Vindicating Moral Error Theory: A Threefold Defense Against Companions in Guilt
Abstract
Moral Error Theory (MET) posits that moral statements ordinarily presuppose stance-independent moral properties which fail to obtain, rendering first-order moral propositions systematically false. A major challenge to MET comes by way of Companions in Guilt (CiG) arguments, which hold that moral and epistemic normativity are on par such that the rejection of one entails the rejection of the other. CiG proponents argue, then, that if one is committed to epistemic normativity, she is justified in accepting moral normativity, thus granting her good reason to reject MET. Furthermore, CiG purports that if the error theorist rejects epistemic normativity, she loses the rational basis necessary to justify error theory, leading to self-defeat. This paper motivates three ways the error theorist can respond to CiG. First, we object to the parity premise on which CiG hinges. While the argument assumes that moral and epistemic normativity stand or fall together, we argue the sufficiently objectionable features of moral normativity do not generalize to epistemic normativity. Second, granting the parity premise, we adopt a broader Normative Error Theory (NET) and engage with those arguments which charge NET as self-defeating. We contend that the normative error theorist does not lose out on good reasons, and that she faces no self-defeat. Third, by demonstrating a dilemma created by an internal tension between the two key premises, we show that CiG either fails due to disparity or becomes dialectically redundant. By offering these three ways out of CiG, each alone sufficient to defend the error theory, we show it is overdetermined that MET is insulated from CiG.
Start Time
16-4-2025 1:30 PM
End Time
16-4-2025 2:30 PM
Room Number
252
Presentation Type
Oral Presentation
Presentation Subtype
UG Orals
Presentation Category
Arts and Humanities
Faculty Mentor
Allen Coates
Vindicating Moral Error Theory: A Threefold Defense Against Companions in Guilt
252
Moral Error Theory (MET) posits that moral statements ordinarily presuppose stance-independent moral properties which fail to obtain, rendering first-order moral propositions systematically false. A major challenge to MET comes by way of Companions in Guilt (CiG) arguments, which hold that moral and epistemic normativity are on par such that the rejection of one entails the rejection of the other. CiG proponents argue, then, that if one is committed to epistemic normativity, she is justified in accepting moral normativity, thus granting her good reason to reject MET. Furthermore, CiG purports that if the error theorist rejects epistemic normativity, she loses the rational basis necessary to justify error theory, leading to self-defeat. This paper motivates three ways the error theorist can respond to CiG. First, we object to the parity premise on which CiG hinges. While the argument assumes that moral and epistemic normativity stand or fall together, we argue the sufficiently objectionable features of moral normativity do not generalize to epistemic normativity. Second, granting the parity premise, we adopt a broader Normative Error Theory (NET) and engage with those arguments which charge NET as self-defeating. We contend that the normative error theorist does not lose out on good reasons, and that she faces no self-defeat. Third, by demonstrating a dilemma created by an internal tension between the two key premises, we show that CiG either fails due to disparity or becomes dialectically redundant. By offering these three ways out of CiG, each alone sufficient to defend the error theory, we show it is overdetermined that MET is insulated from CiG.