelligence operations, interaction with federal authorities, and interjection of counter terror into community policing efforts. These three areas are most certainly tied together.

The first area is intelligence. Officers from top to bottom must be adept at gathering, analyzing, and sharing intelligence in a manner consistent with the national strategy. However, this is not a simple undertaking as terror intelligence can be a complicated skill. Hence, the most important attribute to this incorporation and the second area of focus is training and mentoring garnered through the interaction with federal authorities. Here, federal agencies must provide two things. The first is timely, accurate, and pointed intelligence and the second is training in counter-terror fields. But in order for all of this to be successful, local law enforcement agencies must incorporate homeland security into a community policing approach (Doherty, 2006), which is the third arena of focus for the study. Without counter-terror intelligence being interjected into everyday policing efforts, the local law enforcement agencies are blind to the terror threat that is operating within their communities.
Scope of the Study

The results of this study answers the question, “are smaller agencies prepared to combat today’s terror threat through intelligence, interaction with federal agencies, and incorporating homeland security into community policing approaches on a level commensurate with larger agencies?” Using a data set collected by The Council of State Governments, this researcher examined data in several arenas to determine if large policing agencies as well as small agencies are adapting to meet Al-Qaida’s operational and tactical shift. Allocation of resources to intelligence, relationships and interactions with federal agencies, and how officers’ duties have been affected by counter-terror on a daily basis are examined to attempt to answer the hypotheses posed by this study. By testing the three hypotheses concerning the aforementioned arenas, it is envisioned that the larger question stated above will be answered.

Hypotheses

When placed together, the hypotheses answer the larger question of, ‘are smaller agencies taking an active role in the combating of terrorism on the homeland?’ Each hypothesis consists of three focus areas: Intelligence gathering, interactions with federal agencies, and everyday duties of officers on patrol.

H1: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not allocating resources to intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing in a manner consistent with larger agencies.

H2: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner consistent with the interactions between larger agencies and federal law enforcement.
H3: Since 9/11 officers in larger local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the duties of homeland security more than smaller local law enforcement agencies.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE PRIOR RESEARCH

To find research on local law enforcement’s role in combating terror is a task in and of itself. To find empirical research would be to stumble upon a proverbial gold mine. In this paper, only one empirical study is discussed, and it is minor in nature. Basically, most of the knowledge in this area is not empirically supported; most is extremely well-founded opinion from terrorism scholars and law enforcement experts. These opinions will be stated here in order to provide the proper background for this study.

Research, as it is concerned for local law enforcement, has been categorized into three general categories: the threat posed by terrorists, the role of intelligence, and interaction with federal law enforcement. Many researchers believe the threat is currently evolving and is looking to break into new tactics called ‘wave attacks.’ These wave attacks are simpler tactics such as a suicide bomber, and several of these smaller attacks would be carried out over a matter of days, as exhibited by past international actions of Al-Qaida. Intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing are pivotal in protecting the homeland. Research shows that in order for local law enforcement to successfully exploit intelligence, they must integrate it into a community policing framework and be properly trained in intelligence operations because the proper intelligence sharing network has yet to be introduced. That being said, this training more times than not comes from federal authorities, as does much of the other training required for local law enforcement to properly thwart and react to terrorist activity in the United States.
The Evolving Threat

The threat of terrorism in the United States evolves each and every day. With the terrorists’ widespread adoption of internet propaganda and training, a blueprint for a successful attack is simply an anonymous click away. (Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 21). Obviously, Al-Qaida remains the most prominent threat to the United States. The National Strategy for Homeland Security claims:

Despite concerted worldwide efforts in the aftermath of September 11 that have disrupted terrorist plots and constrained al-Qaida’s ability to strike the Homeland, the United States faces a persistent and evolving terrorist threat, primarily from violent Islamic terrorist groups and cells. Currently, the most serious and dangerous manifestation of this threat remains al-Qaida, which is driven by an undiminished strategic intent to attack our Homeland. Although earlier efforts in the War on Terror deprived al-Qaida of its safe haven in Afghanistan and degraded its network by capturing or killing most of those responsible for September 11, the group has protected its top leadership, replenished operational lieutenants, and regenerated a safe haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas – core capabilities that would help facilitate another attack on the Homeland. (Homeland Security Council, p. 9)

Independent researchers would also agree with the government writers of this strategy to assume that Al-Qaida is the number one terror threat to national security. However, this seems to be where the agreements might end. In this strategy, Al-Qaida is painted as still an operating command center actively doling out plans to a well-organized command chain of eager jihadists. However, evidence from the London bombings have prompted some outside of government to claim that Osama Bin Laden has become an ‘ism,’ inspiring shoot off cells that rarely, if ever, come into contact with Al-Qaida commanders. Research of attacks and communications between jihadists and Al-Qaida commanders leads Ron Suskind to believe “al-Qaeda has largely devolved or maybe evolved into a franchise operation. Radical groups in various countries are largely self-activated and self-sustaining…”(Suskind, 2006, p. 2). Suskind goes on to say “10
planes exploding over the Atlantic or in U.S. airspace would indeed have created what U.S. experts believe our jihadist opponents desire: an upward arc of terror and dread between a second-wave attack and whatever might follow, five or even 10 years down the road” (p. 2). Operationally speaking, it seems Al-Qaida is not in the business of creating large scale attacks (hijacking an airliner) at a blistering pace but to set in motion independent cells that have the ability to create small scale attacks (suicide bomber) that not only terrorize for the current news cycle but for years to come.

What does this operational change in Al-Qaida mean for law enforcement in the United States? Researchers have gravitated towards the idea that the frequency of attacks may increase and even be lumped together over a matter of weeks and move towards simpler tactics when held against the sensationalism of 9/11.

A good example of Al-Qaida inspired terror groups moving away from direct contact with their command is the plot to blow up JFK’s fuel line averted in early 2007. The plotters had connections inside the countries of Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, two countries not normally associated with Al-Qaida, and the legal complaint against the plotters never details Al-Qaida connections. However, “the details of the plot speak to the ongoing debate about the relevance of al Qaeda's central leadership. While the name "al Qaeda" is never mentioned in the complaint, a senior U.S. military intelligence officer says that "it's definitely there if you know what to look for" (Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2007, p. 3).

While this example serves to strengthen the idea that Al-Qaida has moved towards largely unconnected cells, the London Transportation system bombings help solidify the idea of a transition towards tactics that are much more simple than hijacking airliners. Furthermore, a
A firm called Security Management conducted research on over 30 Al-Qaida inspired attacks. The findings were as follows:

Until now, the same type of target or sector had never been hit twice in quick succession. The group's attacks on businesses, government and diplomatic facilities, and the commercial aviation system have been simultaneous or spread out, not sequential. Before London, the shortest time between attacks on two similar targets occurred when a September 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, was followed by a December 2004 attack on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. About five months separated an attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, and a cluster of suicide bombings in Casablanca, Morocco, three of which struck a hotel, a restaurant, and a Jewish community center.

If al Qaeda planned the July 7 and 21 attacks, as well as a third strike on the London transit system that was thwarted or aborted, then this does represent a shift in al Qaeda’s pattern of attacks, says Jeff Chapman, who has conducted hundreds of terrorist investigations. "We haven't seen this before outside of Iraq." (Gips, 2005, p. 1)

An assessment from a U.S. Army Military Intelligence Bulletin further solidifies this finding:

Al-Qaeda no longer believes that single, large-scale attacks not employing CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) have enough of an impact for its core series of operations. Consequently, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are actively pursuing a strategy of "wave attacks" designed to hit multiple targets and target classes around the world using a variety of tactics over the course of concentrated 7-9 week periods. The recent attacks in Chechnya, Riyadh, and Casablanca point to the beginning of the second such wave of attacks. Additional small and large-scale attacks can be expected around the world during the next 6-8 weeks. The period running from 6 October 2002 to 28 November 2002 marked the highest concentrated period ever of successfully executed large and small-scale operations by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Rather than ride out the "afterglow" period following the Limburg operation, al-Qaeda and its affiliates continued to strike. The events of the past five days indicate the beginning of a similar trend. No fewer than four significant attacks have been executed in Chechnya, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and Casablanca, Morocco. Additional small and large-scale attacks can be expected around the world during the next 6-8 weeks. (Venzeke, 2003, p. 1)
While these tactics have not been put into use in the United States, there are good examples of these wave attacks on the international scene. Below is a listing of Al-Qaida attacks between the dates of 12 May 2003 and 16 May 2003 inclusive.

12 May 2003: Vehicular, Suicide Bombing--Chechen Nadterechnyy District administration building--Znamenskoye, Chechnya.

13 May 2003: Vehicular, Suicide Bombing--Jedawal Compound--Riyadh, Saudi Arabia--al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.


13 May 2003: Bombing--Saudi Maintenance Company (Siyanco) Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

14 May 2003: Assassination, Suicide Bombing--Chechen Administration leader Akhmad Kadyro--Iliskhan-Yurt, Chechnya.

16 May 2003: Suicide Bombing--Restaurant (Israeli ownership)---Casablanca, Morocco.

16 May 2003: Suicide Bombing--Spain House (Spanish social club/restaurant)-Casablanca, Morocco.

16 May 2003: Suicide Bombing/ Vehicular Bombing (unconfirmed)--Israeli Alliance Circle Club--Casablanca, Morocco.

16 May 2003: Suicide Bombing--Farah Maghreb Hotel--Casablanca, Morocco.

16 May 2003: Suicide Bombing--Jewish Cemetery--Casablanca, Morocco.

Obviously, Al-Qaida has shown a propensity towards the wave attack on the international scene. Researchers believe the wave attack tactics will occur in the United States.
Intelligence

The ability of law enforcement to gather, analyze, and share intelligence is of utmost importance in preempting and reacting to terrorism. While this is an everyday occurrence for federal law enforcement bodies, local law enforcement must also be familiar with the proper techniques needed to fully use terrorism intelligence. The idea of local law enforcement officers acting as collectors of terror intelligence concerning national defense is a rather new concept. Thus, the research in this area reflects this fact.

The most publicly visible product of law enforcement intelligence is the Homeland Security Alert System (HSAS), more commonly recognized as the threat levels posted by the Department of Homeland Security in the form of a color such as red and orange. “The advisory system serves as a foundation for a simple communications structure for the dissemination of information regarding the risk of possible terrorist attacks to all levels of government, as well as our nation's citizens” (Kemp, 2006, p. 2).

Obviously, this is the most basic operation contained within the national intelligence sharing network. One merely needs to turn on a national news network to find out what the threat level is for the day. For most citizens, the threat level barely warrants recognition. But what does it mean for our nation’s local law enforcement? When the threat condition reaches threat level orange (which means a high threat of terrorist activity, which is extremely rare), there are several measures to be taken by the police. Below is a list of the measures expected to be accomplished by local law enforcement personnel:

Police and fire personnel should maintain a heightened sense of awareness while responding to, and working at, incident scenes.
Appropriate city officials (city manager, police chief, fire chief, and public works director) should review local emergency response plans and be prepared to activate their emergency operations center.

City managers (as well as police chiefs, fire chiefs, and public works directors) should communicate and coordinate with their respective counterparts at other levels of government in case a coordinated response is needed.

Police chiefs should closely monitor all available security and intelligence data from federal, state, and other local law enforcement agencies.

Police personnel should inspect building and parking areas for suspicious packages.

City managers should work closely with their police chiefs to consider controlled access to all municipal buildings, other significant facilities, and critical components of the public infrastructure.

City managers and police chiefs should ensure that appropriate security measures are in place and are functioning properly.

Police chiefs should make sure that police officers closely monitor all municipal reservoirs and watershed areas, wastewater treatment plants, and other sensitive public facilities.

The city manager should place all emergency management and specialized response teams on call-back alert status. This is also applicable to police and fire chiefs.

The police chief should limit access points at critical facilities to essential personnel only. Entry control procedures should be strictly enforced.

The police chief should ensure that officers are enforcing the restrictions on the parking of vehicles near sensitive public buildings.

The police chief should increase defensive measures around key structures and for major public events.

Both the police chief and the fire chief should make sure that critical response vehicles are stored in a secure area or in an indoor parking facility, if one is available. (Kemp, 2006, p. 3)
Obviously, one can recognize how the above tasks could quickly become a large strain on the manpower of an agency, especially a smaller one. The importance of intelligence sharing between federal authorities and local law enforcement to properly focus the response is pivotal in thwarting or responding to a terror attack. If the intelligence process is faulty at any point, specifically the cross-leveling between federal and local agencies, the results could be disastrous. However, HSAS is merely the tip of the iceberg. This study shall delve deeper into the collection process, the reporting process, the sharing of garnered intelligence, and the training of officers for intelligence operations.

Several questions about terror intelligence arise when the duties of local law enforcement are closely examined. One of the biggest questions posed by previous researchers is how can local law enforcement piece together “the constellation of clues and evidence related to criminal activity (that) is often spread across disconnected databases and paper files in thousands of local, state, and federal agencies” (Kurlander, 2005, p. 2). Kurlander, a retired police chief from Missouri conducting research for the International Police Chiefs Association, sums up the criminal justice data system for local law enforcement below:

In many cases criminals who have been stopped by the police are freed when local law enforcement data searches are unable to access information that is stored outside their own systems. Whether a person is arrested or is released for a crime that occurred in another jurisdiction is frequently based on the ability of the police to confirm the subject's identity that links the person to an arrest warrant. Warrants are stored in various databases at the local, state, and federal level. In addition, terrorist watch lists and investigative alerts are also computerized and stored in still yet different databases. Most of these databases are not integrated and therefore the information is not shared. If this disparate data was fully integrated and subjected to state-of-the-art analysis tools creating a seamless data grid that could be queried in real time, law enforcement agencies would be much more effective in both preventing crime and solving open cases. (p. 2)
As Kurlander mentioned, there is no existing seamless data grid that includes terrorism intelligence. However, researchers do claim there are several examples that could help serve as an example for such a grid that will be discussed later in this chapter.

As mentioned above, researchers have found the informational load placed upon local law enforcement is best described as ‘voluminous.’ Rees, another retired police chief claims:

All of these well-intentioned efforts at information sharing has created a read and-review nightmare for local agencies. Somebody has to sift through all of this information and determine what needs to be passed on for review or acted upon. Often this task falls upon the police chief, who is in a position to determine the need-to-know status of information. Many chiefs spend an hour a day accomplishing this task, and then additional time and effort in the use of that which is determined to be pertinent. Policies, procedures, operations orders, and so on can be affected by information flow. At the very least, the strategies and patrol tactics employed by officers on the beat continue to be affected by voluminous homeland security information. (Rees, 2006, p. 1)

As discussed earlier, the inability to consolidate the intelligence into a singular, manageable format continues to be a failure of the federal government. In conclusion on this point, researchers have found that sharing is not the problem, just that the inability of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to effectively use intelligence within a combination of the different levels of law enforcement has been the shortcoming.

With the facts gathered, many researchers have pondered the idea of what a national database for terrorism intelligence might look like. The Department of Homeland Security and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement is currently fielding the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC), a database for use by local law enforcement that is used for retrieving intelligence on immigrants. The International Association of Chiefs of Police describes this database as follows:
It is a single point of contact that provides timely immigration status and identity information and real-time assistance to United States local, state and federal law enforcement agencies on aliens suspected, arrested or convicted of criminal activity. The LESC assists law enforcement agencies with information gathered from eight immigration databases, the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Interstate Identification Index (III) and other state criminal history indices. (Kurlander, 2005, p. 1)

The LESC is a fine example of what a gathering point for national terrorism intelligence could look like. Here, all levels of law enforcement and different branches have access to a singular point where intelligence is collected and cross referenced, thus providing the local law enforcement officer with a tool that allows him or her to effectively report and reference terrorism intelligence.

However, such a database for terror intelligence does not exist. With that in mind, local law enforcement is not afforded the opportunity to wait on a database to be developed before action is taken. The communication between federal and local law enforcement must occur. This allows for the proper passage if intelligence up that chain as well as down.

With that being said, researchers have suggested several courses of action for law enforcement officers in order to better operate in the current terror intelligence framework. The most prominent suggestions come in the form of simply adding a terrorism intelligence collection mechanism to one of the more popular theories of the criminal justice world, community policing. As far as terror intelligence is concerned, this is a particularly attractive approach. In order for this approach to work, a study group suggested that there be four focus points towards this intelligence approach:

Training – Officers must be trained in facets of terror intelligence: what to recognize, how to develop it, and how to report it.
Approachability – One of the basic tenets of community policing, officers must be approachable, especially by individuals who may have close connections to terrorists.

Promotion and outreach – Attempts must be made to cultivate terror informant and the general public to assist in the collection of intelligence.

Communication and follow-up community information sources – This allows the community to feel protected and be educated about how to deal with intelligence collected. (Doherty, 2006, p. 2)

While the latter three suggestions are already in the repertoire of most officers, the specific training towards using terror intelligence properly will is a focus of this study. Local law enforcement agencies are many times forced to depend upon federal law enforcement to provide the training necessary to prepare officers to efficiently operate in the terror intelligence system.

In conclusion, the ability of local law enforcement personnel to be successful in the gathering, analysis, and sharing of terror intelligence is heavily dependent upon interaction with federal agencies. In order to properly arm officers with the proper intelligence from the outside world, senior officers must rely upon several federal agencies to provide them with a plethora of reports in order to consolidate them into a manageable format to report to beat officers. Also, in order to allow beat officers to operate effectively in the terror intelligence framework, they must be properly trained. Again, local agencies often turn to federal agencies in order to provide the proper training to equip officers with the tools they will need to gather, analyze, and share terror intelligence.
Further Federal and Local Interaction

Within the defense of the homeland, intelligence operations are definitely at the forefront. However, other duties also require federal and local interaction. The 9/11 Commission Report claimed “unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries” (The 9/11 Commission, 2007, p. 400). While this quote may seem to direct focus to ‘traditional’ information, one must also conclude that other instances of information must be shared besides intelligence, such as sharing of emergency management information between the police chief and the fire chief.

As mentioned earlier, researches have decided training of local law enforcement by federal agencies is of utmost importance. This training must encompass not only intelligence, but must be ‘interdisciplinary’ in nature (Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 5). The Department of Homeland Security offers several courses to local law enforcement. Some of the courses include:

- FEMA Training and National Domestic Preparedness Consortium - Direct training for state and local jurisdictions to enhance capacity and preparedness
- The National Center for State and Local Law Enforcement Training - Up-to-date, low or no cost training opportunities for state and local law enforcement officers
- Emergency Education Network - First responder information programming schedule
- The National Fire Academy - Training and educational opportunities for members of the fire, emergency services, and allied professionals
- Noble Training Center - Hospital-based medical training in disaster preparedness and response
The Emergency Management Institute - Training to ensure the effectiveness of organizations and individuals working together in disasters and emergencies

National Incident Management System Integration Center - Information, guidance and resources to assist state, local, tribal and federal agencies in adopting and implementing the National Incident Management System.

National Incident Management System (NIMS) Online Training - Introduction to the purpose, principles, key components, and benefits of NIMS.

Comprehensive Haz-Mat Emergency Response Capability Assessment Program (CHER-CAP) - Resource to prepare for hazardous materials incidents

Emergency Management Exercise Reporting System - System to help emergency managers track and access exercises

National Exercise Program - Training, exercising, and collaboration among partners at all levels.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Threat- and performance-based exercise activities of varying degrees of complexity and interaction

Lessons Learned Information Sharing - Best practices and lessons learned from actual terrorist events and training exercises

U.S. Fire Administration Publications - Free publications for emergency responders including manuals, reports & incident reports (Department of Homeland Security)

Obviously, the Department of Homeland Security provides law enforcement with a plethora of pointed training programs, while other federal agencies such as FEMA and the FBI
also conduct counter-terror training. This study will help to understand if local law enforcement is interacting with the agencies that provide this invaluable training.

**Summary**

To review the research in this field is not a lengthy task. However, one quickly discovers the pointed arguments being made by researchers and experts within this field. The threat is evolving into a simpler ‘wave attack’ threat, intelligence exploitation must be improved for local law enforcement and interaction with federal authorities is pivotal in many areas. All three of these areas are implicitly tied together. The threat is developing tactics that can be carried out just as well in a small town mall as they can Times Square. Thus, local law enforcement of small towns must be successfully tied into the intelligence framework as the larger metropolitan area officers are. They must be trained in how to thwart and respond to these wave attacks. This researcher took the recommendations and opinions of these researchers and empirically determined if small town officers are receiving the tools needed to adapt to the new Al-Qaida tactics.
The purpose of this study is to see if the size of a local law enforcement department is a predictor of more involvement in several activities involving homeland security and counter-terrorism. These activities include allocation of resources to intelligence operations, interaction with federal agencies, and the integration of homeland security into community policing. These activities will be represented by several independent variables within the data set. By looking at the agency’s involvement in certain activities against their size, it will determine if the hypotheses stated are correct or false. Below are the hypotheses restated from Chapter 1:

H1: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not allocating resources to intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing in a manner consistent with larger agencies.

H2: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner consistent with the interactions between larger agencies and federal law enforcement.

H3: Since 9/11 officers in larger local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the duties of homeland security more than smaller local law enforcement agencies.

Data

The data set comes from a study entitled “Impact of Terrorism on State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Criminal Justice Systems in the United States, 2004.” The principal investigators were Chad Foster of the Council of State Governments and Gary Cordner of
Eastern Kentucky University. It was funded by the United State Department of Justice and the National Institute of Justice. It is stored under the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, study number 4677.

The scope of the study served to investigate the changing conditions that came about for law enforcement after 9/11 specifically to look at the impact of terrorism on state and local agencies. The survey was completed in the spring of 2004. The survey was developed by a research team with state and local law enforcement experience and was formulated from scratch to explore new developments. There are two parts to the study, Part 1 dealing with State Law Enforcement and Part 2 dealing with Local Law Enforcement. This study deals specifically with Part 2. The survey was completed via the internet or traditional mailed surveys. The agencies were selected through the National Public Safety Information Bureau’s directory of law enforcement administrators. There was a sample of 400 local police and sheriff agencies, 200 of those being the largest departments. Of the 400 surveys sent, 46.6% were completed.

Variables

A description of the dependent and independent variables follows.

Independent Variable

The independent variable for the entirety of this study is the variable ‘size of department.’ The possible responses for this variable are 1 small, 2 medium, 3 large, or 99 no answer. This is a nominal level variable.
Dependent Variables

There are several dependent variables involved in this study, all of which are interval level variables. They are grouped into the hypotheses they will help to investigate. They are grouped as follows:

H1 dependent variables: A12, Our agency’s allocation of resources to gathering, analyzing, and sharing. The response to this variable is as follows: 1 much fewer resources, 2 fewer resources, 3 no change, 4 more resources, 5 much more resources, 98 NA for our agency, 99 no response.

H2 dependent variables: D10 Our agency’s interaction with FBI; D11, Our agency’s interaction with FEMA. The responses for each of these variables are as follows: 1 much less frequent, 2 less frequent, 3 no change, 4 more frequent, 5 much more frequent, 98 NA for our agency, 99 no response.

H3 dependent variables: E2, Officers have significant new responsibilities in responding to terrorist events; E3 Officers have significant new responsibilities in terrorism-related intelligence gathering; E5, Officers have significant new responsibilities in educating and mobilizing the community for homeland security. The responses for each of these variables are as follows: 1 strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 unsure, 4 agree, 5 strongly agree, 98 NA for our agency, 99 no response.
**Analytic Strategy**

Multiple tests of significance have been completed on the variables to test the hypotheses of the study.

At the univariate level, descriptive statistics were run to describe the basic tenets of the dependent variables themselves. Statistics provided by these tests were: frequency, percentage, standard deviation, and mean. These statistics are provided for each variable and organized by the hypothesis they are associated with within the study.

At the bivariate level, tests were conducted on each dependent variable to test the three hypotheses. These tests served to measure the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. First, a cross-tabulation matrix was conducted to visibly inspect any relationship between the independent variable (size of the department) and the gamut of dependent variables. Also, Chi Square tests were ran against each of the dependent variables. The final bivariate test conducted was the Cramer’s V in order to test relationship while controlling for the large sample size that may affect the Chi-Square test results. This test also served to compare the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. The results are organized into each hypothesis.

Finally, linear regression was used to analyze the multiple dependent variables’ effects upon the independent variable. This served to evaluate the significance of the individual variables while controlling for the dependent variables. These tests were ran separately for the dependent variables of each hypothesis. This linear regression supplies the probability of predicting an agency’s involvement in homeland security against its size.
CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

In this chapter, the results of the statistical tests will be laid out in tables. The results will be organized under the hypothesis they are investigating. The results are in the following order: descriptives for each variable, cross tabulation matrix, chi-square, Cramer’s V, and Linear Regression (Beta). At the end of each set of tests, a conclusion is made as to whether the data support or reject the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1

Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not allocating resources to intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing in a manner consistent with larger agencies. The H1 variable is laid out in Table 1 as follows: H1 dependent variable: A12. Our agency’s allocation of resources to gathering, analyzing, and sharing. The responses for this variable are as follows: 1 much fewer resources, 2 fewer resources, 3 no change, 4 more resources, 5 much more resources, 98; NA for our agency, 99 no response.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics for All H1 Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A12 - ‘Allocation Of Resources to Intelligence’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>.802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much fewer resources</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fewer resources</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More resources</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much more resources</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Within the cross-tabulation, the percentages indicate the large departments are allocating more resources towards intelligence operations as shown in Table 2. For example, small departments answered ‘no change’ 77.4% while large departments answered ‘no change’ 27%. Conversely, 53.9% of the respondents from large departments claimed they allocated ‘more resources’ towards intelligence operations while only 12.9% of small respondents claimed they allocated ‘more resources’ towards intelligence operations. Furthermore, large respondents claimed they allocated ‘much more resources’ 19.1% while only 3.2% of the small respondents answered the same. Combined with a strong Chi-Square score of 44.27 (.001 significance, 8 degrees of freedom, n=164), the cross-tabulations show a strong relationship between the two variables size of department and allocation of resources towards intelligence gathering, analyzing, and sharing, thus supporting hypothesis 1.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Department</th>
<th>Much Fewer Resources</th>
<th>Fewer Resources</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>More Resources</th>
<th>Much More Resources</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>1 (3.2%)</td>
<td>1 (3.2%)</td>
<td>24 (77.4)</td>
<td>4 (12.9%)</td>
<td>1 (3.2%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12 (66.7%)</td>
<td>6 (33.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31 (27%)</td>
<td>62 (53.9%)</td>
<td>22 (19.1)</td>
<td>115 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, a .367 Cramer’s V score (.000 significance, n=164) shows a moderate to strong relationship between the size and intelligence operations variables. This score controls for the large number of respondents, thus further supporting hypothesis 1. Again, a strong relationship is seen between the H1 variables with a regression coefficient Beta of .467 (t score of 6.862, B of .472, significance of .000).

**H1 Assessment**

The hypothesis of “Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not allocating resources to intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing in a manner consistent with larger agencies” is supported by the data contained within this study.

**Hypothesis 2**

Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner consistent with the interactions between larger agencies and federal law enforcement. The H2 independent variables are D10; Our agency’s interaction with FBI; D11, Our agency’s interaction with FEMA. The responses for each of these variables are as follows: 1 much less frequent, 2 less frequent, 3 no change, 4 more frequent, 5 much more frequent, 98 NA for our agency, 99 no response. These results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3

*Descriptive Statistics for All H2 Variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>D10 Interaction with FBI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much less frequent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less frequent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More frequent</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much more frequent</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D11 Interaction with FEMA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less frequent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More frequent</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much more frequent</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, inspection reveals the relationship between size and interaction with the FBI, Table 4. While 65.8% of small agencies reported no change in their interaction with the FBI, only 12% of large agencies reported no change. However, 87.2% of larger agencies reported either ‘more frequent’ or ‘much more frequent’ while only 29% of smaller agencies reported an increase in their interaction with the FBI. Coupled with a strong Chi-Square score of 55.313 (8 degrees of freedom, significance=.000), the cross-tabulation statistics clearly support hypothesis 2.
Table 4

*Cross-Tabulations for Size of Agency and Interaction with FBI*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Department</th>
<th>Much Less Frequent</th>
<th>Less Frequent</th>
<th>No Change (65.8%)</th>
<th>More Frequent</th>
<th>Much More Frequent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>2 (5.3)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25 (65.8%)</td>
<td>9 (23.7)</td>
<td>2 (5.3%)</td>
<td>38 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (35%)</td>
<td>9 (45%)</td>
<td>4 (20%)</td>
<td>20 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
<td>14 (12%)</td>
<td>59 (50.4%)</td>
<td>43 (36.8%)</td>
<td>117 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cross-tabulation statistics shown in Table 5 for the variables size and interaction with FEMA also support hypothesis 2. While 71.8% of the small agencies reported no change in their interactions with FEMA, only 44.3% of the large agencies reported ‘no change.’ Consequently, 54.8% of the larger agencies report they have had more interaction with FEMA while only 25.6% of the smaller agencies reported more interaction with FEMA. The Chi-Square score of 16.290 is significant at .012 level (6 degrees of freedom), thus further supporting the cross-tabulation statistics and hypothesis 2.
Table 5
*Cross Tabulation for Size of Agency and Interaction with FEMA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Department</th>
<th>Much Less Frequent</th>
<th>Less Frequent</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>More Frequent</th>
<th>Much More Frequent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.6%)</td>
<td>28 (71.8%)</td>
<td>10 (25.6%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>14 (70%)</td>
<td>4 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>20 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (.9%)</td>
<td>51 (44.3%)</td>
<td>50 (43.5%)</td>
<td>13 (11.3%)</td>
<td>115 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both Cramer’s V values for the independent variables in H2 show positive relationship between the dependent variable, size of agency, and the independent variables. The test showed interaction with FBI carried a value of .398, significance of .000, while interaction with FEMA carried a value of .216, significance of .012 (n=174). Both tests displayed a positive relationship (FBI, moderate to strong and FEMA weak to moderate) with a significance of at least .05. The Cramer’s V results support H2.

Both regression coefficients show positive relationships between the dependent variable ‘size of agency’ and the independent variables of H3. The linear regression for H2 shows support for H2 as indicated in Table 6.
Table 6
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Interaction With Federal Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interaction with FBI</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>7.460</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction with FEMA</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>3.831</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H2 Assessment

The hypothesis of “Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner consistent with the interactions between larger agencies and federal law enforcement” is supported by the data contained within this study.

Hypothesis 3

Since 9/11 officers in larger local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the duties of homeland security more than smaller local law enforcement agencies. The H3 independent variables shown in Table 7 are as follows: E3 Officers have significant new responsibilities in terrorism-related intelligence gathering; E5, Officers have significant new responsibilities in educating and mobilizing the community for homeland security. The responses for each of these variables are as follows: 1 strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 unsure, 4 agree, 5 strongly agree, 98 NA for our agency, 99 no response.
Table 7

*Descriptive Statistics for All H3 Variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E3 Sig. new resp. in terror-related intelligence gathering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>1.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5 Sig. new responsibility in educating and mobilizing</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>1.171</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within both cross-tabulations for hypothesis 3 independent variables (significant new responsibilities in gathering intelligence and significant new responsibilities in educating and mobilizing citizens for homeland security), a great deal of variance is noticed within the independent variable, size of agency. Furthermore, the Chi-Square values are not statistically significant. Pearson Chi-Square for Size of Agency and Significant New Responsibilities in Gathering Intelligence scores had a value of 14.647, 8 degrees of freedom, and a significance of .066. The Chi-Square values for Size of Agency and Significant New Responsibilities in Educating and Mobilizing Citizens for Homeland Security showed a value of 5.994, 8 degrees of freedom, and a significance of .648. Therefore, the cross-tabulation statistics coupled with the chi-square results reject hypothesis 3. The cross-tabulation results are shown in Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8

*Cross Tabulation for Size of Agency and Significant New Responsibilities in Gathering Intelligence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Department</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>1 (2.5%)</td>
<td>11 (27.5%)</td>
<td>5 (12.5%)</td>
<td>15 (37.5%)</td>
<td>8 (20%)</td>
<td>40 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>9 (45%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>20 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>4 (3.4%)</td>
<td>21 (17.8%)</td>
<td>3 (2.5%)</td>
<td>65 (55.1%)</td>
<td>25 (21.2%)</td>
<td>118 (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9

*Cross Tabulation for Size of Agency and Significant New Responsibilities in Educating and Mobilizing Citizens for Homeland Security*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Department</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>3 (7.5%)</td>
<td>13 (32.5%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>15 (37.5%)</td>
<td>7 (17.5%)</td>
<td>40 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>11 (55%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>20 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large (% w/in dept.)</td>
<td>3 (2.6%)</td>
<td>36 (30.8%)</td>
<td>9 (7.7%)</td>
<td>50 (42.7%)</td>
<td>19 (16.2%)</td>
<td>117 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After reviewing the cross-tabulations and the chi-square, Cramer’s V tests further helped to reject hypothesis 3. Cramer’s V for Size of Agency and New Responsibilities in Terrorism Intelligence Gathering resulted in a value of .203 and a significance of .066 (n=178). For New Responsibilities in Educating and Mobilizing the Community, a Cramer’s V score of .130 was reached with statistical significance of .648 (n=177). Once again, the test results fall short of supporting hypothesis 3. Therefore, Cramer’s V results reject hypothesis 3, as well.

The rejection of hypothesis 3 is furthered with the results of the linear regression tests shown in Table 10. The low significance scores of .082 and .510 serve to reject any positive relationship between the dependent and independent variable.
Table 10

Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting New Responsibilities in Terrorism
Intelligence Gathering and New Responsibilities in Educating and Mobilizing the Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility In Intelligence</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>1.747</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility In Educating and</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H3 Assessment

The hypothesis of “Since 9/11 officers in larger local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the duties of homeland security more than smaller local law enforcement agencies” is rejected by the data contained within this study.
CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to determine if smaller United States local law enforcement agencies’ counter-terror efforts were commensurate with large agencies. Prior research (which did not include any significant empirical research due to nonexistence) claims that Al-Qaida, which is terror threat number one, is moving towards simpler, wave-style attacks that would be effective in smaller population centers. Thus, this study focused on the intelligence operations, interaction with federal authorities and daily patrol activities of small agencies and brings them to bear against large agencies. The data set came from a study entitled “Impact of Terrorism on State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Criminal Justice Systems in the United States, 2004.” The principal investigators were Chad Foster of the Council of State Governments and Gary Cordner of Eastern Kentucky University. The scope of this study served to investigate the changing conditions that came about for law enforcement after 9/11, specifically to look at the impact of terrorism on state and local agencies. From the prior research and data set, three hypotheses were developed to cover the three major duties concerned with counter-terror in local law enforcement. The three hypotheses were:

H1: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not allocating resources to intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing in a manner consistent with larger agencies.

H2: Since 9/11 smaller agencies are not interacting with federal agencies in a manner consistent with the interactions between larger agencies and federal law enforcement.
H3: Since 9/11 officers in larger local law enforcement agencies have undertaken the duties of homeland security more than smaller local law enforcement agencies.

Several tests were used to test the hypotheses. These tests included: descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, and frequency), cross-tabulations, Chi-Square, Cramer’s V, and Linear Regression. Hypothesis 1 and 2 were supported by the data with overall strong relationships. Hypothesis 3 was readily rejected by these tests. The rejection of hypothesis 3 is a promising development. However, the significant failures will be further discussed in this chapter.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

It is possible agency turnover and ignorance to pre-9/11 activities could have tainted the data itself. Therefore, it should be considered that more than one survey be given within a department. This would allow for officers of varying experience within the law enforcement body to offer their view of their counter-terror capabilities creating an all-encompassing study.

Furthermore, distributing to senior leadership as well as patrol officers, would further allow researchers to test the views held within departments and allow for a clearer view of counter-terror capabilities from the street to the office of the chief. It is important to take such measurements to prevent a ‘rose-colored glasses’ view of the capabilities and activities of a department. This would allow for researchers and law enforcement administrators to properly evaluate the situation.
The date of the study was a minor limitation. Since 2004 developments have been made in the counter-terror field. Such a study should be commissioned more often to allow researchers to track and properly identify shortcomings and strong points.

Another minor limitation was the number of medium sized police agencies. More moderately sized agencies should be involved to allow for a truer replication of the actual situation. That being said, researchers should also strive to create a sample more commensurate with the actual sample of police agencies nationwide.

**Implications for Law Enforcement**

The biggest shortcoming was the amount of resources allocated by smaller departments towards intelligence operations. Intelligence is the cornerstone of protecting the homeland against terrorism. More resources should be dedicated to intelligence from collecting on the streets to analyzing and sharing intelligence garnered from the plethora of federal intelligence reports. While New York City may have a higher terror threat overall, the consequences of overlooking America’s smaller cities could have a bedrock-shaking consequence for the nation as a whole. Small town police chiefs must ensure that their officers are armed with the capability to gather, analyze, and share intelligence on a level equal to those of their big city counterparts. The federal and state governments should assist in the procurement of intelligence officers for each county or department, community, and geographic area.

The second biggest failure is of smaller agencies’ interaction with federal agencies. This failure points both up and down. Federal agencies should make it a point to effectively
communicate with each and every law enforcement body, regardless of size. After all, every tiny piece of intelligence could be the missing piece of a 9/11 sized puzzle. Small town police chiefs should also make it a point to keep the lines of communication open with federal authorities for several reasons. Networking within law enforcement has solved countless crimes and will continue to do so in the terrorism field. Furthermore, networking allows for the advertisement of federal counter-terrorism training available to local officers, an invaluable force multiplier for the small town chief.

The last recommendation is for all sizes of local law enforcement agencies. Twenty-seven and one half percent of small departments, 30% of medium departments, and 17.8% of large departments disagreed with the statement that they have not encountered any more significant responsibilities in gathering intelligence since 9/11. Simply put, this is the wrong answer for any department to give. While these numbers may seem significantly small, one must match the results of failure against these statistics to evaluate their importance. In the post 9/11 world, the citizenry is counting on each certified peace officer and his or her agency to intently gather counter-terror intelligence. To have not changed intelligence gathering approaches since 9/11 is to have failed the citizenry, regardless of agency size or area of jurisdiction.
REFERENCES


VITA

J. RYAN PRESNELL

Personal Data
Place of Birth: Elizabethton, Tennessee
Marital Status: Married

Education:
B. A. History and Political Science, Furman University, Greeneville, South Carolina 2002
M. A. Criminal Justice and Criminology, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, Tennessee 2008

Professional Experience:
United States Army, Armor and Intelligence Officer, 2002-2008
United States Army, Counterdrug Task Force, 2006-2007
Sworn Federal Law Enforcement Officer, 2008