Revisionist Khrushchev and Utopian Mao: A Comparison of Soviet Union and Chinese Agricultural Policies During the Sino-Soviet Split
Abstract
The examination of agricultural history provides historians with new methods to perceive the past. Most academic discourse centered around the 1956-66 Sino-Soviet split describes how ideological differences broke down relations between both countries but does not focus on the specific policies that influenced this break. Soviet and Chinese agricultural policies sparked tension between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong before and after this seismic rift. Both leaders’ interpretations of Marxist-Leninist thought influenced farming methods adopted in their respective states. The Soviet Union (USSR) embraced reform upon Stalin’s death while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) embraced fearful and repressive tactics in their agricultural methods. The political landscape inside each nation molded both Khrushchev and Mao’s perspective on agricultural development. This thesis analyzes the factors that shaped each leader’s ideological beliefs on agricultural production before the Sino-Soviet split and explores specific policies that strained relations between them. Primary and secondary sources show how Khrushchev’s emphasis on mechanization and large-scale collective farms contrasted with Mao’s advocacy for decentralized communes and mass mobilization. The Soviet leader’s ideological stance against Stalinism and adoration for American farming practices infuriated Mao in the mid-twentieth century. This study also sheds light on subsequent famine management between both nations through an examination of each nation’s agricultural success upon the Sino-Soviet split. Khrushchev’s diplomatic relationship with the West helped the USSR experience lower famine levels in comparison with the PRC. Grain imports alongside the continuation of foreign mechanized practices in the Soviet leader’s country lessened famine while Mao blamed others for his mistakes and pushed harmful campaigns that forced the rural Chinese population into starvation. This comparative analysis offers insight into the broader implications behind agricultural policy implementation in socialist states.
Start Time
16-4-2025 2:30 PM
End Time
16-4-2025 3:30 PM
Room Number
219
Presentation Type
Oral Presentation
Presentation Subtype
UG Orals
Presentation Category
Arts and Humanities
Faculty Mentor
Henry Antkiewicz
Revisionist Khrushchev and Utopian Mao: A Comparison of Soviet Union and Chinese Agricultural Policies During the Sino-Soviet Split
219
The examination of agricultural history provides historians with new methods to perceive the past. Most academic discourse centered around the 1956-66 Sino-Soviet split describes how ideological differences broke down relations between both countries but does not focus on the specific policies that influenced this break. Soviet and Chinese agricultural policies sparked tension between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong before and after this seismic rift. Both leaders’ interpretations of Marxist-Leninist thought influenced farming methods adopted in their respective states. The Soviet Union (USSR) embraced reform upon Stalin’s death while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) embraced fearful and repressive tactics in their agricultural methods. The political landscape inside each nation molded both Khrushchev and Mao’s perspective on agricultural development. This thesis analyzes the factors that shaped each leader’s ideological beliefs on agricultural production before the Sino-Soviet split and explores specific policies that strained relations between them. Primary and secondary sources show how Khrushchev’s emphasis on mechanization and large-scale collective farms contrasted with Mao’s advocacy for decentralized communes and mass mobilization. The Soviet leader’s ideological stance against Stalinism and adoration for American farming practices infuriated Mao in the mid-twentieth century. This study also sheds light on subsequent famine management between both nations through an examination of each nation’s agricultural success upon the Sino-Soviet split. Khrushchev’s diplomatic relationship with the West helped the USSR experience lower famine levels in comparison with the PRC. Grain imports alongside the continuation of foreign mechanized practices in the Soviet leader’s country lessened famine while Mao blamed others for his mistakes and pushed harmful campaigns that forced the rural Chinese population into starvation. This comparative analysis offers insight into the broader implications behind agricultural policy implementation in socialist states.