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Through the Eyes of the *Post*: American Media Coverage of the
Armenian Genocide

A thesis

presented to

the faculty of the Department of History

East Tennessee State University

In partial fulfillment

Of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts in History

by

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May 2009

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Content Analysis

ABSTRACT

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Many historians refer to the Armenian Genocide of 1915 as the first genocide of the twentieth century. In the context of the first global war, the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire were systematically persecuted and many eliminated while the world watched. Yet today, American memory and conception of the Armenian Genocide is remarkably different from similar historical events such as the Holocaust. The Armenian Genocide and America's reaction to it is a forgotten event in American memory.

In an attempt to better understand this process of forgetting, this thesis analyzes the *Washington Post's* news coverage of the Armenian Genocide. By cataloguing, categorizing, and analyzing this news coverage, this thesis suggests Americans had sufficient information about the events and national reaction to it to form a memory. Therefore, the reasons for twenty-first century collective loss of memory in the minds of Americans must be traced to other sources.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"The breath and intensity of American engagement in the effort to save the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire is an important chapter in American history, one that has been lost.

-Peter Balakain

Literature and research on the Armenian Genocide of World War I is extensive. Authors, journalists, historians, political scientists, and humanitarians have publicized, analyzed, and debated over the intent, implementation, consequences, and responsibility for the massacres. Armenian survivors have published memoirs, telling the stories of how their people and culture were killed. Hollywood has made movies recounting the experiences of survivors. Yet, in spite of the substantial amount of information available on the genocide, American memory of the event is disproportionately small. When compared to the Holocaust, a similar genocide of a religious minority group in the context of a world war, Americans know and learn little about the Armenian Genocide. There is currently no American Genocide memorial in Washington D.C.,¹ while the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum has been open for sixteen years, boasts thirty million visitors annually, and a website with

¹ The Armenian Genocide Memorial of America is currently under construction in Washington DC, with an anticipated opening date of 2011.

information in over twenty languages serving online visitors from over one hundred countries.² Research currently available on university courses on the Armenian Genocide reveals few American universities include stand alone courses or content within genocide courses about the Armenians.³ The failure of the Armenian Genocide Resolution to pass in the United States House of Representatives in 2007 received minimal attention or public reaction.

Still, the contemporary relevance of the Armenian Genocide can be seen in its influence on the diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey and in similar humanitarian crises such as in Darfur. Historians still today attempt to combat the ignorance and apathy of Americans through the publication of books like *The Burning Tigris*, a New York Times best seller in 2003, which details America's humanitarian response to the Genocide.

The current state of American memory and conception of the Armenian Genocide raises a number of issues and questions. Have Americans forgotten about the Armenian Genocide? Did Americans know of the Armenian Genocide at the time of its occurrence? In what context did Americans learn about the Armenian Genocide?

² "About the Museum," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, <http://www.ushmm.org/museum/mission/> (accessed February 25, 2009).

³ Christina Pelosky, "Content Analysis of Undergraduate Courses and Course Content on the Armenian Genocide in United States Higher Education" (doctoral dissertation, Lynn University, 2005), 86-92.

How did Americans react to knowledge of the Armenian Genocide and did they respond with action?

Answering questions about the Armenian Genocide must first begin with a definition and framework of genocide. Crimes against humanity have existed in many forms throughout human history, and for centuries genocide was "a crime without a name."⁴ A Polish-Jewish jurist by the name of Ralph Lemkin coined the term *genocide* during World War II to describe the Nazi campaigns against the Jews, years after the crimes committed against the Armenians had taken place. Lemkin made it his life's work to secure a convention against genocide from the newly formed United Nations after World War II. He succeeded with the 1948 adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.⁵ Today it is the UN Convention's definition that defines international law concerning cases of genocide.

Regardless of the international legal framings of genocide, historians and social scientists continue to define genocide in light of "ambiguities of the Genocide Convention and its constituent debates."⁶ Genocide frameworks vary in the

⁴ James T. Fussell, "A Crime Without a Name," *Prevent Genocide International*, February 11, 2004, <http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/crimewithoutaname.htm> (accessed April 4, 2009).

⁵ Adam Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2006), 8-11.

⁶ Jones, 15.

position they take on key concepts such as victim, agent, scale, strategy, and intent. Minor variations in the terminology can drastically alter the breath of an author's definition of genocide. The exact definition of genocide is crucial when making decisions to apply the term to specific historical events, and as ambiguities in the definition opens the door to the claims of genocide deniers and rationalizes. The definition of genocide used for this study is borrowed from Adam Jones and is as follows: Genocide is "the actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder *in whole or in substantial part* any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means."⁷

Based on the elements of this definition, the term genocide is applied in this study to the case of the Armenians. Use of the term genocide to label the mass killing of Armenians in World War I began almost immediately following the coining of the word. Since then the word has become the symbolic rope in an ongoing intellectual tug-of-war between pro-Armenian and pro-Turkish writers, as if absence of the word in some way erases the reality of the massive loss of life. Intent has become the central issue in the debate among scholars concerning the use of the term genocide. Pinpointing the exact moment of intent in the

⁷ Jones, 22; italics in the original.

perpetration of genocide is extremely difficult though, as genocidal intent often escalates over time and is not always the result of a clearly discernable shift.⁸ Still, the term genocide is easily defensible as applicable to the case of the Armenians, and "the important thing, however, is not the term, but rather the moral position that recognizes the crime and condemns it."⁹

Use of the term genocide does however raise two points of concern. First as the term genocide was not in existence at the time of the crimes against the Armenians, it is nowhere present in news reports, including those of the *Washington Post*, which is the basis for this study. As the *Post* readers learned about the violent persecution of the Armenians occurring during the course of World War I, they did not have the luxury of historical perspective available today. The true genocidal nature of the events may not have been clear as they were unfolding in the media coverage. Consequently the term genocide will be used sparingly to refer to the events as described in actual newspaper articles. Instead terms such as massacre or persecution will be used as a descriptive label. Similarly, a second point of concern is the connotation of the terms massacre or persecution. In the case of this thesis, the terms massacre

⁸ Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 96.

⁹ Taner Akam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 9.

and persecution are not used to define any crime against the Armenians in the singular sense or as alternative options to the term genocide. Instead, the terms are used to describe numerous individual events that all combined to make up a whole event, which here is discussed historically as *the* Armenian Genocide.

To begin looking at American conception of the Armenian Genocide, it is necessary to first recognize at least some American familiarity with the Armenians prior to World War I. The American public was first introduced to the Armenians of Ottoman Turkey almost a century before the First World War began through foreign missionary organizations. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions arose out of the social forces of the Second Great Awakening and emphasized the spread of Christianity to every region of the world. Its first missionaries arrived in Turkey in the 1820s and established the foundation for mission work that would last over a hundred years. Missionaries published accounts of their experiences in the Near East through memoirs and biographies in which they introduced the American public to the minority peoples and culture of Turkey. The authors often idealized the subjects of their efforts, and the result was "both an enlarged store of knowledge and a romantic perception of the Near East."¹⁰

¹⁰ Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 39

American mission work in Turkey incorporated an educational element into their efforts, establishing schools for Christian minority groups throughout the country. By 1914, America had developed the largest network of schools of any country, concentrated primarily in Anatolia among the Armenians. As the missionary presence in the Ottoman Empire grew throughout the nineteenth century, so to did the mission groups' influence on American policy. The internationalism of mission work, however, "contrasted with the political isolationism of the United States government."¹¹ American diplomats in Turkey were chiefly concerned with protecting American citizens, and the United States State Department worked to gain concessions and exemptions for Americans from Ottoman law and protection of American property and investments in Turkey.¹² The American missionary presence in the Ottoman Empire helped to publicize a romantic view of the Armenians, which was a firmly established by the eve of World War I.

When the First World War began, American access to information about the Armenians was supplemented by the American Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau. Appointed by President Wilson, and arriving in Constantinople just months before the outbreak of the war, Morgenthau became the eyes and ears of the

¹¹ Grabill, 38.

¹² Grabill, 1-39.

United States government for information regarding the massacre of Armenians. The United States neutrality during the early war years allowed for ongoing diplomatic relations with Turkey until April 1917, when Turkey broke relations only at the behest of Germany.¹³ During that time, Morgenthau had access to information about the Armenians that the Allied countries did not. He received dispatches from American consuls from around the Ottoman Empire and passed them on to the State Department. When the massacre of Armenians began, the Ottoman government cut the cable wires from Anatolia and censored diplomatic communications. American consuls were forced to find secret ways to transmit messages and use a shorthand code to conceal the content. American missionaries smuggled letters and eyewitness accounts the American embassy to be passed along to the State Department. Morgenthau used the dispatches he received, combining information on his own experiences and insights, to confirm reports about the massacres circulating in the American press. Accurate and detailed information about the atrocities also made its way to relief organizations to be used as fuel to mobilize relief efforts.¹⁴ The varied access to information about

¹³ Robert L. Daniel, "The Armenian Question and American-Turkish Relations, 1914-1927," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 46, no. 2 (Sept 1959), 257.

¹⁴ Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response* (New York: Perennial, 2003), 224, 252, 267, 286.

the Armenians made Americans some of the most informed citizens in the world during the early war years.

This thesis will make use of media coverage from the *Washington Post* as a case study to examine the prominence and presentation of news stories on the Armenian Genocide. As a national daily newspaper at the pulse of American politics, the *Post's* treatment of the Armenian Genocide can provide insight on the way in which American citizens and political leaders in the nation's capital were first exposed to the tragic massacres. The *Post* was founded in 1877 by Stilson Hutchins. Initially destined to be a democratic daily among the southern sympathies in the nation's capital, Hutchins had aspirations for the paper to gain the ear of some of the most powerful men in the country. The first edition appeared on December 6, was four pages, and was sold at three cents.¹⁵

By the time the First World War began in Europe, the *Post* was boasting a twelve page weekday edition and a seventy-four page Sunday edition. In August 1914 the paper ran a triple eight column headline announcing the news of European hostilities. Most American dailies of the early twentieth century did not maintain staff correspondents in international news centers but

¹⁵ Chalmers McGeagh Roberts, *The Washington Post: The First 100 Years* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 3-9.

instead depended on press associations for outside information,¹⁶ and the *Post* was no exception. The *Post* had no foreign correspondents and relied on dispatches from the Associated Press or International News Service to cover the war.¹⁷ From the start of the war, the *Post* strongly advocated American neutrality and strived to present the German side of the war despite the inaccessibility of information from Germany. Once it became clear the United States would enter the war, the *Post* became a supporter of the war effort until the end.¹⁸

News about the massacre of Armenians began almost immediately following their outbreak, giving Americans current and ongoing updates. The *Washington Post's* reporting of the Armenian Genocide had the potential to influence readers' impression of the massacres. The media coverage also had the potential to sway American reaction for or against American intervention in Turkey. The purpose of this thesis is to examine a small component of American memory of the Armenian Genocide in an effort to begin answering the broader questions about the current state of American consciousness. Memory begins with a foundation. American media coverage during the course of the Armenian Genocide provided part of that foundation. Media

¹⁶ Edwin Emery and Michael Emery, *The Press and America: An Interpretative History of the Mass Media*, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1988), 282.

¹⁷ Roberts, 56.

¹⁸ Emery and Emery, 294; Roberts, 125-128, 136-138.

coverage can not only inform readers but also report on and shape their opinions. The content and vocabulary of the reporting can develop a framework for understanding historical events. Analysis of the media coverage of the Armenian Genocide can establish a context of how and what Americans learned about the event.

News coverage, as opposed to diplomatic correspondence or official communications, has implications for drawing conclusions about average Americans. News accounts were accessible and intelligible to ordinary people. In addition to offering a context for learning about the massacres, media coverage offers an understanding of American's reaction to the events through reports on relief work and political action. From this perspective, questions on American comprehension of the Armenian Genocide can begin to be answered.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Armenians in Ottoman Turkey

The Armenians of Turkey are a Christian minority group with a rich cultural history. Known to have been one of the earliest groups to convert to Christianity, the ancient Armenian nation is also possibly the first state to have officially accepted the religion. The geographic core of the Armenian ancestral homeland has at various times throughout history been located on the frontier of numerous empires, causing the group to suffer as a result. The last great Armenian kingdom of Cilicia fell in 1375 to the Mamluks. The rise of the Ottoman dynasty in Anatolia in the fourteenth century began a period of Turkish control of the Armenians which lasted until the early twentieth century.

Soon after the Ottoman conquest of the Constantinople in 1453, Sultan Mehmet II brought Armenians, along with other religious and ethnic minority groups, to settle the new capital. As the Empire expanded its reach in Anatolia toward the Black Sea region, it incorporated more and more Armenians. The Ottomans dealt with the diverse populations it was absorbing by organizing non-Muslim peoples into *millet*s or officially recognized communities. The *millet* system was not a static

institution but instead evolved over time, and use of the term *millet* to describe the formal organization of a semi-autonomous religious community was not common until the early nineteenth century.¹⁹ Religion was the defining characteristic of the *millet* system, as opposed to language or shared origin, as the basis of society. *Millets* were ruled indirectly by the Ottoman state, preferring instead to pass down administrative authority to the religious head of the *millet*.²⁰ The communities were allowed to organize themselves around their own religious laws under the "jurisdiction of diverse patriarchates,"²¹ which controlled many civic aspects of the community's organization. A by-product of the *millet* system was that the ethnic and religious minority groups in the Ottoman Empire were able to maintain their heritage in the form of their language, culture, and traditions, free from the threat of forced assimilation. While the various *millets* held a semi-autonomous status for administrative purposes, their members did not share equality with Muslim subjects. The multi-ethnic nature of the Ottoman state meant it could not rely on a shared language or culture among its people

¹⁹ For further explanation on the definition and evolution of the millet system see Benjamin Braude "Foundation of Myth of the Millet System," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, vol. 2, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), 69-87; and Roderic Davison, "The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," also in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 319-321.

²⁰ Ronald Suny, "Empire and Nation: Armenians, Turks and the End of the Ottoman Empire," *Armenian Forum* 1, no. 2 (1998), 24.

²¹ Stephan Astourian, "The Armenian Genocide: An Interpretation," *The History Teacher* 23, no. 2 (Feb 1990), 117.

for stability. Instead of attempting to "break down the boundaries of these communities and homogenize the population of the empire...around a single identity,"²² the traditional Ottoman policy was to use "distinctions of hierarchy between rulers and ruler, Muslim and non-Muslim,"²³ to organize society. Institutionalized inequality for all non-Muslims subjects became the method of social organization in the Empire.

It was within these distinctions of hierarchy that the Armenian Christians lived as unequal citizens, and civil oppression characterized their existence. The religious freedoms enjoyed by non-Muslims concerned only their private status; in the civil sector they did not enjoy equal rights with Muslims. They were denied the right to serve in many government posts,²⁴ and often they had to wear distinctive clothing or certain colors to denote them as non-Muslims.²⁵ Non-Muslims were free from conscription in the Ottoman military, a desired freedom, but only in exchange for payment of a head tax placed on all non-Muslim males. As a result "there came into being two societies, Muslim and non-Muslim, which did not have equal

²² Suny, 24.

²³ Suny, 25.

²⁴ Carter Findley, "The Acid Test of Ottomanism: The Acceptance of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 339.

²⁵ H. Alojjan, "Origins of the Armenian Colony in Constantinople," *Armenian Review* VII, no. 2 (1954), 119.

rights."²⁶ As long as the Ottoman Empire was content with a non-homogenous society, the Armenians continued a stable existence of inequality.

Still the civil oppression characteristic of the *millet* system was not without its benefits to the Armenian community. The religious freedom it provided within the community allowed the Armenian Church to maintain a place of authority, and its role as the centralizing force in the Armenian community grew between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.²⁷ As Muslim charitable and welfare organizations revolved around religion, the Armenians had to supplement their community with similar institutions, thus creating a vast charitable network. The nature of the *millet* system fostered a tight knit community, which allowed for the preferential treatment of community members in industry. Armenians were excluded from areas where they might accrue influence, so they turned to other professions. As they were limited to a smaller number of professions, they were able to specialize and become highly qualified in those areas. They climbed the economic ladder and accrued wealth and power. In this context, "whatever

²⁶ Enver Ziya Karal, "Non-Muslim Representatives in the First Constitutional Assembly, 1876-1877," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 387.

²⁷ Kevork B. Bardakjian "The Rise of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, vol. 1, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), 96.

discriminations, abuses and inferiority the Armenians were forced to endure must be weighed alongside the considerable benefits this cultural and political autonomy provided."²⁸

While the *millet* system allowed the Armenian community to prosper in many ways, it also created a social context for oppression with a wide range of severity. Suppression of civil rights, exclusion from the government, and the unequal legal status of a minority group are factors that can create an opportunity for further discrimination, even violent intolerance. In the organized suppression of a second class citizenry, massacre or genocide of a particular minority group can occur. The set of legal disabilities denying a minority institutional protection, and redress in the event of actual victimization, is "one of the foremost facts affording persecution in a sociopolitical system."²⁹ The *millet* system created just such a circumstance, and violent victimization eventually became the case for the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.

Although the Armenian community in Turkey lived and prospered under Ottoman rule for centuries, the rise of Armenian and Greek *millets* to a place of economic strength by the mid-nineteenth century gave members of these communities increased

²⁸ Ronald Grigor Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 101.

²⁹ Vahakn Dadrian, *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of the Turko-Armenian Conflict* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 15.

wealth and power through industry, trade, and finance. Armenians excelled in mining, shipping, milling, clothing manufacturing, as well as banking and money lending, areas of the economy where the Turkish government was reluctant to increase its control. It was "in the absence of competition from members of the dominant group, the Armenian merchant class...attained a high degree of prosperity."³⁰ The characteristics of the *millet* system previously discussed were critical in these developments, and individuals used these circumstances to gain opportunities and prosperity in the economic sector. In addition Armenians had the help of coreligionists outside the Empire's borders, the friendship of European states, and the advantages provided during the Ottoman reform era. As the economic control of the Ottoman government steadily declined, the Armenian community's influence grew along side that of the European powers.³¹

As a result of the Armenian community's increased economic strength and influence by the middle of the nineteenth century, the Armenian communities in Europe, as well as in Turkey, were considered in the height of an Armenian Renaissance. The Armenian Renaissance was a cultural revival of their history and civilization, which had distinct political overtones in the form

³⁰ Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Structural-Functional Components of Genocide: A Victimological Approach to the Armenian Case," in *Victimology*, ed. Israel Drapkin and Emilio Viano (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1974), 127.

³¹ Charles Issawi, "The Transformation of the Economic Position of the *Millets* in the Nineteenth Century," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 261-264.

of a growth of nationalistic sentiment. Beginning in the Diaspora with the Mekhitarist Congregation of Venice, founded in 1701, advances such as the printing press, educational revival brought about through missionary activity, resurgence of nationalistic literature, and the modernization of the Armenian language all combined to create a ripe atmosphere for the growth of a large intelligentsia class. Similar in the European Renaissance, the popularity of vernaculars, codification of the Armenian vernacular, and translation of foreign classics, all important milestones in the rise of nationalism, helped to spread liberal ideals. This Armenian cultural awakening fed the fires of a strengthening independence movement and "wrought powerful changes in the community, the most significant of which was perhaps the sense of unity it stirred among the Armenians."³²

The nationalistic movement growing in the Armenian community as part of the Renaissance contained a democratic thread. The Armenian elite sent their children to European universities to be educated, and it was there that they learned about democracy, nationalism, and "the new western ideas of their time."³³ They brought these ideals back home and synthesized them with the cultural awakening, renewing their pride in Armenian history. Armenian leaders came to view a

³² Bardakjian, 96.

³³ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 62.

democratic constitutional system with representatives elected by members of the *millet* as a crucial step in the move towards autonomy.³⁴ An increase in Armenian nationalistic fervor was one of many factors that led to a decline in the centuries old harmonious relationship between the Armenians and the Turkish government. It challenged the basic foundation of Ottoman social and political dominance by confronting the "theory and practice of Muslim superiority and Armenian inferiority."³⁵ By fusing a distinct and independent culture within the Ottoman Empire with western political ideology, the Armenians challenged the heart of the Ottoman social order and aligned itself closer with European principles.³⁶

At the same time the Armenian liberal intelligentsia was growing in strength and influence many eastern Anatolian Armenians of the lower classes suffered from Ottoman oppression. As the Ottoman Empire began steadily to decline in the last half of the nineteenth century, corruption in the government spread. Armenians now had to pay increased taxes to government tax collectors. As many Armenians in Anatolia lived in a sort of "feudal servitude" to their Kurdish neighbors, they suffered

³⁴ Harry Jewell Sarkiss, "The Armenian Renaissance, 1500-1863," *The Journal of Modern History* 9, no. 4 (Dec 1937), 433-448.

³⁵ Robert Melson, "A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894-1896," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24, no. 3 (July 1982), 506.

³⁶ Simon Payaslian, *The History of Armenia From Origins to the Present* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 117-120.

from a dual taxation, one to the Ottoman government and the other to local Kurdish tribal leaders. When they defaulted on their payments to the Kurds, Armenian villages were attacked, looted, and pillaged as punishment. Armenians appealed to the Ottoman government for reform with little success. The situation continued to worsen in the years leading up to the turn of the century, and the European Powers used the situation as a strategy to increase their influence in the Ottoman state. This was a factor contributing to the deterioration of the Turko-Armenian relationship.

Armenians and the European Powers

From a European standpoint in the nineteenth century, the vulnerable status of the Armenians was part of a larger "Eastern Question." The corruption and decline of the Ottoman Empire led to political power struggles among the European Powers over the geographical and political future of the Empire. The fate of Ottoman lands became a focus of international rivalries, competition for economic expansion, and the balance of European power. This conundrum became known as the Eastern Question,³⁷ and the Armenians became "pawns in Europe's struggle for power and

³⁷ Simon Bromley, "The States-system in the Middle East: Origins, Development and Prospects," in *A Companion to the History of the Middle East*, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (Malden: Blackwell Publishing), 507. The Eastern Question is traditionally dated from 1774 to 1923.

dominance."³⁸ Total collapse of the Ottoman Empire was potentially dangerous, given the competing interests, and so the general European consensus was to prop up the Empire. Yet the individual European Powers indulged in furthering their own causes. Russia focused on a slow erosion of Turkish territory, and continuously gave assistance to different religious groups or invaded the Balkan regions on the pretense of assisting Ottoman subjects. France and Great Britain wanted to curb Russia's influence in the region; Britain valued increased influence in Persia and Egypt near its India colony, while France vied for power in Syria and Lebanon. In this way, "through their wars and support of the separatist goals of rebellious Ottoman subjects, European states abetted the very process of fragmentation that they feared, and were seeking to avoid."³⁹

Russia's geographical proximity to Turkish Armenia gave her the opportunity to develop a special relationship with the Turkish Armenians, a relationship that was clouded by Russia's expansionist aims. Russia had long dreamed of controlling the Straits, her only true access to the Mediterranean Sea. Gaining control of the Straits dominated Russia's foreign policy and diplomacy with Turkey. In the late nineteenth century, when the

³⁸ Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005), 8.

³⁹ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 97.

Turkish Armenian community was in a precarious situation, they believed their best chance for autonomy from the Ottoman government was with help from an outside power that would serve as their protector. Russia was a neighbor, had a large Armenian population within its borders, and had at times used its own Armenian population as a reason to increase its influence in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government felt enormous pressure from Russia in the Balkans and on its eastern borders and was suspicious of Russia's intentions toward Armenia.⁴⁰

It was in the context of international rivalries that pressure from European powers for development and westernization helped to instigate Ottoman reforms. Foreign governments may have had differing motivations for desiring reform, yet all the Great Powers had a stake in the future of the Empire. Nationalist movements sprung up in many of the empire's regions and weakened the state's unity. The Sublime Porte⁴¹ hoped reform

⁴⁰ Roderic H. Davison, "The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914," *The American Historical Review* 53, no. 3 (April 1948), 487; Ronald Park Bobroff, *Roads to Glory: Late Imperial Russia and the Turkish Straits* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2006), 2.

⁴¹ Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 5; Bernard Lewis, *Istanbul and the Civilization of the Ottoman Empire* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 95. The Sublime Porte, a French translation of *Bab-i Ali*, is the name used to refer to the Ottoman seat of government. Middle Eastern cultures commonly use terms like gate or door to denote the seat of government. Originally the sultan's household, the center of Ottoman government was formally transferred to the Grand Vizierate in 1654 and his household became known as the *Pasha Kapisi*. Consequently the term Sublime Porte is simultaneously locative, referring to the building or succession of buildings over time that housed the administrative buildings of the government, and it is the European imposed name of the Ottoman government. Here after the Sublime Porte is referred to as the Porte.

would target the heart of nationalistic tendencies, and improvement of the status of non-Muslim citizens would circumvent further intervention of international powers under the guise of protector. In the attempt to stem this tide of internal decline and international pressure, the Ottoman government launched an era of reform during the nineteenth century. At the heart of the reforms was the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. As seen previously, the *millet* system kept non-Muslim communities segregated and at the bottom of the social hierarchy, and Ottoman reforms proposed to reverse this segregation. The reform era from 1839-1876, known as the *Tanzimat* (Reorganization), began with the *Hatt-i Şerif* of Gülhane proclamation in 1839 and culminated with the Constitution in 1876. In the *Hatt-i Şerif*, Sultan Abdulmecid I proclaimed the equality of peoples of all religions and updated the military conscriptions laws to include non-Muslims. A second decree on February 18, 1856, the *Hatt-i Humayun* (Imperial Rescript), went even further to confirm the equality of all the Empire's peoples and called for the reorganization of the state. The reform era culminated with the first written constitution, which established a limited monarchy over all Ottoman subjects regardless of religion.⁴² The radical reforms promulgated during

⁴² Roderic H. Davidson, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 120.

this reform era targeted the very core of Ottoman social organization and attempted to redefine social status as one based on secular loyalty to the state instead of religion.

For many reasons the implementation of Ottoman reform never reached as high as its promise. In many ways the reform measures were used as "weapons of diplomacy in times of international crisis,"⁴³ instead of as genuine measures of change. The push for equality of all subjects went against a centuries old premise of the superiority of Muslims and Islam as the source of legitimacy for government. It meant a revision of the basis of citizenship from one of religion to one in which all citizens were equal in the eyes of the state. Such a change was a complex process, and the anticipated break with tradition was a traumatic shock to the Muslim psyche, one which many Muslims, and even Christians, lashed out against.⁴⁴

Despite Ottoman attempts at reform, nationalistic movements among minority groups in the Empire continued to grow. Demands for equality evolved into demands for autonomy.⁴⁵ These demands turned violent in the Balkan provinces in the spring of 1876, with the outbreak of a Balkan rebellion. Russia intervened militarily, and subsequently won a victory over the Ottomans,

⁴³ Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," *American Historical Review* 59 (1954), 850.

⁴⁴ Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," 852-854, 856.

⁴⁵ Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," 853.

drawing the attention of the other Great Powers. The Russian victory created a major crisis and sparked international tensions, as the fate of the Ottoman Empire became evident, and additionally brought the Armenian question into the international arena. For the Armenians, it presented an opportunity, but ultimate disappointment, on the road toward securing international protection. The Armenians hoped to use Russia's newly enhanced political power as a chance to gain a protector. A petition addressed to Tsar Alexander II from the Armenian national assembly asked simply "What we now hope for, and what we are now so bold as to request, is that the form of administration granted to the Christians in Thrace should also be granted to the Armenians. The cries torn from our hearts would thus be heard and our miseries ended."⁴⁶ With former Russian ambassador to Turkey Grand Duke Nicolas Pavlovich Ignatiev to champion their cause, the Tsar instructed that the Armenian question be taken into consideration at the peace treaty negotiations to the surprise of the Ottomans. Article 16 of the agreement addressed the Armenian issue but did not provide the Armenians with the independence they so desired. They had hoped Russia would support them to the fullest but were content that the article acknowledged the need for immediate

⁴⁶ As quoted in Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*, trans. Suheyra Artemel (Istanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988), 441.

reforms in Armenia, and that its people were under threat from the Kurds and Circassians. In effect the Russian army was to oversee reforms and occupy the regions until the Porte had implemented the changes. This protection was an important step on the road to independence, and the Armenians were satisfied to have Russia as a protector.⁴⁷

Yet, the advances made for the Armenians in the San Stefano Treaty were fleeting. International disapproval of the treaty forced revision of the agreements to include other European powers, to the detriment of the Armenians. Britain strongly opposed the severe terms placed on the Ottomans at San Stefano and feared Russian attempts to crush the Ottomans and partition the country. Britain strategically sent Indian troops to occupy Cyprus in order to force Russia to agree to revise the treaty and refer the Eastern Question to the Congress of Berlin.⁴⁸ The Berlin Conference forced the European Powers to address the Armenian question. Reference to the Armenian Question in Article 16 of the San Stefano agreement was replaced by Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, an article that reduced the concessions given to the

⁴⁷ Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918* (Berkeley: University California Press, 1967), 12.

⁴⁸ "Annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain," *The American Journal of International Law* 9, no. 1 (Jan 1915), 204-205.

Armenians under the former article and "disappointed the Armenians sorely."⁴⁹

After the Berlin Conference, the Armenians realized their biggest potential ally was too weak politically to truly help them, and their actions had critically injured their relationship with the Ottoman government. In addition, the Porte resisted implementation of the proposed reforms under Article 61, while the European powers waned in enforcing them. In their frustration at the turn of events, the Armenians felt compelled to turn to extra-legal means of resistance. The limited reforms they had gained were never enforced, and conditions with their Kurdish neighbors were not improving.

Their frustration and disappointment, combined with the Armenian cultural awakening, became the ideological foundation for a revolutionary movement based on "emancipatory and revolutionary nationalism...and strategic thinking for the purpose of self defense."⁵⁰ In the early 1880s, these revolutionary movements began to spring up in the Diaspora and spread to Anatolia. Militant in nature, the new revolutionary

⁴⁹ Robert F. Zeidner, "Britain and the Launching of the Armenian Question," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7, no. 4 (Oct 1976), 473; "Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey: Signed at San Stefano, February 9/March 3, 1878," *The American Journal of International Law* 2, no. 4, Supplement: Official Documents (Oct 1908), 396; "Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy Russia and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East: Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878," *The American Journal of International Law* 2, no. 4, Supplement: Official Documents (Oct 1908), 422.

⁵⁰ Payaslian, 119.

groups bolstered the morale in Armenian communities, which was low due to discrimination at the hands of Turkish oppressors. The martial arm of these organizations roamed the countryside, protecting the innocent and threatening regular Turkish army units and armed Kurds. They focused on providing a defense network and spreading revolutionary ideas about independence to the Armenian *millet*. These military groups represented frustration with the slow, diplomatic processes of reform and a desire for increased tangible protection against daily subjugation.

The Armenian Revolutionary Movement had several representative parties, the most prominent among them being the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, (also known as the Dashnaks) and the Hunchak Revolutionary Party. These groups and others were influenced by Marxist ideas and shared the general goal of increased autonomy for the Armenians. The different revolutionary groups often disagreed on their definition of reform goals and the means of implementing them and competed for support among the community. While the revolutionary movement gave the Armenian community a sense of empowerment, it also heightened tensions with the Kurds in the eastern provinces and the Porte. Armenian guerilla bands operating in the mountains and rugged terrain attacked Turkish military units and armed Kurdish bands. They assaulted Turkish villages and secretly

stockpiled arms for the Armenian population. However alarming the thought of armed Armenians was to the Porte, the revolutionary movements rarely had a large support base in the community. The revolutionary groups fought among each other over policy and had to employ heavy propaganda campaigns to sway Armenians to their point of view.⁵¹

The Porte viewed Armenian revolutionary activity with suspicion, particularly with regard to the Armenians in Anatolia, due to their close proximity to Russia. In light of the guerilla violence, Sultan Abdul Hamid II established gendarme cavalry units comprised of Kurdish volunteers, named the Hamidiye regiments, to patrol the region. The regiments gave the Kurds a considerable amount of authority, and the Porte restrained from censuring the regiments for excessive behaviors in an effort to encourage their loyalty to the government.⁵² Their role was to patrol the border regions and monitor the Armenians, Kurds, and Turkish nobles. Instead, the Armenians became their primary target, suffering the worst consequences.⁵³ Armenian revolutionary activities and the presence of the Hamidiye regiments finally reached a climax in the summer of 1894. Armenians living in village of Sassoun, being overburdened by dual taxation and Kurdish attempts to take their land, ultimately rebelled. The

⁵¹ Lewy, 11-16.

⁵² Stephen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies* 9, no. 2 (May 1973), 150.

⁵³ Lewy, 9.

Armenian "insurrection," as it was called by the Ottomans, was savagely put down by regular Turkish military, Hamidiye regiments, and Kurdish villagers in a manner that alerted the European powers.⁵⁴ Russia, France, and Britain drafted a memorandum that included proposed reforms for the six provinces with Armenians populations in reaction to the events in Sassoun and sent it to the Porte in the spring of 1895. Pressure for reforms further inflamed tensions in eastern Anatolia, which were "seen as another example of European imperialism, one step on the road to Armenian independence,"⁵⁵ and provoked further inter-communal violence. As a result, the Ottoman government was slow to approve the reforms and even slower to enact proposed changes.

In the months following the European reform proposal, violent confrontations continued in Anatolia, consisting of the organized massacre of Armenians to suppress rebellion. The escalating brutality and delayed reforms provoked a response from Armenian revolutionary groups. In September 1895, an Armenian nationalist organization, the Hunchakist party, organized a protest march in Istanbul to accelerate the implementation of the reforms that the European powers had proposed to the sultan. The march ended in violence as crowds in the city reacted brutally to the protest and launched vicious outbursts against Armenians all

⁵⁴ Akçam, 41.

⁵⁵ Duguid, 151.

over the empire, especially in the *vilayets* where reforms were scheduled to take effect. The massacres intensified even further in August of 1896 when members of the Dashnak Revolutionary Party invaded the Imperial Ottoman Bank "with the aim of instigating foreign intervention."⁵⁶ This incident aggravated the tensions and launched a massive massacre of Armenians in the capital.⁵⁷

The reasons for the 1894-1896 Armenian massacres must be understood within "the context of Armenian-Ottoman relations, and by the unintentional consequences of the Armenian renaissance."⁵⁸ Robert Melson examines the theoretical framework for the 1894-1896 massacres. He argues the Armenian Renaissance and the presence of so many Armenians near the border with a hostile neighbor, set in the context of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, can explain how the Porte came to view the Armenians as a threat. The increased economic power of the community, and strengthened nationalistic ideology as a result of the Renaissance, combined with Armenian connections in the Diaspora which enabled them to reach out to foreign powers for support, threatened the Ottoman government's power. The weakening of the Empire forced the Porte to take drastic measures to keep the Empire from further disintegration, including suppression of

⁵⁶ Uras, 607.

⁵⁷ Uras, 542-547, 591, 607.

⁵⁸ Melson, 506.

dissenters who threatened the historical status quo. Massacre was the means of choice to accomplish this goal.⁵⁹

Additionally it is necessary to delineate the 1890s events as massacres and not genocide. The massacres were partial in nature, took place in urban centers, limiting the targets to men, and killing them outright in locations close to their home or business. The killings lasted only a few days and generally began and ended abruptly, in some cases with the ringing of a bell. The intent was not the elimination of an entire ethnic group, as "there were no wholesale deportations and massacres, as the main purpose of these massacres involved large-scale economic, cultural, and psychological destruction through selective massacre."⁶⁰ Yet, while full scale genocide may not have been the intent, the 1890s massacres are a key turning point in the desperation felt by the Porte, and its willingness to condone violence as a method for unification and rejuvenation of the Empire.

The 1895 reforms the sultan announced as a result of the massacres and international pressure were never implemented. This left the Armenian question unresolved, making it a potential source of future conflict. Therefore, it is not surprising the 1890s persecutions were only a precedent for additional massacres

⁵⁹ Melson, 503-509.

⁶⁰ Dadrian, *Warrant for Genocide*, 85.

to follow. In the last few years of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth, the decay of the Ottoman Empire continued. Ottoman liberals and intelligentsia created a movement that asserted that drastic change was needed to save the Empire from dissolution. Known as the Young Turk movement, it adopted western institutions and ideologies as a basis for change in an effort to protect against the encroaching West. The movement spouted democratic characteristics such as constitutional government and freedom from authoritarian sultans, all within the context of Turkish social customs. Although it started as a movement of reform, over time the ideals of nationalism and Turkish supremacy spread among the Young Turks and made it less and less appealing to ethnic and religious minority groups.⁶¹

In a virtually bloodless revolution, the Young Turk party, or the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), came to power in July of 1908, forcing Sultan Abdul Hamid II to reinstate the constitution of 1876. In the initial days following the revolution, Armenian leaders of the Hunchak and Dashnak parties both supported the CUP and pledged cooperation. However, the wave of good feelings did not last as the CUP became increasingly devoted to the idea of Pan-Turkism. Pan-Turkism rejected liberal

⁶¹ Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, Jr., *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 3-5, 136.

ideals of equality of all Ottoman subjects, consequently excluding "Armenians not just from state power...but also from society at large."⁶² As a result, Armenian communities worked to gather support in order to elect their own people to Parliament. They labored to amass backing for their independence movement and to revive nationalistic sentiment. Armenian leaders tried to entice CUP support, but the new leaders were distracted with problems in the Balkans and were at war almost immediately upon gaining power, thus giving little attention to the Armenian question.⁶³

The Balkan Wars at the beginning of the twentieth century brought the Eastern Question and the future of the Ottoman Empire further into the international arena. Dissolution of the Empire began to seem more and more inevitable, and the European powers scrambled to ensure they would benefit from the decline of the Empire. The eastern border of the Empire was of great concern to both Russia and Great Britain for its strategic geographic proximity to trade with India and the Far East. Germany and France were also concerned with the future of the Ottoman Empire, as they had economic investments in the Empire. New political alliances with the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance brought further complications to the Armenian question, which had not

⁶² Stephan Astourian, "The Armenian Genocide: An Interpretation," *The History Teacher* 23, no. 2 (Feb 1990), 133.

⁶³ Uras, 833-840.

existed at the Berlin Conference. Foreign concern over the Armenians was a symptom of international tensions and rivalry early in the century, but none of the Powers "wanted partition at the moment, and none wanted war at the moment over the Armenian question."⁶⁴ Reform in Turkey became imperative for the Powers to continue their policy of propping up the Empire as a way to maintain a European balance of power. Yet the massive loss of European territory at the end of the Balkan Wars made it abundantly clear Turkey was extremely vulnerable to its internal dissents.

To deal with the intensification of Turkish-Armenian tension brought on by the Balkan Wars, Russia spearheaded another proposed reform program. Months of negotiations resulted in a proposal recommending the establishment of a single Armenian *vilayet* (province) comprised of the six eastern provinces to be headed by a Christian governor. In addition, it called for an administrative council and provisional assembly to oversee the province and the dissolution of the Kurdish Hamidiye regiment. The agreement concluded in February 1914 had six European powers signatories to guarantee implementation of these reforms.⁶⁵ The reform agreement was never put into action, but it did halt European military intervention early in 1914. Yet, other events

⁶⁴ Davison, "The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914," 505.

⁶⁵ W. Van der Dussen, "The Question of Armenian Reform in 1913-1914," *The Armenian Review* 39, no. 1 (Spring 1986), 24.

brought the European powers to war, with one consequence being the escalation of the Armenian question within the Ottoman Empire and international reaction to it.

Genocide

The Armenians found themselves in a vulnerable position at the beginning of World War I. The Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, leaving the Armenians cut off from both Russia and Great Britain. In previous military disputes between Turkey and Russia, the eastern Armenian communities were considered suspects of suspicion as a result of their ties to Russia. The Great War was no exception. The Ottomans' involvement in a much larger war than any previous conflicts with Russia came at a point when the Empire's decline was intensifying and its future was at stake. Consequently the CUP began a preemptive strike against the Armenians in an effort to settle its historical problem of minority ethnicities at its borders. Beginning in the fall of 1914, the government began a number of tactics that provided a glimpse of its future plans for the Armenians. They included harsh tax collection, forced conscription, and confiscation of property in the Armenian regions, combined with forced disarmament, assaults, and

deportations of Armenian civilians in the extreme border regions.⁶⁶

The events of the Armenian Genocide have been cited in countless survivor memoirs, eyewitness accounts, and diplomatic documents. However, the decision for the mass killing and deportations, combined with the presence of premeditated intent by the government, is hotly debated by historians. The destruction of CUP documents after the war and inaccessibility of modern Ottoman archives in addition to the extreme emotion surrounding the events and polarity among historians makes resolution of the debate most unlikely.

The course of the Genocide began in the spring of 1915 with a deportation order issued by the CUP for the removal of Armenians believed to be dangerous. Orders for the deportations were sent to local authorities in the regions, to be carried out by security forces. The deportation decree was typically announced to the village or city with the stated time for all Armenians to report for removal. Armenians were allowed to carry only a limited amount of personal belongings, forced to leave most items behind, many of which were plundered or sold to Muslim neighbors. Deportation orders were often accompanied by mass killings of Armenian civilians. Mass killings were primarily conducted by irregular Turkish gendarme units or armed Kurdish

⁶⁶ Akçam, 130-148.

and Circassian civilians. These atrocities were heaviest in the eastern and central regions of Anatolia and the areas of resettlement. Men were usually separated from the women, children, and old people, and massacre of the male population took place earlier than that of women.⁶⁷

Turkish authorities blamed the need for deportations on the Armenian revolutionary movement, pointing to the outbreak of violence at the city of Van as proof of Armenian rebellion. Located near the Russian border, Van had a large Armenian population. In the spring of 1915 Russian military forces were advancing into Turkish territory, escalating tensions between Armenians and the Muslim Kurds and causing the outbreak of guerilla warfare. The Armenians claimed they were protecting themselves from pillage, while the Porte claimed the Armenians were trying to assist the Russians. Armenian civilians from the city and surrounding countryside fortified the city and held off Turkish military forces until the advance of the Russian army.⁶⁸

At the same time tensions were inflaming in Van, the Porte implemented an organized persecution of Armenian notables and intelligentsia on April 24 in the capital. As part of an "early phase of genocide," by September the government had taken 140 Armenian prisoners in the capital and killed them without charges

⁶⁷ Lewy, 150-151, 221; Akçam, 174-183.

⁶⁸ Lewy, 95.

or a trial. The victims were mostly men from the upper class who were well educated and included political leaders, newspaper reporters, artists, physicians, and clerics. Recent forensic scholarship argues that the targeting of high ranking members of society, termed cerebrogenocide, is a marker used to label ethnic-cleansing as a genocide. The Turkish goal was to deprive the Armenian community of leadership, as it is clear "that the victim's potential leadership profile was of significance and indeed made them the preeminent targets for genocide."⁶⁹

At the end of May 1915, the Ottoman government issued orders to extend the geographic extent of the deportations further away from the border regions and to include the general Armenian population. Local Ottoman officials organized the deportations in coordination with regulations issued by the Porte. An end date for the deportations is hard to confirm, as deportations continued even after decrees to end them had been issued by the government. Local officials implementing the orders often ignored communications to end the deportations. Certainly, they had ended by early in 1917.⁷⁰

The impact of the deportations was severe. People were given from a few days to a few hours notice to pack or sell their belongings. Most left all they had behind. As the male population

⁶⁹ Alen Salerian, *et al.*, "Review of Mass Homicides of Intelligentsia as a Marker for Genocide," *The Forensic Examiner* 16, no. 3 (Fall 2007), 38.

⁷⁰ Lewy, 151-154, 205-207,

was arrested or killed before being deported, the deportee population was mostly women and children. In some cases Armenians were forced to convert to Islam to escape death, although most were willing to convert to save their lives, and so the policy was abandoned by the Ottomans.⁷¹ Regions targeted for deportations were areas where Armenians constituted more than five to ten percent of the population, making the issue one of "Armenian population density."⁷² Those Armenians surviving the initial massacres were made to walk to the areas of resettlement and faced any number of devastations including starvation, rape, kidnap, sickness, murder, and death along the way. Reports of the death toll for the deportations varied wildly and is not completely known. The farther the initial location was from the point of resettlement, the worse the experience.⁷³

Initially, as the Porte issued decrees for deportation, they added provisions "to give the law a semblance of fair play."⁷⁴ The government promised the Armenians they would retain ownership of their original homes and land and even accrue rent money from Muslims living on the land during the term of the deportation. As part of the course of deportations, the Ottoman government also vowed protection for the Armenians from persecution or bodily harm. Furthermore it promised to provide assistance in rebuilding

⁷¹ Akçam, 174-175.

⁷² Akçam, 178.

⁷³ Akçam, 181-193.

⁷⁴ Hovannisian, 50.

Armenian communities and homes in the new areas and to protect the rights of property and life. The potential for the mitigation provisions to be effective was low as the government did little to enforce them, and Armenian deportees were rarely made aware of the existence of such provisions. In addition, the issues of deportation and mitigation often came after the actual deportations and massacres had begun.⁷⁵

As a result, the Armenian quality of life during the deportations, and after, was dire. The resettlement camps for Armenians were located in the inner provinces of the Empire, far from the front lines. The geography of the area was arid and dry. Starvation was a critical problem, especially after Turkey began to experience resource shortages due to the war. The sanitary and health conditions were deplorable, and housing was sparse. In refuge camps in Rakka, epidemic diseases broke out, killing many of the Armenians who had survived the deportations. In Der-el-Zor, the largest of the resettlement camps, the number of Armenian deportees exceeded the prescribed ten percent in relation to the Muslim population, resulting in thousands being expelled to suffer further misery in additional deportations.⁷⁶

The total loss of life from the deportations, whether killed or died, and subsequent conditions is difficult to determine.

⁷⁵ Hovannisian, 50.

⁷⁶ Lewy, 214, 216.

Ottoman census procedures during its last century were inconsistent, particularly with regards to urban versus rural areas. The government made a larger effort to determine accurate counts for male citizens than for females, as Muslim men in certain age groups were considered eligible for military conscription, and non-Muslim males were subject to the head tax. Still the population statistics for all citizens, including Armenians, both before and after the war are unreliable. The counts in the desert and mountain areas, regions with large Armenian populations, were little more than estimates, and figures for females were vastly underestimated.⁷⁷

Not only are pre-war Ottoman population figures difficult to determine, but similarly is the exact cause of death for Armenian civilians. Deaths could have been caused by mass killings during the deportations, the horrific living conditions in refugee camps, military combat, or as a result of post-war military campaigns by Mustafa Kemal. As many as five to ten percent of Armenian women and children converted to Islam and were incorporated into Muslim households,⁷⁸ while others relocated overseas after the war, further complicating the issue. Lastly,

⁷⁷ Stanford Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9, no. 3 (Oct 1978), 325-326, 336.

⁷⁸ Ara Sarafian, "The Absorption of Armenian Women and Children into Muslim Households as a Structural Component of the Armenian Genocide," in *In God's Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 211.

as the debate among historians on the topic is exceptionally polemic, an author's bias can influence the numbers.

Despite the difficulties, many research groups and historians have attempted to establish a number. In the most comprehensive study to date, Dr. Sarkis Karajian created a formula to calculate the Armenian deaths specifically related to the Genocide. He tallied population figures for the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire and the Diaspora for both 1914 and 1924 and the loss of Armenian life from 1918-1922 as result of combat or massacre. Karajian then subtracted the post-war population figures and the loss for life from 1918-1922 from the total pre-war population figure and concluded the total loss of Armenian life to exceed two million.⁷⁹ Yet, as recently as 2002, studies by Turkish historians estimate the death toll at six hundred thousand⁸⁰ one of the lowest estimates thus far.

While events and conditions surrounding the deportations are extensively documented, a fierce debate stills rages among historians. The heart of the controversy stems from the issue of premeditation, an element considered necessary to warrant use of the term genocide.⁸¹ Armenians believe the CUP held pre-wartime plans to annihilate them in an effort to cleanse Turkish society

⁷⁹ Sarkis Karajian, "An Inquiry into the Statistics of the Turkish Genocide of the Armenians, 1915-1918," *Armenian Review* 25 (Winter 1978), 3-44.

⁸⁰ Lewy, 240-241.

⁸¹ See earlier discussion on the definition of genocide.

of non-Turks. Historians cite Young Turk nationalism, available government documents, and diplomatic accounts from westerners to prove the Porte had intent to exterminate the Armenians prior to the outbreak of the war. The premeditated nature and ethnic motivation for the deportations have led these authors to label the event genocide.⁸² Vahakn Dadrian, the foremost historian supporting the premeditation thesis, argues "evidence clearly demonstrates that a pre-war provisional decision was already reached radically to solve the festering Armenian question at the first opportunity that may present itself."⁸³ Others supporting this argument include Richard Hovannisian, Taner Akçam, and most western and Armenian scholars. Conversely, Turkish historians maintain the Armenian communities in the border regions were engaged in treasonous activities and initiated a rebellion during the war to hinder the Turkish war effort. Thus, the Turkish government had no choice but to remove the Armenians from the region to protect the country and the subsequent loss of life was regrettable but not part of any ulterior motives.⁸⁴ With the exception of Akçam, most Turkish historians take this perspective, and it remains the official policy of the modern Turkish government. Of course, some historians attempt to take a middling position, claiming the events can be labeled genocide

⁸² Lewy, 43.

⁸³ Vahakan Dadrian, "The Determinants of the Armenian Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 1, no. 1 (1999), 68.

⁸⁴ Lewy, 90.

due to their catastrophic impact without the presence of premeditation.

Regardless of the presence of premeditation, the impact of the Genocide on the Armenian people can not be overstated. They were the community of people most affected by World War I, and the Genocide altered the course of their entire history. The infrastructure of the community was demolished, as displaced Armenians all over the empire lost their homes, property, and land, and many were left with no choice but emigration. It is clear "the trauma of the horrendous deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, compounded by the loss of the traditional homelands of more than three millennia, left deep, raw wounds on the Armenian psyche."⁸⁵

The Armenians withstood invasions and foreign control in their ancestral homeland for centuries before the Ottomans and always managed to rebuild and recover from any setback. Yet, a consequence of the Genocide was the trauma of the community that has continued into the twenty-first century.⁸⁶ As Armenian generations have passed down stories of the Genocide, it has become engrained into the Armenian identity and consciousness. Donald and Lorna Miller's study on Armenians in the modern

⁸⁵ Richard Hovannisian, "The First World War as the Defining Moment in Modern Armenian History," in *The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean*, ed. Olaf Farschid, Manfred Kropp and Stephan Dähne (Beirut: Ergon Verlag Würzburg In Kommission, 2006), 25.

⁸⁶ Richard Hovannisian, 25-32.

republic reveals that people characterize traumatic current events involving violent discrimination as recurrences of the Genocide.⁸⁷ This aspect of the Genocide history, as part of the Armenian identity, is one of the reasons modern Turkey and Armenians struggle over reconciliation.

⁸⁷ Donald Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, *Armenia: Portraits of Survival and Hope* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 151.

CHAPTER 3

CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

Content analysis is a widely established method of research in social science fields. It is a method that uses systematic procedures to classify textual material in an effort to draw out meaning and relevance. Researchers analyze documents for themes or ideas and compare them for patterns. Content analysis began in the social sciences but "the impetus toward systematic analysis of documentary data is supported by increased interest in the analysis of textual writings in a diversity of fields...the humanities, for instance, have become increasingly involved in textual analysis in recent years and have developed their own methods and concerns."⁸⁸ Traditional content analysis methods focus on systemization and objectivity to give the study a scientific character in which the results can be reproduced by other researchers. Content analysis is appealing when studying mass communication because it can accommodate large amounts of text. Sampling procedures are often applied in content analysis studies that deal with mass quantities of data, combined with reliability tests to ensure accuracy.

⁸⁸ Randy Hodson, *Analyzing Documentary Accounts* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1999), 3.

While the research methods of this study strive for accuracy and reliability, they do so based on a refined methodological procedure and academic integrity. The method of content analysis used in this thesis is designed to specifically suit the needs of historical inquiry. While historians do look for patterns and trends in content, they also focus on the context and framing of the content in an effort to examine the big picture. Historians attempt to place examination of textual content within its historical perspective, recognizing that historical writings do not exist in a vacuum but rather shape and are shaped by their contemporary backdrop.

For the purpose of conducting research on media coverage of the Armenian Genocide, the parameters of research were limited to make the resulting conclusions meaningful and relevant. American media coverage was chosen for several reasons. First, its content is in the English language, making it accessible to the researcher and to English speaking readers wishing to verify the conclusions. Second, American neutrality in the early years of the war provided a unique perspective and access to information through ongoing diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. Finally, the purpose of the research is to develop a historical picture of American understanding and conception of the Armenian Genocide during the war. To

accomplish this, American media coverage was the evidence used for analysis.

The *Washington Post* was chosen as a large American newspaper located in the nation's capital, a unique position from which the *Post* might both reflect on and influence the country's leaders and public opinion. The *Post* was a daily paper by 1914, printing editions every day of the week, including an extended Sunday edition.

The period of study was limited to two years, from January 1, 1915 to December 31, 1916, for a number of reasons. Historians date the Armenian Genocide to 1915. It is impossible to conclusively date the end to the Genocide, particularly as Turkey was not an occupied country at the end of the war and wartime leaders remained in power in the post-war government. The twenty-four month period selected allows for analysis of media coverage of the earliest events in the Genocide and continues long enough to include the variety of relevant topics in the news coverage and time for international reaction and response to be considered as well.

The unit for analysis in this study is the article. Articles were analyzed in their entirety and not broken down by word or sentence. The search for newspaper articles from the *Washington Post* was conducted using one source, the archives search engine on the *Washington Post* website. The words

"Armenia" and "Armenian" were used to identify relevant articles. All articles found were used in the research except those having no significance, specifically articles pertaining to the sinking of the ship *Armenia*.

There are two basic approaches to content analysis: qualitative and quantitative, and the "best content-analytic studies use both qualitative and quantitative operations on texts."⁸⁹ Consequently this study incorporates elements of both but relies primarily on qualitative analysis, with quantitative analysis being a supportive approach. Content analysis requires the use of defined categories to divide the units of analysis, in this case the article. Categorization is done based on set rules of procedure to ensure accuracy and reduce author bias and subjectivity.

This content analysis centers on three major issues. The first issue concerns the main topic displayed in articles on the Armenian Genocide. The five main topic categories were defined through an examination of all the articles for basic content. Five main topics were identified: ***description, international action, aid, subordinate reference, and location***. Each category has a set definition that is broad and easily recognizable in the content of the text. The main topic of each article was

⁸⁹ Robert Philip Weber, *Basic Content Analysis* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1990), 10.

determined using the first two paragraphs of text combined with the headline for additional clarification. The main topic of the each article was used to categorize it into one of the five main topic categories. In the case of an article containing content relevant to more than one of the five defined primary categories, the rule of using the first two paragraphs to determine topic was applied. Additional themes in the content were addressed as a sub-topic, and method for sub-topic identification is discussed below.

The ***description*** category includes all articles in which the main topic is an account of massacres, killing, death tolls, refugee conditions, and/or deportations. These articles can include information on the locations of such events, the victims and perpetrators, the way in which Americans were affected by the massacres, and references to earlier persecutions.

A second category is ***international action***. This category encompasses any articles covering international or domestic political reaction to the massacre of Armenians. It includes a variety of topics such as Allied responses, Turkish and German defense of the events, Armenian resistance and calls for assistance, international diplomacy in calling others to action, American political action in diplomacy with Turkey, and legislation for aid.

The third category on **aid** includes all articles related to aid provided to the Armenians in forms other than military or political assistance. It includes aid sent by or received from all countries, although the news primarily concerns American relief and fundraising.

The fourth category, **subordinate reference**, includes all articles in which the main topic is not related to the Armenian Genocide or the Armenian people in general. Instead, references to the mass killing or suffering of Armenians are a sub-topic or side note used as a reference, example, or supporting evidence for the main topic. While the Armenian Genocide is not the main topic in these articles, they can still provide an interesting perspective on how the massacres were used or interpreted in other contexts and for what political purposes or to support which agendas. As a result, the articles' main topics are widely varied in this category.

The final category is **location**. This category is notably smaller than others and contains articles in which the word *Armenia* or *Armenian* is used to name a location in Asia Minor or as an adjective to describe a geographical location. These articles are primarily about military engagements. The articles in this category were not discarded, as military movements often sparked massacres and so help clarify articles in other categories.

The second major issue of the content analysis concerns the sub-topics or themes present within each category. The subthemes provide the substance of the analysis, as they examine the content for the context, source, and framework in which the Armenian Genocide was presented to Americans. This phase of the content analysis took place after the articles had been sorted into one of the five main topic categories, during which the articles within each category were then analyzed for internal themes. Within the main topic category, an article can have many subthemes and is not divided into only one category. Sub-topics are divisions of the story or supporting points within the story and can be noted when a change of idea or information occurs in the text. Within each main topic category, a series of questions were asked of all the articles to determine subthemes and facilitate analysis. The following questions were asked:

- What reoccurring themes appear in multiple articles?
- Are there any shared sources in multiple articles?
- What kind of language is used to report the Genocide?

The third major issue addressed in the content analysis was the prominence of coverage the *Post* gave to the Armenian Genocide and was determined using a quantitative approach. The rationale for measuring placement of stories is to determine visibility, and quantity of articles is for comparison between

main topic categories. The following indicators are used to measure prominence:

- total number of stories
- number of stories beginning on page one
- number of front page, headline articles
- number of stories based on day of the week, month, and year
- number of articles reported from foreign countries

These indicators were applied to counts based on the total number of articles and the articles within each main topic category. The results of this analysis are displayed in the text of the analysis and also represented in table form. Results from the quantitative analysis provide information on which category received the most coverage, when the media coverage in a particular category was the highest, and how any trends arise from the dates and days of media coverage. Measurement concerning the country of origin for news sources also reveals any reliance on a country or side in the war for information.

Other methods of measuring prominence commonly employed in content analysis were considered but discarded as impractical for this study. One such method was the use of word count. Word count can be used to as an indicator of prominence, with the length of an article indicative of its important. The topics of

longer articles receive more coverage, and so play a larger role in shaping public opinion. While this point is valid, the use of word count as a tool for this study was deemed unfeasible due to discrepancies between the *Washington Post's* report of word count for articles as compared to researcher verification in the text.

The following are the results of the content analysis study.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH RESULTS

Qualitative Analysis

Description

This category includes articles in which the main topic is a description of the mass killings and deportations Armenians. This category is placed first because knowledge and details of the massacres themselves are crucial as a basis for understanding all further action regarding the Armenians. For Americans, the way media coverage portrayed the events, the vocabulary used, amount of detail provided, and placement of blame created the foundation for immediate and future opinion, emotion about the massacres and opinion of Turkey.

The ***description*** category contains a total of forty-nine articles, out of one hundred eighty total, thirty-seven in 1915 and twelve in 1916. The very first article in January 1915 falls under this category and the bulk of the articles in this category were printed between April 1915 and February 1916. The largest number of descriptive articles appeared in August 1915, with a total of eight, in a month of fifteen total articles. Of all five categories, the description group is the first theme to arise in the media coverage, and is heaviest in the mid and late

months of 1915, tapering off by mid 1916. Nine of the forty-nine articles appear on the front page and three appear as headline stories. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).

Before beginning an analysis of the many different sub-topic themes contained in the **description** category, it is first necessary to address the core content, the actual descriptions. Media coverage with descriptions of the massacre of Armenians and conditions of refugees was some of the most graphic of all the articles surveyed and understandably provoked emotion and instigated much of the coverage to follow in other categories. First hand stories and accounts of the killing, pillaging, and treatment of Armenians in Turkey during World War I is perhaps the least controversial aspect of the Genocide, as it is so well documented and collaborated. Articles in the *Washington Post* are comparable in content to eyewitness accounts from other sources on the events.

Article titles in this category provided the first glimpse of the content to follow. Headlines such as "50 Tied and Drowned", "Greatest Horrors in History," and "Starving Armenians," gave readers a glimpse of the content of the article and made it clear the topic of the article was coverage of the massacres. Provoking headlines might as also have been a ploy to draw readers in and gain a shock factor. Descriptive articles reported on the massacre of Armenians "who were led out into the

street, where they were either shot or their throats cut"⁹⁰ or gave vivid descriptions of death such as, "the plain of Alashgerd is virtually covered with the bodies of men, women and children."⁹¹ Other examples included accounts of "throwing the bodies of the victims into the Tigris and Euphrates rivers,"⁹² "corpses of noncombatants, both men and women, strewn along every trail,"⁹³ and wells "in which the bodies of the dead had been crammed."⁹⁴ They used phrases like "general", "systematic", "organized",⁹⁵ "annihilation", and "extermination"⁹⁶ to describe the massacre of Armenians.

While descriptive quotes about the massacres are endless, simple descriptions have limits. Stand alone descriptions about the massacres can not reveal the motivations of the author, assign responsibility for the massacres, determine causes and effect of the events, or the source of the information.

Descriptions are much more relevant when read and understood within the context of the article. Key themes to identify in

⁹⁰ "Turks Cut 150 Armenians' Throats; Force Fifty to Jump Into an Abyss," *Washington Post*, February 28, 1915, R3.

⁹¹ "Hundreds of Men, Women and Children are Slain by Kurds in Armenian Plain," *Washington Post*, March, 20, 1915, 3.

⁹² "100,000 Armenians Sent into Exile; Massacre Victims Put at 10,000," *Washington Post*, August 11, 1915, 3.

⁹³ "Armenia Land of Ruin," *Washington Post*, August 22, 1915, R1.

⁹⁴ "Died in Fleeing Kurds," *Washington Post*, April, 26, 1915, 3.

⁹⁵ "Fear Kurd Massacre," *Washington Post*, April, 18, 1915, 3; "Turks Cut 150 Armenians' Throats; Force Fifty to Jump Into an Abyss," *Washington Post*, February 28, 1915, R3; "Turks Hard Pressed in Armenia; Bitlis Massacre Presages Retreat," *Washington Post*, July 13, 1915, 2.

⁹⁶ "Russians Pursue Turk," *Washington Post*, May 6, 1915, 3; "Turks Kill Thousands," *Washington Post*, August 6, 1915, 2.

articles with descriptions are the kind of vocabulary used, other information provided in proximity to the descriptions, and if the article provided coverage on reactions to the massacres.

Articles in the ***description*** category are unique from those in other categories in that they often included a source for their information such as an eyewitness. Identification of a source for the information made the news more reliable or creditable. In some cases the article referred to a correspondent reporting the news⁹⁷ with little other information, making the nationality or reliability difficult to determine. The most common type of source used was an eyewitness, in most cases a refugee. In "Turks Kill Christians" and "Moslems Slay People in Ten Villages" unnamed refugees in Persia and Russia reported the massacre of Armenians and looting of towns around Lake Van.⁹⁸ In instances where the refugee's name is known, it was reported, as in the case of Dr. Kochadur Bonaparian, an Armenian refugee in Russia who reported the spread of disease and the fate of American missionaries in Armenia.⁹⁹ As refugees were the victims of the offenses, they could have potential bias in reporting the events. They could exaggerate the crimes or death toll to embarrass Turkey or compel assistance from Russia

⁹⁷ "Armenia Land of Ruin," *Washington Post*, August 22, 1915, R1.

⁹⁸ "Turks Kill Christians," *Washington Post*, April 25, 1915, 1; "Moslems Slay People in Ten Villages; Armenians Send Wilson Plea for Aid," *Washington Post*, April 26, 1915, 3.

⁹⁹ "No Missionaries Slain," *Washington Post*, August 22, 1915, R4.

and other Allied countries. Also the refugees primarily fled to Russia or Persia, two locations under Allied control. News coming out of Allied countries could have been biased based on wartime alliances and ulterior motives on the part of the Allies to portray Turkey as evil in an effort to draw the United States into the war on their side.

American missionaries were also the source of large amounts of eyewitness coverage. The area of Lake Van was the location of conflict between the Russian and Turkish armies, and a siege was fought for the city when Armenian guerilla forces fortified the city to wait for the arrival of the Russians. The city housed an American mission and school, so missionaries witnessed fighting and persecutions in the area. Missionaries were a source of information on the events and considered reliable sources of information, as they were American and so not likely to be clouded by national bias. In October 1915 sixteen missionaries arrived in the United States after serving in Turkey. An article recounted how they sheltered Armenians from Turks and Kurds and the terrible conditions in Armenia.¹⁰⁰ In another instance an anonymous female missionary who escaped to Cairo submitted a report describing the situation in Turkey. She recounted the conditions of deported Armenians on their way to Syria, the

¹⁰⁰ "Armenians Loot Turkish Homes When Russians Come to Rescue," *Washington Post*, October 6, 1915, 2.

enslavement of women for Turkish harems, her own attempts to covertly provide aid for refugees, and imprisonment of other missionaries.¹⁰¹

Missionaries not only provided information for reports but also gave public speeches. A story in October 1915 covered a speech by returned missionary Dr. Henry Barnum, who spoke at a church service of the killing of Christians by Muslims. He advocated continued support of the foreign missions board's work in Turkey.¹⁰² American missionaries were considered reliable sources as they had worked in Turkey for decades. They knew the people and the country, had established contacts and were considered authorities on the subject. In addition, missionaries provided the opportunity for American sources of information, that were not filtered through international outlets and correspondents.

Eyewitness accounts were not only filtered through international media outlets but also by international and domestic committees and organizations. The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, the Armenian Red Cross Fund in London, and the Armenian General Progressive Association in the United States disseminated information they received in reports. Relief organizations prepared press releases and made statements

¹⁰¹ "American Woman Missionary Gives Vivid Pictures of Armenia's Fate," *Washington Post*, February 6, 1916, 14.

¹⁰² "Tells of Armenian Slain," *Washington Post*, October 11, 1915, 14.

to inform the public about the events and conditions in Armenia. In some cases, the articles told how the organization received its information, such as an eyewitness or religious spokesperson as was the case with the Katholikos, head of the Armenian Church.¹⁰³

Reliability of sources and the information they provided was clearly an issue, as some reports attempted to demonstrate the validity of their information. In an article on an account of the atrocities in Armenia compiled by an American committee with interests in Turkey, the committee began the report by emphasizing the integrity and authority of the writers and the large amounts of information gathered from informed sources on the topic.¹⁰⁴ In another case, the American Committee on Armenian and Syrian Relief prefaced its publicized report by stating information came through a "high diplomatic authority in Turkey, not American, reporting the testimony of trustworthy witnesses over wide areas."¹⁰⁵

Now that different types of sources and source biases have been discussed, the various sub-topic themes presented within

¹⁰³ "15,000 Slain by Turks," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1916, ES14; "Starving Armenian Devour Dead," *Washington Post*, August 8, 1916, 3; "Armenians Eat Children," *Washington Post*, August 20, 1916, A7; "Hundreds of Men, Women and Children are Slain by Kurds in Armenian Plain," *Washington Post*, March, 20, 1915, 3; "450,000 Armenians Are Slain in Massacres by Moslems," *Washington Post*, September, 25, 1915, 3.

¹⁰⁴ "Greatest Horrors in History Mark Massacres in Armenia," *Washington Post*, October 4, 1915, 5.

¹⁰⁵ As quoted in "Starving Armenians Devour Dead," *Washington Post*, August 8, 1916, 3.

this category will be discussed. There are six sub-topic themes in the *description* category: the correlation between military engagement and Armenian massacres, perpetrators of the persecutions, the use of religious terminology, references to pre-war massacres, the presence of Americans in Armenia, and retaliatory action by Armenians.

The first theme is the correlation between Turkish and Russian military engagements and the massacre of Armenians. Several articles specifically state the two events were related, of that one premeditated the other. In one of the earliest articles printed in 1915, a special cable reported murders of Armenians in Tiflis escalated after news of Russian occupation of Ardahan. The initial death toll of fifteen rose to one hundred fifty in a "systematic massacre" in retaliation after the news of Russian military success.¹⁰⁶ Two later stories made reference to massacres and pillaging of villages that occurred prior to the evacuation of Turks in anticipation of the arrival of Russian forces.¹⁰⁷ A final article told of Russian military successes in Caucasus and the spread of Turkish destruction of Armenian homes in the area.¹⁰⁸ While Russian military success in Armenia was by no means the source of tension between Armenians

¹⁰⁶ "Turks Cut 150 Armenians Throats; Force Fifty to Jump into Abyss," *Washington Post*, February 28, 1915, R3.

¹⁰⁷ "Hundreds of Men, Women and Children are Slain by Kurds in Armenian Plain," *Washington Post*, March 20, 1915, 3; "15,000 Slain by Turks," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1916, ES14.

¹⁰⁸ "Russians Pursue Turk," *Washington Post*, May 6, 1915, 3.

and Muslims, the articles show that at times military movements served as a catalyst to provoke or increase the severity of persecutions.

The second sub-topic theme concerns the perpetrators of the persecutions. Most of the articles that name perpetrators in the massacres cite Turks, Kurds, or both. If not clearly stated, it is unclear whether the term "Turk" refers to Turkish troops, gendarmes, or members of the civilian population. Some articles provided exact information, such as one in April 1915 that reported Turkish troops with the help of local Turkish police massacred Armenians and killed any who escaped the first round.¹⁰⁹ An article only a few weeks later reported Armenians attempts to defend themselves against the Kurds, but "the Kurds were aided by Turkish regulars."¹¹⁰ A similar story said "Turks distributed 40,000 rifles among Kurds in Mush Valley for use against Armenians."¹¹¹

Vague references to Turkish perpetrators without identification of military status created a conception of the "Turk" as a homogenous entity, wholly capable of violent discrimination. Articles that reported persecution by Turkish regular troops and police or the distribution of weapons with

¹⁰⁹ "Turks Kill Christians," *Washington Post*, April 25, 1915, 1.

¹¹⁰ "Kill 10,000 Christians," *Washington Post*, May 16, 1915, 15.

¹¹¹ "Turks Hard Pressed in Armenia; Bitlis Massacre Presages Retreat," *Washington Post*, July 13, 1915, 2.

the intent of killing Armenians implies organization, preplanning, and orders from a higher authority.

Some articles actually cited orders for the massacres or directly blamed the Turkish government. An article in March 1915 said in the cities of Salmaz, Pagaduk, and Sarna the Turkish commissioner gave orders for the "destruction of the towns."¹¹² Two other stories blamed the government directly, saying it ordered the deportation of the Armenians and used it as cover to commit rape, murder, and pillage. One in particular directly stated the persecutions were "not in response to fanatical or popular demand, but is purely arbitrary, and directed from Constantinople."¹¹³

One of the major controversies in the historiography of the Armenian Genocide is the role of the Committee of Union and Progress as the invisible hand instigating the massacres. Some historians argue the CUP secretly ordered wide scale mass killing of Armenians, while other historians argue massacres spontaneously ignited as a result of inter-communal rivalry. In these cases there is also controversy concerning who carried out the massacres, civilian Kurds or Turkish troops, the latter of which would imply orders from the government. While *Washington*

¹¹² "Hundreds of Men, Women and Children are Slain by Kurds in Armenian Plain," *Washington Post*, March 20, 1915, 3.

¹¹³ "Million Facing Death," *Washington Post*, September 3, 1915, 1; "Greatest Horrors in History Mark Massacres in Armenia, Declares Official Report," *Washington Post*, October 4, 1915, 5.

Post news articles can not necessarily be considered reliable sources for solving this controversy, contemporary coverage on the identity of the perpetrators can clarify how Americans understood the events and any deep rooted stereotypes created based on the media coverage.

Another significant sub-topic theme present in articles in this category is the use of religious vocabulary to describe the events. While the terms "Christian" and "Muslim" were commonly used interchangeably with "Armenian" and "Turk," other types of religious terminology were employed to provide context to the reader and associate Armenian with good and Turk with bad. Two articles both created similar parallels between the Jews' escape from Egypt in the Bible and Armenian refugees' flight from Turkey. Armenian and Nestorian Christian refugees' journey to Persia was called an "exodus" in an article in April 1915 and in another, a narrative about an American missionary labeled him a "modern day Moses" who "shepherded his enormous flock out of the Armenian province of Van."¹¹⁴ In another report, a pastor was equated to a "savior" and credited with leading "his" Armenians to the safety of Russia's western civilization, just barely escaping the advancing Turks.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ "Died in Fleeing Kurds," *Washington Post*, April 26, 1915, 3; "Champion Life Saver," *Washington Post*, December 3, 1916, S4.

¹¹⁵ "Champion Life Saver," *Washington Post*, December 3, 1916, S4.

In an story covering a speech by a returned American missionary at the Ingram Memorial Church service in October 1915, the speaker, Dr. Branum, cloaked his account of the massacre of Armenians in strong religious language. He claimed Turks killed Armenians because they were Christian and refused to convert to Islam. He stated the Turks felt it was their mission to rid the world of unbelievers.¹¹⁶

The religious language used in descriptions of the massacres was not extensive, but it is worth noting as a context through which American readers learned and understood the Armenian Genocide. Referring to refugees' journey as an exodus correlates it to the Jewish journey leaving Egypt and connects the Armenians symbolically to God's chosen people, making them worthy of protection. It also drew a correlation between the Turks and the Egyptians as the enslavers and the villains. With this language, the centuries old, complex relationship between the Turks and Armenians was simplified into clearly distinguishable roles. The theme of an American serving as Moses to lead the Armenians to safety is similarly telling. It placed America in the role of savior to the Armenians and assigned it the responsibility to free the Armenians from Turkey. It provides perspective for how Americans may have viewed their

¹¹⁶ "Tells of Armenians Slain," *Washington Post*, October 11, 1915, 14.

relationship and duty to the Armenians and their role as a player in the larger global conflict.

A handful of articles mentioned previous persecutions of Armenians in Turkey, primarily the 1894-1896 massacres under Sultan Abdul Hamid II. A story early in 1915 referred to the 1894-1896 massacres and expressed fear that the current events might become a repeat of the previous century. It claimed the "Young Turks have adopted the policy pursued by Abdul Hamid that year, namely the annihilation of the Armenians."¹¹⁷ Articles from British news sources, quoting letters from a diplomatic representative of the Armenian Katholikos, said that the modern massacres far surpassed any occurring under Abdul Hamid II.¹¹⁸

Articles that refer to earlier massacres provide several perspectives. First they take the Genocide out of the context of the global war and put it into the context of the historical tension between Turks and Armenians. In doing so, it showed continuity in the animosity that stemmed from deep rooted conflicts. It also portrayed the Turks as inherently evil and as not merely retaliating against a situation created by the contemporary conflict. Comparisons to prior massacres also provided a reference point to gage the severity of the current

¹¹⁷ "Russians Pursue Turk," *Washington Post*, May 6, 1915, 3.

¹¹⁸ "Turks Kills Thousands," *Washington Post*, August 6, 1915, 2; "45,000 Armenians Are Dead," *Washington Post*, September, 25, 1915, 3.

persecutions and to emphasize the great need for intervention and aid.

By far the largest sub-topic theme in this category is the presence and safety of Americans in Armenia. As already noted, American missionaries in Armenia provided many eyewitness accounts of the Armenian massacres. In addition to articles attributing information to American sources, much of the news coverage focused on the safety of Americans working in Turkey and their ability to safely escape. Coverage in mid-1915 reported Americans in Armenia were safe and did not fear persecution as they were "regarded as neutral and not likely to be attacked."¹¹⁹ Yet, as the Russian army moved further into Armenia toward the city of Van, where a large American mission was located, reports appeared of threats to American safety. Just days after the first story, the *Washington Post* reported American missionaries in Van were "in grave danger"¹²⁰ as Turk and Kurdish forces besieged the city. In other cities, the news reported Americans had to flee and abandon their missions.¹²¹ Fear for the safety of Americans became a diplomatic issue, as a story two days later reported that the Grand Vizier of Turkey issued an order to the governor of Van in the presence of Ambassador Morgenthau to protect Americans in the city and

¹¹⁹ "More Slain by Kurds," *Washington Post*, May 1, 1915, 11.

¹²⁰ "American Missionaries in Peril as Turks and Kurds Attack Van," *Washington Post*, May 11, 1915, 2.

¹²¹ "Kill 10,000 Christians," *Washington Post*, May 16, 1915, 15.

American interests throughout Turkey.¹²² In August 1915, two articles reported that the American missionaries in Van had escaped the country and reached safety with the exception of one who died.¹²³

Other articles concerning Americans in Turkey referred to an American who provided aid to persecuted Armenians. In one instance, Americans attempted to hide Armenian children by concealing them in schools, only to have them taken away and given to Muslim families.¹²⁴ Others tell of American missionaries in Van who sheltered Armenian women and children during the attack on the city or missionaries at Urumiah who were forced to pay "\$40,000 as a ransom for refugees who had fled to the mission for protection."¹²⁵

Two articles concerning the safety of Americans appear on the front page, each in a headline story, emphasizing the importance of the topic. In an article on April 29, 1915, the headline reads "Crucified by Turks." Missionaries reported the killing of native Christians in Persia, some by crucifixion. A lesser headline in the article read "Turks Attack Americans" and reported Turks attacked an American and French Roman Catholic

¹²² "6,000 Armenians Slain," *Washington Post*, May 18, 1915, 1.

¹²³ "Van Missionaries Escape," *Washington Post*, August 17, 1915, 4; "No Missionaries Slain," *Washington Post*, August 22, 1915, R4.

¹²⁴ "Greatest Horrors in History Mark Massacres in Armenia, Declares Official Report," *Washington Post*, October 4, 1915, 5.

¹²⁵ "Armenians Loot Turkish Homes When Russians Come to Rescue," *Washington Post*, October 6, 1915, 2; "Crucified by Turks," *Washington Post*, April 29, 1915, 1.

Mission in Urumiah and took five Russian priests hostage.¹²⁶ The second headline article reported the death of a U.S citizen in Urfa. Few details were given, only that the American died by poisoning and had been working to disperse funds allocated for refugees.¹²⁷ The prominent placement of articles concerning Americans emphasized the importance of the issue and a focus on Americans as a source of protection to refugees. It also further enforced the image of the evil Turk, who attacked Americans, making him a natural enemy of America. With America portrayed as an enemy of Turkey, it conversely implied she was natural ally of the Entente nations.

While the vast majority of the articles in this category describe persecutions against the Armenians, three describe retaliatory actions on the part of Armenians against Kurds and Turks, the final sub-topic theme. In October 1915 and again in February 1916, two stories told of Armenians looting Turkish homes and killing fleeing troops. After the Turkish retreat in Van, Armenians in hiding came out to "duplicate the atrocities that had previously been practiced upon Armenians."¹²⁸ Similarly, when Turkish forces fled from Erzerum in advance of Russian troops, Armenians massacred Turkish troops and began helping the

¹²⁶ "Crucified by Turks," *Washington Post*, April 29, 1915, 1.

¹²⁷ "U.S. Citizen Killed By Turks, Is Reported," *Washington Post*, November 29, 1915, 1.

¹²⁸ "Armenians Loot Turkish Homes When Russians Come to Rescue," *Washington Post*, October 6, 1915, 2.

approaching Russians¹²⁹. In both articles, the headlines directly reflected the main topic of the Armenian actions, and each article qualified the information to say the Armenian action was retaliatory against similar actions committed against them. While these articles are few, they are noteworthy as they show Americans had knowledge of atrocities committed by Armenians, and that the persecutions were not only the one-sided slaughter of a single ethnic group.

Similar acts of retaliation were described in a unique article detailing an official report issued by the Ottoman government in October 1915. In the report, the Ottoman government claimed many atrocities were committed against Turks by Greeks and Armenians who cooperated with Russian forces. The article recounted ten examples of such atrocities and specifically said it omitted some of the graphic details. The report contained details of rape, suicide, battery, murder, massacre, and dismemberment crimes committed against Turks.¹³⁰ It is clear from this article, and the official Turkish report, that Turkey made an effort to justify its persecution of the Armenians and claimed the sovereign right to defend its citizens against similar acts.

¹²⁹ "Fleeing Turks Being Massacred by Armenians is Report in Rome," *Washington Post*, February 21, 1916, 3.

¹³⁰ "Telling of Atrocities," *Washington Post*, October 22, 1915, 11.

The ***description*** category is crucial to understand the types of vivid details Americans read about the massacre of Armenians. Any type of public outcry, international diplomacy, or relief efforts were a response to the severity of Armenian suffering, which was communicated to the American people in part by the media. Graphic accounts of murder, starvation, and pillage made Americans aware of the plight of Armenian refugees. Religious vocabulary defined the symbolic relationship of the Turks and the Armenians and portrayed America as a savior of the Armenian people. The Muslim Turks and Kurds were continuously named as the perpetrators of violent persecution, and all stories on Armenian retaliation qualified it as justifiable self-defense. Discussion of Armenian massacres from the previous century served to weaken Turkish claims of deportations for national security by demonstrating a historical hatred of the Armenians. The most prominent theme of the safety and importance of Americans in Turkey illustrated American concern over the fate of its own citizens at the hands of the Turks and associated Turkey as an enemy to the United States.

International Action

The ***international action*** category is comprised of articles covering reaction or dialogue from around the world concerning the Armenian persecutions. It is the most widely varied

category, with many subthemes. They range from United States and international political action, accusations of blame, and appeals for aid. Overall, the articles in this category tend to be longer than those in other categories and more often contain excerpts of articles from international newspapers. There are four sub-topic themes: United State diplomacy, international appeals to the United States, Turkish diplomacy concerning the Armenians, and German political action concerning the Armenians.

This category contains fifty-six articles, more than any other category. Thirty of the articles were printed in 1915 and twenty in 1916. They are concentrated in the fall and winter months of 1915 and very early in 1916. They then taper off until a slight resurgence in the summer of 1916. The articles in this category are reactionary to the descriptive coverage of the massacres, and so they peak drastically just two months after the concentration of articles in the *description* category. The month with the highest number of articles is October 1915, when twelve were printed. The *international action* category has five front page articles and one headline story. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).

The first and largest theme in this category is on the topic of United States diplomacy. Starting in April 1915, the *Post* began reporting on American communication with Turkey regarding the massacres. Articles reported the United States

sent appeals to Turkey through Ambassador Henry Morgenthau to protect Armenians and prevent "religious outbreaks."¹³¹ Articles reporting similar appeals continued in May, September, and October 1915 and on into February 1916. The stories reveal a continuity in the United States approach to diplomacy with Turkey. Similar to the first appeal sent in April, news reports said Morgenthau was directed to "take the matter up," "inquire into reported outrages," "inform the Turkish minister of foreign affairs" as to negative American sentiment, and "present a protest, which is in effect a warning" to the Ottoman government of United States displeasure.¹³² As late as July 1916, over a year after the first information on United States diplomatic communication with Turkey, an article reported that the news of more severe atrocities against Armenians had "led the State Department to consider making new representations to the Porte."¹³³

Not only do these articles reveal the lukewarm tone of American policy, some articles mention that American representations to the Porte did not "threaten a break in diplomatic relations", but rather "unless the massacres ceased friendly relations between the American people and the people of

¹³¹ "Appeal Sent to Porte," *Washington Post*, April 28, 1915, 3.

¹³² "U.S. Helping Armenians," *Washington Post*, May 16, 1915, R7; "U.S. Probes Turk Outrages," *Washington Post*, September 28, 1915, 3; "U.S. Aid to Armenians," *Washington Post*, October 5, 1915, 1; "U.S. Warns the Sultan," *Washington Post*, February 19, 1916, 2.

¹³³ "New Protest to Turkey," *Washington Post*, July 30, 1916, A13.

Turkey would be threatened."¹³⁴ Additional articles reaffirmed this policy and further reported that "the United States could not take official action in a matter involving the treatment by a government of its own nationals, and could only take cognizance of the situation on the grounds of justice and humanity."¹³⁵ It was not until December 1916 that an article reveals a shift in American policy. Entitled "U.S. Turns on Turkey," it said the State Department would delay in confirming the new Turkish ambassador until the United States received a reply from Turkey on past representations.¹³⁶

While the *Post* is not persuasive as a legitimate source on American foreign policy toward Turkey in these years, it is useful as an indicator of the type of information presented to Americans on U.S. policy regarding the Armenian Genocide. It can also provide evidence as to American's reaction to the policy and news on the massacres. In May 1915, an article reporting on American diplomacy noted the State Department had received "a flood of communications from various parts of the country," pushing for the government to help Armenians in Turkey.¹³⁷ Additional articles named American public sentiment as the motivation for representations to the Ottoman government and

¹³⁴ "U.S. Aid to Armenians," *Washington Post*, October 5, 1915, 1.

¹³⁵ "Wilson Warns Turks," *Washington Post*, October 10, 1915, 2; "Makes Plea for Armenians," *Washington Post*, February 20, 1916, 3.

¹³⁶ "U.S. Turns on Turkey," *Washington Post*, December 19, 1916, 3.

¹³⁷ "U.S. Helping Armenians," *Washington Post*, May 16, 1915, R7.

stated the "American people have been deeply stirred by the fate of the Christians ruthlessly slaughtered in Armenia."¹³⁸

References to American public opinion calling for action reveals a reaction to the news of the massacres provided in articles containing descriptions. They also reveal a motive on the part of the United States government to use that public opinion to threaten Turkey with possible deterioration of relations. At a time when the United States was still a neutral country, strained relations could escalate if the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies.

A second trend in the articles in this category is international appeals to the United States to help the Armenians or convey messages between nations. America's status as a neutral country made it especially attractive as an intermediary between the Allied and the Central Powers. It also gave the United States more access to information concerning the Armenians, which she could in turn share with the Allied countries. The first article covering American communication to the Porte over the Armenian persecutions cited a request from the Russian government as the impetus for America taking action. Severed relations between Russia and Turkey prevented negotiations between the two, so Russia turned to the United

¹³⁸ "U.S. to Aid Armenians," *Washington Post*, October 5, 1915, 1; "Wilson Warns Turks," *Washington Post*, October 6, 1915, 2; U.S Warns the Sultan," *Washington Post*, February 19, 1916, 2.

States. Included in the Russian request was a message from the head of the Armenian Catholic church to President Wilson asking for aid.¹³⁹

The majority of appeals for aid from the United States came from Great Britain. Viscount Bryce, former ambassador to the United States, was a vocal proponent of United States action. Three articles in September 1915, January and February 1916 reported on Bryce's appeals for US action. He called on the neutral nations, "especially America," to use their influence on Turkey to stop the horrors and persuade Germany to reprimand the Porte.¹⁴⁰ Later articles report he directly asked the United States government to send relief to the Armenians.¹⁴¹

Further appeals came in stories quoting British sources: the chairman of the British Armenia committee and the minister of At. Augustine's Edgbaston. Two additional stories were reprinted from British newspapers. In one, America was named the "important neutral," and all the stories reiterated the claim that American pressure on Germany could stop the massacres.¹⁴² Similar to the articles on Viscount Bryce, they contained

¹³⁹ "Appeal Sent to Porte," *Washington Post*, April 28, 1915, 3.

¹⁴⁰ "Plea for Armenians," *Washington Post*, September 27, 1915, 12.

¹⁴¹ "Bryce Sends Appeal Here," *Washington Post*, January 26, 1916, 4; "Armenian People Victims," *Washington Post*, February 23, 1916, 1.

¹⁴² As quoted in "Plea for Armenians," *Washington Post*, July 3, 1916, 2; "Turks Killing a Nation," *Washington Post*, September 19, 1915, 1; "Look to U.S. for Aid," *Washington Post*, October 10, 1915, 14.

descriptive information on the massacres in an effort to connect the reality of the horror directly to appeals for action.

Another trend within the *international action* category is Ottoman diplomacy involving the massacre of Armenians. Beginning in August 1915, a series of articles presented random and inconsistent information about Turkish politics on the Armenian issue. The first such article hinted at conflict in the Turkish cabinet over the issue of the Armenian Genocide. It reported, the "grand vizier, according to one correspondent, had threatened to resign unless the reported treatment of Greeks and Armenians ceases."¹⁴³ Two months later, an article reported that Turkey made clear to the United States government that "she will not permit interference by any foreign power of her so-called 'Armenian policy'".¹⁴⁴ Then only five days later, the *Washington Post* printed news out of Constantinople that the Porte had thrown an "impenetrable veil over its action toward all Armenians," in light of public disapproval on the Armenian policy from the Turkish upper classes who "favor a policy of conciliation, and some of who even go as far as to advocate the establishment of a separate Armenian state".¹⁴⁵ Contradictory information about the political mood in Turkey attested to the limited and unreliable sources but also to the volatile mood in

¹⁴³ "Turkish Cabinet Split," *Washington Post*, August 27, 1915, 3.

¹⁴⁴ "U.S. to Aid Armenians," *Washington Post*, October 14, 1915, 3.

¹⁴⁵ "Armenian Issue Vague," *Washington Post*, October 10, 1915, ES16.

the country as the Porte faced an advancing Russian army and fluctuating public opinion on the Armenian persecutions.

Also in October 1915, articles on Turkish political action began to shift toward a theme of Turkish justification of their actions, calling them reactionary to Armenian rebellion. An article announcing the appointment of Halil Bey to the Ottoman cabinet contained an interview in which he claimed the Armenians were "traitors" who conspired with the Russian army in the attack on Van.¹⁴⁶ Continuing with this theme, two articles out of Berlin in February 1916 reported on the publication of a Turkish White Book on the mass killing of Armenians. The book identified a historical conflict between the Ottoman government and the Armenians in which the latter continuously sought international protection from Russia and Great Britain. At the outbreak of the war, the "Armenians shrank from no sacrifice in furtherance of the entente's military operations."¹⁴⁷

The final sub-topic theme is German political action concerning the Armenians. There are nine articles that contain this theme, all of which were published in a five month period from September 1915 to January 1916. They fall into two almost equal sections: articles in which the Germans defend Turkish

¹⁴⁶ "Halil Bey in Cabinet," *Washington Post*, October 25, 1915, 2.

¹⁴⁷ As quoted in, Augustus Beach, "Porte Accuses Entente Powers of Inciting Armenian Uprising," *Washington Post*, February, 16, 1916, 2.

actions against the Armenians, and articles in which Germany protests the massacres.

The articles in which Germany supports the Turkish persecutions of Armenians claimed that the Armenians were seditious and gave assistance to the Russians. In "Uphold Turkish Acts," the article reported that Turkish actions to deal with the Armenian uprisings were "an internal affair which concerns him alone."¹⁴⁸ Similarly, an article in the same month, containing excerpts from a German newspaper, said the "oppressive measures the Ottoman government found itself compelled to adopt against its Armenian subjects" were a "war measure," and that the British press was exaggerating the state of conditions in Armenia.¹⁴⁹ German sources also used a tactic of identifying atrocities committed by the Allies in India, Ireland, Poland, and the Boer War to combat Allied condemnation of the mass killing of Armenians.¹⁵⁰ In the most extreme defense of Turkey, one article quoted a letter publicized by the German ambassador in which he called the alleged atrocities "pure invention," and said the reports from the Armenian *catholicos* were only written under pressure from Russia.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ "Upholds Turkish Acts," *Washington Post*, October 10, 1915, 14.

¹⁴⁹ "German View of the War: British Stories of Armenian Outrages are Held Unreliable," *Washington Post*, October 25, 1915, 4.

¹⁵⁰ "British Accused of Atrocities in Reply to Armenian Charges," *Washington Post*, October 30, 1915, 2.

¹⁵¹ "Envoy Defends Turks," *Washington Post*, October 28, 1915, 3.

In an opposite approach, some articles reported on German attempts to halt the Turkish persecution of Armenians. Three articles ranging from October 1915 to December 1915 all made almost identical reports. They claimed the German ambassador in Turkey submitted a protest on behalf of the German government on the subject of Armenian massacres to the Turkish foreign office. The article cited both Ambassador Morgenthau and James Barton of the American Committee on Armenian and Syrian Relief as corroborating sources that confirm the existence of such a protest.¹⁵² In a comparable story, a German diplomat representing the German Emperor publicized a statement, stating Germany holds the protection of Christians in Turkey as a high priority and would take measure to uphold its responsibility.¹⁵³

One lone article presented a vague view of the German diplomatic position. It contained an excerpt of the reply from a political leader in the German foreign office on the topic of the Armenians. It said the Turkish government was compelled to action by seditious intrigues on the part of the Armenians. It further stated the Turkish and German governments were participating in an "interchange of ideas" on the subject, yet

¹⁵² "Armenian Issue Vague," *Washington Post*, October 10, 1915, ES 16; "U.S. to Aid Armenians," *Washington Post*, October 5, 1915, 1; "Germans Defend Armenians," December 23, 1915, 2.

¹⁵³ "Try to Save Christians," *Washington Post*, December 12, 1915, 20.

the story was unclear as to the type of position Germany had on the massacres.¹⁵⁴

Aid

The category on **aid** includes all articles that report on pleas for aid to the Armenians from any source, civilian efforts to raise money or supplies, and domestic political action to support civilian relief efforts. There are five identified sub-topics in this category: pleas for aid, domestic political action, the role of private organizations, international diplomacy, and civilian relief efforts. All of the sub-topics are present in more than four articles.

The **aid** category includes twenty-nine articles total, seven in 1915 and twenty-two in 1916. The bulk of articles on aid were published in the fall of 1916, with thirteen in October 1916. **Aid** articles are heaviest toward the end of the twenty-four month period examined, coming after articles describing the massacres and international actions. The **aid** category has two front page articles, the same as the **location** category, and the fewest. Of the two front page stories, one is a headline article. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).

The first sub-topic theme concerns pleas for aid. The first articles containing pleas for aid to the Armenians came in June

¹⁵⁴ "Armenians Only Removed," *Washington Post*, January 23, 1916, R5.

1915. They stories reported dire circumstances in Van, due to limited medical supplies and personnel and told of Armenians hiding in American buildings. In both, American missionaries in Van begged for urgent assistance.¹⁵⁵ Further articles with pleas for aid came in the fall of 1915, the first from Lord Bryce of Great Britain. Bryce communicated with a private relief organization urging American humanity to respond with assistance.¹⁵⁶ A second report in October contained a letter to the newspaper from the wife of an Armenian. In it, she lamented the woeful situation of the Armenians and urged America to do its duty to the Armenians.¹⁵⁷

A second sub-topic theme is domestic political action on relief efforts. While articles covering international action and diplomacy were discussed in the last main topic category, this sub-topic theme deals only with political action directly related to relief efforts. The first instance came through multiple reports of attempts by Ambassador Morgenthau to provide relief for Armenians and negotiations to bring Armenian refugees to the Untied States. Two articles in September and October 1915 reported that Morgenthau offered the Turkish government money to transport Armenians to America, where they "would make good

¹⁵⁵ "Americans at Van Safe," *Washington Post*, June 21, 1915, 2; "Russians Advance in Persia; Tribes Welcome the Troops; U.S. Citizens Seek Supplies," *Washington Post*, June 28, 1915, 2.

¹⁵⁶ "Bryce Appeals for Help," *Washington Post*, October 8, 1916, 11.

¹⁵⁷ "Urges Response to Call for Relief in Armenia," *Washington Post*, October 16, 1916, 6.

citizens to settle the less thickly populated parts of the Western States."¹⁵⁸ The articles reported Morgenthau offered one million dollars of his own money and promised to raise four million dollars more as part of the plan and that the Turkish government accepted the offer.¹⁵⁹

Early articles in this category show that the United States government took a hands-off approach to orchestrating Armenian relief efforts. A September 1915 story reported that all efforts to raise relief for Armenians will be on the part of private organization without United States government assistance, as the Turkish government had threatened against interference. Private organizations were preparing to launch a nation-wide appeal for relief with information provided by Morgenthau on the massacres.¹⁶⁰

Still later articles reveal a slight shift in the government's policy. Private relief organizations encountered difficulties in transporting supplies to Turkey and turned to the government for assistance. Reports beginning only a month later told of collaboration with the United States Navy in sending material supplies and possible transportation of refugees back to America. Almost a full year later, in October

¹⁵⁸ "U.S. to Aid Armenians", *Washington Post*, September 14, 1915, 3.

¹⁵⁹ "Morgenthau Offers \$1,000,000 to Bring All Armenians to America," *Washington Post*, October 2, 1915, 2; "U.S. to Aid Armenians," *Washington Post*, September 14, 1915, 3.

¹⁶⁰ "To Send Armenians Aid," *Washington Post*, September 24, 1915, 2.

1916, similar articles described further attempts for collaboration between the United States Navy and private relief organizations. The first article reported the Navy denied a request for a battleship to transport supplies to Armenia, but two weeks later an article informed that the Navy approved space on a collier for supplies.¹⁶¹ While the United States government did not participate in the collection or distribution of supplies, the articles show cooperation on the part of the government in the relief effort.

Two more articles in 1916 show a much more direct political action. The first in February covered a political partisan clash between two United State Senators during discussions over a resolution. Senator Lodge proposed a resolution requesting President Wilson name a day for public relief collections to aid Armenians.¹⁶² An article the following September reported the success of the resolution, saying it passed Congress and consequently President Wilson issued two proclamations. They appointed specific relief days for private contributions to aid Armenians and Lithuanians to be collected by private relief organizations.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ "Denied U.S. Relief Ship to Syria," *Washington Post*, October 1, 1916, 3; "War Relief for Syria," *Washington Post*, October 15, 1916, A5.

¹⁶² "Stone and Borah Tilt," *Washington Post*, February 10, 1916, 3.

¹⁶³ "Wilson Calls for War Relief," *Washington Post*, September 9, 1916, 10.

This sub-topic is small, due to the limited amount of government action regarding aid for the Armenians. While United States political action for the Armenians on a diplomatic level is discussed in a different category, this sub-topic shows the United States government did very little to contribute to relief effort for Armenians; one article even reported the State Department would respect Turkey's policy of non-interference. The only real sign of government participation was through the Navy Department's transportations of supplies, and that only occurred after massive efforts on the part of private organizations.

A third sub-topic theme in this category concerns the role of private organizations in the relief effort. It is a large theme reflecting the prominent position they played in raising money, supplies, and interest for the Armenians. None of the articles in this sub-topic theme reported on the committees themselves, but rather the committees are referenced for their role in the raising funds and organizing collections. All of the articles reflect the prominent role private organizations played in raising money and coordinating the logistics of transportation and distribution of supplies in Turkey.

Several organizations are mentioned by name in these articles including the Red Cross, Armenian Atrocities Committee, American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, and Armenian

and Syrian colonies of Washington. All but one of the articles were printed in 1916, with the first reporting on the initial funds being forwarded to Morgenthau for refugees.¹⁶⁴ The rest of the articles were published in the fall 1916, primarily regarding a nation-wide relief day to raise money for the Armenians. While the government issued a proclamation designating a relief day, private organizations were responsible for its implementation. Both the Red Cross and the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief took a large role in organizing the collections of goods. Several articles mentioned meetings in Washington, D.C. to arrange locations and volunteers to collect goods.¹⁶⁵

A fourth sub-topic theme is diplomacy in the relief effort. As previously mentioned, private relief organizations dealt with the logistics of transporting and distributing supplies, at times in collaboration with the United States Navy. Negotiating the distribution of supplies in Turkey was the responsibility of the State Department and so required government action. Three articles in September and October 1916 reported on the struggles in gaining Turkish acceptance of relief aid to refugees. In September Turkey overturned its early decision to deny shipments

¹⁶⁴ "\$100,000 Sent Aid Armenians by Two Committees in New York," *Washington Post*, October 9, 1915, 3.

¹⁶⁵ "Sanctions Syrian Aid," *Washington Post*, September 15, 1916, 3; "Relief Plans Formulated," *Washington Post*, October 11, 1916, 10; "War Relief for Syria," *Washington Post*, October 15, 1916, A5; "Red Cross Chapter Meets Today," *Washington Post*, October 25, 1916, 4.

of aid, at first saying they were not necessary. Instead Turkey allowed distribution of supplies, provided it took place in the port of Beirut through the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. The Turkish government did not allow for distribution in Armenia.¹⁶⁶

Diplomatic negotiations concerning aid also extended to the Allies, as the United States needed permission to cross the Allied naval blockade to deliver the supplies. One article mentioned hope for Allied cooperation "as the French government has been anxious to get such supplies through and may itself contribute."¹⁶⁷ Days later a similar story reported the Allies accepted the proposal and agreed to allow relief supplies to pass through the blockade.¹⁶⁸ Diplomacy issues in delivering aid required team work between private organizations and the United States government.

The final sub-topic theme is civilian relief efforts. Civilian relief efforts are similar to the role of private organizations in that it does not pertain to political action and the government's role. Civilian efforts include articles on people giving to the relief effort, working as volunteers and as part of religious organizations in promoting the cause of the Armenians. Articles including this theme mainly reported on the

¹⁶⁶ "Sanctions Syrian Aid," *Washington Post*, September 15, 1916, 3; "Armenians to Get Food," *Washington Post*, September 22, 1916, 1.

¹⁶⁷ "Sanctions Syrian Aid," *Washington Post*, September 15, 1916, 3.

¹⁶⁸ "Ask \$5,000,000 Relief," *Washington Post*, October 4, 1916, 3.

events of the Armenian Relief Day ordered by the government. It took place in October 1916, the same month when the majority of articles in the *aid* category were printed.

For three weeks leading up to the Armenian Relief Days on October 21 and 22, the *Post* printed seven articles detailing the plans to raise funds in the Washington, D.C. area. Religious organizations were instrumental in assembling volunteers and publicizing the need for contribution. Ministers from four large churches vowed to preach on the need for assistance to the Armenians. They also asked for businessmen to offer space in their place of business for booths and female volunteers to work at collection booths to accept donated items and money. Some churches also took up a special collection on October 22 or donated all the money collected during service.¹⁶⁹

Social status was an element of the relief efforts as volunteerism was considered acceptable for upper class women. The *Post* headlines read "Society Girls in War Effort" and reports paid special attention to the "girls and matrons" volunteering for service. Multiple articles name the women in charge of the plans and two articles give the full names of every female volunteer, along with her address.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ "Church Girls to Help," *Washington Post*, October 8, 1916, 7; "Volunteer for Relief Work," *Washington Post*, October 9, 1916, 10; "Relief Day in Churches," *Washington Post*, October 22, 1916, 13.

¹⁷⁰ "Society Girls in War Effort," *Washington Post*, October 20, 1916, 12; "Relief Donations Large," *Washington Post*, October 22, 1916, 15.

Articles reporting on the events of the Armenian Relief Days reflect a localized view of the relief efforts. Stories center on the work of local churches and community members with little attention to nation-wide efforts. Several articles name the churches and businesses who participated in collecting money and tallies from the local organizations on the amount of funds received.¹⁷¹ Only one article mentioned the larger relief efforts, saying the "Capital held its own with other metropolitan centers and substantial sums were collected on the day set aside by President Wilson as Armenian relief day," although it did not include a source or any further information.¹⁷²

Subordinate Reference

The **subordinate reference** category is one of the most widely varied categories. It includes all articles in which the main topic of the story is not related the Armenian Genocide or the Armenian people. Instead, mention of the Armenians comprises a minor sub-note within the article, in some cases only a single sentence or phrase. In this category, reference to the Armenians was only a small component in the overall topic of the article, and the Armenians were used as supporting evidence in an

¹⁷¹ "Relief Plans Formulated," *Washington Post*, October 11, 1916, 10; "Relief Day in Churches," *Washington Post*, October 22, 1916, 13; "War Aid by Churches," *Washington Post*, October 23, 1916, 5.

¹⁷² "War Aid by Churches," *Washington Post*, October 23, 1916, 15.

argument or as an example of one group out of many affected by the war. As the main topics of the articles in this category vary so widely, it contains fewer shared sub-topic themes. There are four themes: international plans for the future of the Armenians, the massacre of Armenians as supporting evidence for ulterior agendas, correlations between the Armenians and military affairs, and Armenians in the context of the political climate in Turkey.

The ***subordinate reference*** category has a total of thirty-six articles, nineteen in 1915 and seventeen in 1916. Publication of the articles was as sporadic as the main topics. The articles are present in seventeen of the twenty-four months surveyed, with August 1915 and December 1916 sharing the highest number of five articles. There are few trends in a publication of *subordinate reference* articles, the most revealing trend being front page and headline articles. This category has nine front page articles, all of which are headline articles, located above the fold, making it the most conspicuous of all the categories. While the articles' main topics vary, it is clear from their prominent placement that the Armenians made it into more headline articles as a side note than as the main topic. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).

The first sub-topic theme in this category is international plans for the future of the Armenians. Four articles included

reference to discussions or plans for the future of Armenia. Two articles, the first in April 1915 and the second in December 1916, are similar in that they reported on international agreements between the Entente Powers. The front page, headline articles in April entitled "Sees End of Turkey," covered a written agreement between France, Great Britain, and Russia. The agreement conceded the future dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and proposed an autonomous Armenia "under the suzerainty of Russia."¹⁷³ Similarly, an article over a year later told of a reply by the Entente Powers to a communication from Germany. In it the Allies proposed peace terms that included a Russian sphere of influence over the Armenians.¹⁷⁴

Two further articles described the proceedings of an international conference on self determination for oppressed nationalities that included hearings as to the future of the Armenians. The conference was meant to "plan for the development of an American international policy toward oppressed or dependent nationalities through their representatives in America."¹⁷⁵ The conference heard speakers on behalf of numerous minorities throughout Europe including the Jews, Serbians, Belgians, Poles, and Ukrainians, who all pleaded for American influence in granting them independence. Both articles

¹⁷³ "Sees End of Turkey," *Washington Post*, April 19, 1915, 1.

¹⁷⁴ "Allies' Reply Ready," *Washington Post*, December 30, 1916, 1.

¹⁷⁵ "Ask Aid for Oppressed," *Washington Post*, December 12, 1916, 4.

summarized a selection of the conference's hearings and quoted famous speakers yet never any concerning the Armenians. Instead, they only mentioned the Armenians as one of many groups receiving consideration and do not pay further attention to the distinct future of Armenia.¹⁷⁶

The previous articles contained some of the only references in the *Post* relating to the post-war future of Armenia, and then they are only alluded to as part of larger international negotiations. Specific description of the Allies' plans for the future of Armenia always named Russia as a guardian to an autonomous, not independent, region, reinforcing Russia's historical interest in Asia Minor and the Turkish Straits. In addition, Russia's principal role suggested reluctance on the part the other Allied Powers to commit protection to a free Armenia in the post-war balance of power. International conferences debating the future of many of Europe's oppressed minorities illustrate the large number of peoples asking for assistance and the many potential obligations the Great Powers would encounter if they upheld the ideal of self-determination at subsequent peace conferences.

The second sub-topic theme is the use of the Armenian massacres as supporting evidence for ulterior motives; there are

¹⁷⁶ "Upholds Small Nation," *Washington Post*, December 11, 1916, 3; "Ask Aid for Oppressed," *Washington Post*, December 12, 1916, 4.

six articles. The first, in March 1915, reprinted an essay written by Viscount Bryce, former British Ambassador to the United States, on his views of American public opinion on the nations at war. In the article, Bryce argued the American people favored the cause of the Allies against the militarism of Germany. He cited examples such as the American protection of English subjects in belligerent countries and American efforts at providing relief in Armenia and Palestine to the victims of the Central Powers excesses as proof that Americans prefer the Allies.¹⁷⁷

A similar article used the Armenians in an argument on the German violations of submarine warfare. It claimed Germany violated humane morals and American rights in the destruction of property and safety. The article argued the American people abhor all forms of inhumanity, including the massacre of the Armenians, not just humanitarian violations by Germany.¹⁷⁸

Two related articles recounted speeches by British leaders, one condemning German control over Turkey and the other criticizing President Wilson's foreign policy. In both, knowledge of Armenian suffering was used to condemn the actions of an international power. In "Fears Prolonged War," Premier

¹⁷⁷ "Impartiality of the United States Government Proved, Says Bryce, Who Declares American People Favor Cause of Allies as Representing Ideals of Liberty," *Washington Post*, March 28, 1915, 7.

¹⁷⁸ "Full Freedom of the Seas to Our Nationals and Our Commerce," *Washington Post*, January 10, 1916, 6.

Asquith claimed "that by lifting a finger Germany might have arrested the Armenian horrors" in a warning against a German controlled Turkey in the post-war international balance of power.¹⁷⁹ Likewise, in a speech attacking American policy, the dean of Westminster blamed President Wilson for his compliance in the Armenian persecutions.¹⁸⁰

The final two articles, both appearing as front page, headline news, reported on speeches given by former president Theodore Roosevelt, condemning the Wilson administration's neutrality. In them Roosevelt said he was shamed by United States inaction, and that the United States had "been no use to the Armenians,"¹⁸¹ and had clung to the "most selfish neutrality ...at the expense of the Belgians and the Armenians".¹⁸² Roosevelt used the vulnerability of weak countries or peoples as a way to criticize American isolationism.

In these examples, the Armenians and their suffering was used to support ulterior agendas, primarily to condemn the German government and support United States entry into the war on the side of the Allies. In each case, the Armenians became a piece of evidence, a tool to make a point. The articles placed the Armenian persecutions into the larger perspective of a

¹⁷⁹ "Fears Prolonged War," *Washington Post*, November 10, 1916, 5.

¹⁸⁰ "Must End Military Brigandage, Is Westminster Dean's Reply to U.S.," *Washington Post*, December 26, 1916, 2.

¹⁸¹ "T. R. Ready for War," *Washington Post*, January 31, 1916, 1.

¹⁸² "U.S. 'Shamed' -T.R.," *Washington Post*, October 29, 1916, 1.

global war in which many groups of people suffered as a consequence. While none of the articles actively diminished the plight of the Armenians, neither did they propose action to specifically aid the Armenians, with the exception of American entry into the war.

The third sub-topic theme involves correlations between the Armenians and military affairs. As previously discussed, some formerly reviewed articles in an earlier category reported on a connection between military engagements and the spread or severity of massacres. This sub-topic theme has similarities and differences to those previously reviewed articles, in that while a connection exists, it did not necessarily denote a military engagement.

Several articles reported on military encounters and their impact on the Armenians. One focused on the lack of media attention paid to fighting occurring outside of the major theaters of war, including the Caucasus. It addressed the success of the Russian military in the region and the attacks by Kurdish irregulars against the Armenians.¹⁸³ Similarly, two additional articles reported on Russian military successes in relation to the Armenians, stating the Russian military took into account the Armenian population when maneuvering in the

¹⁸³ "Campaigns of the Year Outside the Two Big War Theaters," *Washington Post*, August 1, 1915, M8.

region so as not to expose them to Turkish revenge.¹⁸⁴ The Russian army also vowed to relieve Armenian suffering and execute Turkish civil officers responsible for implementing massacres.¹⁸⁵

In further examples, two stories addressed the Armenians in correlation with the military in a different way. One covered a session of the Russian Duma addressing war needs and praised the Armenians for their courage of spirit in facing the persecutions and fighting back by joining the Russian army as volunteers.¹⁸⁶ Another cited a statement by the Turkish embassy to refute rumors of defeats and named Russian military failures in Anatolia as the source behind Armenian uprisings. It said the Russian army exploited Armenian peasants and encouraged them to rebel when the Russian army failed to push back the Turks.¹⁸⁷

Articles covering military issues are varied in their reference to the Armenians. Some contain references similar to other articles, drawing a connection between military engagements and the Armenian persecutions. More interesting are the articles citing the existence of Armenian volunteers to the Russian army, and Turkish accusation of Russian interference in inciting Armenian rebellions. In the first instance, the

¹⁸⁴ "Turkish Soldiers Outmaneuvered by Russians in Upper Euphrates; Halil Bey's New Army Driven Back," *Washington Post*, August 13, 1915, 3.

¹⁸⁵ "Turks Fight at Bay," *Washington Post*, February 19, 1916, 1.

¹⁸⁶ "Duma is in Session to Meet War Needs," *Washington Post*, August 2, 1915, 1.

¹⁸⁷ "Turks Deny Defeats," *Washington Post*, August 3, 1915, 2.

existence of Armenian volunteers would corroborate the Ottoman charge that the Armenians were traitorously cooperating with the Russian enemy and consequently legitimize the Turkish decision to deport them away from the front lines. In the second case, the Armenians were seen as pawns in an international ploy to force the Turkish government to suppress the Armenians and become the villain. The American public had to weigh these images of the Armenians against other media coverage when developing an opinion of the Armenian Genocide.

The fourth sub-topic theme is the Armenians in the context of the political climate in Turkey. The **subordinate reference** category has a large number of articles covering the political situation in Turkey, most of which were negative. Articles reported on a situation in Turkey, citing numerous clues as to a worsening crisis. As evidence they described the spread of espionage, Turkish secret police efforts in censoring free speech, and criticism of the government. They reported the Young Turk party was reduced to a political figure head by the secret committee of elite members who launched a "reign of terror" against their political opponents.¹⁸⁸ Other stories stated the Turkish army suffered from sedition "spreading among the

¹⁸⁸ "Young Turks Open Reign of Terror," *Washington Post*, July 13, 1915, 1.

regiments of the garrison," and government officials feared assassination attempts.¹⁸⁹

References to Armenians in this context varied. In most cases the articles reported on the continuing persecution of Armenians. They tied the deteriorating political climate to persecution of Christians, who became the targets of Turkish secret police, and Young Turk attempts to foment anti-Christian agitation.¹⁹⁰ In multiple stories, Armenian persecution was compared to threats of similar treatment against Greek Christians.¹⁹¹ In one rare case, a story reporting on the vulnerable condition of the Turkish army mentioned dismissal of a religious figure in the government for criticizing the persecution of Armenians.¹⁹²

References to Armenians in this circumstance were so varied they do not constitute a significant perspective. The stories are more cohesive in their coverage of political crisis in Turkey than they were in tying it to Armenian persecutions. Articles in this sub-topic theme also repeated themes articulated in more depth in other categories, namely the

¹⁸⁹ "Turks Suffer Heavily," *Washington Post*, May 18, 1915, 3; "Adrianople Troops Seditious; Fear to Go to Dardanelles," *Washington Post*, July 21, 1915, 2; "Turks Spies Active," *Washington Post*, July 28, 1915, 3.

¹⁹⁰ "Turks Spies Active," *Washington Post*, July 28, 1915, 3; "Adrianople Troops Seditious; Fear to Go to Dardanelles," *Washington Post*, July 21, 1915, 2.

¹⁹¹ "Adrianople Troops Seditious; Fear to go to Dardanelles," *Washington Post*, July 21, 1915, 2; "Turkish Mob Wrecks New Italian Embassy at Constantinople," *Washington Post*, October 11, 1915, 1; "Greece Near War," *Washington Post*, August 29, 1915, 3.

¹⁹² "Turks' Army in Peril," *Washington Post*, September 14, 1915, 2.

presence of anti-Christian sentiment and massacre of Armenians. The fact that coverage referred to the Armenians within stories on Turkish struggles drew a correlation between them. It implied Turkish persecution of Armenians was a manifestation of the deteriorating circumstances in Turkey and further suggested the Armenians became a scapegoat for Turkish military defeats and civilian suffering.

As references to Armenians in the articles of this category were minor, often merely a phrase, their contribution to an understanding of the Armenian Genocide in the eyes of the American public can also only be minor. The main topic of the articles would have had a much more significant impact than any minor sub-topics, of which the Armenians were one of many. Portrayal of Armenians in this category were most valuable for the ways in which they substantiated themes in other categories and to understand that political figures used the Armenians as evidence to support their agendas.

Location

The final category is **location**. It includes all the articles that make use of the word "Armenia" or "Armenian" as a location or a description of a location. These articles do not contain any information on the persecution of Armenians, international action concerning the massacres, or aid to

refugees. They primarily concern military movements and are included for analysis as they are useful references on dates and locations of military engagements to compare with the spread or severity of massacres.

This category contains a total of ten articles. The articles are sporadically dispersed throughout the twenty-four month period of survey, beginning in February 1915 and ending in December 1916 including two front page articles but no headline news. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).

Nine of the ten articles report on military engagements in Armenia. The first sub-topic theme is early Turkish military success in Armenia. The first of three articles with this theme was printed in February 1915. It told of the surprising successes of the Turkish army in Armenia, who recovered from slow mobilization to push back the Russians. It attributed the success to the influence of German military officers.¹⁹³ The second article, in July of the same year, said Turkish patrols pushed into Russia to harass Russian outposts. Russia suffered losses in its attempt to repulse the Turkish attacks.¹⁹⁴ A final article printed early in 1916 contained news out of Berlin. The

¹⁹³ "Turk Army Surprises," *Washington Post*, February 2, 1915, 2.

¹⁹⁴ "Turks Push 100 Miles into Russia But Are Driven Back Near Ardost," *Washington Post*, July 21, 1915, 2.

article refuted claims in British news sources that Russian forces had taken Erzerum or surrounded the fortress.¹⁹⁵

The second sub-topic theme is Russian military success in Armenia. Six articles gave continuous accounts of Russian advances further into Turkey toward Constantinople. Citing information from the Russian War Office, one article said Russian forces inflicted heavy losses on the Turks and captured Turkish military officers "as well as a number of the rank and file" in Armenia.¹⁹⁶ Additional articles continued the theme, reporting the landing of troops along the Black Sea coast region, and detailed information on the Russian advance in Asia Minor as part of a three pronged attack to capture Bitlis.¹⁹⁷

Eight of the ten articles, all on the military engagements, came from Allied news sources. Most came out of Petrograd, with some from London and one from Paris, with the exception of one from Berlin. Five of the articles with information coming out of Petrograd cited their source as official statements from the Russian war office. Allied news sources were more likely to report military successes to boost morale and appear strong on the international front. Propaganda can not be ruled out as a motivation for publication of articles on military successes.

¹⁹⁵ "Turks Halt Russians," *Washington Post*, February 2, 1916, 3.

¹⁹⁶ "Moslems Driven Back," *Washington Post*, August 15, 1915, 8.

¹⁹⁷ "Armenian Fort Captured," *Washington Post*, February 19, 1916, 1;
"Russians Land New Army in Armenia," *Washington Post*, February 20, 1916, 1;
"Russians Take Bitlis," *Washington Post*, March 4, 1916, 4.

The last article in this category is unrelated to military engagements. It is a Bulletin of the National Geographic Society published March 1916. It discussed the city of Diarbekir in Asia Minor. As a city strategically located on the banks of the Tigris River, it had been fought over by numerous groups throughout history including the Armenians. As a result, the city suffered a massive population decline.¹⁹⁸ This unique article presented the military conflict in Armenia outside the context of the contemporary world war and instead portrayed the region as a coveted, strategic location throughout history. In this case, the Armenians were not singular victims but instead one of many groups fighting over a region that has suffered exploitation and population decline as a result.

This category is extremely small and therefore unlikely to have had a major impacted on the overall tone of media coverage on the Armenian Genocide or American's reaction to it. The most important feature of this category is its lack of any reference to the persecution of Armenians. While many articles in other categories made use of the words "Armenia" or "Armenian" for locative purposes, they contain news of other topics as well. These specific articles, coming primarily from Allied news sources, purposely neglected any reference to persecutions. Articles in the ***description*** category note a correlation between

¹⁹⁸ "War Is No Novelty Here," *Washington Post*, April 1, 1916, 6.

Russian military movements and the outbreak of massacres. It is possible that official Russian statements from the war office did not want reports of massacres tied to news of troop movements, as they might indicate Russian responsibility in provoking Turkish persecutions.

Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative component of the content analysis examines the prominence the *Washington Post* gave to the Armenian Genocide. Prominence was determined by using five topics of inquiry: total number of articles, total number of editions featuring stories on the Armenians, number of front page and headline articles, number of stories based on the day of the week, month, and year, and types of foreign news sources used by the *Post*.

Total Number of Articles and Editions

The *Washington Post* printed one hundred eighty articles featuring the word "Armenia" or "Armenian" in the twenty-four month period from January 1, 1915, to December 30, 1916. In the same twenty-four months, the *Post* published seven hundred thirty editions of the paper. Out of those seven hundred thirty editions, thirteen editions contained more than one article,

five editions contained three articles, and one edition contained four articles on the Armenians. Consequently, only one hundred fifty-three of seven hundred thirty potential editions covered anything related to the Armenians. (Refer to Table 1.)

The *Post* published articles on the Armenians in less than one fourth of its editions in the two-year period. Without comparing articles published on another topic, for instance the invasion of Belgium, it is difficult to gauge whether the attention the *Post* gave to the Armenians is more or less than it gave to other subjects. Still, coverage in less than one fourth of editions seems to be a small amount. Given the newspaper's anti-war stance while America remained a neutral country, it could be predicted that the paper gave limited coverage to all topics relating to the war or any issues it deemed might provoke American sentiment to favor joining the war.

Front Page and Headline Articles

The *Post* printed twenty-seven articles about the Armenians on the front page, fourteen of which were located at the top, above the fold. The ***description*** and ***subordinate reference*** categories had equal number of nine front page stories.

International action was second with five front page articles, and ***location*** and ***aid*** had equal number of two articles. The ***subordinate reference*** category had nine headline stories,

description had three, **international action** and **aid** had equal number of one, and **location** had no headline articles. (Refer to Table 6).

Stories about the Armenians appeared on the front page in less than one sixth of the total number of articles, and in less than one tenth of stories, the information appeared as a headline article, above the fold. It is not surprising the **description** category shared for the highest number of front page articles. Descriptive coverage of the Armenian Genocide was the most graphic type and the most likely to provoke a reaction from readers. As stories in the **description** category were among the earliest printed, its front page articles were prominent for both their location in the paper and the chronology.

The **subordinate reference** category shared the same number of front page articles. In these stories, the Armenians did not figure prominently, and so the articles' placement can have the slightest bearing on shaping public opinion. The articles' main topic had more effect on its position on the front page than did information about the Armenians.

Articles by Day, Month, and Year

The *Post* printed one hundred eighty articles in the twenty-four month period, fifty-two, a little over one fourth, on Sundays. Sunday editions of the *Post* in both 1915 and 1916

contained the most articles, in some cases more than three times the number in other days of the week. The Sunday edition of the *Post* was the largest, with multiple sections. (Refer to Table 4.)

Of the one hundred eighty articles, the *Post* printed ninety-seven in 1915 and eighty-three in 1916. In 1915, October had the highest number of twenty-two stories, and in 1916 February and October had an equal number of fifteen articles. (Refer to Table 3.)

Articles by Source

Of the one hundred eighty articles, sixty-seven, slightly over one third, did not name a location or city as a source of information. The one hundred twenty-three remaining articles identified twenty-two different cities or regions as sources. Six of the cities were domestic and the rest were international, with the exception of Armenia, which is a region. Multiple articles cited more than one source, so the one hundred eighty stories had a total of one hundred ninety sources. (Refer to Table 5.)

The sources of information for the media in reporting the Armenian Genocide is very important to understanding any potential filters or interpretations on the content. As previously noted, the *Washington Post* did not have any

international correspondents, so it was limited to using international or larger domestic news outlets for its information. Information often passes through multiple media outlets, and consequently potential censors, before reaching the *Post*. In some cases the *Post* printed articles from international newspapers verbatim, and in other cases the information was incorporated into an original article. Most articles named the city of origin, and in some cases the international newspaper, that initially reported the information. The United States was a neutral country in the early war years and so had wider access to information out of Turkey through Ambassador Morgenthau than some countries. Great Britain cut the lines of communication from Germany early in the war, so American newspapers had limited access to German news sources. With this being the case, few news sources out of Turkey or Germany were used, instead news came heavily out of Entente countries. Cities used as news sources include Petrograd, Paris, London, Rome, New York, Tiflis, Berlin, Athens, Van, Tabriz, Basle, Amsterdam, and Boston. Most information coming out of Armenia or Persia came through Russian or British sources respectively. It is difficult to pinpoint any exact bias on the information based on the channels it passed through without a detailed comparison of story content based on the city of origin, the analysis of the media coverage must be viewed with the potential biases in mind.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The Armenian Genocide tested the depth and commitment of the American ideals of humanitarianism and democracy. American efforts to save the Armenians through relief work had its limits when it came time to back the cause of a free and independent Armenia. During the war, the Armenian cause experienced unprecedented popularity as the American public rallied to provide relief and aid to the suffering Armenians. At the close of the war, the cause of Armenian statehood was swept up in the idealism that dominated the peace discussion. Yet the "unparalleled tragedy of the genocide lent the impetus, but did not inspire a political solution to the Armenian catastrophe."¹⁹⁹ From the signing of the Mudros Armistice to the Treaty of Lausanne, the movement for an Armenian homeland disintegrated and lost the attention and emotion of the American public. The activism of the relief effort vanished as America withdrew back into isolationism and "would seem to suggest that most American felt they had discharged their responsibilities toward the Armenians through the activities of relief organizations."²⁰⁰ American commitment to the Armenians was defeated by disunity in

¹⁹⁹ Mark Malkasian, "The Disintegration of the Armenian Cause in the United States, 1918-1927," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 16, no. 3 (August 1984), 352.

²⁰⁰ Daniel, 258.

the Armenian independence movement and the growth of isolationism in American politics after the war, which tested "the relationship between popular appeals for aid and justice and the limits of what the federal government would and would not do for a foreign people."²⁰¹

During the war the cause of the Armenians received widespread attention in the United States. Through its position as a neutral nation in the early war years, the United States had the potential to influence the Ottoman government. The American ambassador to the Porte, Henry Morgenthau, informed the United States State Department of the persecutions of Turkish Armenians early in 1915 and continued as an ardent supporter of the Armenian cause for many years thereafter. Morgenthau beseeched help from American relief organizations to raise funds to assist displaced and suffering Armenians. The American public was familiar with responding to humanitarian crises during World War I and from the initial days of the war participated in relief movements to help the Belgians, Poles, Serbs, and others. Morgenthau relayed news of Turkish atrocities, which corroborated similar reports from American missionaries in Turkey to their organizations. The reaction was swift, fierce, and began a chain reaction of relief efforts for the Armenians that lasted throughout the war and after.

²⁰¹ Balakian, 296.

One of the earliest organizations created in response to the Armenian crisis was the American Committee on Armenian Atrocities (ACAA).²⁰² The leaders of the committee combined Christian ideals on philanthropy and bureaucratic skills in fundraising and public relations, a stellar combination. They immediately began to publicize the importance of relief throughout the United States, aided greatly by the new media. Media coverage of the Armenian atrocities played a significant role in informing and shaping public opinion and altering people to the efforts of relief organizations. The ACAA quickly implemented a national education campaign, using pamphlets and speakers to incite sympathy for the Armenians, and established local committees around the country to collect funds. They held mass rallies in New York and Philadelphia and collected money at football games in response to continuing pleas from Morgenthau for funds. Overwhelming response from the American public promoted the federal government to establish a special day for Armenian relief to collect supplies and unify the cause. Churches across the country used their pulpits, collection services, and Sunday school classes to teach people about the Armenian persecutions and spur activism. The American public rallied around the Armenian cause on a massive scale and the

²⁰² James E. Barton, *The Story of Near East Relief* (New York: MacMillian, 1930), 2-10.

tragedy brought the "status of Armenia closer to the American heart than ever before."²⁰³

American relief efforts were aided by America's neutral status in the early war years. Relief organizations had access to information from consuls in Turkey and reports to the State Department to use in its publicity campaign. Additionally, consular officials had authority to administer the relief funds collected to the needy in the Ottoman Empire.²⁰⁴ Throughout the early efforts to alleviate the suffering of Armenians, the United States government never threatened military intervention in the Ottoman Empire to stop the massacres. The Wilson administration clung to its isolationist policy, and never viewed the Armenian crisis as "sufficiently important to justify an official ultimatum to the Turkish authorities."²⁰⁵ When a declaration of war against Germany became imminent in the spring of 1917, American policy toward Turkey and the Armenians came to the forefront. The media played a large role in influencing American public opinion. Graphic descriptions of Armenian persecutions in the media coverage, and corresponding vilification of the Turk,²⁰⁶ embittered the American people, who favored war with Turkey. Yet, President Wilson faced pressure to avoid war with Turkey from the same groups who were working to

²⁰³ Balakian, 349-350.

²⁰⁴ Daniel, 259.

²⁰⁵ Daniel, 255.

²⁰⁶ Daniel, 253-254.

provide relief to those suffering at the hands of the Turks. American missionary groups sought to avoid war with the Ottoman Empire to "safeguard nearly a century of American Board investment in the region,"²⁰⁷ and not to jeopardize post-war missionary work in the country.²⁰⁸ American failure to declare war on Turkey allowed for the continuation of relief work and tabled the Armenian Question until the end of the war.

The ideal of self-determination dominated the post-war political climate, giving the Armenians hope in their desire for independence. Following the defeat of the Central Powers at the end of the war, the popularity of the Armenian cause in the United States took on a political air. President Wilson's Fourteen Points "boosted hopes for Armenian self-determination to unprecedented heights."²⁰⁹ Dedication to the Armenian cause was grounded in American sympathy for Armenian suffering during the war, and a feeling of responsibility to make it right.

America's failure to defend the Armenians and ensure the existence of an independent state is due to number of factors. The matter of Armenian independence was tied to America's acceptance of a mandate for the nascent country. The American public was largely in favor of a mandate for Armenia. Support for it was published by newspapers and religious

²⁰⁷ Malkasian, 353.

²⁰⁸ Simon Payaslian, *United States Policy Toward the Armenian Question and the Armenian Genocide* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 119-120.

²⁰⁹ Malkasian, 352.

organizations.²¹⁰ New organizations comprised of Armenian Americans and prominent American activists took up the cause, the most influential being the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA) and the America-Armenia society (ASS). These two committees differed in their approach to securing the future of Armenia, with the ASS favoring a mandate²¹¹ and the ACIA favoring direct American aid to Armenia.²¹² Conflict in the movement for Armenian independence weakened it. The staunch nationalist aims of the ACIA clashed with the missionary interests of the ASS, leaving the movement "scattered and unorganized"²¹³ and working against each other to secure approval of a mandate.

The divisions within the movement for Armenian independence were not the only factors working against it. The American mandate for Armenia was tied to Congress' ratification of the peace treaty and League of Nations. President Wilson faced immediate opposition to the peace treaty upon his return from Europe in the summer of 1919. Resistance in the Senate was led by isolationist Henry Cabot Lodge, who waged a fierce campaign to defeat the treaty. Wilson tried to rally public support for

²¹⁰ Balakian, 358.

²¹¹ Thomas Bryson III, "The Armenia America Society: A Factor in American-Turkish Relations, 1919-1924," *The Armenian Review* 29 (Spring 1976), 54-55.

²¹² Richard George Koolakian, *The Struggle for Justice: A Story of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, 1915-1920* (Dearborn: Wayne State University Press, 2008), 124.

²¹³ Daniel, 264.

the treaty in a tour of the West to educate Americans. He used public support for the Armenian cause to promote the treaty, knowing "it had been a cause dear to the hearts of Americans."²¹⁴ Still his efforts were not enough. The Senate first rejected the League of Nations Covenant in November 1919. The Armenian cause was now firmly "entangled in the Wilson-Lodge feud and the larger morass of partisan politics."²¹⁵ When Wilson submitted the mandate proposal the following May, the American public responded silently to Wilson's pleas and Congress rejected the mandate resolution, "unencumbered by popular pressure."²¹⁶

The failure of the American mandate for Armenia marked the rapid decline of American support for the Armenian cause. Content analysis of *Washington Post* news coverage of the Armenian Genocide from 1915 to 1916 reveals the American public had a solid foundation of information about the Armenian Genocide. Beginning early in 1915, the *Post* published articles on the massacre of Armenians in Turkey. It continued publication of news on the topic in a consistent pace through the end of the twenty-four month period surveyed, and undoubtedly continued through the break in diplomatic relations with Turkey and possibly until the end of the war and afterward.

²¹⁴ Balakain, 302.

²¹⁵ Malkasian, 353.

²¹⁶ Daniel, 264.

The *Post's* media coverage included graphic details of systematic atrocities committed against the Armenians. The *Post* made readers abundantly aware of the suffering of Armenian refugees and invoked sympathy by identifying Armenians as good Christians being persecuted at the hands of villainous Turks. The *Post* gave a large amount of attention in the media coverage to the affect the massacres had on Americans living in Turkey. American readers at home could establish a mental connection to the massacres when reading about the experiences of their fellow countrymen.

The media coverage provided Americans with knowledge of the international reaction to the massacres. The public knew about Allied outrage at Germany and Turkey for condoning such persecutions and the American government's lukewarm threats to Turkey to cease the massacres. There is an unmistakable lack of coverage on any public outcry for the United States government to do more politically to help the Armenians; undoubtedly because such pressure was nonexistent. Historical scholarship and analysis of the *Post* confirms a widespread movement in American culture to assist the Armenians through humanitarian efforts. Yet, sympathy for Armenian suffering did not reach to the doors of the Capital building in the form of a powerful lobby to insist on American intervention in Ottoman Turkey.

The Post's attention to the Armenian cause included extensive coverage on the ways Americans reacted to the news and the outpouring of support through efforts to provide aid to Armenia. The massive humanitarian movement to raise funds to assist Armenian refugees is recounted in the words of the *Post*, alerting Americans as to their efforts of their countrymen and inspiring continued action.

It is clear the *Washington Post* paid attention to the Armenian Genocide. Yet, the failure of the mandate for Armenia proved the fleeting nature of America's commitment to the Armenians. The outpouring of sympathy and responsibility provoked and recounted in the media coverage was limited to humanitarian efforts and failed to extend to political protection of Armenian independence. Today the story of Armenian suffering and the abandonment of the Armenian cause is but a minor, and often overlooked, chapter in the larger saga of the First World War. Americans, certainly the readers of the *Washington Post*, learned about, reacted to, and then neglected the Armenian tale so swiftly after the war; it can be no surprise that almost one hundred years later American remembrance of the tragic events is minuscule. American memory of the Armenian Genocide had a foundation in the media coverage offered in its most political of cities, but it has eroded over time.

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APPENDIX

Tables

Table 1

Article Chart in Chronological Order						
	Title	Date	Day of Week	Page	Issue Number	
1915						
1	Armenians Flee to Russia	01-15-1915	Friday	2	14,098	D
2	Want Stalks Turk City	01-17-1915	Sunday	11	14,100	SR
3	Turk Army Surprises	02-03-1915	Wednesday	2	14,117	L
4	Turks Cut 150 Armenians' Throats; Force Fifty to Leap Into an Abyss	02-28-1915	Sunday	R3	14,142	D
5	48,000 Prisoners in Kief	03-17-1915	Wednesday	3	14,159	L
6	Hundreds of Men, Women and Children are Slain by Kurds in Armenian Plain	03-20-1915	Saturday	3	14, 162	D
7	Impartiality of US Government Proved, Says Bryce, Who Declares American People Favor Cause of Allies as Representing Ideals of Liberty; by Viscount Bryce	03-28-1915	Sunday	7	14,170	SR
8	Turkey First Nation to Recognize Officially an "Armenian Language"	04-11-1915	Sunday	R4	14,184	SR
9	Fear Kurd Massacre	04-18-1915	Sunday	3	14,191	D
10	Sees End of Turkey	04-19-1915	Monday	1	14,192	SR
11	Turks Kill Christians	04-25-1915	Sunday	1	14,198	D
12	Died in Fleeing Kurds	04-26-1915	Monday	3	14,199	D
13	Moslems Slay People in Ten Villages, Armenians Send Wilson Plea for Aid	04-26-1915	Monday	3	14,199	D
14	Appeal Sent to Porte	04-28-1915	Wednesday	3	14,201	IA
15	Crucified by Turks	04-29-1915	Thursday	1	14,202	D
16	More Slain by Kurds	05-01-1915	Saturday	11	14,204	D
17	Russians Pursue Turk	05-06-1915	Thursday	3	14,209	D

18	American Missionaries in Peril as Turks and Kurds Attack Van	05-11-1915	Tuesday	2	14,214	D
19	US Helping Armenians (Real Estate Classified Ads)	05-16-1915	Sunday	R7	14,219	IA
20	Kill 10,000 Christians	05-16-1915	Sunday	15	14,219	D
21	6,000 Armenians Slain	05-18-1915	Tuesday	1	14,221	D
22	Turks Suffer Heavily	05-18-1915	Tuesday	3	14,221	SR
23	Allied Nations Hold Turkey Responsible for Kurd Massacres	05-24-1915	Monday	1	14,227	IA
24	Missionaries Need Help	06-06-1915	Sunday	3	14,240	IA
25	Americans at Van Safe	06-21-1915	Monday	2	14,254	AID
26	Russians Advance in Persia	06-28-1915	Monday	2	14,261	AID
27	Peril of the Christians in Turkey Never So Great, Americans Report	07-12-1915	Monday	3	14,275	D
28	Young Turks Open Reign of Terror	07-13-1915	Tuesday	1	14,276	SR
29	Turks Hard Pressed in Armenia; Bitlis Massacre Presages Retreat	07-13-1915	Tuesday	2	14,276	D
30	Christian Women Dragged from Death to Shameful Slavery (Miscellany Section) by Rev. Herbert Whitehouse	07-18-1915	Sunday	M8	14,281	D
31	Adrianople Troops Seditious; Fear to Go to Dardanelles	07-21-1915	Wednesday	2	14,284	SR
32	Turks Push 100 Miles into Russia, But are Driven Back Near Ardost	07-21-1915	Wednesday	2	14,284	L
33	Turks' Spies Active	07-28-1915	Wednesday	3	14,291	SR
34	Campaigns of Year Outside the Two Big War Theaters (Miscellany Section)	08-01-1915	Sunday	M8	14,295	SR
35	Brilliant Assemblage Present	08-02-1915	Monday	1	14,296	SR
36	Turks Defy Defeats	08-03-1915	Tuesday	2	14,297	SR
37	9,000 Women and Children Slain by Turks on the Banks of the Tigris	08-04-1915	Wednesday	2	14,298	D
38	Turks Kill Thousands	08-06-1915	Friday	2	14,300	D
39	100,000 Armenians Sent in Exile; Massacre Victims Put at 10,000	08-11-1915	Wednesday	3	14,305	D
40	Turkish Soldiers Outmaneuvered by Russians on Upper Euphrates; Halil Bey's New Army Driven Back	08-13-1915	Friday	3	14,307	SR

41	Turks March on Armenians	08-14-1915	Saturday	3	14,308	D
42	Moslems Driven Back	08-15-1915	Sunday	8	14,309	L
43	Van Missionaries Escape	08-17-1915	Tuesday	4	14,311	D
44	Throw Off Turks Yoke	08-22-1915	Sunday	9	14,316	D
45	Armenian Land of Ruin	08-22-1915	Sunday	R1	14,316	D
46	No Missionaries Slain	08-22-1915	Sunday	R4	14,316	D
47	Turkish Cabinet Split	08-27-1915	Friday	3	14,321	IA
48	Greece Near War	08-29-1915	Sunday	3	14,323	SR
49	Million Facing Death	09-03-1915	Friday	1	14,328	D
50	14,000 Armenians Massacred	09-09-1915	Thursday	1	14,334	D
51	Turk's Army in Peril	09-14-1915	Tuesday	2	14,339	SR
52	US Aid to Armenians	09-14-1915	Tuesday	3	14,339	AID
53	Armenians Beg Bulgars for Help; 835,000 Exiled, Church Heads Slain	09-14-1916	Tuesday	3	14,339	IA
54	Turks Killing a Nation	09-19-1915	Sunday	1	14,344	IA
55	To Send Armenians Aid	09-24-1915	Friday	2	14,349	AID
56	45,000 Armenians are Slain in Massacres by Moslems	09-25-1915	Saturday	3	14,350	D
57	50 Tied and Drowned; by A. S. Safrastiass	09-27-1915	Monday	1	14,352	D
58	Plea for Armenians	09-27-1915	Monday	12	14,352	IA
59	Envoy Defends Turks	09-28-1915	Tuesday	3	14,353	IA
60	US Probes Turk Outrages	09-28-1915	Tuesday	3	14,353	IA
61	Morgenthau Offers \$1,000,000 to Bring all Armenians to America	10-02-1915	Saturday	2	14,357	AID
62	Armenians for America	10-03-1915	Sunday	4	14,358	IA
63	Greatest Horrors in History Mark Massacres in Armenia	10-04-1915	Monday	5	14,359	D
64	US Aid to Armenians	10-05-1915	Tuesday	1	14,360	IA

65	Armenians Loot Turkish Homes When Russians Comes to Rescue	10-06-1915	Wednesday	2	14,361	D
66	Wilson Warns Turks	10-06-1915	Wednesday	2	14,361	IA
67	\$100, 000 Sent to Aid Armenians by 2 Committees in New York	10-09-1915	Saturday	3	14,364	AID
68	Look to U.S. for Aid	10-10-1915	Sunday	14	14,365	IA
69	Upholds Turkish Acts	10-10-1915	Sunday	14	14,365	IA
70	Oppose Armenian Plan	10-10-1915	Sunday	ES 12	14,365	IA
71	The Armenian Issue Vague; Turks Hiding News of the Events	10-10-1915	Sunday	ES 16	14,365	IA
72	Turkish Mob Wrecks New Italian Embassy at Constantinople	10-11-1915	Monday	1	14,366	SR
73	Tells of Armenians Slain	10-11-1915	Monday	14	14,366	D
74	Goes to Bring Armenians	10-14-1915	Thursday	2	14,369	AID
75	Views of Capital Visitors on Interesting Current Topics	10-21-1915	Thursday	6	14,376	SR
76	Telling of Atrocities	10-22-1915	Friday	11	14,337	D
77	Halil Bey in Cabinet	10-25-1915	Monday	2	14,380	IA
78	German View of War	10-25-1915	Monday	4	14,380	IA
79	Doomed All Armenians	10-26-1915	Tuesday	2	14,381	IA
80	Turks Spare No Armenians	10-27-1915	Wednesday	1	14,382	D
81	Russia to Assist Armenians	10-28-1915	Thursday	1	14,383	IA
82	British Accused of Atrocities in Reply to Armenian Charges	10-30-1915	Saturday	2	14,385	IA
83	Did Not Stir Armenians	11-17-1915	Wednesday	3	14,403	IA
84	Two Turkish Chiefs to Hang	11-22-1915	Monday	2	14,408	IA
85	Kill Women by Fire	11-27-1915	Saturday	1	14,413	D
86	What Father Dakras Saw	11-28-1915	Sunday	M5	14,414	D
87	US Citizen Killed by Turks, Is Report	11-29-1915	Monday	1	14,415	D
88	US Must Put Duty and Honor First	12-01-1915	Wednesday	2	14,417	IA

89	Assail US Inaction	12-01-1915	Wednesday	2	14,417	IA
90	New Cardinals	12-06-1915	Monday	2	14,422	SR
91	Anxiety in England	12-12-1915	Saturday	18	14,427	SR
92	Try to Save Christians	12-12-1915	Saturday	20	14,427	IA
93	To Raise Armenian Corps	12-12-1915	Saturday	20	14,427	IA
94	British Intrigue Caused Armenians Massacres, Declares German Writer	12-21-1915	Tuesday	3	14,437	IA
95	Turkey's Food, Cotton and Copper Plentiful Asserts Moslem Leader	12-22-1915	Wednesday	3	14,438	SR
96	Germans Defend Armenians	12-23-1915	Thursday	2	14,439	IA
97	Bulgars Kill Armenians	12-26-1915	Sunday	13	14,442	D
1916						
98	American Missionaries Investigate Condition of Armenian Refugees	01-02-1916	Sunday	ES2	14,449	IA
99	Full Freedom of the Seas to Our Nationals and Our Commerce	01-10-1916	Monday	6	14,457	SR
100	1,5000 Armenians Are Killed	01-15-1916	Saturday	3	14,462	D
101	Americans and Armenians	01-22-1916	Saturday	2	14,469	IA
102	Armenians Only Removed	01-23-1916	Sunday	R5	14,470	IA
103	Bryce Sends Appeal Here	01-26-1916	Wednesday	4	14,473	IA
104	T. R. Ready for War	01-31-1916	Monday	1	14,478	SR
105	Turks Halt Russians	02-02-1916	Wednesday	3	14,480	L
106	American Woman Missionary Gives Pictures of Armenian's Fate	02-06-1916	Sunday	14	14,484	D
107	Stone and Borah Tilt	02-10-1916	Thursday	2	14,488	AID
108	Fresh Massacres Reported	02-14-1916	Monday	3	14,492	D
109	Porte Accuses Entente Powers of Enticing Armenians to Uprising	02-16-1916	Wednesday	2	14,494	IA
110	Armenian Fort Captured	02-19-1916	Saturday	1	14,497	L
111	Turks Fight at Bay	02-19-1916	Saturday	1	14,497	SR
112	US Warns the Sultan	02-19-1916	Saturday	2	14,497	IA

113	Russians Land New Army in Armenia	02-20-1916	Sunday	1	14,498	L
114	Makes Plea for Armenians	02-20-1916	Sunday	3	14,498	IA
115	Sultan Says Armenian Rebellion Made it Necessary to Remove All to Rear so as to Protect Army	02-20-1916	Sunday	6	14,498	IA
116	Fleeing Turks Being Massacred by Armenians is Report to Rome	02-21-1916	Monday	3	14,499	D
117	Armenian People Victims	02-23-1916	Wednesday	1	14,501	IA
118	Plot to Kill Kaiser; by Marquise de Fontenoy	02-23-1916	Wednesday	4	14,501	SR
119	Morgenthau Sees Wilson	02-26-1916	Saturday	2	14,504	IA
120	Russians Take Bitlis	03-04-1916	Saturday	4	14,511	L
121	War Is No Novelty Here	04-01-1916	Saturday	6	14,539	L
122	Turkey Appeals for Food	04-09-1916	Sunday	ES9	14.547	SR
123	Million Armenians Killed	04-16-1916	Sunday	13	14.554	D
124	America's Aid to Stricken	04-16-1916	Sunday	ES4	14.554	AID
125	Sooren, Most Famous of Armenians Who Have Been Persecuted	04-23-1916	Sunday	A12	14,561	D
126	15,000 Slain by Turks	05-07-1916	Sunday	ES14	14575	D
127	Morgenthau to Speak Here	05-15-1916	Monday	4	14,583	IA
128	Morgenthau Talks on East	05-15-1916	Monday	10	14,583	IA
129	Turks Avenge Armenians	06-04-1916	Sunday	A2	14,603	IA
130	Congress Condensed	06-09-1916	Friday	6	14,608	IA
131	Yacht Sails for Russia	06-17-1916	Saturday	3	14,616	AID
132	Congress Condensed	06-22-1916	Thursday	6	14,621	AID
133	Favor Day for Armenians Relief	06-25-1916	Sunday	17	14,624	AID
134	\$2,000,000 Spent on War Relief by the Rockefeller Commission	07-01-1916	Saturday	7	14,630	AID
135	Plea for Armenians	07-03-1916	Monday	2	14,632	IA
136	House for Armenian Day	07-20-1916	Thursday	5	14,649	AID

137	Concerning the Turk	07-24-1916	Monday	4	14,653	SR
138	Holds UP US Relief	07-30-1916	Sunday	A12	14,659	IA
139	New Protest to Turkey	07-30-1916	Sunday	A13	14,659	IA
140	New Envoy to Porte Sees Wilson	07-30-1916	Sunday	ES5	14,659	IA
141	Starving Armenians Devour Dead; Driven To and Fro Over Desert	08-08-1916	Tuesday	3	14,668	D
142	Armenians Eat Children	08-20-1916	Sunday	A7	14,679	D
143	Patriarchate is Abolished	08-20-1916	Sunday	RE7	14,679	IA
144	Wilson Names War Fund Days	08-27-1916	Sunday	A6	14,686	IA
145	Cruiser Wreaked	08-30-1916	Wednesday	1	14,689	SR
146	Wilson Calls For War Relief	09-09-1916	Saturday	10	14,697	AID
147	Sanctions Syrian Aid	09-15-1916	Friday	3	14,703	IA
148	Huge U.S. War Gifts	09-21-1916	Thursday	1	14,709	AID
149	Armenians to Get Food	09-22-1916	Friday	1	14,710	AID
150	Denied U.S. Relief Ship to Syria	10-1-1916	Sunday	3	14,791	AID
151	Ask \$5000 Relief	10-04-1916	Wednesday	3	14,722	AID
152	Church Girls to Help	10-08-1916	Sunday	7	14,726	AID
153	Bryce Appeals for Help	10-08-1916	Sunday	11	14,726	AID
154	Volunteer for Relief Work	10-09-1916	Monday	10	14,727	AID
155	Relief Plans Formulated	10-11-1916	Wednesday	10	14,729	AID
156	Episcopal Convention Opens	10-12-1916	Thursday	3	14,730	SR
157	War Relief for Syria	10-15-1916	Sunday	A5	14,733	AID
158	Urges Response to Call for Relief of Armenia; by Lucy Thoumaian	10-16-1916	Monday	6	14,734	AID
159	Society Girls in War Relief	10-20-1916	Friday	12	14,738	AID
160	Relief Day in Churches	10-22-1916	Sunday	13	14,740	AID

161	Relief Donations Large	10-22-1916	Sunday	15	14,740	AID
162	War Aid by Churches	10-23-1916	Monday	5	14,741	AID
163	Red Cross Chapter Meets Today	10-25-1916	Wednesday	4	14,743	AID
164	US Shamed, T. R.	10-29-1916	Sunday	1	14,747	SR
165	Fears Prolonged War	11-10-1916	Friday	5	14,759	SR
166	Goes to Feed Syrians	11-14-1916	Tuesday	5	14,763	AID
167	6,000 Armenians Killed	11-24-1916	Friday	3	14,773	D
168	Turks Hold Americans	11-29-1916	Wednesday	1	14,778	SR
169	Marooned Americans	11-30-1916	Thursday	6	14,779	SR
170	Champion Lifesaver	12-03-1916	Sunday	S4	14,782	D
171	Uphold Small Nation	12-11-1916	Monday	3	14,790	SR
172	Ask Aid for Oppressed	12-12-1916	Tuesday	4	14,791	SR
173	Heads Red Cross Again	12-14-1916	Thursday	3	14,793	SR
174	Armenians Thank Wilson	12-15-1916	Friday	3	14,794	IA
175	A Resourceful American	12-16-1916	Saturday	6	14,795	D
176	Start \$1,000,000 War Relief	12-17-1916	Sunday	R5	14,796	AID
177	U.S. Turns on Turkey	12-19-1916	Tuesday	3	14,798	IA
178	Must End Military Brigandage	12-26-1916	Tuesday	2	14,805	SR
179	Turkish Village Taken	12-28-1916	Thursday	3	14,807	L
180	Allies' Reply Ready	12-30-1916	Saturday	1	14,809	SR

Table 2

Articles by Month and Category						
1915						
	Description	Location	Sub Ref	I-Action	Aid	Total
Jan 1915	1	0	1	0	0	2
Feb 1915	1	1	0	0	0	2
March 1915	1	1	1	0	0	3
April 1915	5	0	2	1	0	8
May 1915	5	0	1	2	0	8
June 1915	0	0	0	1	2	3
July 1915	3	1	3	0	0	7
Aug 1915	8	1	5	1	0	15
Sept 1915	4	0	1	5	2	12
Oct 1915	5	0	2	12	3	22
Nov 1915	3	0	0	2	0	5
Dec 1915	1	0	3	6	0	10
Total 1915	37	4	19	30	7	97
1916						
Jan 1916	1	0	2	4	0	7
Feb 1916	3	3	2	6	1	15
March 1916	0	1	0	0	0	1
April 1916	2	1	1	0	1	5
May 1916	1	0	0	2	0	3
June 1916	0	0	0	4	1	5
July 1916	0	0	1	6	0	7
Aug 1916	2	0	1	2	0	5
Sept 1916	0	0	0	0	4	4
Oct 1916	0	0	2	0	13	15
Nov 1916	1	0	3	0	1	5
Dec 1916	2	1	5	2	1	11
Total 1916	12	6	17	26	22	83
Total 1915-1916	49	10	36	56	29	180

Table 3

Articles by Month and Year		
	1915	1916
January	2	7
February	2	15
March	3	1
April	8	5
May	8	3
June	3	5
July	7	7
August	15	5
September	12	4
October	22	15
November	5	5
December	10	11
Total	97	83

Table 4

Articles by Day of Week		
	1915	1916
Monday	18	12
Tuesday	15	5
Wednesday	15	10
Thursday	7	8
Friday	7	7
Saturday	11	13
Sunday	24	28
Total	97	83

Table 5

Articles Sources by Location						
	Description	Location	Sub Ref	I-Action	Aid	Total
No Location	7	3	14	23	20	67
Amsterdam	1			1		2
Armenia	1					1
Athens	1		4	1		6
Berlin		1	1	8		10
Boston	4			4	1	9
Bucharest	1					1
Chicago					1	1
Constantinople			2	2		4
Julfa	1					1
London	13	3	7	7	1	31
Milan			1			1
New York	6		3	9	3	21
Norfolk					1	1
Paris	3	1				4
Petrograd	2	5	2			9
Philadelphia					1	1
Rome	2		2			4
Sofia				1		1
St. Louis			1			1
Tabriz	2					2
Tiflis	9			1	1	11
Van	1					1
Total	54	13	37	57	29	190

Table 6

Front Page and Headline Articles			
	Total	Front Page	Headline
Description	49	9	3
International Action	56	5	1
Aid	29	2	1
Subordinate Reference	36	9	9
Location	10	2	0
Total	180	27	14

