The Impact of World Bank’s Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid on Forest Management in Cameroon: Policy Hybridity in International Dependence Development

Asongayi Venard
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The Impact of World Bank’s Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid on Forest Management in Cameroon: Policy Hybridity in International Dependence Development

A thesis
presented to
the faculty of the Department of Cross-Disciplinary Studies
East Tennessee State University

In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts in Liberal Studies

by
Asongayi Venard
May 2014

Dr. Ke Chen, Chair
Dr. Jill LeRoy-Frazier
Dr. Lon Felker

Key words: World Bank, Cameroon, Conditionality, Ownership, Hybridization, Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid, Forest Management, International Dependence Development Model
ABSTRACT

The Impact of World Bank’s Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid on Forest Management in Cameroon: Policy Hybridity in International Dependence Development

by

Asongayi Venard

Many developing countries depend on the World Bank for development assistance, which the Bank often provides with policy reform conditions. Resistance to World Bank’s conditionality caused the Bank to posit “ownership” as a country’s real assent to its development policies. The combination of ownership and conditionality invalidates the neocolonial, false-paradigm and dualism theses in explaining the international dependence development model. This study explains this model by investigating how the relationship between conditionality and ownership in the context of this model impacts forest management in Cameroon.

Integrating theoretical and methodological insights mainly from political science, economics, geosciences, and sociology, the study finds that in this model, conditionality and ownership have a hybrid relationship that fosters and hinders effective forest management in Cameroon. This finding positions policy hybridity within this model. It proposes a nouvelle way to understand international development policies’ interactions, and the effects of the interactions on natural resource management.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my lovely wife Awung Linda Foretia Epse Asongayi; to my daughter Ntukem Maria-Rosae Asongayi, and my son Azengala Maryson Asongayi whose smiles, silence, and sacrifices let me conduct and compose this work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A Bangwa proverb says: a single hand cannot tie a bundle. This work is a “bundle” tied truly by many hands, and I wish to thank all contributors beginning with God Almighty.

Without the editing, constructive criticisms, and suggestions of an outstanding committee of three, this thesis would not have assumed its current identity. I render immense gratitude to Dr. Ke Chen who chaired my research committee for her sacrifices, quick feedback, and the scholarly and Geographic Information Systems insight she brought into shaping this work. Much appreciation also goes to Dr. Jill LeRoy-Frazier for the encouragement, editing, comments, and significant intellectual insight that she rendered to shape this thesis. She presented to me the value of interdisciplinary research that evidently influenced this work. I would also like to acknowledge the contributions of Dr. Lon Felker. His knowledge of international public administration and comments were instrumental in giving this work its final form.

I will not be candid enough if I fail to mention, and to appreciate Dr. Longo Stefano for the spark that enkindled into this study. In an independent study with him, he introduced me into global development issues in a unique and profound way. The books and scholarly articles he recommended to me, his deep insight on political economy, and his concern for the environment laid the foundation of my choice to engage in this research.

To my family in the USA and in Cameroon, immediate and extended, I cannot withhold these words: “Thank you –nkongte!” I am forever indebted to you for your love, your material, moral, social and spiritual support, without which I would not have completed this work.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge that in the absence of the graduate assistantship that I received from the Department of Cross-Disciplinary Studies to pursue my academic goals at East Tennessee State University this thesis would certainly not have come to fruition. Consequently, I thank the department for the assistance.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Governments that enter into agreements with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (also known as World Bank, and likewise referred to herein as the Bank) claim that it is for the better, that opposition to the agreements is uninformed or badly intended. Yet general strikes, riots, and ransacking of supermarkets manifest that World Bank policies such as conditionality, which is basically the attachment of policy reforms to multilateral aid, and ownership, which is fundamentally a government’s real assent\(^1\) to such policies, can mobilize popular resistance. Scholarly opinion on the impact of these policies on forest resource management is also divided: statistical findings range all over the spectrum of possible conclusions. This study is an engagement in this debate on the outcome of the policies of the World Bank by examining the complex impact that the relationship between conditionality and ownership within the context of the international dependence development model has on forest management in Cameroon.

The new development paradigm proposed by John H. Dunning and Fabienne Fortanier envisions development as a “holistic and multi-faceted, yet contextual concept that embraces a variety of human needs and objectives, [is concerned] with the dynamics of structural societal transformations . . . emphasizes the importance of institutions . . . and regards means and ends as

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\(^1\) Throughout this thesis, “real assent” is extrapolated into public policy from John Henry Cardinal Newmann’s discourse on assent (unconditional acceptance of a proposition) to religious faith. Newmann distinguishes between notional and real assent. By notional assent, he means the assent that one gives to statements of truth that are general and abstract – it is the mind contemplating its own creations as notions. Acts of notional assent include profession, credence, speculation, opinion, and presumption. Real assent is the assent to statements of truth that have been apprehended as real objects through mental activities and experience. Real experienced objects leave impressions on the imagination to which the intellect assents. Real assent exercises an influence on both individual and society; and influence that notional assent does not incite. Notional assent remains at the mental level, while real assent stimulates affections and passions, and thereby moves from notion to action. Real assent, therefore, involves belief, conviction and certitude. John Henry Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), 89, 103, 123-125.
interwoven and part of the development process.” In this process of transformation, the idea of the improvement of human wellbeing in a sound environment remains very important. In regard to this holism, the World Bank acknowledges the need to integrate natural resource and environmental management into poverty reduction agenda so as to minimize the risk of economic growth at the absolute expense of environmental protection. The United Nations Organization (UNO) appreciates this risk in terms of an “environmental disaster scenario: ” living standards in most countries have been rising; however, standards will fall dramatically by 2050 in less developed countries because of large scale deforestation, continuous land degradation, dramatic decline in biodiversity, economic downturn, political instability, and social inequalities.

The stakes are high, especially as developing nations such as Cameroon continue to depend on multilateral aid that is tied by donors such as the Bank to forest management policies that risk fostering such a scenario. This implies that forest management in Cameroon cannot be separated from such policies. Faced with both these dependence and environmental disaster scenarios, it is necessary to identify the cause-and-effect policy dynamics associated with forest resource management in the country so as to pave the way for appropriate resource management critical in the international dependence development model, which basically asserts that less developed countries rely on bilateral and multilateral development assistance from the developed world.

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Problematic

Harry Magdoff documents that at the July 1944 conference that created the World Bank, Henry Morgenthau, the conference president, spoke of the ultimate function of this institution in terms of the creation of a dynamic world economy in which the peoples of every nation will be able to realize their potentialities in peace . . . and enjoy, increasingly, the fruits of material progress on an earth infinitely blessed with natural riches. This is the indispensable cornerstone of freedom and security. All else must be built upon this. For freedom of opportunity is the foundation for all other freedoms.\(^5\)

Just two decades after the World Bank had been in existence, Magdoff documented these words of Morgenthau in a book that the former titled *The Age of Imperialism*. According to Bruce Rich, this institution for “freedom and security” could not have so quickly become a propagator of imperial world governance unless the Bank “beneath its long, self-proclaimed mission of banker to the poor [by transferring] larger and larger amounts of money to developing-country government agencies for capital-intensive, export-oriented projects”\(^6\) had constructed the sort of bureaucratic world that Max Weber would have characterized as “the hardest to destroy.”\(^7\) This is the world of dependence – the reliance of developing countries on financial resources from the Bank because they are poor despite rich natural resource endowment in those countries. To borrow Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s image of the “Palace of Crystal,”\(^8\) in this world of dependence, developing countries have all the development problems, and the Bank has all the answers.

Björn Hettne iterates that from the 1970s, neo-Marxists such as Henrique Cardoso, Osvaldo Sunkel, Theotonio Dos Santos, and Ruy Mauro Marini have used three main theses to

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explain the international dependency development model.\textsuperscript{9} The first, which Gert Tinggaard Svendsen calls the neocolonial dependence thesis, asserts that there is an unequal power relationship between rich nations at the center of global governance and poor countries at the periphery, and rich nations take advantage of the power they possess to exploit poor ones. In this exploitation process, a small group of individuals and capitalist institutions in rich nations, who occupy the top position in global governance, ally with an elite faction that constitute the governments of poor or peripheral countries at the bottom of the global power structure.\textsuperscript{10} Geerat J. Vermeij explains that in top-down management, those at the power center make all the decisions and regulations of resource management, while those at the periphery simply receive and implement decisions from the center.\textsuperscript{11}

Richard W. Stevenson observes that these governments are often weak in resisting the capitalist institutions such as the World Bank at the power center because the former rely on financial assistance from the latter for the government’s economic and political interests. Furthermore, the Bank uses the aid as leverage or as an instrument of control in the top-down global power structure. In this structure, therefore, the Bank formulates resource management policies and compels peripheral countries to which it lends to adopt the policies as requirement or condition for receiving assistance from the Bank.\textsuperscript{12}

However, the neocolonial dependence thesis is unable to account for two pertinent elements that characterize global governance and resource management. The first of these, as

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
pointed out by Doborah Moore and Leonard Sklar, is the insistence on respect for the sovereignty of nations. This emphasis has characterized the refusal of some governments such as Zimbabwe to submit to all social, economic, and environmental policies of the Bank without contest. Secondly, there is an inherent contradiction within the political economy of capitalism that ironically defies the neocolonial dependence thesis today. This contradiction has been underlined by Immanuel Wallerstein in his analysis of world systems. In the ceaseless accumulation of capital, “capitalists need a large market,” writes Wallerstein, “but they also need a multiplicity of states, so that they can gain the advantages of working with states but also can circumvent states hostile to their interests in favor to states friendly to their interests.”

This implies that the economic production and consumption that characterize capitalism need national political power to survive. Consequently, the power relationship between capitalist institutions such as the World Bank and the political government of nations in natural resource management cannot be simply explained as unequal distribution of power.

A different theory, therefore, is necessary to account for the international dependence development model. One of these theories is the false-paradigm theory. Svendsen affirms that the false-paradigm thesis attributes economic stagnation in poor countries to uninformed counsel from international development “experts” who, nevertheless, may provide advice without any ill intentions. Ramagnoli and Mengoni iterate that this theory sees domestic governments as robots that merely implement in their countries mainstream economic analysis and policies formulated in the developed world without consideration for specific social, political, cultural,

religious, or environmental conditions of the country.\textsuperscript{16} This falsity is the failure of modernity the embraced in World Bank’s economics. In the words of Jean Chesnaux, it is “the failure of a global techno-economic short-term project, locked into itself because it has become ‘unhinged’ from natural and social realities. It works against the local and concrete interest of every human society.”\textsuperscript{17}

One solution to this failure is to polarize within the same development space the development ideologies and policies of the Bank and those of a national government that more often reflect the reality of the local contexts in developing countries. Nicholas A. Ashford and Ralph Hall write about this polarization as the “dualistic thesis” of the international dependency development model, which finds no meeting point between the substantive content of development policies that fit rich, western societies and those that are appropriate for the developed countries.\textsuperscript{18} This thesis suggests that for effective development, the Bank should merely be a listener to national governments that are more versed in their local realities. Thus, the Bank must not tie its multilateral aid to any policy reforms in a country.

There are two problems with this dualism: first, it fails to appreciate the fact that nations have become inserted into the global whole in such a way that social, economic, and political circumstances in powerful nations tend to determine the state of affairs in other countries. Consequently, the formulation and implementation of public policy cannot be limited simply to factors that arise from and remain within specific local circumstances. Second, the World Bank, for the sake of its own perpetuity, must prescribe certain development policy requirements for its debtors in order to ensure that the loans it disperses can be repaid. However, amidst movements

\textsuperscript{16} Ramagnoli and Mengoni, \textit{The Economic Development Process in the Middle East and North Africa}, 18.
\textsuperscript{17} Jean Chesnaux, \textit{Brave Modern World} (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1992), 150.
\textsuperscript{18} Nicholas A. Ashford and Ralph Hall,\textit{Technology, Globalization and Sustainable Development: Transforming the Industrial State} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 159.
that counter neoliberal economics out of political expediency, the Bank realizes, as Maynard
Keynes ones insisted, that it needs to have “a certain amount of faith in the development
prospects of a country – a faith that transcends the expectations that can certainly be associated
with particular projects.”19

The Bank demonstrates this faith in its policy of ownership in which it appreciates some
development policies as formulated by national governments with due consideration for the
broad political economy, social relationships, cultural, and environmental aspects of their
countries and calls on national governments to internalize development and resource
management policies designed by the Bank. This policy implies that the neocolonial thesis of the
international dependence development model that privileges the neoclassical economics of
capitalist societies above all other disciplinary insights and arguments in development projects is
inadequate to explain the top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top natural resource management that the
Bank proposed to nations after the Earth Summit in Rio. This faith in the development prospects
of policies formulated by a national government also implies that the dualistic thesis of the
international dependence development model is inappropriate to explain the Bank’s perception
of the development knowledge that governments and localities possess. The Bank’s insistence on
attaching certain policy reforms as a requirement for its development assistance indicates the
Bank also has confidence in its own development knowledge. The false-paradigm must itself be
false in cases where this knowledge has yielded some positive results, as in the management of
forest resources in Cameroon.

To downplay the validity of the hitherto stated three theses of the international
dependency development model does not, however, mean that developing countries have

stopped relying on the World Bank for development assistance. Inasmuch as developing countries continue to depend on the Bank, and the Bank continues to use conditionality as an instrument of power to maximize control of its supported development programs in developing countries, A. Gunder Frank as quoted by Hettne, could not have been absolutely right in 1977 to claim that “dependence has now completed the cycle of its natural life.” As the cycle continues in the sphere of forest resource management to which the Bank now devotes a significant amount of its attention in its development agenda, the above critique of the three theses implies that the dynamics of power relations, knowledge conviction, and shareholder participation associated with the Bank-country relationship and the impact of this dynamics on natural resource management in countries have to be explained differently.

The Bank influences this relationship through conditionality understood as policy requirements that the Bank attaches to its financial assistance to countries. Countries also influence this relationship through the Bank’s policy of ownership in which states grant real assent to development and associated resource management policies. Consequently, one can say that this explanation involves the dynamic relationship between the Bank with conditionality on the one hand and the country with ownership on the other hand. Thus, it is not only the contact between the Bank and the government of a country as institutional entities that can impact forest resource management but the dialogue between conditionality and ownership as well. Ultimately, it is this compound relationship and its impact on resource management that needs to be explained differently.

What is this different explanation, and how and why has this different relational dynamic affected forest management in Cameroon? These questions can be reframed into one. The

relationship between conditionality and ownership policies arises because of international dependency development. It is this development model that engages the management of forest resources in Cameroon. Therefore, one can simply ask: in what way has the relationship between conditionality and ownership within the context of international dependence development impacted the management of forest resources in Cameroon? This is the problem of this study.

To respond to this problematic, it is important first to look at the background of forest management in Cameroon. However, it is necessary to point out ab initio that although some scholars have analyzed and criticized the policies of the World Bank, none of them have looked at forest management in Cameroon in light of the relationship between conditionality and ownership. For example, Anna Lawrence, Bianca Ambrose-Oji, Rita Lysinge, and Charles Tako have examined biodiversity conservation on Mount Cameroon in the light of local challenges from policies of the Cameroon government; Michael K. McCall and Peter A. Minang have assessed participatory Geographic Information Systems for community-based natural resource management in the country; and Peter Geschiere has criticized the World Bank for blindly betting on the community in the 1994 forest management law. Phil René Oyono has analyzed several times Cameroon’s strengths and flaws in forest management but has not linked them to the relationship between conditionality and ownership.

**History of Forest Resource Management in Cameroon under the Development Timeline**

Cameroon lies between 8° 30 to 16° 10 E Longitude and 1° 40 to 13° 05 N latitude. It is bordered in the north by Lake Chad, in the north-east by Chad, in the south by Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, in the south-east by Congo (Brazzaville); the Central African Republic is in the east, Nigeria occupies the west, and the waters of the Atlantic Ocean constantly wash the southwest coast of the country. According to the most recent United Nations data, the 475,650
square kilometers area country had a human population of 20,030,000 in 2011. Figure 1 shows that the triangular nation is rich in vegetation with abundant dense forest in the south and cropland in the north of the country respectively.

Figure 1. Map of Cameroon and the country’s diverse vegetation
http://www.wri.org/our-work/project/congo-basin-forests/cameroon#project-tabs

Mosaic forest, close deciduous forest, and savanna are also present. In 2010, forest land occupied 42.0% of the land area of this middle-income country of more than 240 tribes and
languages. The World Bank documents that forest resources are second only to oil in the sectorial contribution of natural resources to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country. The forest accounts for 9.6% of the nation’s GDP. Forest resources not only contribute significantly to the economic growth of the country and its trading partners but also to tourism, energy supply in the form of fuel-wood, and the infrastructural (building materials), recreational, educational, medicinal, and cultural wellbeing of the country. Since the last century, the utilitarian value of these forest resources has made forest management a critical element of the nation’s political economy. The features of this management have paralleled historically the development timeline proposed by McMichael: a journey from the development project (late 1940s to early 1970s) through the globalization project (1980s to 2000s) to millennial reckonings (2000s to present).

The development project has its roots in colonialism, in which European colonizers envisioned their culture and political economy as superior to those of the colonized. To develop the colonized, therefore, meant progressively assimilating the colonized to be like the colonizers. McMichael notes that this metamorphosis involved a pattern of colonizers establishing in colonies an economy of specialized extraction and production of raw materials and primary products to provide for the insufficiency of such materials in Europe. This production involved setting up plantations. The extraction process made use of European industrial technology. The colonial era was truly a time of Africa’s resource bondage to Europe. Richard A. Goodridge observes that in this epoch of subjugation, Germany, which colonized Cameroon, promulgated

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the All-Highest Decree of 10 June 1896 in which the “Germans classified all lands in the Protectorate of Cameroon as ‘unoccupied’ and, therefore, ‘ownerless,’ and these became ‘Crown Lands’ to be disposed of by the Protectorate Government as they deemed fit.”

Mike Rudin notes that following this doctrine of *terra nullus*, German plantations increased in Cameroon from seven in 1891 to 182 in 1913. Goodridge documents that by 1914, the Germans had converted 264,000 acres of forest land in the southwest Cameroon into plantations.

The conversion of virgin forests into plantations in Cameroon created an economic system that contradicted the perception of forest land as a property of the commons. Ambe J. Njoh points to German companies such as West Kamerun Gesellschaft, Afrikanishe Fucht Kompagnie, and Thormählen, which held the above-mentioned 264,000 acres of plantation land, as economic institutions that set up this plantation system. The system was also in disaccord with the cyclical logic of land use that had been present in the country before colonialism. Oyono iterates that under this logic, virgin forest transformed into farmlands for subsistence purposes was allowed to fallow naturally and eventually regain its forest status. Under the plantation agriculture and the export of logs to Germany and other European countries for shipbuilding and canal piling, land was valued according to its economic utilitarian capacity. This capitalistic and accumulative system, which Oyono terms “Eldorado,” became the ingredient of the development project in the early two decades of the independence of Cameroon. Table 1 shows forest management features in Cameroon in this development project era.

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25. Ibid., 253.
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<td>The forest was viewed by France, Britain, and Ahidjo’s government as a source of material for raising living standards. Mandated masters used European technology to foster forest exploitation in Cameroon.</td>
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<td>National framework for economic growth</td>
<td>The British Ordinance No. 38 of 1946 gave the British government absolute rights to control all lands and forests in Cameroon. Ordinance No. 74/01 of 6 July 1974 made Ahidjo’s government the guardian of all lands.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of aid to bind developing countries to the developed world, and exploit natural resources for societal development</td>
<td>France and Britain constructed roads in Cameroon under the guise of development aid. France declared all lands in East Cameroon terres vacantes et sans maître, and began vast exploitation of forest resources in Cameroon. Britain and France exploited Cameroon’s forests vastly, and they exported the forest resources to Europe. Thus, the aid development was really drainage development.</td>
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<td>Development via industrialization, especially agro-industrialization</td>
<td>The French and the British upheld plantation development, and continued administration of German plantations that became property of the colonial state.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial investments are managed by multi-class alliances in development-states</td>
<td>Through the policy of assimilation, the French trained a class of Cameroonian elites who were incorporated into the management of logging companies in east Cameroon. Ahidjo put tribal elites at the head of national industries to create a socio-political bond between different tribes and the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development through regional, class, gender, racial, and ethnic inequalities in states and markets</td>
<td>The French in 1946 introduced legislation to train ethnic groups in forest management skills. However, natives who received the training were elites assimilated into French culture – les assimilés, and not les indigènes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29. Planned liberalism was a political economy of programmatic development in Cameroon under President Ahidjo. In this political economy that combined socialism and capitalism, the Cameroon government led the economic development of the country while encouraging the growth of the private sector. See Mark Dike DeLancey, Rebecca Mbuh, and Mark W. DeLancey, “Planned Liberalism,” Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 308.


The development project as described by McMichael was organized at the international level by Western centers of power such as the United States of America and Great Britain to foster national economic growth. It involved the U.S. bilateral Marshall Plan and multilateralism under the Bretton Woods System.\textsuperscript{36} In McMichael’s development periodization, the period from the 1980s to the 2000s was the era of the globalization project characterized by seven elements. First, a Washington consensus arose from global managers and policy makers who favored market-based and rejected development strategies led by the state. Second, Britain, USA, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan grouped themselves into the G-7. Third, this group sought to implement global management capitalist policies through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Fourth, in this capitalist political economy, market powers are concentrated in the hands of transnational corporations (TNCs) and financial powers in the hands of transnational banks (TNBs). Fifth, with this concentration of powers, states found themselves subjected to economic discipline that varied in intensity by geopolitical position, global currency hierarchy, debt load, and resource endowment. Sixth, under this political economy, the development of the world was conceived as realizable through class, gender, race, and ethnic inequalities that result from the prioritization of private property and self-interest in the capitalism. Lastly, from these inequalities arose resistance from less developed countries and from movements that contested unbridled market rule promulgated by capitalist multilateral institutions.\textsuperscript{37}

However, nowadays, not the features of the development project but those of the globalization project characterize the international dependence development model. There are the features of an era, precisely of the post Rio Earth Summit convention on Sustainable

\textsuperscript{36} The Marshall Plan involved transfer of billions of dollars from the USA to Europe and Japan to serve the geopolitical interest of the USA during the Cold War, expand trade, stabilize prices, increase production, destroy socialism and eliminate labor militancy. The Bretton Woods System involved the creation of the IMF and the World Bank to stabilize national finances, provide money for Third World to import First World infrastructural technologies for national economic growth, and encourage Third World primary exports to earn foreign currency.

\textsuperscript{37} McMichael, \textit{Development and Social Change}, 147.
Development in 1992, when the collaboration and resistance of the Cameroon government to the global environmental management policies of the World Bank, in a system of interactions between the two stakeholders, created forest management policies from both the government and the Bank. The nature of this interaction and its impact on forest management in Cameroon constitute the concern of this work. To speak of this relationship between the stakeholders and their policies as interactive insinuates that interactionism will be a significant element in the theoretical framework of this study.

**Theoretical Framework and Thesis Statement**

One needs a framework in order to formulate a response to the above-stated problematic. In the framing of the problematic, one thing that was insinuated was that there is interaction between the Bank and national governments with respect to forest management. The Bank, and the country that receives financial assistance from the Bank, reciprocate through conditionality and ownership. In this reciprocity, the Bank and its policies influence the government and its policies, and vice-versa. As a result, this influence affects forest management in Cameroon.

Issues related to answering the question, therefore, are the interaction between conditionality and ownership, specification of the nature of this interaction, and identification of the effect that the result of this interaction has on forest management in the country.

In pointing out the difference between sociology-focused interactionist theory and ethics-based consensus theory, N. H. Groenman, O D’a Sleven, and M. A. Buckenham underline that interaction does not seek the acceptance of fundamental values as consensus does. At the social level, interactionist theory as posited by modernist thought simply looks at how individuals, understood as persons, institutions or groups, influence each other by their actions. Interaction,
therefore, implies that the actions of actors are linked – not independent. Postmodernists are wary of this very positivist approach to interactionism. Making use of an “interpretive interactionist” approach that is informed by post-structuralism, feminism, neo-Marxism, and cultural studies, post-modernism extends interaction to different metaphysical spheres such as systems of discourse. That is, as Kent L. Sandstrom, Daniel D. Martin, and Gary Alan Fine explain, post-modernism insists that as self and institutional identities have become fragmented because of ideological exchanges between multiple systems, one must admit that ideological and conceptual interactions are also part of the scope of interactionism.

When different institutions (actors) and varied ideological formulations (instruments of action) are combined, the result is a hybrid. This is a standpoint that has been affirmed by scholars of religious fundamentalism and linguists. In his study of current trends in Islam, Thomas Hegghammer found that changes in the political contexts in which jihadist groups function in the Middle East (especially Western troops in the Muslim world), changes in the media environment that allows groups with different world views to interact online, structural and ideological cleavages between groups of different ethnic and geographical origins, and increased subjugation of jihadists to marginalization in a world in which the majority of people are anti-Islamic fundamentalists have led to a new jihadist identity. The interaction between different jihadist structures and ideas has given rise to “the ideological hybridization of Jihadi groups.”

Linguist scholars such as A. Suresh Canagarajah have also noted that a language is actually a hybrid of multiple languages, especially when examined from the perspective of

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etymology and word migration or the adoption of words from one language into another language without changes in spelling, pronunciation, and meaning by non-traditional speakers. As institutions, individuals from different lingua backgrounds, and world views of these different actors interact, words move across languages as a medium of communication. What results is a process of word adoption that gives languages a hybrid identity.41

Thus, when there is institutional negotiation, interaction between different bodies of power, and exchange of world views in various forms such as ideologies and policies, and through different media such as language, the result is not a formula that is universally applicable, but a hybrid. “Hybridity,” writes Ilan Kapoor in the Postcolonial Politics of Development, “is not made into formula or ontology but into rule. A rule has no meaningful content by itself and must be applied and implemented according to specific context.”42

The impact that hybrids have on any phenomenon is really a synergy of the individual components from which the hybrid is composed. A mule, for example, is a hybrid animal from the cross breeding of a male horse and a female donkey. When a mule acts, it acts as a whole organism in its own right. One cannot say that when it acts with the sensitivity of a horse, it becomes a horse, and when it lives long, it becomes a donkey. Rather, although the acts posited by a mule may result from its composite material essence, the mule posits its own acts as one, whole substance. In order words, it acts as a system, not as isolated parts.

Systems theory within the fields of engineering and thermodynamics sees elements within a system as not only having strong functional relationships with each other but at times exerting synergized influence on other assemblages. Even if a stimulus is applied to one part of

the system, the functional relationship affects the assemblage as a whole. This effect may be weak, strong, positive, or negative. Often, considering that energy in systems is a conserved factor, increased effect in one area is accompanied by a decreased effect in another. Therefore, the effect can be positive in one area and negative in the other.\(^43\)

Katrina Brown and Francois Ekoko apply this systems thinking to human-environment interactions and human-ecosystem relationships in Cameroon. Having considered that forest management in Cameroon involves the maintenance, the exploitation of forest resources, the control, and the monitoring of forest centered activities, they avow that forest management in parts of the country such as Southern Cameroon should be understood in terms of synergy: “the combined or coordinated action or working-together of two or more elements . . . . This combined action may produce an increased or enhanced effect.”\(^44\) This synergy is present in the maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forests in the country. Thus, the thesis statement of this study is that the hybrid relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international dependency development model has a synergized impact on the dimensions of maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest management in Cameroon.\(^45\)

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45. The interactions that make policies hybridization possible are based on institutional dependency and not interdependence. It is necessary to point out the difference between what I refer to hear as interactive dependence and interdependence. Hettne argues that interdependence is an “ambiguous innovation” in development theory that can refer to one of five things. These include “the rivalry within the ‘centre’” of global power as in the case of Western Europe being more dependent that the USA because the latter has a higher adjusted Gross Domestic Product; the industrialization of nations such as Great Britain; the rise of new regional power centers such as Mexico in Latin America, India in Asia, and Nigeria in Africa; “a common predicament for the peoples of the world,” which suggests that all humanity is sailing in the same ship of riches and poverty, resource endowment and resource deficiency, etc with disregard for classes that are within a ship and for differences in access to resources within the ship. Interactive dependence, however, unequivocally means that in the global political economy, capitalist rely on political governments for access to the market within nations and political governments rely on global capitalist institutions for financial assistance to attain their economic, social, and political interests.
Hypothesis

Conditionality and ownership may be absolutely unrelated. In this case, one cannot say that the relationship between the two policies within the context of the international dependency development model has any effect on forest management in Cameroon. If the absence of a relationship affects forest management in the country, then, logically, it is this absence of link, and not the relationship, that affects forest management in Cameroon. This no-relationship will fall outside of the realm of the above stated status questionis of this study. The question assumes that there is a relationship between the two policies. The relationship, however, may have no effect on forest management in Cameroon. This constitutes the null hypothesis (H₀) of this study, and it can be briefly stated:

H₀: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international dependence development model does not affect forest management in Cameroon.

Alternatively, the relationship of conditionality and ownership may impact forest management in Cameroon. This is the alternative hypothesis (Hₐ). Hₐ can involve three possibilities: positive impact (Hₐ₁), negative impact (Hₐ₂), and positive and negative impact (Hₐ₃). Therefore, the different strands of the alternative hypothesis can be stated as follows:

Hₐ₁: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international dependence development model fosters the maintenance, exploitation or use, control, and monitoring of forest management in Cameroon.

Hₐ₂: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international dependence development model hinders the maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest management in Cameroon.
HA3: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international
dependence development model impacts forest management in Cameroon both fosters and
hinders the maintenance, exploitation or use, control, and monitoring of forest management in
Cameroon. Different research methods will aid in deciphering which of these hypotheses is true.

Research Design

Data Sources

Three data sources were used in this research. The first is qualitative. It involved data
collection from primary and secondary relevant sources associated with the policies of
conditionality and ownership, the relationship between these two policies, and the effect of this
relationship on forest management in Cameroon. Primary sources refer to archived documents
and publications authored by the World Bank and by the government of Cameroon from the
1980s to 2013. Analysis of documents was not simply in terms of their stated contentions; it also
considered the history behind the contentions in the documents in order to access them as both a
locus of knowledge and a symbol of power expression. Secondary sources were the
commentaries of other scholars and researchers with respect to the object of this study. Other
literatures that do not strictly focus on conditionality, ownership, and forest management in
Cameroon were also employed in this study to illuminate the response to the problematic.

Geographical Information Systems (GIS) data on Cameroon forest lands published by the
World Resource Institute in vector, raster, and image were also collected. These data were freely
available electronically in the institute’s website. The different GIS data sets used herein are
those the institute published in 2004 and 2013. Data from the different years enabled the
tracking of changes resulting from the impact of policies on forest resource management.
Data Analysis Methods

Qualitative theoretical analysis and quantitative analysis of the sort in this research requires an interdisciplinary approach to unravel the complexities in the conditionality-ownership relationship impact on forest management in Cameroon. Some conditionality measures are based on economic rationalizations, some on ethics, and others on political economy; ownership requires political will; and logging management within the context of the international dependence development model is tailored to strengthen public and private efforts to achieve socially, economically, and ecologically sustainable use of national forest. Thus, four disciplines broadly used in this research are geosciences, sociology, political science, and economics. Other disciplines used to a lesser extent are law, psychology, anthropology, and gender and diversity studies because logging management likewise involves a mindset, controlling illegal logging, examining how different genders relate with the forest because of the influence of the conditionality-ownership policies relationship, and performing geospatial analysis to determine the extent of to which stakeholders abide by the law governing forest management and the degree of deforestation resulting from this relationship.

As varied as the above mentioned disciplines are, the methods for this interdisciplinary research are from the natural sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences. The methodological approach from the geosciences discipline of the natural sciences used in this study is GIS analysis. This involves quarrelling GIS data, performing spatial analysis, examining existing maps at magnified levels for detail, creating maps, and inserting coordinate points into GIS maps.

Synthesizing discourses in different texts as a qualitative research method of the humanities provides the theoretical insight to conceptualize the distinct natures of conditionality
and ownership, to establish the relationship between the two policies, and analytically to articulate the impact of this relationship on forest management in Cameroon. The concept of infrapolitics from the political sciences also provides a methodological framework for understanding the behavior of different actor vis-à-vis forest management in Cameroon.

James C. Scott’s notion of infrapolitics calls for the juxtaposition of hidden and public transcripts to provide the cultural and structural underpinning of actions in the scope of politics and political economy.\(^46\) In 1990, Scott suggested in this vein that the absence of openly declared contests by individuals and groups to hegemonic powers does not indicate acquiescence.\(^47\) Open contests fall into the scope of public transcripts that are verbal and non-verbal acts by which dominant elites portray themselves.\(^48\) However, there is also everyday resistance that consists of what subordinates say and do beyond the public realm. This is the hidden transcript; or what sociologists call the ontological narratives of the conduct of individuals and groups. Hidden transcripts may, therefore, take such forms as delay tactics, subtle approaches to assert one’s possession of power to control a circumstance, and immaterial cultural attitudes such as apathy towards issues that may be proposed by others in the power structure. Public records in this study were accessed through written works (for example, Bank’s evaluation of its assistance and attitudes and actions of actors commented upon by researchers). Hidden transcripts were discerned in the daily lifestyle of Cameroonian society. This study juxtaposes both the public and hidden transcripts associated with the relationship between conditionality and ownership and its impact on Cameroon’s forest resource management within the international development dependence model.

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47. Ibid., 200.
Sociological analysis of power structure in relations among institutions and analysis of behavioral patterns illuminate the impact of the hybrid on forest management in the nation in the course of time. Statistical analysis underlines any disparities in forest management that may result from differences in areas of emphasize in the COH and paints the picture of forest management in Cameroon in the form of figure representations such as charts. Economic based calculations such as cost-benefit analysis reveal the operative mindsets of entities that use forest resources.

In the impact analysis, features of the conditionality-ownership hybrid were treated as the independent variables, while the dimensions of forest resource management, namely maintenance, use, control, and monitoring, were the dependent variables. For example, the interaction between conditionality and ownership led to confidential and competitive auction as the method of procuring forest concessions in Cameroon. Cost-benefit analysis and firm theory enabled the establishment of the impact relationship between this method and increased deforestation measured by changes in volume of timber harvested.

An appropriate layout is necessary to answer coherently the four sub-questions involved in the status questionis and elaborate all the findings in this study. In this regard, the second chapter of this work focuses on detailing the nature of conditionality and ownership as distinct policies. Without a clear understanding of these two key concepts, one cannot identify the relationship between them in the context of the international dependence development model. The third chapter establishes the nature of the relationship between the two policies based on their very nature. The fourth chapter situates this relationship in the management of Cameroon’s forest. The fifth chapter is an analysis of the impact of this situation on forest management in Cameroon. The sixth chapter, which is the conclusion, briefly recaps the arguments in the
previous chapters, states which of the hypothesis is acceptable, and mentions the path to further research that this study leads one.
CHAPTER 2
THE NATURE OF CONDITIONALITY AND COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

In discussing legal aspects of the operations of the World Bank, the institution’s Legal Vice Presidency office notes that conditionality, which is basically the staking of Bank loans on certain policy reforms in recipient countries, was an uncommon phenomenon before the 1980s.\(^1\) In 1997, Jacques Polak asserted that the Bank had used the term “conditionality” in 1970 not to refer to its own policy, but to describe conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the Fund’s loans.\(^2\) This corroborates Joseph Gold’s earlier (1970) contention that the historical roots of the term “conditionality” are in the IMF, and not the World Bank.\(^3\)

This brief history of policy conditionality indicates that Thaddeus Malesa and Peter Silarsky may be right in affirming that the term “conditionality” was a relatively unused word in the Bank’s operations before the institution introduced structural adjustment programs in the last three decades. After the Bank introduced these programs in multiple developing countries, the institution became famous for its practice of conditionality. Countries approaching this international developer for aid and loans have become aware that the disbursements will most certainly be made on condition that the country fulfills certain policy requirements issued by the donor or lender, namely, the Bank.\(^4\) Irrespective of the precise purpose, content, and way that the conditions associated with financial assistance are eventually implemented in a country, the


Bank is aware that the effective application of development policies and the realization of policy objectives is impossible if a country does not internalize and treat the policies as its own. That is, aid conditions are not enough effectively to develop a society with World Bank aid and loans; countries also have to value and treat development policies as though they were desired, formulated, and fully implemented by the countries without any external influence from the Bank. This is the fundamental affirmation of the Bank’s policy of ownership.

In the dynamics of the Bank’s development assistance, therefore, there are two poles: the Bank with conditionality at one end, and the country with ownership at the other. This chapter focuses on these two terminals. It frames the meaning of conditionality, illuminates the rationale and types of conditionality, and examines the essential and multidimensional nature of country ownership.

Framing a Definition of Conditionality

Etymologically, the English word “condition” originates from two Latin words: *con* and *dicere*. *Con* translates into English as “with,” and *dicere* is the Latin word for the English verb, “to say”. This etymology suggests that “condition” implies that something is said with some other thing attached to it. This implication is present in Livy’s assertion that the “*condicere* is used of two parties who come into an agreement about something.” In Aristotle’s philosophical logic, to state that “B” can be done only with the implementation of “A” is to stipulate that the realization of “A” is conditioned by “B”. This is the logic of the World Bank’s conditionality, where “A” refers to specific policies, processes, and intended outcomes, and “B” to loans and aid. This is the logic that leads Sarah L. Babb and Bruce G. Carruthers to define conditionality as

“the placement of policy conditions on the disbursement of financial resources to national
governments.”

The above definition is akin to what the Bank postulates in its operational policy (OP) on
what conditionality is:

the specific set of conditions attached to the disbursement of policy-based lending or
budget support – which of course can take different forms, ranging from explicit
agreements to implicit understandings and from traditional ex ante conditions based on
promises to ex post conditions based on actual implemented measures.

These ranges are the formal, not the material, content of loan conditions. In Paragraph 13
of OP 8.60, the Bank asserts its right and prerogative to determine the material content or matter
of loan conditions. This threefold matter includes the “maintenance of an adequate
macroeconomic policy framework, implementation of the overall program in a manner
satisfactory to the Bank, and compliance with these critical program conditions.”

The Bank pursues this triad through the use of prior actions, regular tranche, floating, and effectiveness
conditions. In single tranche operations with which prior actions conditions are attached, the
country takes action to meet all conditions before the Bank approves a loan to the nation. The
Bank applies regular and floating tranche conditions to multitranche operations. Regular tranche
conditions refer to policy actions for which the Bank can foresee their time of implementation
with certainty and that are critical to attain program objectives. In floating tranche, the timing is
indeterminate. Effectiveness conditions delay policy implementation by demanding that certain
conditions be implemented from the time the Bank approves a loan to the time the loan becomes

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effective. These different conditions are present in almost all World Bank sponsored development activities in developing countries, such as forest sector reforms in Cameroon as will be shown in the fourth chapter herein.

In the attempt to define conditionality by appeal to the form and matter of loan conditions, the Bank falls into a problem that is common within the field of public policy, namely, technicality. “The precision which seems to be gained through a highly technical definition,” P. Stuart Robinson writes, “may prove spurious as it mixes awkwardly and misleadingly with the ordinary language one must to some extent use in discussing it.” Here, such crisis of technicality is in the tautological use of the word “conditions” as common words to define conditionality. To resolve this problem, one may take recourse in Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of language. Aquinas asserts that in the definiens (that which symbolizes or gives the same meaning as the word or words being defined), one can use classificatory words instead of the definiendum or word(s) in the thing being defined so as to avoid circular reasoning. In this regard, one can appeal to Benedicte Bull, Alf Morten Jerve, and Erlend Sigvaldsen’s definition of conditionality as “the application of specific, predetermined requirements that directly or indirectly enter into a donor’s decision to approve or continue to finance a loan or grant.” Here, specific requirements are classifications that stand in the place of the Bank’s use of the word “conditions” in defining conditionality. However, limiting aid and loan conditions to “predetermined requirements” excludes ex-post conditions. That is, ex-post conditions are based

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11. Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologiae* I, q.29, a.1, ad.3.
on project outcome; they are not stipulated by the Bank before a development project begins, as is the case with ex-ante conditions. Thus, ex-post conditions are not “predetermined.” This limitation compels one to extend the search for a more comprehensive definition of conditionality. To do this, one has to go beyond the scope of public policy into other disciplines.

One can describe this phenomenon of attaching specific requirements to loans and aid as an interdisciplinary metaphor in the relationship between international financial institutions (IFI) as lenders and nation-states as borrowers. In other words, conditionality can symbolize the integration of different disciplinary insights in the development of human society. According to the Legal Vice Presidency of the World Bank, the Bank’s Articles of Agreement provide the legal framework and power to the Bank to use conditionality in its lending process associated with development projects.13 Economic development is central in the Bank’s development policy, and economics involves the combination of factors of production (land, labor, capital, and entrepreneur) in ways that can yield maximum profit. This means that economic development, by its nature, demands that certain conditions such as the availability of land, the minimization of labor cost, and the maximization of capital exist. An institution that is concerned with economic development, therefore, needs the power to control the mix of these conditions in human society. It is in this vein that Susan Schadler et al. assert that in the use of the power that the Bank and the IMF have from their Articles of Agreement – the power to use policy requirements in the provision of development aid and loans – both institutions simply intend to

foster economic growth in the country that receives development assistance from these institutions.¹⁴

In criticizing this assertion of Schadler et al. from the perspective of political economy, Graham Birg argues that the economics-centered claim of Schadler et al. is too narrow in understanding World Bank’s attachment of policy reforms to development assistance. He contends an earlier mentioned point – the Bank knows that the effectiveness of this attachment depends on both the political will of governments to comply with stipulated conditions, and the prevailing country circumstances that caused a national government to turn to the IFIs. This contention is based on the fact that the political will of governments and the existing country circumstances determine the extent to which governments implement development assistance reforms required by the World Bank. Consequently, conditionality should be understood not only from an economic perspective but more from the angle of political economy.¹⁵

In positing a theory of international institutional influence, Rachel E. Epstein subjects conditionality to a sociopolitical analysis, in which she refers to such country-specific circumstances as the “social context.” This theory states that the mechanical terrain in which IFIs such as the World Bank and the IMF can enforce compliance to conditionality is the social context wherein nations are embedded in a hierarchy of powers with respect to the IFIs.¹⁶ In fact, reflective of this idea of social context, Stefan Koeberle and Thaddeus Malesa point out that the

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On page 883 of this article, Epstein affirms that the social context is characterized by the alienation of regime and sector in the country that turns to the IFI for loans, the perception of the status of domestic actors as subordinated to that of the IFI, and the consistency of the conditionality norms.
focus of conditionality has moved from macroeconomic and reforms associated with trade to “more complex social sector and public sector management issues.”

From the foregoing discussion, conditionality has dimensions of legal empowerment, economic objectives, political will, and social context. Therefore, one can define World Bank as the policy phenomenon by which the Bank, being legally empowered by its Articles of Agreement, attaches, in varied forms, certain specific, social-context-sensitive policy requirements to the economic assistance that it provides to countries and demands that governments have the political will to implement the requirements. With the economic collapse that plagued developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, the Bank has insisted that this phenomenon is a necessary measure in its “due diligence obligation to ensure that its resources are used effectively and responsibly by the borrowing country.”

Rationale of Conditionality

In favor of conditionality, Christopher L Gilbert and David Vines suggest that the Bank is not a private lender that is simply interested in making profit. Rather, it is a developer; it is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in a politically, socially, ethically, and economically complex world. This means that based on the Bank’s development knowledge and survival instinct, it has a moral and institutional responsibility to ensure that the loans it gives to countries are used for the development of human society. The Bank must be able to trust that its financial assistance will be used to this end. As a public institution, it also has the financial and

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fiduciary responsibility to see to it that there is transparency and liability with respect to
development priorities and economic efficiency associated with the use of its funds.\textsuperscript{19}

According to those on the left who are critical, conditionality is an instrument of power.
The global social context referred to by Epstein in the theory of international institutional
influence is pyramidal. The Washington consensus created a global hierarchical structure in
which a few developed nations in the West use financial resources, through multilateral
institutions such as the World Bank, to control the political economy of less-developed nations in
the self-interest of the Western political elites and financial giants. This perception implies that
conditionality is an instrument of control of the political economy of less-developed nations.
Conditionality gives the Bank the means to “induce reform in very poor policy environments,”
Paul Collier and David Dollar say, by “ignor[ing] domestic politics.”\textsuperscript{20}

Despite such a position against conditionality, the Bank still sees the policy in its various
types as a way to safeguard trust and foster both transparency and accountability in Bank’s
financial assistance to countries. An elaboration on each of these types of policies is necessary to
understand fully how conditionality and ownership relate and how conditions attached to
development assistance can shape resource management.

\textbf{Types of Conditionality}

Daniel Cabello, Filka Sekulova, and Douwe Schmidt list four types of World Bank
conditionality: fiduciary, process, policy or economic policy, and outcome.\textsuperscript{21} The content of and
distinctions between these forms of conditionality provide the framework for donor or lender and

\textsuperscript{21} Daniel Cabello, Filka Sekulova and Douwe Schmidt, \textit{World Bank Conditionality: Poor Deal for Poor Countries}, ed. Joshua Craze (Amsterdam: A SEED Europe, 2008), 8.}
beneficiary or borrower expectations in the application of requirements associated with financial resources. These four forms of conditionality deserve expanded discussion.

Fiduciary Conditionality: Safeguarding Trust

According to David Shand, fiduciary conditionality is based on a trilogy of risk: the risk that the funds disbursed by the Bank will be diverted and used for unknown and unauthorized uses by the financial resources recipient nation, the risk that there may be no timely report given to the Bank on the use of aid or loans, and the risk that although the funds reach the budget, the expenditure is not in conformity with the approved budget.22 By use of *ex ante* fiduciary conditionality, the Bank mitigates these risks and safeguards its trust in the realization of the terms of funds disbursement. Trust is a subject that has attracted significant discourse based on different disciplinary assumptions, especially in psychology, economics, and sociology.

Psychologists often center on attributes of a trusting party (trustor) and a party to be trusted (trustee). They also focus on internal cognitions that result from personal attributes. Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman contend that trust is not risk but the willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable to the actions of a trustee, knowing that such actions may be impossible to monitor or control.23 This distinction between trust and risk is very important to an understanding of the Bank’s operations with respect to development through conditionality. Whenever the Bank makes financial disbursements to a country, the trilogy of risks mentioned above is involved. Yet, this risk does not stop the Bank from providing development assistance. The arguments of liberalists earlier stated cannot fully explain why the

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Bank, despite the risks, still proceeds to provide financial aid. Nations may receive the aid and yet refuse to be controlled by the Bank, as the case of Zimbabwe shows.

On page 390 of Jane Kanchense’s *Zimbabwe’s Child Brides: Using Participatory Action to Unleash Human Potential* (published in 2008 by Trafford Publishing, Victoria), Kanchense documents how Zimbabwe, after receiving financial assistance from the Bank for many years, has refused to be controlled by the World Bank by resisting the Bank’s structural adjustment programs. Following economic sanctions from the Bank and the IMF, Zimbabwe retaliated by refusing to pay its debt to the Bank. Therefore, how can the Bank, conscious of the risky possibility that there can be this resistance from countries, still provide development aid and loans? The answer is trust: trust that the assistance will be used for the intended purpose; the finances will reach the budget of the development program approved by the Bank; or trust in the Bank itself – that if a nation resists as Zimbabwe did, the Bank will have the power to sanction the country on the international scene. The Bank’s development assistance, therefore, involves a mix of risk and trust. Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman have discussed this mix from a psychological perspective in their dyadic model of trust.

The World Bank’s propensity or general willingness to trust its financial resources recipient varies. This variation depends on the trustworthiness of the country that receives a loan or assistance from the Bank. In psychological terms, the Bank perceives a country as trustworthy before it provides development loans to the nation. At one end, therefore, there is the Bank as a “trustor,” and at the other end there is the country as the trustee. Hence, the psychology-based model of trust can be said to be dyadic. Such a model of dyadic trust reproduced in Figure 2 is useful to analyze the psychological dimension of fiduciary conditionality.
Trustee trustworthiness is determined by three factors: ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability is the competence that the recipient nation has in the area, project, or program for which the Bank makes financial disbursement to be used. Benevolence refers to the willingness of the trustee to show good behavior to the trustor. With respect to fiduciary conditionality, benevolence is the willingness of the trustee to be good to the Bank by duly complying with the conditions of the financial resource disbursement. Integrity depends on the values of the trustee that may cause it to either collaborate with or resist a trustor in this trust relationship.

The extent to which a country is receptive to Bank’s policies provides a perspective for understanding this matrix. The Bank, as Robert H. Wade observes, upholds capitalism as a core value in economic progress. Thus, if the political economy of a country favors capitalism, then

the Bank perceives the country as a low-risk nation. Considering that trust is inversely proportional to risk, the Bank will likely take the risk to disburse funds with fewer and less intense conditions to the country that upholds capitalism. If the country resists the Bank’s capitalist political economy, then the lending risk is high and the level of trust is low. Consequently, the Bank will present more radical conditions before disbursing funds.25 It seems that it is in the nature of humankind to act in this way, for as Thomas Hobbes contends in his behaviorist philosophy of trust:

_Trust is a Passion proceeding from the Belief of him from whom we expect or hope for Good, so free from Doubt that upon the same we pursue no other Way to attain the same Good: as Distrust or Diffidence is Doubt that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other Means. And that this is the Meaning of the Words Trust and Distrust, is manifest from this, that a Man never provideth himself by a second Way, but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold._26

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25. First generation conditionality in Cameroon provides a good historical example of this dynamic matrix of trust relationship between the country and the Bank. In a spirit of trust in Cameroon, the World Bank on June 2, 1986, noted that there were “no gross or obvious problems which threaten Cameroon’s financial or economic stability, its creditworthiness, or the stability of its financial system to perform adequately on a day to day basis” (World Bank 1986). Nevertheless, after 1987, the Bank distrusted the economic stakes in the nation because of a global oil-price crisis that presented Cameroon with a challenge to embrace “more rapid and more radical” adjustment of the nation’s economy, and structural changes that will create jobs for the country’s rising population (World Bank 1987).

The government of Cameroon refused to trust the Bank in these demands by preferring to hang unto the prebendalism. Reialhrd A. Joseph defines prebendalism as “patterns of political behavior which rest on the justifying principle that offices should be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office holders as well as their reference or support group. The official public purpose of the office becomes a secondary concern, however much that purpose might have been originally cited in its creation or during the periodic competition to fill it.” Richard A. Joseph, _Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic_ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 68.

Piet Konings narrates that in the 1970s and 1980s, prebendalism was the principal political sociology of the government of President Paul Biya in Cameroon. In this phenomenon, the nation was under a neopatrimonial state of hegemonic alliances of elite groups who had access to state resources, and used this access to cement themselves to the existing government power structure. The structural reforms that the Bank called for implied that these elites would lose control of the state economic and political apparatus. Therefore, the elites sought to preserve their interest in the status quo by fiercely contesting economic and political liberalization. Consequently, the government initially preferred to initiate its own reforms in such a way that the self-interest of the elites would not be affected. It was only when Cameroon’s economy continued to decline that the government was forced to succumb to structural changes as conditions for receiving World Bank loans. Piet Konings, _Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa: Civil Society and Agro-Industry in Anglophone Cameroon's Plantation Economy_ (Bamenda: Langaa, 2011), 133-135.

The rational and “belief of him” perspectives of trust indicate that trust is not an irrational act; rather, it involves rational calculations that consider the probability of trustee openness to the values of a trustor. According to Oliver E. Williamson, this view of trust is based on a common assumption in economics, namely, that rational choice is the *principia maxima* of human behavior.\(^{27}\) Mar Zey notes that the reason for this assumption is that human beings are intentional and purposive individuals who always make logical decisions that give them the greatest satisfaction and fulfill their self-interest.\(^{28}\) The sociologists Ivan Marková, Per Linell, and Alex Gillespie, however, deny that the essence of trust can be “probabilistic calculus.”\(^{29}\) Rather, from a sociological perspective, they view trust as a relational concept because attempts to subject trust to purely quantifiable probability empty trust of the context without trust cannot exist. To replace the elements of dynamism and relation in trust with calculated control reduces trust to a “static abstract category and it turns it into a statistical entity.”\(^{30}\)

The above stated understandings of trust in the disciplines of psychology, economics, and sociology are not totally at odds with each other. Satisfactory outcome at the end of the dyadic model of trust proposed by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman represents utility. Zey observes that “expected utility theory” is simply the label that psychologists give to what economists term “rational choice theory.” Nor are social context and rational choice absolutely at daggers drawn with one another. Victor Nee argues that although methodological holism in sociology has attempted to alienate choice-theoretic approach from relational concepts in institutional


\(^{30}\) Ivana Marková, Per Linell, and Alex Gillespie, “Trust and Distrust in Society,” 7.
paradigms, historians have insinuated that Max Weber was right in contending that both rationality and tradition play significant roles in institutional change. Tradition is not simply the conservation of values and a modus operandi of institutions but the transmission of the values and modes from one group to another in time. This transmission is not indifferent to the prevailing circumstances in which institutions exist. Consequently, in the relationship between past and present generations of people, the present generation calculates the applicability and workability of the values and modes of past generations in their present context. Therefore, in institutional change, there is a combination of tradition in which a new generation socially relates with past generations through the transmission of values and modes, and rationality in which the new generation calculates the trustworthiness of these elements and adapts them to present circumstances. Thus, Nee suggests that instead of pitting rational choice against social relations that may not involve self-interest rationalizations, “a more constructive approach is to model the reciprocal interaction between purposive action and social structure.”

One finds this approach in Denise M. Rousseau, Sim B. Sitkin, and Ronald S. Burt who define trust as “a psychological state comprising intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” The state is psychological; the positive expectations are economics-based; and sociology stresses the interactive context in which the behavior of others manifests. In fiduciary conditionality, the Bank is in a mental state of reservation as to how the funds it gives to a country will be used. Nevertheless, it proceeds to disburse the funds because it has a positive expectation of how the funds will be applied to

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32. In this definition of trust, “intention to accept vulnerability” is a contribution made by psychology to the understanding of trust. Economists insist on “positive expectations of the intentions,” while sociologists demand that the “behavior of another” be included in the comprehension of trust. Denise M. Rousseau, Sim B. Sitkin, Ronald S. Burt, and Colin Camerer, “Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust,” The Academy of Management Review 23, no.3 (July 1998): 395.
development programs. In disbursing the funds, the Bank enters into social interaction with the recipient country. Having provided financial assistance, the Bank becomes vulnerable to how the country will actually use the funds in the process of policy implementation. In order not to become a victim in this vulnerability, the Bank uses process conditionality to direct the process of policy implementation.

Process Conditionality

The material constitution of process conditionality is the management of funds under the umbrella of good governance. According to Cabello, Sekulova, and Schmidt, process conditionality assures that necessary institutions that build national capacity to ensure proper financial management exist in a country before the Bank lends or gives money to the nation or that there be good governance in a country as prerequisite to receive financial aid from the Bank.

According to the Bank’s staff, P. Landell-Mills and I. Serageldin, governance denotes “how people are ruled and how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated. It refers to a nation’s system of politics and how this functions in relation to public administration and law. Thus, the concept of governance goes beyond that of government to include a political dimension.” This definition, however, does not address what it means to speak of governance as “good”. Ved P. Nanda avows that “good governance” is a phenomenon with an imprecise meaning, yet it is a determinant in the selective process of the Bank’s provision of aids. Nanda attempts to resolve this crisis of meaning by the via negativa: he enumerates elements the Bank thinks must be absent for there to be good governance. These are corruption, nepotism,

bureaucracy, and mismanagement. Willem H. Buiter appeals to the principles of governance devoid of these elements to explain what process conditionality stands for, or is aimed at. These principles are accountability, transparency, and democratic participation.36

The Bank defines accountability as “the ability of citizens, civil society, and the private sector to scrutinize public institutions and governments and to hold them to account. This includes, ultimately, the opportunity to change leaders by democratic means.”37 Joseph Basset sheds light on this rather redundant definition38 by speaking of accountability with respect to process conditionality. He says that accountability is “the principle that government decision-makers in a democracy ought to be more answerable to the people for their actions . . . . [It involves] more than merely the tacit concern of the governed. It implies both mechanisms for the active monitoring of public officials and the means for enforcing public expectations.”39 In accountability, citizens attain voice: they interrogate the management of public goods in the hands of their government, and they take democratic actions such as political elections to declare judgment on the way the government manages public affairs. Deepa Narayan avows that through such actions, citizens and stakeholders influence and control public life.40

The Bank adopts an interdisciplinary perspective in looking at accountability as a principle of good governance. Accountability as an act of citizens’ empowerment is not only political. Inasmuch as there is politics because human beings are rational and social beings, accountability is also social. Social accountability involves association, resources, voice,

38. In defining “Accountability,” the Bank recourses to the stem of the word itself, namely, “account”.
information, and negotiation. Association is ethical – precisely, it involves the freedom of citizens to come together and function as groups. The availability of resources is an economic concern in the function of associations. Groups must mobilize resources in order to attain their objectives of holding government accountable through voice. Voice is power! For there to be accountability in governance, there has to be a two-way communication between governors and the governed, each being able to formulate and express opinions. To exercise voice, people need access to information that they can use in the process of negotiation. Negotiation is not only a socio-political act in the sense that it entertains spaces of debate and dialogue but also a legal one; it likewise involves the rules of the game that must be formulated to ensure orderly participation of stakeholders. Bank staffers Ana Bellver, Marcos Mediburu, and Maria Poli observe that transparency is necessary to hold government accountable for its operations.

The Bank speaks of transparency in terms of progress reviews and assurance that there is conformity between the reviews and country conditions and capacities. For ActionAid International, to speak of transparency simply in terms of project reviews and the correctness of the reviews is to limit the scope of transparency. Therefore, one must have recourse to other sources to understand more broadly what the Bank perceives in terms of transparency as a function of process conditionality. One such source is the works of World Bank staff member


42. Anna Bellver, Marcos Mediburu and Maria Poli, “Strengthening Transparency and Accountability through Access to Information,” En Breve no. 131 (July 2008): 1. En Breve or “en breve” is a publication of the Knowledge and Learning Team of the Operations Services Department of the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank.


Lorenzo Bertolini who underlines clarity, autonomy, participation, and open access to information as the key attributes of transparency as understood by the Bank.45

To the Bank, clarity means plainly stating the rules or laws, roles, and institutional objectives in unambiguous terms. It involves providing a legislative framework and straightforward guidelines for public resource management.46 Bertolini notes that autonomy implies that regulators should be insulated and protected from interference from policy makers and special interest groups. Participation emphasizes that stakeholders should be part of the development decision-making process.47 Shah observes that external stakeholders (such as the Bank) often chose to enhance national government transparency by amplifying the voice of citizens in order to reduce corruption.48

Open access to information is a way of promoting voice. In fact, in physics a transparent object is that which light can pass through and one can see through. In the philosophy of knowledge, to “see a point” is to be enlightened or to possess knowledge about a thing. In discussing Del McWhorter’s assertion that the power of identity recognition arises from knowledge about bodies and pleasures, Charles E. Scott agrees with McWhorter that information as the data of knowledge gives voice.49 Francis Trix and Andrea Sankar forcefully hold the same view as Charles, namely, that both the absence of information and the presence of incorrect information deny voice.50 These assertions highlight the importance of the availability and access

to information in giving voice to a people. Thus, Cohen insists that transparency ensures that government shares with citizens the information that citizens deserve to know and that citizens can organize themselves to pry information from government in the struggle to let their voices be heard. Voice is an expression of power. Cohen also avows that transparency is not just about information among government, stakeholders, and civil society; it also extends to the exercise of voice in acts of power such as free and fair political elections. With respect to economics, transparency demands that citizens should voice their rational choices in budgetary processes, and their voices should count.51 However, it is worth giving a note of caution here: as it will be shown later, to the Bank, the voice of citizens does not always mean the voice of “all” citizens.

The Bank uses different process conditionality measures to achieve transparency. Bruni notes the Bank’s demand that there exist a legal framework and institutions necessary to enable access to information between government and citizens in a country.52 Peters highlights the presence of performance data as part of this information. These data provide the material for scrutinizing government bureaucracy.53 John K. Johnson and F. Rick Stapenhurst iterate the role of independent observers (IO) that are often commissions and international not-for profit organizations that act as anticorruption bodies. From an institutional perspective, the Bank opts for the decentralization of government so as to deprive bureaucrats the monopoly of power over the civil society.54


Speaking of decentralization, Purohit notes that when local governments have real power, the authenticity and confidence with which they treat local interest issues and the checks that they place on higher levels of governance give room for the reign of transparency. For gains to outweigh costs in decentralization, local government must have the authority to generate and use revenue (at least some) at the local level, and it must also be answerable to higher levels of government. Electronic or E-government is one of the ways of reducing costs because it reduces delays in the transmission of papers. It does not only reduce documents processing cost but makes more available information that the public can access easily.\(^5\) Shah highlights the economic tool for transparency: trade liberalization reduces circumstances in which government officials can indiscriminately exercise unaccountable discretionary powers.\(^6\) Trade liberalization is the heart of economic policy conditionality.

**Economic Policy Conditionality: The Reign of Neoliberalism**

Economic policy conditionality involves the World Bank’s prescription of conditions that will favor economic “progress” in countries that turn to the Bank for financial aid and loans. It hinges on “the Warren thesis”: the view, as Hettne explains, that economic progress is the essence of the development of human society.\(^7\) The human being as *homo oeconomicus* is at the center of this world. Ward Edwards iterates that such an “economic man” is assumed in the rational choice theory to be completely informed, infinitely sensitive, and rational.\(^8\) Being completely informed, *homo oeconomicus* knows both causes and outcome (predictable and real). Being infinitely sensitive, economic man pays full attention to a continuous chain of alternatives.

\(^6\) Shah, “Tailoring the Fight against Corruption to Country Circumstances,” 250.
\(^7\) Hettne, “The Development of Development Theory,” 256.
that lie before him or her in the decision-making process. Being rational, *homo oeconomicus* orders everything towards the maximization of utility.\(^{59}\)

Robert A. Nisbet suggests that this conception of the human being in a society that progresses because of the dynamic interaction of the forces of demand and supply is both the foundation and *visio summa* of classical economics. In such a society, change is cumulative, purposeful, marginalist, and directional.\(^{60}\) As classical economics suffers from what Ben Fine describes as “esoteric and intellectually bankrupt technicism,”\(^{61}\) that has the risk of being out of touch with the pace of necessary changes in the history of political economy, the World Bank from the middle of the twentieth century endorsed the modernization theory that is attuned, as Susan Engel notes, with the development ideology of the institution’s founders.\(^{62}\) The theory presents societal development as evolutionary. This concept of evolution, Anthony D. Smith notes, implies that the growth of human society is a concrete historical process that involves the formulation and implementation of certain policies.\(^{63}\) In the provisions of the operational statutes of the World Bank, decisions associated with such policies (precisely economic) must be dissociated from all other spheres of a country’s life – “Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their [Bank’s directors] decisions.”\(^{64}\)

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Tony Killick – from a global overview\(^{65}\) – and Festus Ugboaja Ohaegbulam – with specific focus on Africa\(^{66}\) – observe that from the 1980s to the 1990s, neoliberalism became the theoretical framework that has guided the Bank in prioritizing economics in its development works. Economic policy conditionality, therefore, has aimed at fostering the reign of neoliberalism. John William, however, suggests that to the Bank neoliberalism was simply a re-branding of neoclassical progressive or modern evolutionary development with greater emphasis on the virtues of the market and the vices of the state in economic growth.

As a theory of political and economic practices, “neoliberalism,” writes David Harvey, “proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade.”\(^{67}\) Practically, the Bank has used Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to enforce this theory, which thrives on the self-interest psychology, social individualism, legal deregulation, and political cooperation with financial institutions in order to realize economic “growth.” Caroline A. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Molly Bauer enumerate the elements of SAPs: upholding privatization as a way of rolling back the state from steering the national economy and enforcing the rapid removal of barriers to trade, capital flows, and foreign direct investment (FDI) as a means of encouraging the reign of the global free market. It also involves tight monetary policies such as increased interest rates, fiscal austerity measures like currency devaluation and higher taxes, and economic contraction policies such as reduction in


government services and subsidies. These measures are intended to correct disequilibrium in balance of payments and to promote liberal economies, which Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer define as “those in which governments play a very limited role in both the internal workings of the economy (for example, setting wage rates) as well as in international economic activity (for example, setting import quotas).”  

John Pender notes that the relationship between SAPs and economic policy conditionality is in the fact that nations have to accept and implement these neoliberal economic standards as requirements to receive loans or financial assistance from the Bank. However, if the Bank is not satisfied that these measures have actually led to the liberalization of a country’s economy, the Bank does not *ipso facto* withdraw its assistance. At times, it proceeds with provision of aid within the context of outcome conditionality.  

**Outcome Conditionality: Focusing on Results**

The nature of outcome conditionality can be understood via distinctions between it and other types of conditionalities. As discussed above, fiduciary conditionality is based on variables before the beginning of financial assistance for development projects. Economic conditionality is concerned with input variables at the beginning of a development program. Both fiduciary conditionality and economic conditionality are at the *terminus ad quem* part of a development program or project. Process conditionality is concerned with the qualities such as transparency, accountability, decentralization, and democracy in the course of program or project implementation. Distinct from these three types of conditionality, outcome conditionality is at

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the *terminus ad quem*. It focuses on the results of policy implementation; in this regard, Angelina Fisher also calls it “performance-based conditionality.”

While the variables in fiduciary conditionality are discretionary (either the Bank takes the risk to loan or avoids the risk), the variables in process conditionality are functional (the government, for instance, should decentralized). While the variables in economic conditionality are prescriptive (for example, the Bank tells a government either to privatize state parastatals or forfeit financial aid from the Bank), those of outcome conditionality are inferential. That is, in outcome conditionality, the assessment of outcome determines what conditions the borrowing country needs to fulfill in order to proceed with the possibility of realizing ultimate policy objectives. In outcome conditionality, the Bank infers the content and nature of financial assistance conditions from the fate of previous policy implementation. Thus, fiduciary and economic conditionalties look forward; process conditionality looks at the present; and outcome conditionality looks backward. Figure 3 shows the ideal conditionality continuum.

Figure 3. A time-based representation of the ideal conditionality continuum

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Outcome conditionality occurs at the *terminus ad quem*. Following this position, Andrew Mold picks up a succinct definition of outcome conditionality from the European Commission’s *EC Budget Support: An Innovative Approach to Conditionality*, wherein outcome conditionality is defined as providing aid on the basis of “progress attained for a number of indicators, mainly of results in the reduction of aspects of poverty directly linked to service delivery and of public financial management.”

The rationale of this conditionality is multifold. Firstly, it covers the prediction gaps associated with the imperfections of economic equations. The flexibility of human behavior in the marketplace makes it difficult to predict with absolute certainty that specific inputs will always yield particular results. A combination of structural adjustment measures, for example, does not imply that balance of payments will be corrected exactly as predicted by Bank economists. The economic outlook of a society is always influenced by non-economic forces – geographical, political, cultural, and sociological - which do not occur and influence economics in ways that can be determined by calculus. For example, following the application of structural adjustment programs, the Global South has had disastrous economic results because of what John Gatar terms “exogenous factors” that include natural disasters and political unrest, just to name a few. Outcome conditionality serves should-in-case purpose against the presence and influence of these non-economic factors. For example: in case natural disasters disorient the progress of a program from desired outcome, then outcome conditionality reorients the current results towards ultimate desired goals.

Secondly, outcome conditionality enhances another policy of the World Bank (and IMF), namely, country ownership. Quoting the IMF, Anna Ivanova writes that outcome-based conditionality is viewed as “reducing the perception of micro-management of countries’ economic policies and helping foster and build on country ownership, by giving the authorities greater flexibility to design their own economic policies. Drawing on the risk-sharing result of the standard principal-agent model with unobservable action . . . making financing conditional on outcome would strengthen the incentives of the authorities to achieve a better outcome.”

Ivanova’s words suggest that there are psychological, political, and moral dimensions to outcome conditionality. Theodore Panayotou observes that developing countries perceive conditionality with disdain because they consider it an infringement on their national sovereignty. Outcome conditionality plays a game with the mind: it assuages such perception by according to national governments the opportunity not to stick absolutely unto donor-prescribed policy conditions but also to determine what policies they can pursue as a consequence of the results of prior implementation of the Bank’s conditioned-development programs. This determination is an act of political empowerment in which governments envision themselves as being in control of the fate of their countries. Being in control likewise puts governments in positions of moral responsibility for the chain of outcomes. Therefore, the government as agent of policy implementation and collaborator with aid donor in the process of policy design, enters into “risk-sharing” with the Bank as donor or principal policy-maker. To grasp clearly this moral culpability and political empowerment of government in relation to conditionality, one needs to pay closer attention to what country ownership is.

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Country Ownership: “A Term Whose Time has Gone?”

In discussing the implications of country ownership of reform programs for conditionality, Omotunde E.G. Johnson claims:

‘Ownership’ from the perspective of the typical citizen, we believe, is more about (1) the right of the country representatives to be heard in the process of diagnosis and program design, and (2) the freedom and ability of the country to choose the program to be implemented, without coercion, than about (3) who designs the program. Of course, many among the educated elites in civil societies in “aid” recipient countries would prefer that their nationals design the programs, if they have the requisite technical skills; they would also want, over time, their own nationals to be fully equipped to design every program. In the short term to medium term, however, these same elites will not typically insist on a program being designed by local persons for the program to be deemed locally owned. Hence, there is no necessary correlation between the degree of active country participation in the program design (relative to participation of outsiders) and the extent or degree of country ownership. In brief, the line of causation runs from country ownership (ex ante) to participation in design and finally to implementation.  

Following the above dismissal of the designer of programs as an issue of concern in country ownership, Omotunde thinks that there is country ownership when both citizens and non-citizens believe that the representative of a country freely choose whatever program they implement, and as such the full responsibility of the outcome of the program rests with the country. The question that this definition does not answer is: who designs the program that the country representatives chose? From the above claim, Omotunde may think that this question is unimportant. However, the serious problem with his position is a belief in the power of epistemology that obliterates the historical and political affirmation of sovereignty that has characterized nations’ critique of conditionality vis-à-vis ownership. That is, Omotunde insists on the value of expert knowledge to the point where he dismisses the fact that one reason that

governments have insisted on “owning” their development programs is that they perceive World Bank’s conditionality as a thread to their sovereignty.

Omotunde’s conception of ownership reflects a problem of clearly and completely stating the essence of ownership that has plagued many scholars and policy analysts – a crisis that led Buiter to assert that country ownership of Bank policies is a term “Whose time has gone” because “it has been used and abused in so many ways to gloss over realities deemed uncomfortable and to create a pleasant buzz to distract the uninformed and unwary, that it now needs to be put out of its misery.”

To redeem country ownership from “misery,” one will certainly need to look more broadly at the different dimensions of ownership. To resolve the problem of incomplete expression of “what constitutes adequate ownership,” John H. Johnson and Sulaiman S. Wasty formulate four dimensions of ownership that display the interdisciplinary richness of the term. These dimensions include “locus of initiative,” intellectual conviction, political support, and stakeholder involvement. It is necessary to expand on each of these dimensions because they interact with the different types of conditionality.

**Dimensions of Ownership**

On page two of Borrower Ownership, Johnson and Wasty vividly enumerate the four dimensions of ownership. The first dimension actualized in the Bank’s operations touches on the political economy of planning: the “locus of initiative,” which focuses on who designs a program, the extent of collaboration in the formulation and implementation of programs, and whether reluctance based on arguments such as the demands of conditionality cause the Bank to withhold the disbursement of funds to a country. The second dimension is psycho-

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epistemological: the “level of intellectual conviction among key policymakers,” which involves the degree to which policy makers were in consensus about the nature and causes of problems, the alternatives to resolve problems and the methodology to adopt in the problems solving process. The third dimension is ethico-political: the “expression of political will by top leadership” as evident in different political and moral statements and actions. Lastly, there is the socio-political dimension: the “efforts toward consensus-building among constituencies” that is often expressed in broad based citizen participation in campaigns to stimulate support, participation, or resistance to certain programs.79

Johnson and Wasty’s articulation of the dimensions of ownership is preferable to that of Omotunde because it expresses more expansively the ontological and functional complexities of ownership. Furthermore, the Bank adopts Johnson and Wasty’s understanding of ownership as the four criteria that one has to use to assess country ownership.80

However, as Janet Entwistle and Filippo Cavassini insinuate in assessing country ownership of Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs), Johnson and Wasty’s dimensional elaboration of country ownership is difficult to operationalize because it fails to consider an important external dimension, namely, ownership as a function of aid assistance from donors and lenders such as the Bank.81 While one can conceptualize ownership as independent of aid conditions, such is not the case in the real world of application. To use the words of Omotunde – this is the “‘ultimate defining quality’ of country ownership”82 – that countries hardly ever act as

they would “ideally” do under unrestricted liberty because they are affected by their own interest and the behavior of other stakeholders in the enjoyment of their sovereign rights and in the design and implementation of their own development policies.\textsuperscript{83} The Bank’s behavior, for example, is visible in the prescriptions of conditions to financial aid and loans. Therefore, ownership is not purely ownership in the practical world. Rather, it is modified by conditionality. Also, because the Bank acknowledges its limitations in interfering in the sovereignty of nation states, conditions attached to loans are not always fully implemented without the final decisions resting with the country. In this regard, conditionality is also modified by ownership. Consequently, what occurs in the real world is a combination of conditionality and ownership,\textsuperscript{84} wherein there is neither pure conditionality nor ideal ownership; rather, a \textit{heterozygous} phenomenon occurs in which there is both conditionality and ownership.

John Pander iterates the Bank’s claims in its Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP), wherein the Bank posits that its CDP is not based on conditionality, “but on a relationship of partnership between itself playing the re-positioned institutional role of ‘Knowledge Bank,’ and the borrowing government, which has full ‘ownership’ of policies it chooses to pursue.”\textsuperscript{85} However, he also contends that conditionality still “constrains genuine ownership of development policy.”\textsuperscript{86} Nevertheless, the prevailing Bank’s view of the relationship between conditionality and ownership is neither in terms of conditionality as a constrain on ownership, nor as a substitute for it. Rather conditionality is a policy that enhances countries’ ownership of

\textsuperscript{83} Johnson, “Country Ownership of Reform Programs and the Implications for Conditionality,” 5.
\textsuperscript{84} Allan Drazen says that “Conditionality makes little or no sense if there is full ownership, but it also makes no sense if there is no ownership.” Allan Drazen, “Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach” (July, 2002): 6. International Monetary Fund. \url{http://econweb.umd.edu/~drazen/ConditionalityIMFStaff.pdf} (accessed October 16, 2013).
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 397.
agreements that they enter into with the Bank in order to receive financial assistance from the Bank. Therefore, there is a sort of policy conduciveness in which conditionality and ownership create space for their co-existence.

I contend theoretically in the next chapter that this space is one of interaction between the two policies in development programs. In this interaction, each policy undergoes a modification, and the result is a hybrid of the two. As will be evident in the discussion in the chapter, the basic ontological and functional foundation of this hybridization is that the hybrid is neither conditionality nor ownership – it has an identity of its own even if it resulted from conditionality and ownership – and it does not advocate what conditionality and ownership distintively advocate. Rather, this hybrid embodies certain elements of conditionality and excludes others, and it embraces certain features of ownership and excludes others. I call this hybrid the Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid (COH), and I label the process by which it is formed as Conditionality-Ownership Hybridization (COHZN).
CHAPTER 3
CONDITIONALITY-OWNERSHIP HYBRIDIZATION

As evident from the discussion in chapter one, conditionality and ownership are conceptually distinct. However, in their application to real life issues, there is an interaction between the two policies in order to attain some degree of stability in the process of policy implementation – as opposed to total conflict and tension – for the purpose of resource management and societal development. This state of stability involves both win-win and loss-loss: the Bank and the financial aid recipient country both retain some of what they desire through conditionality and ownership respectively; at the same time, they lose some of their contentions in the process of interactions between these two policies. This is what I refer to as the hybrid state.

Therefore, I define the Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid (COH) as the real-world combined actualization of conditionality and ownership in which the nature and contentions of one is modified interactively and pragmatically by the other in the transition from policy conceptualization to policy outcome. The result of this policy fusion is not distinct, multiple policies, but one phenomenon with its own unique aspects. These aspects, following the dimensions of ownership, also involve the locus of policy formulation, intellectual conviction, public or political support from leaders, and consensus among stakeholder constituencies, structures, or institutions. The aspects can be viewed as distinct; however, in the life of the COH, they are integrated into one species – the COH. The COH may have different accidental features – as genes combine differently in different individual hybrid animals – but the COH remains a hybrid in its own species identity. A discussion of these four aspects or tetradium is necessary to unveil the identity of the COH.
Locus of Policy Formulation

As earlier discussed, providers of funds are the agencies such as the World Bank that formulate financial disbursement conditions, and they insist on the fiduciary necessity to posit these conditions based on the need for trust, accountability, and transparency in the use of public funds by borrower countries to implement a variety of policies and programs, and to carry out development projects. According to ActionAid International, country ownership means that these “policies are home grown, developed by countries themselves . . . .”¹ This conception of ownership is to some extent theoretically akin to that of the IMF, which places in the hands of the country the responsibility to formulate and carry out policies.² The position finds theoretical support in the “Harmon Doctrine” or the absolute sovereignty theory, which says that a state or country has absolute rights to do as it pleases within its territory.³ Johan G. Lammers insists that this theory is subject to significant criticisms.⁴ Today’s globalized world is characterized, as Bertrand de la Chapelle observes, by a complex, inclusive, and dynamic transnational network necessary to govern the “global polity.”⁵ In this regard, the view that the locus of initiative in country ownership is exclusively country-centered does not receive practical support from the World Bank.⁶

³. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Recueil des Cours (Maubeuge, France: Triangle Blue, 2002), 432.
⁶. ActionAid International, for example, laments that following a more narrow definition of ownership in practice, the World Bank has sidelined Pakistan as a nation that has to design its own development policies and
Linking ownership to conditionality, the Bank posits a limited concept of ownership in which there is country ownership when a nation has a sound track record of implementing Bank designed policies. Koeberle and Walliser iterate that the Bank unequivocally asserts that where government designed policies are insufficient or weak, the Bank, instead of substituting conditionality for ownership, prefers not to disburse development loans. The Bank, therefore, acts as an economic institution that relies on information and social capital to determine adverse selection (the kind of risk that an intent-borrower constitutes) and to avoid moral hazard. Gleaning from Maitreesh Ghatak and Timothy W. Guinnanne, one can say that the reason why the issue of moral hazard arises in the conditionality-ownership hybrid is that “the lender cannot stipulate perfectly how the borrower should run the project.” Conscious of such limitation, the Bank engages in what Judith Teichman terms “social learning:” “a deliberate attempt to adjust goals and techniques of policy in response to past experiences and new information.” For this end, the World Bank’s technical experts assist the borrower country in designing reform policies and safeguarding the interest of the Bank. Paul Collier suggests that the implications of conditionality put governments in positions in which they have to pay heed to the epistemic insights provided by these technical experts so as to receive future assistance from the Bank. In effect, there is a dépassement of the theory of absolute sovereignty to the community of interests

projects as a function of ownership, and has proceeded with a large damn construction project despite public opposition. See ActionAid International, “What Progress?” 2.


theory that makes joint management the means of attaining the best possible administration.\(^\text{10}\)

Thus, while the locus of the design of aid conditions is the Bank and the place where development policies are designed in the light of ownership is theoretically the sovereign country, the locus of initiative in the COH is both the World Bank and the finance recipient country.

There is a point that is worth mentioning here, namely the place of power in this locus of initiative of the COH. One of the mating animals from which a hybrid is produced may be more powerful than the other, but that does not mean that they do not come together in the reproductive process. The social context of conditionality admits power differential; however, it is necessary to note different types of power. The anthropologist Eric R. Wolf, on page five of his *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Governance* (that was published in 1999 by the University of California Press, Berkeley, California) identifies four different types of power. The first is power in the sense that Friedrich Nietzsche used it. It refers to potency or capability that inheres in individuals. The second is the ego power, or the ability of an ego to impose itself on others in social action. This is the sort of power that Epstein talked about in terms of the “social context”. The third power is exhibitive, that is, it involves individuals actually using the power they possess to control the context of interactions. The last power that Wolf talks about is tactical power, by which institutions and groups circumscribe the actions of other individuals and groups within determinate settings. From these four different modes of power, what is present in the locus of initiative is the first mode – power as potency. There is power that inheres in the Bank as an institution and in the government as a body polity. The power may differ in degree, but this

difference is insignificant in determining whether the Bank or government participates in policy formulation. In this participation, both the Bank and the government are simultaneously powerful and weak; they have potency, but they cannot do without the other. The Bank cannot force the government to sign a document else be extinct. The earlier cited case of Zimbabwe is an example of this weakness of the Bank. The government also cannot force the Bank to sign a document. It is at the level of the other three aspects of the COH such as intellectual conviction, canvassing for political support, and stakeholders participation that the ability of an ego to impose its will on the other sets; that one party begins to control the context of interaction; and that institutions and bodies tactically organize and circumscribe the actions of others. In the aspect of the locus of initiative, power is simply substantive – it inheres in the institution and body polity, but it is not functional as is the case with other dimensions such as intellectual conviction.

**Intellectual Conviction**

To speak of country ownership in terms of intellectual conviction is to adopt an anthropomorphic approach in the sense that intellectual conviction looks at a country as a human being with an intellect, and therefore as one who can have mental attitudes such as conviction. Katherine Marshall observes that for many years, the Bank sorely relied on development aid conditionality as it perceived it without realizing that in the absence of conviction and determination on the part of a country to act, development programs cannot be realized. The main reason being that the Bank cannot go into a country and take over its control as a government does. For example, the Bank can exert pressure on a government to privatize state parastatals, but the Bank cannot put the parastatal on bid in the market. Only the government can do that. The Bank can insist that IOs exist in the management of a sector in a country, but the government can control the management terrain in such a way that the IOs are incapacitated to
work. Without the determination of a country to act, the Bank can act and sanction, but its development agenda will not be realized if a country absolutely resists. Consequently, in the last two decades, the Bank has realized that there cannot be country ownership unless the country believes that development policies and programs that it proposes together with the Bank will lead to the realization of objectives. In his discourse on religious experience, William James posits that belief is the intellectual function of cognizing, of being certain and convicted of a reality or an idea. This understanding of belief seems to limit conviction to the mental sphere.

However, “intellectual conviction” is not restricted to mental attitude. As Alan R. White notes, it is also a “disposition to behave” that entails a sense of moral commitment to both ideology and practice. Gilbert Ryle lists five elements that are associated with this commitment: the unhesitating utterance of what one is convinced of; other things that one says regularly, relevantly and without hesitation presuppose what one is convinced of; one is ready to persuade others to accept one’s conviction; where relevant, one behaves in accordance with one’s conviction; and when one acts inconsistently with the object of one’s conviction, one feels a certain lack of satisfaction, and thus seeks reforms.

The above theoretical insight on intellectual conviction provides a framework for understanding the Bank’s affirmation that country ownership is necessary to realize both policy and institutional change in a nation. Through intellectual conviction, the country becomes

committed to the change – propounds it in its utterances; where relevant, basis other national actions on the change; convinces other stakeholders in the country to accept reforms; and takes action to realize the change and to reverse the state of affairs where such action is inconsistent with the commitments of the country. This same attitude of adequate understanding and support of a program also applies to the Bank in the pursuance of conditionality. In this regard, the Bank unequivocally insists that although country ownership is necessary for development, it is not sufficient in order for a country to receive assistance from the Bank. “Due diligence,” the Bank tells its staff, “requires that the Bank be satisfied that any program, project or policy for which it provides support will, in the Bank’s experience and judgment, contribute in a sustainable way to the country’s development.”

Although the Bank, as a general rule, defers to the knowledge based intellectual conviction of a country, the Bank calls upon its staff to withhold such deference where “Bank’s formal policies, technical knowledge, or international experience strongly indicate otherwise.” Therefore, country ownership is never absolute; it is not a guarantee that a country will have its way with the Bank with respect to policies that the nation is intellectually convicted of. Rather, the Bank’s intellectual conviction associated with conditionality, as a formal policy, sets opposing restrictions to the totality of ownership.

However, the fact that a country may be intellectually convicted of its ideologies, policies and programs appropriate to its national context that may be in opposition to the content of Bank assistance conditions does not imply that there cannot be agreement in the intellectual convictions of the aid donor and recipient. Intellectual conviction vis-à-vis country ownership is not a negation of flexibility on the part of a state’s commitment to country ownership. From a political perspective, Charles Lockhart says that

17. Ibid.
[t]hese two stances, flexibility and commitment, do not always create conflicting demands on the statesman; they may be complementary as well. An exceptionally clever statesman may manage to appear committed to his adversary but achieve this appearance in a subtle fashion which allows him to maintain options without the danger of losing face . . . . A more common complementary relationship between flexibility and commitment arises when the statesman is committed but wishes for the purpose of furthering his commitment to appear flexible to the adversary. Creating doubt in the adversary’s mind about the time, place, and nature of a general’s plans is an important element of surprise attacks, for instance.\textsuperscript{18}

The World Bank also admits of the union of commitment and flexibility in the conditionality-ownership relationship. The Bank affirms “country dialogue and joint analytic work” as the \textit{modus operandi} in bridging the gap between intellectual conviction and implementation of policies as Bank and nation desire within country contexts.\textsuperscript{19} Paul Nystrom and William Starbuck avow that dialogue involves a hermeneutical process of unlearning what one holds onto in a way that overcomes blindness and rigidity, without eliminating one’s core values.\textsuperscript{20} Therefore, what really results from the dialogue-interaction between the country that is intellectually convicted of its policies and programs and the Bank that is likewise intellectually convicted of conditionality is a sort of what Donald Schon labels, “dynamic conservatism.” Dynamic conservatism is both the tendency and the actuality of hanging onto what one is convinced of, yet being open to reform in some areas.\textsuperscript{21}

David Laskin beautifully explains the dynamic conservatism by reference to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1939 radio address: if one must speak of a conservative as the man with two legs on the ground who has never learnt how to walk, then one must also talk of the radical (progressive)

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\textsuperscript{19} World Bank, \textit{Supporting Development Programs Effectively}, 9.
\textsuperscript{20} Paul Nystrom and William Starbuck, “To Avoid Organizational Crisis, Unlearn” \textit{Organizational Dynamics} (Spring 1984): 60-61.
\textsuperscript{21} Donald Schon, \textit{Beyond the Stable State} (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1973), 32.
\end{flushleft}
as the man whose both feet are walking “in the air.”

Dynamic conservatism bridges these extremes. It is dynamic because it avoids well-conceived and planned schemes of resistance, so as to give room for connections among special interests. It is conservative because it retains the inertial or the core issues of a social system. Historically, it was America’s President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s economic philosophy, which purported to continue chief New Deal programs combined with the attempt to reform certain aspects of the federal government. Les Metcalfe is of the opinion that reforms must cope with this policy philosophy through a process of beliefs and attitudes transformation within a unit such as a political body.

At the heart of this transformation in beliefs and attitudes is the ability of the Bank to trust the development knowledge of the financial assistance recipient government, and the potency of the country to trust the knowledge that the Bank possesses. Truly, fiduciary conditionality raises questions of whether the Bank trusts the country to work with it in implementing policies and programs. However, the fact that the same Bank propounds ownership puts on the Bank the onus to trust the borrowing government’s conviction of development policies that can work in the country. That is, the fact that the Bank supports the policy of ownership indicates the Bank’s acceptance of its own limitation in knowledge and power to implement development programs in a country based only on conditionality measures; the Bank, therefore, must have some trust in the knowledge and power that a government possesses in order to foster country ownership. This trust does not mean that the Bank forfeits all rationalizations that determine whether it can trust a borrower, but that in dynamic conservatism,

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trust is transformed: it is a transformation from a self-centered, individualistic psychological factor that favors exclusive reliance on one’s self-interest and intellectual conviction, to what John Dunn envisions as “a modality of action” that gives room for people to “cope with uncertainty over time.”

If one labels the stakeholders’ knowledge as light and the uncertainty they have to deal with as darkness, then dynamic conservatism means that the Bank and the country stand in the zone between light and darkness in which they each have some power, but are not absolutely in control of the policy-making process. In a beautiful figurative imagery, Guido Möllering captures this paradox of light and darkness or known and unknown with respect to trust in his review of Piotr Sztompka’s book, titled *Trust: A Sociological Theory*:

Finally, consider once more the sculpture of the ‘Illuminated Crowd’ shown on the cover of the book. One interpretation was that the light guides the crowd away from darkness; and Sztompka’s theory suggests that trust can be part of the classic source enlightenment – human reason. Related to this is the notion of human control: if trust is functionally and instrumentally rational, then it is also controlling and controlled. However, is there not another view that conceptualizes trust as a response to the impossibility of control? In the words of Lewis and Weigert (1985:976): ‘Trust begins where prediction ends’. This is not the place to begin an alternative theory of trust, so let me just hint at what it might entail by referring to another interpretation of Mason’s sculpture (one close to the artist’s own interpretation). The illuminated crowd does not move towards the light, but undulates between light and darkness along ‘degrees of emotion’: illumination, hope, interest, hilarity, irritation, fear, sickness, hunger, violence, murder, and death (Edwards 1994:163). Trust is a phenomenon that embodies this human condition: the availability of some knowledge (light) on the one hand, and ‘the power of the unknown [shadows] in everyday reality’ (Edwards 1994:164) on the other.

In this zone of light and darkness, of courage to act and fear of the other’s control of policy implementation circumstances, of hope that things can be done in one’s interest and irritation at the other’s different priorities, and of the opposition between one’s intellectual

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conviction and the other’s beliefs, the paradoxical nature of trust transforms conditionality and ownership. For the sake of action, the Bank journeys from the lack of trust that characterizes fiduciary conditionality to the readiness to trust the borrowing country without losing these two values: there should be transparency and liability in the use of financial aid provided by the Bank for the development course that the disbursement was made. It is a journey into the hybridization of conditionality in the provision of loans and a country’s intellectual conviction of the national context that should configure the use of funds. The knowledge associated with intellectual conviction as a dimension of country ownership also undergoes a transformation. As the light of a country’s knowledge comes in contact with some other knowledge from the Bank, the country finds that it both knows and does not know – the country enters the moment of dusk and dawn where daylight and darkness mix. This is the moment of trust – where the intellectual conviction associated with country ownership causes the nation to hang onto the country’s values, and, yet, pushes the nation to open up to technical development knowledge from the Bank (knowledge that the Bank enforces through conditionality). It is the moment of conditionality-ownership hybridization. When this hybrid occurs under trust, national political leaders can support policies that the country proposes together with the Bank.

**Political Leadership and Support**

The most salient meaning of country ownership posited by the World Bank is this: “[c]ountry ownership means that there is sufficient political support within a country to implement its development strategy, including the projects, programs, and policies for which external partners provide assistance”27 When Tony Killick talks of country ownership as “government ownership,” he is really speaking of this one dimension of country ownership,

namely, political support. The Bank does not provide an explicit definition of what it means by “political support.” This is not an unfamiliar phenomenon. David Easton observes that often, the expression “political support” is used very loosely without a technical meaning. However, he formulates political support as a politics-based attitude by which persons favorably, unfavorably, positively, or negatively orient themselves to an object.

Political support is necessary based on an argument that has been made by anthropologists such as David Mosse. Although most international institutions are creations of sovereign states, people so easily question the authority that these institutions without sovereign territorial boundaries (such as the Bank) have over them because human beings do not naturally devolve from such institutions. Amidst this legitimacy crisis, Samuel P. Huntington observes that in world politics, “every international organization at some points finds itself limited by the very principle which gives it being.” Conscious of this problem, the Bank has to rely on political support from within sovereign nations in order to realize development policies and programs.

Anna Ivanova et al. in an econometric study of variables that affect the implementation of IMF-supported programs found that political support is negatively affected by “strong vested interests” in the legislative organs of countries (parliament, for example) with respect to development policies, by lack of political cohesion around development programs, by weak

bureaucracy, and by ethnic divisions.\textsuperscript{33} Conditionality serves to overcome these negativities. Transparency and accountability enforced in process conditionality, for example, combats vested interests. Also, it is hard to deny totally Joseph Stiglitz’s note that through economic conditionality, the Bank address not only market failures but also the ability of political institutions to reverse the path of economic downturn.\textsuperscript{34} One can read in this Stiglitz’s observation that although the World Bank’s Article of Agreement demands that the Bank should function without consideration for country politics, the combination of political support dimension of ownership and economic conditionality indicates that economics and politics cannot be separated in the implementation of policies at country level.\textsuperscript{35} Ironically, the Bank is aware of this fact as evident in this statement from its report team: “Macroeconomic reforms, for example, can increase pressure and support for SOE [State-Owned Enterprise] reform, thus making it politically more desirable.”\textsuperscript{36}

This inalienability of economics from politics at the level of policy implementation is supported by public choice theory and a government’s fiduciary responsibility to its citizens. Michan Andrew Connor iterates that this theory emphasizes that despite people’s rational choices to maximize economic efficiency and productivity (as Frederick Taylor affirmed in scientific management theory), people also bond and act together according to shared

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\item\textsuperscript{35} William Ascher iterates the restriction of all Bank’s activities to economics and not political considerations, as one reads in the institution’s Articles of Agreement contradicts the Bank’s public practices and it causes a problem for Bank staff who cannot make their political analysis explicit or systematic even when they know that political factors are at work in determining how a country will use financial assistance from the Bank. See William Ascher, “New Development Approaches and the Adaptability of International Agencies: The Case of the World Bank,” \textit{International Organization} 37, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 431. \url{http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706450} Accessed January 28, 2014.
\item\textsuperscript{36} Mary Shirley \textit{et al.}, \textit{Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership} (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995), 16.
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preferences (the position advanced by political sociology). With respect to the responsibility that governments have to the citizens, M. Stephen Weatherford argues that one central element is often the national macroeconomic outlook. A government as a political unit that fails to take seriously economic issues is at the risk of being disempowered by the citizens. Thus, the economic conditionality of the Bank has currency value to a government: it can either purchase favor or defeat from the citizens. Consequently, the application of economic conditionality will be out of touch with human sociopolitical behavior if the Bank fails to appreciate country politics as a determinant in the support given to development programs.

It can, therefore, be said that while country ownership seeks political support as means for policy implementation and conditionality aims at transparency, accountability, efficiency and productivity as ends, the COH embraces political support as means to realize the four-fold ends. Political support, nevertheless, is not limited to the political leaders of a country. Politics is primarily the life of the polis – the city. Citizens are part of this life, and they hold the power to sanction their political leaders through ballot boxes and serious political strikes. Thus, the civil society is also part of the body that needs to grant political support to development policies and programs. Multiple institutions and representatives of the civil society such as common initiative groups (NGOs) need to become part of the process of policy formulation and implementation. In this regard, the COH embodies stakeholder consensus.

Stakeholders Consensus


For a significant elucidation of the drawbacks of Taylor’s scientific management theory, see Jonathan R. Tompkins, Organization Theory and Public Management (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 67-92).

In 1999, the World Bank’s president, James Wolfensohn (1995-2005), called for the inclusion and active involvement of not only borrowing governments, but also their civil societies and other international agencies in the Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) of the Bank. To the Bank, this represented a “major shift” – a shift from ownership confused as government ownership to country ownership.\(^{39}\) There is country ownership when governments receive sufficient support for strategies among stakeholders such as ministries, parliament, subnational governments, civil society organizations, and private sector groups.\(^{40}\) A people are psychologically more comfortable with reforms and they feel morally responsible for the reforms when their participation matters in the design and implementation of programs. Paul Victor Obeng, speaking of the benefits of the involvement of all parties in the implementation of SAPS in Ghana, supports this contention: “as a people,” he writes, “we achieved a sense of ownership of the economic program, a greater acceptance of the consequences of the program, and a stronger commitment to implement.”\(^{41}\)

This advocacy for the involvement of multiple civil society stakeholders in the private and public sectors indicates the Bank’s embrace of an idea that historians have held for many years. This idea, as Rick Szostak summarizes it, is that institutional changes have not resulted from a single innovator working in isolation.\(^{42}\) Rather, it has involved multiple groups working together. In this regard, a common recommendation within the Bank has been that such entities as corporations should work in partnership with not-for-profit organizations, governments, and

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local communities so as to promote ownership. However, differences in perception of policy outcome have often provoked resentment and discontent among stakeholders.

Buiter observes that the main factor that often influences stakeholders’ attitudes with respect to country ownership is the outcome of the implementation of ideas, policies, and programs within the context of the prevailing circumstances of a country. As James A. Sheppherd and James K. McNulty posit in the decision affect theory of psychology, differences in outcome perception can disband stakeholders because people feel displeasure when outcome is not consistent with their intentions and contributions and elated when outcome is in accord with their desires. Conditionality can resolve this risk of stakeholders falling apart by creating common ground between them from two perspectives: one advanced by the public policies enhancement-incentive theory, and the other proposed by the dialogue network theory.

The enhancement-incentive theory proposed by Buiter touches on the role of process and outcome conditionalities in enhancing ownership. Conditionality, especially process conditionality through its emphasis on transparency, representativeness, and democratic participation does not oppose ownership; rather, conditionality fosters ownership. Furthermore, stakeholders can jointly participate in policy formulation and development programs implementation when they are motivated by common incentive. Conditionality, therefore, can serve as “a means of enhancing the incentive compatibility and thus the credibility of programs.” Program incentives are the concerns in outcome conditionality. This implies that

outcome conditionality can be the impetus pushing stakeholders to find common ground in their incentives, and it can make stakeholders look at development programs as credible. When there is a sense of commonality in incentives and the belief that programs are worthy of implementation, stakeholders will likely continue to work together.

How can working together possibly result from what people believe? Marily Motz in pointing out the usefulness of folklore scholarship asserts that folklore is not useful simply because it collects and categorizes what people believe, but it explores what people do with what they believe. She speaks of the link between the mental category of belief and the action category of belief in words that can be simply put: if one wants to know what people really believe, one simply needs to see what they do in their daily life of interpersonal and intergroup interaction. This means that there is a link between belief and action. Motz suggests that belief provides the framework for creating the point of interaction between individuals, groups, and ideas – in the context of this work, different development stakeholders.

Interaction does not imply homogenization. Stakeholders do not have to homogenize their beliefs before development policy common ground can be possible among them. In fact, as theologians and philosophers have long posited, unity neither implies sameness nor denies diversity. In a religious analysis of Keith Dixon’s sociology of belief, Robert W. Friedrichs makes it clear that the ultimate product at the point of intersection between participants in a belief system is reasonable paradox - in which though there is disagreement, there is also

common ground that allows the parties to work together. In this regard, although a country’s intellectual conviction in the objectives of a program (ownership) may not fully fall in line with what it thinks the Bank believes in and prescribes as policy conditions to arrive at certain outcome (conditionality), the objectives of the program can provide a unifying point in this belief-system paradox that gives room for policies to be implemented.

According to the dialogue network postulated by Christopher Gilbert, Andrew Powell, and David Vines, development epistemic insights from the Bank create an understanding of “good policies” outcome between stakeholders, thereby bridging them. There is what Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow call, “system of relations” when interested parties approach outcome with a sense of dynamic conservatism in a process of dialogue and joint work that is characterized by fidelity to core values and learning and unlearning.

From the foregoing discussion, country ownership involves stakeholder involvement and collaboration in the implementation of ideologies, policies, and programs. Conditionality measures can bond stakeholders and cause them to work together – after all, failure to do so will be grounds for the stakeholders not to benefit from financial aid from the Bank. This reasoning, nevertheless, must be made with some reservations.

In a contention that brings conditionality into stakeholders’ involvement in country ownership, the Bank holds that to consult with different stakeholders in the design of development strategies does not mean that they all have to be of one mind before policies and

An extrapolation from Dixon’s view will imply that country and Bank’s conviction and certainty in the objectives of a program, even if associated with conditionality, will lead to the elimination of all contradictions between the country and the Bank. However, such is not often the case. Friedrichs’ rebuttal to Dixon provides the insight for understanding how in real life, despite conflicts between the Bank and the country over what they are intellectually convinced of, both parties come to agreement.


50. Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), 65.
programs are adopted and implemented. According to the World Bank, in the presence of opposition from some stakeholder in the midst of “sufficient support” from other stakeholders within and outside the government, governments can proceed with major policy reforms. In fact, in moments where different factions arise within the government itself because of World Bank’s development policies, branches of government that support the Bank can proceed with the reforms.  

This position of the Bank is the way Bank controls the context of the abilities of people to exhibit their own capabilities. To employ Wolf’s types of power, this position is the Bank’s tactical power at work; it is the institution’s acknowledgement that the common public sphere is not always common. The implication behind this standpoint is that despite the need for collaboration between stakeholders to realize development programs, the Bank does not want subaltern counterpublics. Nancy Fraser posits this concept of subaltern counterpublics, which affirms that in a system of social inequality, it is common for subordinated members to group themselves, circulate discourses against the dominant group, and formulate interpretations that will defend their own interests, identities, and needs and enable them to achieve voice. This is akin to the contention that Chester Bernard makes in his inducements-contribution theory of organizational systems. Temkins notes that in this theory, Bernard posits that when organizational members and institutions do not make gains from what they contribute to a system (such as a body polity), they are most likely to withdraw their participation in, and consent to issues, of the system.

51. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively, 8.
Newton’s second law of thermodynamics provides insight on how to proceed amidst such discontent. According to this law, energy is continuously dissipated in a system, generating randomness or disorder (entropy) until the system attains equilibrium. In order to get work done, entropy has to be kept constantly low; otherwise, as Erwin Schrödinger notes, there will arise “the dangerous state of maximum entropy, which is death”\(^{54}\) of the system. To prevent this state of disintegration in social systems, conflicts, and strains that generate entropy must be reduced to a minimum or eliminated. How to do this can be extrapolated from the relative entropy function of a multinomial system involving different entities or stakeholders \((N)\), which Robert K. Niven\(^{55}\) defines as

\[
\eta = - \sum_{i=1}^{S} P_i \ln \frac{P_i}{q_i}
\]

where \(s\) is the equiprobable to which an entity is allocated, the most probable position in the asymptotic limit \((N \to \infty)\), where \(P_i\) is the probability of an entity in the \(i\)th category, \(q_i\) is the source or ‘prior’ probability of category \(i\), and \(ln\) is the natural logarithm. From the above equation, one way to control the magnitude or amount of entropy is to limit \(N\). Therefore, dissatisfied groups or individuals whose actions generate entropy need to be minimized or kept out of the system in order for the system to functional steadily or for work to be done.

However, if \(N\) becomes zero, the system will cease to function. For perpetual existence, Bernard advises that organization structures and systems (such as a system of government and national stakeholders constructed to formulate and implement development programs) should

\(^{54}\) Erwin Schrödinger, 1944 What is life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1944), 71.
turn to the world outside of the system for resources.\textsuperscript{56} This solution is reflected in the Bank’s assertion that where there is sufficient support from international agencies such as the Bank itself for the government to proceed with a development plan, the latter can do so.

To proceed as such really means that the government becomes a subaltern that embraces the Bank’s conditionality measures and forsakes certain voices of contest arising from within the country, so as to receive assistance from the Bank. In this vein, “ownership” seems to be a term that masks the Bank’s control of the public sphere in which the Bank interacts with national governments. As a subaltern, the Cameroonian government formulates a counterpublic discourse in terms such as “majorité Presidentielle.” Oben Timothy Mbuagbo and Robert Mbe Akoko iterate that this term is “equally designed to forestall any alternative political discourse on the future of Cameroon.”\textsuperscript{57} Through national media outlets such as the national daily newspaper, namely the Cameroon Tribune, and the national radio and television, namely the Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV), which are owned and controlled by the government, the government defines itself in the public sphere as the “majority” that has the voice and power to shape the national political economy irrespective of conditionality measures. In cases where the Bank calls for the democratization of resource management in the country, for example, such democratization has to favor the interest of the majority – the presidential majority.

Considering that some of the opposition that the government might face can, and easily arises from some citizens disgruntled over the functioning of the government, the Bank calls on governments to “link participatory processes to permanent institutions, i.e., to favor

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{56} Tompkins, \textit{Organization Theory and Public Management}, 191. \\
institutionalized rather than ad hoc processes that might undermine such institutions."58 As a function of prior action conditionality, the Bank often requires that governments put in place such institutions before it can receive financial assistance from the international lender.59 Under the banner of country ownership, this demand from the Bank does not stop the country from adding other institutions to what the Bank deems most essential. The resultant of this addition cannot be in contradiction with what the Bank desires. Stakeholders who find it difficult to cope with the Bank’s procedures and therefore prefer to function in a way at odds with the Bank, for example, will be eliminated from the pool of stakeholders in the COH. It is worth noting that the Bank and other international donors with which it cooperates in funding development projects are also categorized as stakeholders. Conditionality, therefore, is a policy that selects bona fide (with respect to Bank’s ideas and procedures) stakeholders from the total pull of n stakeholders included under the policy of ownership.

From the above discussion, the COH with respect to stakeholders’ inclusion in the country-Bank formulation and implementation of development policies and programs can be mathematically represented in the following equations:

Ownership \( (x_1) = x_1^1 + x_1^1* + x_1^2 + x_1^3 + x_1^3* + x_1^4 + x_1^5 + x_1^5* + x_1^6 + x_1^7 \) \-------------------------(1)

Conditionality \( (x_2) = x_1^1 + x_1^3* + x_1^5* \) \-------------------------(2)

Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid or COH \( (x) = x_1^1 + x_1^2 + x_1^3* + x_1^4 + x_1^5* + x_1^6 + x_1^7 + E \) \--------(3)

Now, COH involves changes in \( x_1 \) \( (d x_1) \) because of the influence of \( x_2 \) on \( x_1 \)

58. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively,10.
59. The mainly agriculture-based Women-in-Development (WID) project in the Gambia is an example of this requirement. In 1987, the World Bank began the design of this project, and it insisted on the participation of non-governmental organizations in the government led process to realize the project. One of the conditions that the Bank attached to the project loan was that the government must have a "statement of government policy” that is satisfactory to the Bank with respect to the participation of institutions as NGOs. See Deborah A. Bräutigam and Monique Segarra, “Difficult Partnerships: The World Bank, States, and NGOs,” Latin American Politics and Society, 49, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 159. Accessed January 1, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30130827
Also, COH involves changes in $x_2$ ($dx_2$) because of the influence of $x_1$ on $x_2$

The interaction between $x_1$ and $x_2$ is also influenced by the special interests of groups ($E$), and the presence and interests of groups in the interaction can neither be strictly attributed to the Bank nor the financial aid recipient country.

\[ \therefore \text{COH} \rightarrow f(dx_1 + dx_2 + E) \]

i.e $x = dx_1 + dx_2 + E$-----------------------------------------------(4)

Where $x^1_1, x^1_1^*, x^2_1, x^3_1, x^3_1^*, x^4_1, x^5_1, x^5_1^*, x^6_1$ and $x^7_1$ are different stakeholders;

$dx_1$ and $dx_2$ are changes in country ownership and conditionality respectively; and

$x^1_1$ and $x^1_1^*$ conflict and are mutually exclusive, just as $x^3_1$ and $x^3_1^*$, and $x^5_1$ and $x^5_1^*$

From the discussion in the second chapter of this work, conditionality and country ownership can be theoretically conceived and analyzed as distinct and alienable from each other. The present chapter shows that they are also theoretically related as hybrids. Inasmuch as these are policies that affect international development in practice, this hybrid cannot be restricted to the sphere of intellectual conceptualization. It has to be part of the practical reality or actions that are part of the Bank’s development function. One such action is forest management as in the case of Cameroon. In other words, in the management of forest in Cameroon, the modified forms of conditionality and ownership are operationalized together as conditionality-ownership hybrid.

The next chapter focuses on this implementation, presence, or practical operationalization of the COH in the management of forests in Cameroon.
CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONDITIONALITY-OWNERSHIP HYBRID IN CAMEROON’S FOREST SECTOR

While conditionality and country ownership are two distinct and theoretically alienable Bank development policies, chapter three contended that these policies are related as COH.

Table 2 displays these differences and hybridization.

Table 2. Differences between conditionality and ownership and their hybridization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Conditionality</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>COH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policies designer</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>World Bank and country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual conviction</td>
<td>The Bank possesses the technical knowledge and experience to manage resources and develop human society</td>
<td>Governments are most knowledgeable about their national contexts, and can best determine what managerial and development policies suit their countries</td>
<td>Through dynamic conservatism and social learning, both the Bank and national governments have some trust in each other’s knowledge of policies appropriate to manage resources and develop a country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Support</td>
<td>Political support is aimed at causing country to support Bank’s motion to ensure transparency, accountability, and neoliberal efficiency and productivity in resource management</td>
<td>Political support is aimed at causing political factions to unite over specific managerial laws and policies</td>
<td>Political support aimed at uniting political factions over laws and policies to ensure transparency, accountability, and neoliberal efficiency and productivity in resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders Consensus</td>
<td>Policies’ design and implementation proceeds with consensus among stakeholders in accord with the Bank’s vision and interest</td>
<td>Policies’ design and implementation proceeds with consensus among stakeholders in accord with the country government’s vision and interest</td>
<td>Policies’ design and implementation proceeds with selective inclusion of stakeholders who are in consensus with country governments’ vision and interest and without hindrance to the interest and vision of the Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the last three decades, the management of forest resources in Cameroon has involved the application of each of these features of the COH. First, both the World Bank and the government of Cameroon designed the laws and policies that direct the management of forest in the country. Second, in the design and implementation of forest management laws and policies, the Bank and the Cameroonian government embraced dynamic conservatism and social learning. Third, in the process of designing and applying the laws and policies, political support remained and remains very necessary to foster transparency, accountability, the neoliberal model of efficiency (absolute freedom of the market) and the neoliberal paradigm of productivity (ceaseless accumulation of capital) in the forest sector. Lastly, both the design and implementation of the laws and policies governing forest management in Cameroon involved, and continue to involve, selective inclusion of stakeholders. Forest management in Cameroon involves the application of the COH in all its four dimensions.

**Designers of Forest Management Laws and Policies**

The principles, regulations, and course of action that govern the management of forest in Cameroon today are explicitly enshrined in, and one can infer them from the Cameroon Forest Policy of 1993 and Law no. 94/01 of 20 January 1994. The enactment of this law goes beyond absolute country sovereignty, and it shows the Bank’s limitation in policy stipulation. Rather, it involves both the Bank’s and the Cameroonian government’s jointly making policies and laws in accordance with the locus of policy formulation dimension of the COH. Speaking of the parties involved in the formulation of the articles of this law, the political anthropologist Peter Geschiere says, “it is clear that this law carries the signature of the World Bank . . . . The Cameroon

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1. The forest policy designed by the Cameroon government and published in 1993 served as the foundation for drafting the 1994 Forest Law of the country. The 1993 policy was a revision of the 1981 forest management law with the intention of aligning forest management in the country to Agenda 21 of the 1992 Rio Summit.
legislative institutions – notably the parliament – only accepted the law after prolonged resistance and under heavy pressure of the World Bank with financial sanctions.”

Geschiere’s observation indicates that the Bank used conditionality as a policy leverage to influence the design of this law. However, what does it mean to say that Cameroon only “accepted” the law after conditionality threats from the Bank? Does it mean the Cameroonian government was simply a passive recipient of the law that played no role in the design of the forest management regulations and policies? One must be skeptical about responding to this second question in the affirmative, because Forest Monitor refers to the role of the Bank in designing the forest management regulations and policies as “assistance”. Assistance places the primary responsibility of policy formulation in the hands of the Cameroon government and puts the Bank and the government on the platform of collaboration. Assistance suggests that the government of Cameroon was actively involved in formulating the law and polices. Therefore, to respond to what “acceptance” means in the context of the formulation of the 1994 Forest Law and associated forest management policies, one must resort to the history of the enactment of the law. This reference is important because, as Frederick A Olafson asserts, historical life or past events provide a significant framework for a proper understanding of the content of promulgations.

In over one and a half decade prior to 1994, forest management in Cameroon was guided by Forest Law No. 81-13 of 27 November, 1981. According to Eavan O’Halloran and Ferrer Vicente, this law opened channels for government officials to practice corruption in forest
management by failing to treat issues of conflict of interest in personnel who approved forest exploitation licenses. It encouraged “quick-cut-and-run” as companies were only awarded logging licenses for five years, and the government lost significant revenue from forest resources because of low tax collection from the forest sector. In fact, the net effects of the law were waste of resources, fast deforestation, low revenue to government from forest exploitation, and deep inefficiencies and corruption in forest management.\(^5\) In 1994, the World Bank stepped in to arrest this crisis as part of the SAPs package.

Cameroonian government’s protest of the conditions of first generation structural adjustment programs at the end of the 1980s and in the early years of the 1990s (as explained in footnote 73 herein) caused the Bank to distrust the government. With fiduciary conditionality at stake, the Bank resorted to process conditionality – as Guiseppe Topa \textit{et al.} note, by tying the disbursement of the Economic Recovery Credit of 1994 and the third structural adjustment credit (SAC-III) to the government’s reform of the management of the nations’ forest resources.\(^6\) Herwig Cleuren observes that the Bank soon found itself limited in using conditionality to enforce reforms because “MPs [members of parliament] and other powerful people earning money from the logging industry were not impressed by the World Bank’s threats to cancel credit lines and pushed through their own will on crucial issues.”\(^7\)


\(^{6}\) Guiseppe Topa \textit{et al.}, \textit{The Rainforests of Cameroon: Experience and Evidence from a Decade of Reform} (Washington, DC, World Bank, 2009), 23.

SAC-III was a credit of US$180 million from the Bank to Cameroon. One of the six tranches in which this credit was disbursed was tied to reforms in the country’s forest sector. See World Bank, \textit{Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project} (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), no.12. Accessed February 1, 2014. \url{http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/04/693591/cameroon-third-structural-adjustment-credit-project}

\(^{7}\) Herwig Cleuren, \textit{Paving the Road for Forest Destruction: Key Actors and Driving Forces of Tropical Deforestation in Brazil, Ecuador and Cameroon} (Leiden: Research School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies, 2001), 143. Universiteit Leiden. Accessed December 31, 2013. \url{https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/8389}
This initial phase of the reforms process underlined the difference between conditionality and ownership. Cameroon government’s ownership of the reforms was further strengthened by the vested interests of a foreign stakeholder, namely, the French government. For instance, Frances Seymour and Navroz Dubash take note of the indications that in November 1993, the French government lobbied the Cameroon parliament against the Bank’s reform agenda so as to protect the interest of French logging companies against the Bank’s suggested log export ban. The MPs waged a media war against the Bank. In rebuttal, the Bank also engaged in a media campaign to explain to Cameroonians the benefits of the law.

The way out of this tense situation was negotiation. While the Bank’s forest and environment team engaged in dialogue with the Cameroon government, another team in Washington, DC began working on a new forest law. In the meantime, frustrated by the inability of the Cameroon’s executive branch to persuade the nation’s parliament to formulate forest management policies that were totally in line with the Bank’s draft, the Bank engaged in an alternating-offer game with the government. Seymour and Dubash capture this game and its raison d’être in these words:

The National Assembly’s [of Cameroon] amendments to the draft law were inconsistent with what the World Bank considered to be sound forest policy. . . . The World Bank realized that any effort to persuade the government to challenge the Assembly and reverse the most serious changes in the law would be futile. It therefore asked MINEF [Ministry of Environment and Forestry] to draft an Implementation Decree that would interpret the law in line with the draft that the World Bank had originally agreed to. The Ministry submitted a draft version of the decree to the World Bank in July 1994. The World Bank rejected this version and several staff spent over a year revising the decree line by line. A final version, acceptable to the Bank, was issued in August 1995.

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9. Ibid., 62-64.
10. Ibid., 67-68.
This vivid description of the negotiations between the Bank and the government indicates that the laws and policies that govern forest management in Cameroon have the design hand of the Bank and the Cameroon government in it. Furthermore, it shows that the law is not only acceptable to the government but also to the Bank. Acceptance by the government implies country ownership of the forest management policies and laws, and acceptance by the Bank highlights that the Bank, through conditionality, was actively involved in the design of the forest management policies and laws. In this application of the locus of policy formulation dimension of the COH, both the government and Bank staff embraced dynamic conservatism and social learning in designing the forest management laws and policies.

Dynamic Conservatism and Social Learning in Forest Management Policies and Laws Formulation

In the era after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 3 to 14 June 1992, both the government of Cameroon and the World Bank embraced dynamic conservatism and social learning in the formulation of the policies and laws that govern the management of forest resources in Cameroon. This is evident from two perspectives. Firstly, the 1993 forest management policies propounded by the Cameroon government were intended to align forest management in the country to Agenda 21 of the Conference.\(^\text{11}\) It is necessary to note that whoever accepted or rejected Agenda 21 indirectly embraced or shunned respectively the World Bank because the Bank’s 1991 forest paper and associated Operational Policy 4.36 of 1993 squared with the principles of Agenda 21. The 1994 Forest Law was necessary because this alignment of policies to Agenda 21 was not absolute: the government embraced certain tenets of the Agenda but failed

\(^{11}\) Agenda 21 is the product of the said conference that spells out the principles and course of action for environmental sustainability. It was so called because it purported to be a global agenda for the beginning of the twenty-first century.
to include others. This represents dynamic conservatism and social learning in country ownership. Secondly, while some Articles of the 1994 Forest Law are in conformity with the values and knowledge of the Bank and the government alike, others are in conformity with the mind of the government but at variance with the original mind of the Bank, or in line with the mind of the Bank but at odds with that of the government. This also represents dynamic conservatism and social learning in the COH. Each of these perspectives deserves close examination.

The 1993 Forest Policy

The World Development Report 1992 published by the World Bank focused on the link between development and the environment. In this report, the Bank pushed for sustainable development by adopting the definition of “sustainability” in the Brundtland Commission’s report of 1987. The Commission conceived sustainability as “[m]eeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the needs of future generations.”

Richard F. Kosobud notes that as an essential aspect of this definition, the Bank added meeting the needs of the poor. Having called attention to the needs of the poor, the Bank resorted to economic models to environmental management such as pricing social costs, top-to-bottom command and control technologies or regulations, and leaving control decisions to enterprises, communities, and households on condition that governments levy Pigouvian taxes or issue effluent permits. The same ideas of sustainability and cost-benefit approach to environmental management are present in Agenda 21. Bruce Rich observes that as the Bank had the dominant knowledge and experience

in global environmental governance through its Global Environment Facility (GEF) in the one to two years prior to Rio, the agreements of the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro were key “in strengthening the Bank’s role as money manager for the global environment.” 14 Thus, it is logical for the Bank to say that it ties its non-lending activities such as promotion of global partnerships and initiatives, technical support, capacity building, and analytical and advisory work across sectors and counties to support for the principles of Agenda 21. 15

Although Cameroon was present at the UNCED and agreed to the principles of Agenda 21, 16 it partially abandoned this Agenda by basing its 1993 forestry policy on the forest management principles in the Guidelines on the Conservation of Biological Diversity in Tropical Production Forests produced by the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) in 1993. 17 Some of the policies that the government adopted from the Guidelines were also in Agenda 21. Therefore, in this forest policy, the government essentially “owned” its forest policy by adopting only some of the forest management values in Agenda 21. In this regard, Cameroon partially aligned itself with the mind or values of the Bank in global environmental management. As evident in Table 3, which displays the comparison between the conditions for Bank’s financing with respect to its clients’ forest sector management and the tenets of the 1993 forest policy in Cameroon, this partial alignment did not totally fulfil the conditions that the Bank prescribed for receiving financial support from the Bank.

Table 3. A comparison between the conditions for Bank’s financing with respect to its clients’ forest sector management and the tenets of the 1993 forest policy in Cameroon\textsuperscript{18}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Bank’s forest policy conditions for Bank’s financed activities</th>
<th>Tenets of Cameroon’s 1993 forest policy</th>
<th>Comparison between Bank’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Bank Group financing for commercial logging in primary tropical moist forests</td>
<td>Policy failed to check the continuous logging in Cameroon’s tropical rain forests</td>
<td>Mismatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The adoption of policies and an institutional framework consistent with sustainability</td>
<td>Revitalize the forest sector by setting up efficient institutional framework. No specific policy to enforcement strongly sustainability</td>
<td>Partial match</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A participatory approach to the management of natural forests</td>
<td>Improve the participation of local populations in forest conservation and management</td>
<td>Match</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The adoption of comprehensive and environmentally sound conservation and development plans,</td>
<td>Policy attempted to ensure the regeneration of forest resources by plantations, but no comprehensive plan was put in place for this end</td>
<td>Partial mismatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A clear definition of the roles and rights of key stakeholders, including local people, in forest exploitation and management</td>
<td>No specific roles and rights ascribed clearly to stakeholders and local peoples with respect to forest management</td>
<td>Mismatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basing commercial use of forests on adequate social, environmental, and economic assessments</td>
<td>Encouraged trade in forest products, but did not put in place adequate social, environmental and economic assessment mechanisms for forests’ exploitation</td>
<td>Partial match</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making adequate provisions to maintain biodiversity</td>
<td>Sought the preservation of biodiversity</td>
<td>Match</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguard the interests of local people, including forest dwellers and indigenous peoples</td>
<td>Did not safeguard the interests of indigenous peoples and forest dwellers in forest exploitation</td>
<td>Mismatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing adequate enforcement mechanism</td>
<td>No regulatory mechanism was put in place for planning land use, forest protection and production</td>
<td>Mismatch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{18} For a list of these conditions used in this table, see Uma Lele et al. *The World Bank Forest Strategy: Striking the Right Balance* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), Box 1.2. The conditions are detailed in the Bank’s *The Forest Sector: A World Bank Policy Paper* that the Bank produced in September 1991, and in the Bank’s 1993 Operation Policy 4.39 (was revised in April 2013), which Lele et al. document as Appendix A in their work cited above.
With up to 44.7% mismatch, over 33.3% partial match, and only 22% match between the Bank’s conditions and the forest management policies that the Cameroon government “owned” in 1993, the World Bank resorted to fiduciary and process conditionalities in order to cause the Cameroon government to reform its forest sector. In fiduciary conditionality, the Bank distrusted Cameroon’s forest policies, and it halted the disbursement of SAC-II. However, in the 1993 forest policy, the government underwent dynamic conservatism and social learning in a simultaneous conservation and change of values as shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Values conservation and changes in Cameroon’s 1993 forest management policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values of Forest Management from Independence to 1992¹⁹</th>
<th>Values of Forest Management According to Agenda 21 and World Bank²⁰</th>
<th>Values of Forest Management in the 1993 Forest Policy of Cameroon²¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-down state centered forest management</td>
<td>Decentralized, multisectoral approach to forest management</td>
<td>State-centered approach to forest management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All lands under the guardian of the state²²</td>
<td>Lands owned by both governments, local communities and private individuals</td>
<td>Lands owned by governments and private individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local communities excluded from forests management²³</td>
<td>Local peoples included in forest management</td>
<td>Local peoples limitedly included in forest management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximization of forest resource exploitation</td>
<td>Sustainability privileged over maximization of forest exploitation</td>
<td>Exploitation of forest with some concern for sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest valued in terms of profits making</td>
<td>Forest has ecological, economic, social, spiritual, scientific, and cultural values</td>
<td>Forest has ecological, economic, and political values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 1993 forest policy preserved some of the values of forest management that were active in the country from post-independence to the Rio Earth Summit, and the government learned new forest management principles from its social interaction with the Bank. According to Marvin D. Krohn et al., social interaction is often characterized by differential reinforcement. Differential reinforcement is the aspect of social learning theory in which rewards and punishment condition the appropriation of knowledge and the behavior of groups and individuals in daily interactions. In discussing motivation theory as constitutive of the cause-effect relationship, Thomas E. Wren suggests that this appropriation can be understood in terms of psychological attraction and deviation from desires and pain caused by both perceived and actual rewards and punishment. Inasmuch as prosocial actions are coextensive with psychological aspirations and value-based actions, both desire and pain are motivations for knowledge acquisition and actions. In fact, Charles Darwin in his evolution theory and other deductive theorists such as Karl Popper and Eric Beinhocker posit that perceived hurt or threat is a cause for entering the mode of aversion wherein one of the determinants of survival is the ability of the threatened to adapt by conservation of what it possesses within itself for survival and/or by acquisition of new knowledge and values from the entities with which it interacts in its

24. Social interaction in this statement has the same meaning as Guy E. Swanson understands it. It refers to the “process in which individuals relate to their own minds or the minds of others; the process, that is, in which individuals take account of their own or their fellows’ motives, needs, desires, means and ends, knowledge, and the like.” Guy E. Swanson, “On Explanations of Social Interaction,” Sociometry 28, no. 2 (June 1965): 102. Accessed February 13, 2914. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2785645](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2785645)


environment. The insight provides a framework to understand the behavior of governments in general and the Cameroon government in particular with respect to the forest management reforms of 1994 in the country.

The assertion of Darwin, Popper, and Beinhocker implies that when governments perceive adversarial conditions, they adjust themselves to avoid circumstances that can hurt their wellbeing. In this adjustment, governments resort to their capabilities and/or acquire new knowledge from its milieu of interaction with other governments and institutions. If one of such institutions constitutes the threat to the government’s wellbeing, the adjustment by knowledge acquisition can simply involve the government’s adoption or acceptance of the standpoint that the institution favors.

With respect to forest management in Cameroon, the Cameroon government perceived the World Bank as an institution that could significantly hurt the government by making the provision of Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) dependent on Cameroon’s reform of its forest sector. John Tazifor Tajoche narrates that in early 1990, Cameroon suffered terribly from economic crisis under World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs that paralyzed the government. Most urban places in the country became sites of popular protest that were known as “operation ghost towns,” which involved citizens’ engagement in violent demonstrations that seriously destroyed government’s infrastructure. The weak economy put the government of President Paul Biya at the risk of political collapse. SAC-III was absolutely necessary for the government to avoid this fall and to recover the economy. Therefore, when the Bank made the

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28. John Tazifor Tajoche, Cameroon History in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Buea: Education Book Center, 2003), 248.
disbursement of SAC-III dependent on Cameroon government’s reform of the forest sector, the later perceived this Bank’s conditionality measure as politically hurtful. The government averted the adversity by learning and adopting some new forest management values in its interaction with the Bank. This learning and adoption led to the grand forest reforms that resulted in the promulgation of the 1994 forest law – a law that contains both the World Bank’s forest management values and Cameroon government’s conservation of some of its pre-1994 forest management approaches.

The Forest Law of 1994

The forest law of 1994 is a good example of the product of the combination of country ownership and conditionality that results in a modification of what both policies stand for in particular context. Taken in its entirety, this law is neither what the government wanted in country ownership nor what the Bank wanted in conditionality measures. Rather, it is a model of the simultaneous union and exclusion of conditionality and ownership in the sense that it includes certain elements that the government wanted in the law while excluding others, and it includes some elements that the Bank wanted while excluding others. In this regard, the law is an exemplar of the COH in action. These elements can be examined under the strength of the legal framework for forest management, the allocation of logging concessions, requirement of the forest management plan, forest zones, and highly politically debated incentives for forest sustainability and economic enrichment from forest exploitation.

One can hardly deny Seymour and Dubash’s contention that the 1981 Forest Law that constituted Cameroon’s “ownership” of its legal framework for forest management was weak, and as such could not serve as a strong regulatory tool for planning land use, protecting the
forest, and guiding forest resource exploitation in Cameroon.\textsuperscript{29} One evidence of Seymour and Dubash’s assertion can be gleaned from Jolanda van den Berg’s disappointment that “this law provided for a system of local taxes to be paid in a national fund, which in theory should have financed development activities throughout Cameroon, but in practice hardly served as such.”\textsuperscript{30} It was a law that failed to consider eminent corruption in the country by making stipulations without consideration for enforcement mechanisms. The law also abolished direct negotiations between logging companies and local peoples,\textsuperscript{31} and provided for the creation of national forest reserve that served for economic enrichment of the nation and as a tool for political maneuvers (see earlier discussion on prebendalism).\textsuperscript{32} M. P. E. Parren \textit{et al.} note further evidence of this lack of enforcement provisions in the law. The 1981 law allocated 20\% of the national territory to gazette forest, the equivalent pf 1.9 million ha of forest reserve. However, annual production from unreserved forest alone stood at 3.7 million m\textsuperscript{3}.\textsuperscript{33} These weaknesses were the results of a sovereign nation’s formulation of its forest management regulations as it deems fir for itself – the spirit of country ownership.

Through conditionality, the Bank sought to roll-back the state from this high involvement in forest management. It called for the restoration of direct negotiation links between forest companies and local peoples, and this was inserted in the 1994 forest law. It insisted on legal

\textsuperscript{29} Seymour and Dubash, “The Right Conditions,” 63.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 227.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 224.
provisions for enforcing the law.\textsuperscript{34} However, the Law retained the creation of national forest reserve (30\% of national surface area), and it re-positioned the government at the center of all forest management as the state valued in the 1981 forest Law.\textsuperscript{35} Although the law put in place mechanisms for enforcement of the forest management regulations,\textsuperscript{36} it ended up being neither as strong as the Bank wanted through conditionality nor as weak as the government wanted through ownership that sought to preserve the status quo. Therefore, although the World Resources Institute and Biodiversity Support Program attempt to make one believe that the law introduced “far reaching changes,”\textsuperscript{37} Gregore Sieböck is also somewhat right in describing the law as “a significantly watered-down forestry law [that] was eventually passed in 1994.”\textsuperscript{38} The allocation of forest concessions is one area that embodies this strength and weakness.

Seymour and Dubash note that prior to the promulgation of the 1994 Forest Law, the Prime Minister of Cameroon had the sole discretion over the allocation of logging concessions in the country. The Minister of Agriculture, and later the Minister of Environment and Forestry, was responsible for granting small “Sales of Standing Volume” (\textit{Ventes de Coupe}), which are logging permits issued only to Cameroonians for forest exploitation within 2,500 ha. \textit{Licenses} were awarded for larger concessions. These \textit{licenses} were renewable when logging companies wanted.\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{tabular}{l}
\textsuperscript{35} Government of Cameroon, \textit{Law No. 94/01 of 20 January 1994}, Section 8(2) and Section 20, and Section 40 (1) and (3). \\
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., Section 1, and Part VI (Prosecution of Offenses). \\
\textsuperscript{37} World Resource Institute and Biodiversity Support Program, “The World Bank, Conditionalities, and Forest Sector Reform,” 1. \\
\textsuperscript{39} Seymour and Dubash, \textit{The Right Conditions}, 63.
\end{tabular}
Topa et al. write that the Bank sought through the process conditionality measures in SAC-III to take away this discretionary power from the Prime Minister. Precisely, the Bank called for the “adoption of new, detailed regulations for awarding harvesting rights, including revised selection criteria and an external validation mechanism involving an independent observer.”\(^{40}\) The law ended up introducing public auction as the method of allocating forest concessions. This approach found favor with the Bank as the institution considered the method to be based on transparent, more revenue generating, and less corruption-susceptible.\(^{41}\) It also received the favor of the government on two grounds. Firstly, the approach enables the government to capture more income from the sales of standing volumes.\(^{42}\) Secondly, although the 1994 forest law takes away discretionary concession allocation powers from the Prime Minister by introducing public auction, the government maintains the right to overrule allocation committee’s recommendations in cases where it thinks that the national interest is under threat.\(^{43}\) Topa et al. also observe that the Bank saw the law as a step forward but not satisfactory because despite the introduction of auctions that the government resisted, there were potential transparency crisis because the government still had a role that the Bank perceived as excessive in the allocation of concessions and guarantee of sustainable forest management.\(^{44}\) Yet, Cameroon owned the law as the President signed it into effect, and the Bank eventually approved SAC-III.

Sustainable forest management was one of the key issues in the 1994 forest law. Prior to 1994, the government enforced sustainability under the system of licenses that were issued

\(^{40}\) Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 28.


\(^{42}\) Ibid., no.94.

\(^{43}\) Government of Cameroon, Law No. 94/01 of 20 January, 1994, Section 47 (3).

\(^{44}\) Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 22-24.
following agreement between forest exploiters and the government. The Independent Observer, Global Witness, iterates that under this system, holders of licenses had the right to log exclusively for export or for local processing with restrictions on some species.\footnote{Global Witness, \textit{Project of Independent Observation in Support of Forest Law Enforcement in Cameroon}, Report No. 017 En (July 2002), 2. Global Witness. Accessed January 19, 2014. \url{http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/017En-F.pdf}} According to Seymour and Dubash, there were no management requirements for \textit{ventes de coupe} and \textit{licenses}.\footnote{Seymour and Dubash, \textit{The Right Conditions}, 63.} Against this oxymoron of sustainability measures that the Cameroonian government “owned,” The World Bank in SAC-III required that there should be procedures for preparing, approving, and monitoring forest management. The role of monitoring and assessing the implementation of forest management plans would be performed by international nongovernmental organizations. Furthermore, there should be a guarantee system to ensure compliance with forest management plans.\footnote{Topa et al., \textit{The Rainforest of Cameroon}, 28.} The net effect of the interactions between country ownership and conditionality with respect to sustainability was the introduction of forest management plans, with the Forest Administrator (state services in charge of the forest) reserving the right to determine whether a plan is observed or not.\footnote{Government of Cameroon, \textit{Law No. 94/01 of 20 January 1994}, Sections 22(2), 29(5), 31(1) and 37(2).} The requirement of management plans in the law satisfied a government interested in capturing revenue from its approval of such plans, and it pleased the Bank in its hope that the implementation of such plans “will make more transparent a process [of forest zones management] which in the past contained serious abuses.”\footnote{World Bank, \textit{Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project.} nos. 15 and 16.}

Forest zones in the 1994 forest law were also different from previous land use plan. Cyprian Jum \textit{et al.} remark that from the colonial days to the promulgation of this law, the top-to-bottom directed structure and process of forest management characterized by the state-centered
expropriation of natural wealth in Cameroon excluded local communities from rights to controlling specific forest spaces. Villages as collective entities could not access and benefit economically from forest resources. The national context that called for this exclusion was the consolidation of post-colonial affiliation of citizens to the unifying identity of the state. In the first two decades after independence, most African states were nations in transition from fidelity to colonial masters to faithfulness to a collective identity as a state. Consequently, most regulations and *modus operandi* of African governments privileged the role of the state in ensuring national prosperity – a role that had the psychological effect of causing citizens to identify themselves with the state.

No wonder then, as Mbatus observes, that the 1972 constitution of Cameroon amplified the politico-material vision of the state as an organism that is intended to “exploit its natural wealth in order to ensure the well-being of every citizen by raising living standards.” The mention of “every citizen” implied the minimization of the exploitation of natural resources by local communities for their own benefits. Consequently, the government in Law No. 81-13 of 27 November 1981 zoned forests as state, local councils, private and communal (communes) forests. Oyono makes it clear that *communes* simply implies basic territorial units of the decentralization of the national government. Therefore, “communes” forest gazette does not imply any loss of forest control by the state.

51. Most African states achieved independence from colonial and mandated masters’ rule in the 1960s.
In this *esprit de l'état*, local peoples had little or no bargaining rights with logging companies over the use of the forest that “belonged” to the former. Geschiere invokes sympathy for the local communities when he dramatizes their fate under this system:

Under the former rules [before the 1994 law], a company was held to come to some sort of agreement with the population that took mostly the form of a *cahier des charges* (a written list of obligations). In practice these amounted to a series of *ad hoc cadeaux* (food, palm-wine, shirts for the local soccer team, etc) and sometimes assistance for constructing a school or a bridge. However, the villagers could hardly exercise pressure on the company in case of differences of opinion regarding these charges. When a conflict threatened, the administration invariably sided with the company, and in those days the gendarmes knew how to quench any resistance. After all, a fixed principle of all the legislation concerning the forest, ever since the colonial state imposed its authority on the area was that all forest, as far as it was not cleared and cultivated, belonged to the state. . . .

The World Bank, having considered these exclusion and drama as a hindrance to “rational and sustainable management of the forests,” sought to end the crisis by using the approval of SAC-III as a process conditionality measure to demand the “the designation of areas in nonpermanent forests for future community forests.” Following this conditionality request, the government modified its stand on the forest zone and began looking at community forest as economically beneficial to local peoples. Consequently, “forestry blocks” became attributable to local peoples based on simplified management plans. However, the management of such forest continues to respect the centrality of the state. This is because according to the reference that Section 37 (6) makes to Section 16 of Law No.94-1 of January 20, 1994, community forest management remains bounded by the state’s master plan for regional development. On another note, in the said Law, the government did not entirely abrogate the old forest classification;

57. Ibid., no. 3.3.13.
rather, community forest was simply added as one other forest zone into the old politically crafted classification. The effect of this integration is multiple forest zones as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Forest zones of Cameroon

Source: Based on the provisions of Sections 20, 22, 24, and 34 of Forest Law No.94-01 of January 20, 1994.
Political Bandwagonism for Forest Reforms

From the rationale of conditionality, one can say that conditionality is characterized by the bandwagon effect. Scott G. Dacko describes the bandwagon effect as a social science behavior theory that asserts that as the number of people who embrace a view increases, others will jump onto the bandwagon. This theory assumes that the acceptance of ideas diffuses as previous success in spreading the idea creates group pressure.\(^{59}\) In political terms, more political actors will accept propositions as the number of people who have already done so increases. In the context of forest reforms in Cameroon,\(^{60}\) the theory implies that as the Bank politically asserts its reform vision and galvanizes support around it, politicians in Cameroon will eventually become unable to resist the Bank’s vision; rather, they will succumb to what the Bank wants.

However, absolute sovereignty theory suggests that nations tenaciously defend themselves against external compulsions in order to uphold their legitimacy. One thing that is common between the assumption of the bandwagon effect theory and the absolute sovereignty theory is balance theory. As Dacko notes, this theory affirms that the strength of the relationship between marketers and customers is directly proportional to the extent to which marketing actors satisfy deep-rooted individual desires and motives.\(^{60}\) With respect to the place of the COH in reforms associated with political support, this theory implies that national politicians will hop unto the bandwagon only when the bandwagon, in one way or another, favors their personal interest. This is the theoretical foundation of the legal and policy based national political support for the Bank’s view of efficiency, transparency, accountability, and productivity in forest management in Cameroon.


\(^{60}\) Ibid., 42.
Support for Productivity with Sustainability

One of the novelties of the 1994 Forest Law is the introduction of concession or Forestry Management Unit (FMU), popularly known by the French acronym UFA (unités forestières d’aménagement). A concession is essentially a forest land in which a license-holder “is granted the right to collect a specific volume of wood . . . for the long-term supply of his wood-processing industry or industries.” Concessions are granted to both Cameroon nationals and foreigners. The Bank argues that before concessions came into existence, companies had no incentives to manage forest sustainably because no benefits were allocated as reward for good forest management. This is because the pre-1994 legislation did not allow the transfer of contracted exploitable forest spaces, and access to these maximum 200,000 ha concessions was only limited to five years. Consequently, companies could not benefit from previous practices during subsequent felling cycles. According to Rob Glastra, the effect of this was that companies engaged in quick deforestation to maximize profits within the allowable short-term.

Sieböck iterates that as a solution to this sustainability problem, the Bank conditioned the approval of SAC-III on the government’s legalization of forty years concession life-span. Furthermore, as Seymour and Dubash observe, the Bank also requested that the concessions size should cover a maximum area of 500,000 ha.

Cameroonian politicians at the National Assembly vehemently objected to both conditions. According to Seymour and Dubash, the forty years concession life span would have limited the amount of bribe-money that the politicians made from frequent approval of the

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61. Government of Cameroon, Law No. 94-01, Section 46.
64. Seymour and Dubash, Right Conditions, 66.
renewal of concessions. They also argued to the public that the 500,000 ha concession size would open vast areas of Cameroon forests to plundering. However, some of these politicians owned shares in concessions. Thus, their personal pecuniary interest could not permit a total ban on concessions. Therefore, owning its own reforms amidst conditionality pressure from the Bank, the National Assembly promulgated a law, which allows that concessions in the permanent domain shall last for fifteen years renewable (also assessed every three years), and the maximum concession size remains 200,000 ha. Within the active concession timeframe, companies still could not export logs.

Another productivity measure that brought conditionality into contact with the political dimension of country ownership was the issue of log export ban. It was the one issue in which the prescriptive character of conditionality became reactive, and the reactive nature of ownership in these reforms became prescriptive. Boniface Essama-Nssah and James Jerome Gockowski are of the opinion that Cameroon has always believed that it benefits from its natural resources when they are processed locally. This is the reason why in 1981 the government limited the exportation of timber to 40% of the entire production. During the forest reforms debates of the 1990s, the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) submitted a bill to the National Assembly

65. Seymour and Dubash, Right Conditions, 66.
66. Government of Cameroon, Law No.94-01, Section 46 (2) and Section 49.

It is worthy to note that although the Bank approved of this middle ground as a step in the satisfaction of its conditionality measures, the Bank now pushes for a complete elimination of any limits to the life span of a concession. It now wants concessions to be granted for life. However, the Bank laments that both the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon (in a February 2011 meeting) and the Minister of Finance (during the 2011 spring meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and on other occasions) are not totally resistant to such allocation of concessions for an indefinite period. Their stand is that they do not see the permanent allocation of land to timber companies as a move that will bring sufficient economic benefits to the state (versus other options such as renewal of concession exploitation-contracts or permits. See World Bank. Cameroon - Forest and Environment Development Program Project: Report No: ICR2223 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), no. 27. Accessed February 1, 2014. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/01/16388332/cameroon-forest-environment-development-program-project-cameroon-forest-environment-development-program-project
that called for a complete ban on log exportation – a 100% local processing of all logs prior to export. The party viewed a total ban as a clear-cut policy that is easier to implement.\textsuperscript{67}

As David Harvey indicates, the principle of comparative advantage on which neoliberalists base their glorification of the market favors not just the liberalization of trade, but also the elimination of export controls.\textsuperscript{68} It is obvious, therefore, that the neoliberal World Bank reacted by opposing this total log ban view of the government. The Bank argues that this idea fosters “the establishment of industries that can survive only because they have access to raw timber at preferential prices, resulting in significant lower forestry revenue.”\textsuperscript{69}

Considering that real life policy decision and application neither always follows country ownership nor conditionality, but the COH, a compromise position was found in the forestry law. This position requires that 70% of all production of each species of log shall be processed locally for a transitional period of five years (1994 to 1999), after which a total ban on log exportation will take effect as the government wanted.\textsuperscript{70} After June 30, 1999, when a complete ban on log exportation was imposed on rare hardwoods such as iroko (\textit{Milicia excels}), moabi (\textit{Baillonella toxisperma}), and bubinga species (\textit{Guibourtia demeusei}, \textit{Guibourtia pellegriniana}, and \textit{Guibourtia tessmannii}), the law continuously opens a loophole to accommodate subsequent log export by giving room for the payment of graduated surtax on unprocessed forest exports.\textsuperscript{71} This loophole generates revenue for the state and partially falls in line with the export economics argument of the Bank. The Bank’s valuation of forest resources in Cameroon is not limited to

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
\bibitem{69} World Bank, \textit{Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No. P-7244-CM}, no. 58.
\bibitem{70} Government of Cameroon, \textit{Law No.94-01}, Section 71 (1) and (2).
\bibitem{71} Ibid., Section 66.
\end{thebibliography}
revenue from log export but also to a wider variety of economic practices such as market based auction of concessions and the tax system.

Support for Neoliberal Efficiency and Transparency: Auction and Independent Observer

It had earlier been stated that the current economic model of the World Bank is neoliberalism. Rosario Espinal avows that neoliberals bet economic efficiency on the free market and their exalted market is “the optimal space for the production and distribution of wealth and . . . the optimal vehicle for social mobility.” 72 Therefore, to them the subjection of forest resources to market forces guarantees the efficient use of the resources for economic progress. Espinal further insinuates that in as much as privileging the market challenges state led developmentalism, neoliberal economics often finds itself at daggers drawn with the political centralization of the state in national governance. 73

Despite this contrast between valorized free market and state interventionist development vilified as inefficient, the possibility of converting political capital into economic capital and vice-versa unite the two frontiers. Richard H. Robbins says that a J.P. Morgan currency strategist faced with the question of what political system (authoritarian or democratic) better fostered economic growth suggested that “rules that encourage the centralization of power and the depletion of political capital also allow for greater accumulation of economic capital” 74 because such rules can be easily applied to measures that generate revenue. It is through this conversion dynamism between political and economic capitals that auction became the method of awarding

73. Ibid., 33.
74. Richard H. Robbins, Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002), 373.
concessions, and independent observer became part of the forest management process to guarantee transparency, and a system of taxation was introduced into the forestry sector.

The government had always preferred to award concession unilaterally to companies, because it provides the opportunity for politicians to benefit from large sums of money from the corporations. Seymour and Dubash narrate that such was the case in 1997 when the government defied the public bidding system introduced in the 1994 forest law and granted two concessions to French logging companies. Although the World Bank at the time had a fragile dialogue relationship with the government over economic conditionality issues such as privatization, the Bank reacted strongly against this move by stacking the approval of SAC-III on the annulment of the provisional concessions. Proper market-based auction, the Bank argued, would generate more revenue for the state as the highest bidder will receive the concession award. Furthermore, the Bank required that the government put in place an independent observer (IO) of the forest management process as condition for the disbursement of the second tranche of SAC-III. The international IO will adjudicate the attribution of concessions, monitor and publish on activities in the forest sector so as to prevent unlawful award of concessions, illegal logging, and to foster transparency in forest management.

Following interactions between conditionality and ownership, the competitive bidding approach became lawful, although the free-market is really not “free” in this process. This is because as Topa et al. indicate, there is an Interministerial Commission for Awarding Forest Concessions that also examines the technical capacity of the bidder to determine eligibility. An IO is part of this Commission and it reports to the Minister of Forest on the integrity of the

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76. Ibid., Annex C: 82.
auction process. In the person of the IO, the government loses political capital, but it gains economic capital in the auction process. From this economic capital, the government regains its political capital by sponsoring its own State Forest Service that the IO advises. This Service monitors forest activities at the levels of FMU, regional and national forests. Within the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MINEF), there is a Central Control Unit (CCU) linked to the Minister’s office. As Philippe Auzel et al. list, the CCU collects and centralizes data from its provincial offices, undertakes control missions, compares field date with the National Forestry Database System (SIGIF), and proposes sanctions against defaulters in the management of concessions by different stakeholders.

Stakeholders Involvement in Forest Management

Stakeholders’ involvement in forest management in Cameroon can be looked at from two perspectives: the participation of stakeholders in the formulation of regulations and policies and the inclusion of stakeholders in the forest activities such as logging, clearing, and afforestation. In the first case, stakeholders are agent causal-beneficiaries in the sense that they create or put in place underlying frameworks such as regulations from which they can derive certain benefits. In the second perspective, stakeholders are direct causal actors in the sense that their actions have direct effects on recipients. In the first case, for example, stakeholders make or influence the making of forest laws; in the second, stakeholders act within the physical limits of forests, and their actions have effects on the forests.

77. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 39-40.
Agency theory in sociology emphasizes the first perspective by focusing on the causal agent, while the transaction cost theory in economics capitalizes on the second by insisting on the effects of action. However, these two perspectives are related by the fact that the effect is really the result of a trans-action (from one actor to another) posited by agents. As one can comprehend from reading Jill Solomon, this link is the standpoint of stakeholder theory.\(^8\) It is also the theoretical foundation for stakeholders’ involvement as perceived by the Bank and the government in shaping forest management in Cameroon. Liviu Amariei provides a long list of these stakeholders. He writes:

At national level, the most important stakeholder groups are the Government, as the owner of the forest resource base; the private sector, represented through three Professional Associations of Forest Extraction Companies, (representing international, national, and national young entrepreneurs’ interests, respectively: Groupement de la Filière de Bois Camerounaise, Syndicat des Exploitants Forestiers du Cameroun and le Syndicat des Jeunes Exploitants forestiers du Cameroun); the local communities that are represented in the National Assembly; and the civil society, including NGOs and universities. An additional stakeholder group that has been very active in shaping the policy and legal framework during the last decade is the international donor community, acting through organisations such as the World Bank, the European Union, FAO, UNDP, IMF; NGOs such as IUCN, WWF and Global Witness, and national overseas development agencies such as DFID, GTZ, AFD, CIDA/ACDI and SNV.

At the local level the most important stakeholder groups are the administrations at district and sub-district level, while the business sector is represented through individual processing companies, concessionaires and loggers. Local communities are also active at this level through Local administrations and village chiefs. The civil society is not well organised at the local level, for example, NGOs do not play an important role at this level. The international community is present also at local level through individual donor-driven projects and their management teams.\(^8\)

\(^8\) Jill Solomon, *Corporate Governance and Accountability* (West Sussex: John Willey and Sons Ltd., 2010), 16.


http://www.fao.org/forestry/195800b266e69b6880da012e1a1875f2319a15.pdf

The full names of the abbreviated stakeholders are as follows: FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), UNDP (United Nations Development Program), IUCN (International Union of the Conservation of Nature), WWF (World Wildlife Fund), AFD (Agence Française de Développement, known in English as French Development Agency), GTZ (German Technical Cooperation), CIDA/ACDI (Canadian International Development Agency) and SNV (Netherlands Development Organization). To the donor community that included the World Bank, the FAO, UNDP, WWF, SNV, and IUCN, Topa *et al.* add the ADA (African Development Bank) and the
From the above list, a few points need to be pointed out. The first concerns the Bank’s stakeholder selection. In the causal-beneficiaries micro-cycle, the Bank conditioned the approval of SAC-III on the involvement of both public and private stakeholders in the consultations, information gathering, and debates that characterized the process of designing the 1994 forest law. It involved its technical expert team, other international organizations, and the private sector in this process. The government was present through its MINEF, and the presence of NGOs fortified country ownership. The effect of these multiple stakeholders with varied self-interest was a tense situation. Boniface Essama-Nssah and James J. Gockowski observe that the government of Cameroon (Presidency, Prime Ministry, and MINEF) was not genuinely committed to the forest reforms. Key stakeholders such as foreign logging companies and the Cameroon parliament were in opposition to the reform. The Bank itself failed to formulate an implementation strategy compatible with the political, social, and economic realities of Cameroon. One other issue was that although the discussions of these different stakeholders – especially from the Bank – led to the inclusion of local communities as agents of forest sustainability and economic beneficiaries of forest products, local communities were not included in the law drafting process.


With the exclusion of local communities from the debates that led to the enactment of the 1994 forestry law, the Bank cannot, therefore, be totally right in claiming that its development objective in Cameroon’s forest has not only
Nevertheless, the inclusion of local communities as direct causal actors in the forest management law is a very significant novelty that contrasts with the old provisions of the government. It is really the product of the COH. The 1994 forest law speaks of such a community as a “village”. To procure a community forest, the village has to prepare a simple management plan, and sign a convention with the Ministry of Forest and Wildlife (MINFOF). The procurement is based on a pre-emption right – a legal reference by which local communities can request ownership of a forest within their village from the government. According to the Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement (CED), this right encourages local communities to own forests. Thomas K. Erdmann notes that although the acquisition is by right, the exploitation of the local community forest has to be small-scale logging as prescribed by MINFOF. Vabi et al. add that the benefits from this logging go to the village.

Furthermore, as Jean-Christopher Carret observes, local communities receive forestry fees in accordance with the decentralized forestry taxation system. The two types of taxes paid by timber companies to local communities as direct or indirect transfers are annual forestry fees and

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84. Republic of Cameroon, Law No.94-01, Section 37 (1).
85. In 2004, the government split MINEF into the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) and the Monistry of the Environment and Protection of Nature (MINEP).
86. Ibid., Section 37 (1), (2), and (7).
a sort of royalty or “ecotax” of CFA 1,000 (U.S $1.50) per cubic meter of timber exploited in a vente de coupe that a village claims customary right over.\textsuperscript{90}

The discussion in this chapter has focused on the application of the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector. Two points are worthy of note from the discussion. First, there was negotiation between the Bank and the government of Cameroon in the reform of Cameroon’s forest sector. Second, reform ideas and policies put forth by the Bank came into contact with those expressed by the Cameroon government. The totality of the outcome of this contact was neither what the Bank put forth, nor what the Cameroon government suggested. Rather, in the interactions, the policies attained a life of their own as the COH. The next chapter focuses on how this COH has impacted forest management in Cameroon.

CHAPTER 5
IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONDITIONALITY-OWNERSHIP HYBRID ON FOREST MANAGEMENT IN CAMEROON

This study seeks an answer to one question: in what way has the relationship between World Bank’s conditionality and ownership affected forest management in Cameroon within the context of the international dependency development model? Having detailed the nature of conditionality and ownership as distinct policies, established the hybridized relationship between the two policies, and exposed the implementation of this hybrid in Cameroon’s forest sector within the context of the Cameroon’s dependence on World Bank’s international development assistance, it is appropriate at this point to turn to an analysis of how this implementation has affected the management of forests in Cameroon. This management, as earlier mentioned according to Brown and Ekoko’s studies on Cameroon’s forest sector, involves the maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest. Therefore, it is in analyzing how the COH affects these four dimensions in Cameroon’s forest management that one can attempt to answer the status questionis of this study. In doing this, one will be examining essentially how the COH affects what Carl Alwin calls “la possibilité” of forests – the forests’ resource yield, resource exploitation, exploitation direction or control, and necessary checks to ensure that the regulatory framework on the forest is respected by stakeholders.

From the previous chapters of this work, especially chapter four on the implementation of the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector, this study is concerned with forest possibilities. As indicated earlier, the determination and regulation of forest possibilities in Cameroon involves firm decisions and regulations to achieve certain forest-based objectives, and to monitor the attainment of these objectives specified in the national forest policy. These objectives, from the research of Brown and Ekoko earlier mentioned, usually fall into four main categories:
maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest resource exploitation. The administrative, economic, legal, and social components of the planning and regulation of forests are integrated into these categories. Formulating the objective categories and integrating the planning and regulation of forests into them imply that the planning and regulation affect the objective categories. This is the standpoint of the alternative hypothesis formulated in chapter one of this work, as opposed to the null hypothesis that negates this relational impact.

One can conceptualize this impact in terms of what Alwin speaks of as “la possibilité”. Forest possibilities are not restricted to what the forest can generate from a material perspective; rather, they also include in the broad sense the different ways in which the forest can be shaped by the administrative, economic, legal, and social actions of human agents. This shaping is at the center of forest management; it is the focal point in the implementation of the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector. This chapter is concerned with the precise way in which this implementation has configured Cameroon’s forest sector by shaping the maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest resources in the country. This is the last of the four questions into which the problematic of this study was divided.

To answer this sub-question of the problematic, one needs to keep track of the COH and its implementation in Cameroon’s forest sector (the $x$ factor, or independent variable). One also has to use necessary methodology (statistics, GIS, cost-benefit analyses, and juxtaposition of hidden and public transcripts) to link this $x$ factor to the maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forests in the country (the $y$ factor, or dependent variable).
Implementation of the COH in the Forest Sector: Disparity of Emphasis in Forest Management Categories

From the discussion in chapter four herein, there are thirteen main features of the COH as realized in Cameroon’s forest sector. These thirteen elements can be classified into the categories of maintenance, use, monitoring and control of forests.

As shall be discussed below, forest maintenance is the core of sustainable forest management. The three features of the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector that fit into the maintenance category are the introduction of forest management plans, the zoning of the national forest estate into permanent and non-permanent forests, and the inclusion of local communities as stakeholders that will presumably not use high capacity machines to exploit forest vastly, and as such guarantee forest sustainability.

Six features of the COH in the nation’s forest sector are directed at the use of forest resources for different purposes. These include public auction by which interested entities procure concessions to exploit for economic purpose; the requirement of forest management plans to be submitted to the government within the first three years of forest allocation, the right given to holders of concessions licenses to exploit resources from the concession for a period of 15 years renewable (with assessment of the concession at three years interval), restrictions on the exportation of logs, the inclusion of foreign logging corporations as stakeholders although they resisted the forest reforms of the mid 1990s, and the granting of community forest to villages so that they can exploit for their own economic, social and anthropological enrichment. Table 5 displays these and other features in their respective forest management categories.
Table 5. Implementation of the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Feature in the COH</th>
<th>Feature of the COH in Cameroon’s Forest Sector</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policies designer</td>
<td>World Bank and Country</td>
<td>1) World Bank and Cameroon government put forth a policy and legal forest management framework (1994 forest law and its implementation degrees) that safeguards the interests and values of the Bank through conditionality and the Cameroon government through ownership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Intellectual Conviction  | Dynamic conservatism and social learning moves Bank and national governments to have some trust in each other’s knowledge and values related to forest management policies and laws in Cameroon | 2) A watered down forest law that, yet, sought to achieve a balance between the maintenance, utilization, monitoring and control of forests in Cameroon  
3) Public auction as method of allocating forest concessions to logging companies  
4) Government maintains right to rule on the final allocation of forests to applicants, and to reclaim forest from manager if government deems necessary  
5) Introduction of forest management plans  
6) Zoning of national forest estate into permanent forests (state forest and council forest) and non-permanent forests (communal, community, and private forests) |
| Political Support        | Political support is aimed at uniting political factions over laws and policies to ensure transparency, accountability, and neoliberal efficiency and productivity in the management of resources | 7) Introduction of concessions with license-holder having the right to collect specified volume of wood for long-term (15 years renewable, and assessed every three years) supply of his or her processing industry or industries  
8) 70% of log production processed locally from 1994 to 1999; increased export restriction after 1999 with some species exported after payment of graduated surtax  
9) Introduction of independent observer and monitor to ensure transparency and accountability in forest management |
| Stakeholders Involvement | Selective inclusion of stakeholders who are in consensus with country governments’ vision and interest and without hindrance to the interest and vision of the Bank | 10) MINEF present, not genuinely committed to reforms, but maintains (with MINATD) control of reforms implementation  
11) Foreign logging companies oppose reforms, but included as stakeholders  
12) Bank present as stakeholder, but does not formulate an implementation strategy compatible with the political, social and economic realities of Cameroon  
13) Local communities absent in reforms design process, but included as agents of forest sustainability, and economic and social beneficiaries of forests’ resources. |
Five features of the COH in the country’s forest sector focus on the administrative control of forest resource exploitation in Cameroon. These include: Feature 1 on the negotiations between the Bank and the Cameroon government as two main actors in formulating the forest sector policy and regulatory framework that embraced and excluded simultaneously some of their interests and values; Feature 2 that touches on the categorization of the forest law as a law that although it sought a balance between the maintenance, use, control and monitoring of forests in Cameroon, nevertheless, remains weak with respect to its implementation; Feature 5 that concerns the inclusion of forest management plans as a compulsory element of the forest management process; Feature 10 on the lack of commitment from government institutional representatives as stakeholders in the forest reforms; and Feature 12 related to the failure of the World Bank to come out with the 1994 forest law implementation strategy compatible with the political, social and economic realities of Cameroon.

Monitoring includes two features. These are Feature 4 on the right that the Cameroon government’s maintains to rule on the final allocation of forests to concession applicants and to reclaim forest from managers if the government judges that the body to whom the forest is allocated is poorly managing the forest; and Feature 9 that concerns the introduction of independent observers and monitors to ensure transparency and accountability in forest management.

Before examining the impact of these features on the maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forests in Cameroon, a significant analysis deserves close attention. The thirteen features are not equally distributed among the four categories of forest maintenance, use, control, and monitoring. Table 6 summarizes the numerical classification of these features.
Table 6. Classification of forest management elements and corresponding features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forest Management Categories</th>
<th>Associated Features</th>
<th>Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>Features 5, 6 and 13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilization</td>
<td>Features 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, and 13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Features 1, 2, 5, 10, and 12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Features 4 and 9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 also indicates the weighted points of features to corresponding forest management categories. This weighted point is simply the total number of features associated with a category. Figure 5 is a chart that displays the emphasis that the COH gives to each of the forest management elements.

![Figure 5. Disparity in emphasis that COH gives to categories of forest management](image)

Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 reveal that the areas of emphasis in the COH vis-à-vis forest management in Cameroon are exploitative use of the forest resources (37%) and the control of access and exploitation of forest by stakeholders (31%). Neoliberal economic policies conditionality from the World Bank stressed the use of forest management for economic enrichment. Political support dimension of ownership emphasized forest access control by the government of Cameroon. Maintenance focused on the wellbeing of the object of attention,
namely, the forest. Monitoring that deals with what the public deserves, namely, transparency and accountability on forest management, constitutes 13%.

With 25% weighted average as the level of equal significance of the four categories, maintenance of the forest and monitoring have little significance compared to use and control in the direction of the COH to forest management in Cameroon. There is, therefore, a disparity in the impact of the COH on forest management in Cameroon with respect to the categories of maintenance or sustainability of forests, use or exploitation of forest resources for anthropocentric purposes, the control that the Cameroon government has over the access to forests and exploitation of forest resources, and monitoring forest related activities to ensure accountability and transparency that the public deserves vis-à-vis the forest as wealth of the Cameroon nation and global environmental welfare. Having considered the forest management categories comparatively, it is necessary to pay closer attention to each of them.

**COH and the Maintenance of Forests**

As mentioned above, the maintenance of forest is the central concern of sustainable forest management. In the same year (1993) that the government of Cameroon and the World Bank were engaged in negotiations to formulate forest management laws and policies for the country, and when suggested policies and laws were interacting with each other, the Helsinki Ministerial Conference for the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) was discussing the multifunctional sustainability of forests at local, national, and global levels. This conference defined sustainable forest management as “the stewardship and use of forest in a way, and at a rate, that maintains their biodiversity, productivity, regeneration capacity, vitality, and their potential to fulfill, now and in the future, relevant ecological, economic and social functions, at local, national, and
global levels, and that does not cause damage to other ecosystems.\textsuperscript{1} The COH has affected sustainable forest management in Cameroon in the light of this definition. Key related elements in this definition are biodiversity and productivity, generational capacity and vitality, and the “now and in the future” or intergenerational element of forest management. The impact of the COH on the maintenance category of forest management shall be examined with respect to this grouping. Just as the definition suggests, this analysis shall insight from earth sciences, economics, and sociology.

**Biodiversity and Productivity**

One of the great impacts of the COH on forest management in Cameroon is the zoning of the Cameroon forest estate. This zoning allocates forest spaces to specific uses. Logging companies explore forest management units, which they log for their economic gains. Councils can, and do, secure forest spaces for the use and enrichment of the councils. Local communities can, and also own forests for their religious, social, economic, and cultural welfare. Through this zoning, biodiversity is conserved in forest reserves, and stakeholders can access non-permanent forests such as FMUs, community forests, and council forests for their own benefits. Figure 6 displays the current different zones of Cameroon’s forest estate.

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Liisa Saarenmaa criticizes the use of the word “maintains” in MCPFE’s definition of sustainable forest management. In her argument, “maintain” fails to capture the dynamic nature of ecosystems and of resource management that needs to satisfy human needs in today’s world. She suggests that this dynamic management embodies the “(i) exploitation that leads to reduction in the renewable resource, (ii) sustainable management that aims at maintaining the renewable resource, (iii) progressive management that aims at increasing the renewable resource.” Liisa Saarenmaa, “Sustainable Forest Management: Research Priorities and Coordination in Finland,” in *Sustainable Forest Management*, ed. J. Bo Larsen (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 1996), 196.

Saarenmaa’s argument, however, fails to consider that “to maintain” does not exclusively mean not to change. When technicians do maintenance work on a house, they do not seek to preserve the house in its original condition. Rather, they remove some components associated with the functioning and integrity of the house, preserve what still deserves to be preserved, and they add what will keep the house in the possible optimal condition. Analogically, maintenance as a function of sustainable forest management can embody simultaneously exploitation (removal) of renewable resources, preservation of forest resources, and additions (increase) to the renewable resource.
Figure 6. Map of the zones of Cameroon’s forest estate
Source: Generated with Cameroon Forest GIS Data (World Resource Institute, 2013)
The 2012 GIS Data on Cameroon Forest makes a significant revelation: for almost a century (1905 to 1995), Cameroon had just fifteen protected forest spaces that encouraged biodiversity growth. Through conditionality measures that called for the creation of more reserved forests and Cameroon government’s ownership of the need to protect its national biodiversity, eighteen protected forest areas were created and classified by the government in just two decades. Figure 7 represents this progress in chart from.

![Figure 7. Forests created and classified as protected areas from 1905 to 2012 in Cameroon](image)

Amidst this positive milestone, the COH has also caused significant biodiversity crisis in the country. The high cost of producing forest management plans coupled with a 50% devaluation of the CFA in 1994 as a function of the COH have forced local communities that intended to own community forests to seek, through a system of trade by batter, the assistance of logging companies with necessary financial and technical capacities to design the plan. In this
system, logging companies produce forest management plans for local communities in exchange for logging rights within the forest spaces of the communities. Intersection of the 2013 World Resource Institute’s GIS data for Cameroon’s FMU and community forests reveals that logging companies exploit resources in 268,953.019 km² of community forests that has a total area of 12,973,885.352 km². Let the area of intersection be $\Sigma A_{int}$, and let the total area of community forests be $\Sigma A_{comfrst}$. The percentage of community forests exploited by logging companies will be

\[
\frac{\Sigma A_{int}}{\Sigma A_{comfrst}} \times 100 = 2.07\%
\]

Charlie Pye-Smith envisions this phenomenon of logging companies exploiting resources within community forests as a serious threat to biodiversity conservation because community forests fall within the non-permanent forest zones that are not intended for biodiversity maintenance but for economic, social, and spiritual uses. On average, Cameroon loses 13.3% of its forest cover annually due to deforestation, in a country with an average of 2,400 species in a forest area of 2,700 km². Logging companies are deforesting 2.07% of community forests. This percentage value may seem insignificant. However, Nouhou Ndam et al. document that the forest in the Mount Cameroon area habitats an average of 2,400 species in an area of 2,700 km². This is a good representation of the biodiversity richness of forest in Cameroon – a richness that has caused the World Bank and the Cameroon government to engage in the creation of more protected forest areas in the country. If one extends the figures of Ndam et al to the national scene, one would find by simple proportion that an average of 239,069 species individuals are at risk in Cameroon forests because of logging by corporations. The situation is aggravated when

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3668735
one considers that this deforestation also goes in the FMU concessions of the giant logging companies directly procured from government. How right then must Philippe Auxel be to lament that in the country, “species composition [in the forests] has changed due to the over exploitation of high value timber species.”

The COH led to the legalization of non-permanent forest that can be exploited without concern for biodiversity conservation. The net effect of this laissez-faire regulation has been the increasing loss of Cameroon’s biodiversity under a myriad of factors sustained by the COH – factors that logging is only one of. Table 7 displays these factors.

Table 7. Biodiversity Threat under Policies and Laws upheld by the Bank and the Cameroon Government under the COH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities Provoking Habitat Change</th>
<th>Nature of Change</th>
<th>Loss of Biodiversity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forest Clearing for Agriculture</td>
<td>Flora and fauna vegetation lost, introduction of new species, e.g. cocoa, rubber, oil palm, etc</td>
<td>Loss of biodiversity in quality and quantity Many species under threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logging</td>
<td>Upset of ecological balance wildlife habitat removed</td>
<td>Reduced flora composition Threat to wildlife population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontrolled Hunting Poaching</td>
<td>Disturbance of wildlife management programme</td>
<td>Reduction of wild life population, ecosystem modification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel wood</td>
<td>Habitat destruction</td>
<td>Destruction of vegetation, erosion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The reason for this biodiversity crisis is that in the COH with respect to forest management in Cameroon, the stakeholders seek to enforce biodiversity maintenance as an environmental virtue by legal means but fail to interconnect this maintenance with economic and

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social insights. As Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edward, and Johanna Mang contend, neoliberal free trade introduced by conditionality measures into the COH encourages the exploitation of flora and fauna.\(^5\) For over four hundred years, neoclassical economic theorists upheld the domination of nature by human beings based on the ability of human beings to dominate and configure nature in a way that other animals and plans cannot do. The theories of hierarchies in ecology (for example, the superior complexity of tissues over cells, of populations over tissues, and of ecosystems over populations) corroborated the hierarchical structural system that neoclassical economists upheld. In this hierarchy, economic systems restrict and alter natural systems through based on a conception of time that does not follow the rules of nature. Tomde Schlichter iterates that in the neoclassical economics system time is a duration in which the “now” is most important. To natural systems, time is an unfolding of moments, and what is most important is that nature stabilizes itself in the unfolding process. Thus, “the economical system generates a malfunction and threatens the superior system with destruction and, by the same token, its own destruction.”\(^6\) The impact of privatization is an example of this malfunction.

Although privatization has promoted the involvement of different stakeholders in forest management, and thereby attempted to end profligate activities such as high bribery and corruption within the high ranks of government, David Humphrey argues that “privatization reduces the access rights of local communities and caters to the demands of markets for immediate financial returns. Market mechanisms tend to generate only those forests goods with monetary value that can be traded for profit. They cannot capture the full public goods value of


forests and thus promote a reductionist view of forests.”7 This reductionist view is also present in some local peoples’ approach to forest regeneration and vitality.

Forest Regeneration and Vitality

The COH is an example of neoliberals’ betting on local communities to manage forest spaces sustainably because the communities do not have heavy machines used by corporations to log vast areas of forest. Through collective action, local communities could resist threats to unsustainability within their forest spaces. Furthermore, the Bank’s sustainability argument in the COH was that the fallow cropping system of agriculture practiced by local peoples will give room for forest to regenerate before they cultivate in the same spaces again. Through ownership, these arguments led to the legalization of community forests.

An unfortunate element of this reasoning is its failure to define “community” within the context of Cameroon. The 1994 forest law uses the word “village” as synonymous to community. However, while it is possible to have a community spirit or sense of social bonding to others in a village, it is not always the case that such a spirit will reign. When one speaks of his or her village in Cameroon, one is talking of where one hails from in the line of ancestral descent. Immigrants who live in some villages do not identify where they currently reside as their village. The cases of the “came-no-go” in the South West Region and of the Baka pygmies in the East Province are evidence of this assertion that belonging to a community in Cameroon is based on ancestral ties and not residence in a place with geographical boundaries.

The political sociologists and anthropologists, Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh, note that descendants of persons from the French and Northwest Grassfield lands of Cameroon who were sent by their chiefs to labor in the plantations in the Bakweri villages at the South West Atlantic Coast of Cameroon are constantly referred to by the villages as “came-no-go” – a derogatory expression for immigrants to the Bakweri geographical village; an expression that refers to one without a home because one came from some other place into a new land, but one has not returned to one’s place of origin. This opposition between the descendants of settlers who are viewed by the “sons of the soil” (autochtones) as allogénes or strangers, feel rejected in the Bakweri lands. Thus, they do not work together with the Bakweri towards forest regeneration. Rather, with the leverage that their economic viability provides them, they buy lands in the South West Region, cut down the forest, and build houses. Such cut forest cannot regenerate.8

Geschiere sees the fate of the Baka pygmies as similar to the “came-no-gos.” Under the wave of political liberalization, the Baka who speak of themselves as people of the forest risk losing their citizen rights. To the CPDM government, one is valued in these days on multiparty politics in terms of what one can contribute to the victory of the CPDM in elections. To vote, one needs a national identification document. Vote power is the currency to buy government officials with vested interest in the forest and stop them from interfering in the forest spaces of local peoples. Without identification documents, the Baka pygmies lack this currency. Thus, their forests have been invaded by logging companies in which government officials own shares.9

According to Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, the effect of this invasion has been displacement of the pygmies, many of who now crowd the hunting, cultivating, and living spaces of the Bantus in the East Region. With the contestation of social and food security spaces between the pygmies and the Bantus, some pygmies move into living in other forest spaces. The consequence of this political liberalization, social contest, and resettlement is that logging companies that have chased the Baka pygmies out of the forest are deforesting areas once occupied by the pygmies, and the pygmies and destroying forest in new areas where they settle. Figure 8 shows the location of one such forest, namely CADENVI Ngoyla community forest (latitude 2.62278 and longitude 14.02666).

Figure 8. CADENVI Ngoyla as one of five community forests (marked cyan) in Ngoyla Area Source: Created Using GIS Cameroon Forest Data (World Resource Institute, 2013).

Figure 9 is a pixel view of the same forest location in 2000. It is a magnified view (1:523,978) of the vegetation map of Africa, which was published by the same Institute in 2004.

Figure 9. Pixel view of the mosaic forest and cropland of CADENVI Ngoya Forest in 2000. Source: Created using Africa Vegetation GIS Data of 2000 (World Resource Institute, 2004).

Figure 10 is a pixel view of the vegetation of the same forest space in 2013.

Figure 10. Pixel view of CADENVI Ngoya community forest area as rural complex in 2013. Source: Created using GIS Cameroon Forest Data (World Resource Institute, 2013)
The GIS data in Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5, and Figure 5.6 reveal the danger that the sociopolitical and anthropological phenomenon described by Geschiere and Nyamnjoh presents to forest regeneration and viability in Ngoyla community forest area. Comparing Figures 5.5 and 5.6, one sees that in 2000, the forest allocated to the community was mosaic/cropland forest. In 2013, this deforestation has occurred, and the forest has been transformed from forest land into rural complexes. This transformation implies a loss of biodiversity that inhabited the forest space in 2000.

One theory proposed by Phil Rene Oyono that accounts for the cause of this deforestation is the survival instinct under poverty theory, which says that local peoples easily, and intensively recourse to forest resources as a means of survival in a time of serious poverty as the sort that the devaluation of the CFA under World Bank and IMF conditionality measures caused in Cameroon. Devaluation brought about a fall in the purchasing power of consumers. For example, among the Bantu, the average annual income per family dropped from USD 83.5 to 20, and among the Baka pygmies from USD 25 to USD 6.5. Unfortunately, the SAP economic conditionality package of the Bank also caused increases in the prices of commodities in Cameroon. To survive, many families turned to the forest for food. Forests were cleared for planting of food crops and animals were hunted for food, thus depleting the forest biodiversity. 11

Sustainable natural resource management is an interdisciplinary phenomenon. If local peoples’ economic welfare is neglected, they will turn to the environment for their means of survival. Oyono’s theory suggests that it is simply in the nature of poor humankind to act in this

way for the purpose of self-preservation in existence. Economic welfare and environmental wellbeing cannot be alienated across the human life span.

“Now and in the Future”: Intergenerational Considerations of Forest Maintenance

Although decree no.0518/MINEF/CAB implementing the 1994 forest law as a product of the COH prioritizes community forests, this high cost of producing a forest management plan causes many communities to forfeit their rights to own forest lands. A GIS analysis of Cameroon’s forest data in 2013 shows that only 151 local communities out of the 375 that have submitted applications for community forests ownership (40.26%) have been able to produce the plan.12 Communities without forest management plans are at the risk of forfeiting ownership rights to their forest lands. These are lands that the communities had possessed in the traditional and historical contexts in which land in Africa was perceived a property of the commons. Fondo Sikod iterates that this cultural perception “ensured the conservation of certain plant and animal species through the system of taboos.”13 Furthermore, forest land under this perception was not viewed in the capitalist sense of commodities to be sold and bought, but in the anthropological sense of intergenerational assert.

12. For this GIS analysis, I used the GIS forest data for Cameroon published by the World Resource Institute in 2013. The shapefile used was CMR_Fcom_2013 that contains data on community forest in Cameroon. In this analysis, I inserted a data frame in ArcMap, and labelled it Com_FMP (for Community Forest Management Plan). I then opened the attribute table of CMR_Fcom_2013. The field named “DATE_PSG” has the dates the forest management plan associated with a particular community forest was approved. After clicking on “Select by Attributes” and ensuring the method is to create a new selection, I double clicked “DATE_PSG”. I then clicked >, then clicked Get Unique Values, followed by a double click of ‘’. Therefore, the expression box read: "DATE_PSG" > ‘ ‘ I ended the query operation by clicking Apply. Looking under the field labeled “ATTRIBUTAI,” I noticed, for example, that the management plans of the forest attributed to Cobadem have not been approved, while that of Tinto has been approved. I then calculated the selected data in cyan (151) as a percentage of the total number of community forests (375) visible at the bottom of the attribute table with selected data.

As Ambe J. Njoh explains, this sense means that distant past generations in Cameroon considered themselves custodians of lands for future generations. Ownership of forest lands was preserved within family and village circles. Mike A. Yanou and Patience Sone iterate that proprietorship of forest lands was not lost because lands were not valued in economic terms and sold to raise money for family and village needs. Rather, as Yanou and Sone add, forest lands were involuntarily surrendered as spoils in cases of war. Temngah Joseph Nyambo notes that forest lands were also possessed by inheritance along with family lands, thereby ensuring that families always owned their lands. According to Emmanuel Neba Ndenacho, these family and community owned forest lands were preserved, voluntarily offered by owners to migrants for house construction and small scale agricultural purpose, and forest resource exploitation was moderate for religious rites, medicinal objectives, and basic family agricultural subsistence purposes.

The COH has changed this ancestral perception of the integration of anthropocentric necessities and the stewardship of the environment for the needs of future generations. Phil Rene Oyono, Charlotte Kouna, and William Mala carried out an ecological anthropology study in the local communities of Akok, Kaya, and Koli-Ngoumou in Cameroon to access how the present generation in the COH era of forest management in the country perceives nowadays’ access to

16. Ibid., 88.
forest resource benefits in the country in an intergenerational timeline. Their findings are represented in Figure 11.

![Distribution of 100 pebbles in Akok, Kaya2, and Koli-Ngoumou representing the perception of intergenerational access to forest resources (vertical axis)](image)

Figure 11. Disparities in Intergenerational Access to Forest Resources as Perceived by the Akok, Kaya, and Koli-Ngoumou Local Communities in Cameroon.

Source: Stakeholders’ perception of intergenerational access to forest resources data used in constructing this chart was obtained from Phil Rene Oyono, Charlotte Kouana, and William Mala, “Benefits of Forests in Cameroon: Global Structure, Issues Involving Access and Decision-Making Hiccoughs,” Forest Policy and Economics 7 (2005): 360.

Figure 10 shows that although local communities risk dispossessing their ancestral forest lands under the current forest management system constructed by the COH (as in the case of the World Bank’s project in Ngoyla Mintom\(^\text{19}\)), present generations over exploit forest resources

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\(^{19}\) The World Bank project in Ngoyla Mintom involved the erection of a new protected area and logging and mining concessions, which overlapped with resource areas customarily used by indigenous and local communities. The project included plans for land use and land tenure studies. However, there were no measures explicitly stated to foster the inclusion of indigenous peoples and local communities in the project design and implementation process that would have ensured that the local communities continuously possessed their lands. The Bank operationalized as “sensitization” workshops its own OP4.10 that calls for “Free Prior and Informed
compared to past generations, and this exploitation will limit the access that future generations will have to forest resources.

**COH and the Use of Forest Resources**

The COH associated reforms introduced auction - a competitive bidding system – as the method of awarding a 15-year renewable harvesting right to the forest, with the claim that this long duration (compared to the previous five year system) will allow concessionaires to reinvest their capital in the forest, instead of engaging in quick cut-and-run that clears the forest. The winner of the bid has to show proof of adequate technical expertise and investment capacity, and comply with the technical, social and environmental obligations spelt out in the management plan. Topa *et al.* note that Cameroon became the first country in the world to adopt this method of opening the door for interested parties to use the forest, and it has had significant impact: “less than 10 years after this system was implemented in Cameroon, harvesting rights went from being administratively distributed, short-term concessions, free from any forest management obligations, to being long-term, competitively awarded concessions, accompanied by forest management obligations spanning the duration of the contract.”

The auctioning system has opened the doors for the government to generate more revenue from the forest. The administratively set base in the form of forest annual tax in 1990 was $0.60 per hectare. Under the market mechanism, the area tax to an average of $5.60 per hectare for FMUs and to $13.70 per hectare for ventes de coupe in 2005.

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Consultation” of local peoples before the start of any Bank projects. World Bank, “PPG CBSP: Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Ngoyla Mintom Forest,” (June 20, 2010): 5. Failure to include the indigenes in the project design and implementation sidelines and denies local peoples of their customary rights to their forest lands.  
21. Ibid.
Economically advantageous as this free market system is, Topa et al. observe that the efficiency of this neoliberal forest procurement model depends both on confidentiality and competition. Confidentiality means that information provided by the bidders on their identity and capacity has to be treated as secret by the awarding body in order to protect them from unfair competition from other bidders. This is an ethical stand that raises two issues. First, confidentiality hides information from the public on who intends to exploit the wealth of the nation; second, it contradicts the necessity of free access to information by which competition in the market is enhanced.

From the discussion on transparency in chapter one, this unavailability of information is a non-transparent measure that may present unpleasant surprises to the public. Such is the case of the American palm oil company, Herakles Farm. The people of Nguti were surprised to find that their source of livelihood, namely, the forest, had been procured by this company following a confidential auction deal with the government, without any prior notification of the local peoples who were henceforth excluded from accessing the forest that they had relied on for many years for their food and energy supplies and spiritual needs. Greenpeace vividly documents this unpleasant phenomenon:

The area [acquired through confidential auction] includes 62,433 hectares (154,209 acres) of dense natural forest as well as farmland and agroforestry smallholdings. . . A Greenpeace team documented that the setting up of one of the project’s nurseries at Fabe deprived people of access to a valuable collecting area for forest products, and that cocoa farms have been taken without farmers’ consent. Locals were not properly consulted before the establishment convention was signed. The convention gives Herakles Farms the exclusive right to farm in the area and includes no provisions for compensation of residents. The company claims “a huge outpouring of support from communities”, and says its project will not displace people, yet simultaneously communities have consistently objected to the plans by complaining to the government, signing petitions and organizing peaceful demonstrations.

In 2010, Herakles began illegally clearing forest to establish oil palm nurseries, in the absence of a presidential decree authorizing the concession, which is required by law.

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22. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 40.
Herakles has also violated a court decision, made in the town of Mundemba, to suspend all activity of its plantation following a complaint filed by local people. Furthermore, the company was found guilty of illegal logging; forestry officials issued a report detailing these activities in April 2012.23

Although the actions of Herakles Farms constitute a take-over of lands on which men farm their cocoa, women are the most affected in this land grab confidential auction system. Women gather forest products such as bush mango (*Irvingia gabonensis*), monkey cola (*Cola lepidota*), and bush pepper (*Piper guineensis*) with which they provide food to families. They also sell these products locally and in the Nigerian international market to improve their economic status. Greenpeace documents that these “forest products provide around 30% of women’s cash income in the region.”24 Robert Dibie highlights the contention of Marxist feminist theory that gender inequality has its roots in class inequalities created by the capitalist political economy.25 In line with this theory, one notes that the procurement of the Nguti forest by Herakles Farms, and the fact that local women cannot access this forest as they did in the past, therefore, constitute acts of the disempowerment and control of women with respect to forest management. This ceasing of women’s spaces in forest management and the associated economic impoverishment limits their space of control in the local decision-making process because they lack the financial strength to bargain their influence in the Cameroon society: “where women have economic power,” writes Akwalefo Bernadette Djeudo, “they are able to control their lives better than elsewhere.”26


24. Ibid., 8


At the heart of this disempowerment of women is a problem in the 1994 forest law that rarifies the COH. It is a problem that can be articulated in two ways. First, the law assumes that there is equal rights in local communities with respect to resource management. Consequently, and second, the law is silent on gender inequality with respect to natural resource management in the country.27 Driss Ezzine de Blas, Manuel Ruiz-Pérez, and Cédric Vermeulen capture the first perspective in these words: “Finally, the 1994 Forestry Law interprets ‘community’ as a homogeneous group of forest users relating to power and land tenure, bypassing the reality of local forest tenure, which is mainly composed of adjacent spaces owned by different families with unequal historical rights.”28 Historically, unequal rights with respect to forest tenure and forest resource use are most visible in the inequality that exists between women and men vis-à-vis forest resource management in Cameroon. It is because of such inequality that, as Joyce Endeley found in her research on women empowerment in the country, Bafaw women, led by the women’s traditional council (Wupunda), have demanded that the Bafaw traditional council should give and recognize the right of Bafaw women to possess, control, and dispose of all lands – forest and otherwise – just as men do.29 Frank F. K. Byamugisha iterates that “legal recognition of women’s land rights is the first step toward reversing the discrimination against women.”30 Thus, a legal framework of forest management that fails to recognize and highlight

27. Patience U. Ajonina et al. claim that “gender-sensitive policies” were a “concern in the reformed 1994 forest, wildlife and fisheries legislation.” See Patience U. Ujonina et al., “Gender Roles and Economics of Exploitation, Processing and Marketing of Bivalves and Impacts on Forest Resources in the Senaga Delta Region of Douala-Eden Wildlife Reserve, Cameroon,” International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology 12 (2005): 170. However, there is no mention of gender issues anywhere in the 1994 Forest Law. It seems, therefore, that if the claim of Ajonina et al. is true, then the sensitivity resulted in a deliberate avoidance of any statement that has gender connotations in the law.
the role of women in forest management, in a society in which there is gender inequality, is based on a COH dimension of selective inclusion of stakeholders that fails to include clearly women in the management of forest resources.

It is worth noting that the relationship between forest and women is not only one way; that is, just as women (and the families to which they provide food) benefit economically and nutritionally from the forest, the forest also benefits from the approaches that women adopt in the use of forest land and resources. In the division of labor that characterizes traditional societies in Cameroon and many other African countries, men cut-clear permanently forest spaces to grow cash crops such as coffee and cocoa for the economic wellbeing of families. Women, however, engage in a form of agro-forestry that preserves many trees on plots to serve the clamber growth needs of climbing crops such yams (*Dioscorea* species of the family Dioscoreaceae).

Furthermore, as Peter K. Karani observes using the traditional Ugandan society as an example of forest management practices in traditional Africa, “cultivation of food crops . . . did not involve the destruction of all trees on the plot . . . because they were too large to fell.”31 Nowadays, neoliberalism gives room for logging companies such as Herakles Farm to dominate forest lands by using technologically sophisticated machines to destroy more trees than women do in traditional farming methods. If these are the sort of equipment that the Bank argued would lead to sustainable forest management, then ironically for the good of the forest, women, as Esther Mwangi, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Yan Sun found in their study of forest management in Latin America and Africa, do not have access to these machines.32


file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/ES-2010-3873.pdf
Three other characteristics of women’s agro-forestry are crop rotation, mixed cropping, and fallow farming. Cameroonian women do not exploit forest in large scale as logging companies do. Women are interested in cultivating forest lands for food production and low scale production of crops that they often sell in the local markets for their economic welfare. Therefore, they have to equilibrate farming for economic enrichment and ensuring that forest lands remain fertile for food crops cultivation. Based on indigenous knowledge, women adopt mixed cropping and crop rotation to attain this balance. Jane I Guyer observes that in mixed cropping Cameroonian women, for example, plant leguminous plants such as groundnuts and maize in the same forest space. Nitrogen fixing bacteria such as *Rhizobium leguminosarum* attach to the roots of leguminous plants. By fixing nitrogen in the soil, they improve soil fertility, thereby improving crop yield and fostering the growth of forest plants in fallow times when women leave the forest to regenerate.33

Concerning crop rotation, women plant crops such as maize on a forest plot in one season, then plant beans on the same plot in the next farming season. The FAO acknowledges that “crop rotation is a key principle of conservation agriculture because it improves the soil structure and fertility, and because it helps control weeds, pests and diseases.”34 These are sustainable forest management approaches that women use in their exploitation of forest lands. The COH, by minimizing the role of women as stakeholders in forest management and upholding logging by giant corporations, and by denying women access to forest lands that they have cultivated sustainably for many decades, as in the above mentioned case of Herakles Farm, ends up withholding from the forest these elements of soil fertility and resource regeneration.

With respect to competition, the politics of “to the victor belongs the spoil” suggests that competitive approaches to acquiring natural resources have the risk of turning those resources into objects that are dominated by the victor, and “spoiled” in this phenomenon of dominion. The victor turns to value the resources only as objects to be exploited and used for the victor’s own gains. Focusing on the case of logging, one finds that the volume of timber species harvested in Cameroon has significantly increased since the 1994 forest law was enacted by the Cameroon government after negotiations with the World Bank and the hybridization of forest management policies and regulations from both parties. This volume of timber harvest in Cameroon’s forest is represented in Figure 12.

![Graph showing timber volume harvested in Cameroon forest from 1987 to 2010.]

Figure 12. Timber volume harvested in Cameroon forest from 1987 to 2010


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The graph shows that timber harvest quickly rose after the enactment of the 1994 forest law; thus, expressing a negative effect of the COH in terms of biodiversity conservation, and a positive impact of the COH with respect to the exploitation of the forest for economic gains. The fall in timber exploitation after the year 2000 is thanks to Cameroon government “owning” the forest reforms by imposing a log export ban, although the World Bank’s conditionality measures opposed this action of the government. Due to this opposition, the government did not totally stop the ban, rather it modified the ban rules in 2003 by restricting the exportation of only some species of timber. This, again, caused more timber exploitation. This increase in timber exploitation at the availability of the least regulatory opportunity can be explained in terms of firm theory. To lay a foundation to provide a firm-theory based explanation for the increase in timber harvesting, it is necessary do carry out a cost-benefit analysis so as to determine the financial gains that logging companies ideally make.

If one assumes constant cost and benefits for a three years period of forest resource exploitation within a concession, then one can carry out a cost-benefit analysis to determine when logging companies break-even, and what cumulated discount cash flow they have at the time that they break even. Using data from multiple sources,\textsuperscript{35} one finds that logging companies that exploit concessions hypothetically break-even within the first year of procuring a concession

\textsuperscript{35} The cost of legality compliance, cost of forest certification, baseline timber harvesting annual operation costs (based on one annual coupe), and cost estimates for meeting legality and/or sustainability for timber producers values came from Table 10.2, Table 10.3, Table 5.1, and Table 10.4 respectively in Atyi’s “Study on Development and Progress in Timber Procurement Policies. Country Case Study: Cameroon.” I calculated the value of timber export products to European markets using 2007 average. In the above mentioned article, precisely in Table 6.5, Atyi provides the US dollar value of all concession products sold in the European market in 2007. Paolo Omar Cerutti, Robert Nasi and Luca Tacconi on page 36 of their article titled, “Sustainable Forest Management in Cameroon Needs more than Approved Forest Management Plans,” Ecology and Society 13, no.2, state that there were 101 concessions in Cameroon in 2007. I divided the total number of each product as Atyi provides by 101 to determine the average number of each product from a concession. Considering that Atyi also provides the market value of the total of each product, I then used simple proportion mathematics to determine the market value of each product from a concession. Finally, I summed up the European market value of each product from a concession.
in Cameroon. Table 8 displays the ideal cumulative cash flows of these companies within three years of timber harvesting.

Table 8. Cost-Benefit Analysis/ Capital Budgeting in US $ for Logging within Concessions in Cameroon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Legality Compliance</td>
<td>($308,418.330)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Forest Certification</td>
<td>($98,481.570)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline timber harvesting annual operation costs (based on one annual coupe)</td>
<td>($489,184.000)</td>
<td>($489,184.000)</td>
<td>($489,184.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Timber Export Products to European markets using 2007 average</td>
<td>$3,520,905.040</td>
<td>$3,520,905.040</td>
<td>$3,520,905.040</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Estimates for Meeting Legality and/or sustainability for Timber Producers</td>
<td>($41,911.030)</td>
<td>($41,911.030)</td>
<td>($41,911.030)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cash Flow</td>
<td>($406,899.900)</td>
<td>$2,989,810.010</td>
<td>$2,989,810.010</td>
<td>$2,989,810.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Cash Flow</td>
<td>($406,899.900)</td>
<td>$2,582,910.110</td>
<td>$5,572,720.120</td>
<td>$8,562,530.130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The economic theory of the growth of the firm as elaborated upon by Edith Tilton Penrose asserts that this quick break-even is an incentive for companies to aim at profit maximization by taking advantage of every opportunity to expand production for the growth of the firm.\(^{36}\) Robinson Djeukam iterates that with this sort of incentive, companies increase log harvesting in order to generate more revenue from sales of logs from their concessions.

Logging companies consider the forest only in its economic dimension and their single objective is to maximize financial benefit. Their “grab-it-and-run” logic – a good example of what early 20th-century European geographers called Raubwirtschaft – consists in extracting the maximum of rich timber species in very little time, without

concern for sustainability. These practices are based on high discount rates, indicating an undervaluation of the future. Companies want to get profits to pay back debt to banks (that charge interest rates), to pay dividends to shareholders, and to make further investments. Profits are obtained by discounting future sustainability. Accordingly, companies perceive sustainable management as a constraint to overcome.37

Selective logging, which is the approach towards sustainability fostered by stakeholders through the COH, may be less hazardous to canopies than clearing. However, Djeukam argues that this approach encourages companies to search for the best trees by constructing roads deep into the forest, thereby failing to appreciate the socio-ecological complexity associated with forest management in the hands of corporations. Selective logging has had the effect of destroying peasant fields, opening up the forest to human settlements and farming, and to commercial hunting. The effect of these practices on forest management in Cameroon has been unaccountability in the forest sector. Human settlements within forest spaces inevitably render forest resources such as *Loxodonta africana cyclotis* and *Gorilla gorilla* accessible to people who are hardly accountable to the government on how they extract resources from the forest for their social, religious, economic, and medicinal interests.38 Djeukam also argues:

> Although promoters of timber exploitation argue that selective logging on large concessions is required in order to reach sustainable management, none of this, in actual practice, is proven to be true . . . . Present logging methods [promoted by the COH that encourages logging with heavy and more effective machinery] are very destructive since the extraction of each cubic meter of wood implies the destruction of larger volumes, resulting in a significant change of the initial ecosystem diversity. Harv

ested volumes can be as low as 5–6 m3/ha out of a potential volume of 35 m3/ha. This is because only a few high value timber species (8% of known species) are extracted from the forest for commercial purp

euses . . . .

> In addition, it is important to note that there is much waste of the valuable wood – up to 25% of raw logs – at the logging sites in the forest as well as at the sawmill . . . .39

38. Ibid., 10.
39. Ibid.
These socioeconomic phenomena and forest resource wastage factors are not considered by the Bank and the Cameroon government in the formulation of sustainable forest management legal framework. Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edward, and Johanna Mang emphasize that these factors contradict the assertion that the legal enforcement of biodiversity maintenance measures is sufficient to the control of standing volumes that can be logged annually. Therefore, the suggestion that allowing logging companies to continue extraction within a concession for longer periods of time is a sustainable forest management approach that incentivizes companies to stop cut-and-run forest resource exploitation is a faulty argument. Private ownership, Lawrence C. Christy et al. argue, does not always give the incentive to care for forest land considering that individuals and business entities give less value to long-term benefits because of the time-value of money.

One can also ask to extent to which the use of forest resources is providing economic benefits to local communities. Apart from the state that does not need to produce a plan on how it will manage its own protected forest lands before the government itself can approve the reservation, all other potential forest land owners must submit a forest management plan to the government within the first three years transition period of concession allocation. Within this period, the manager is allowed to exploit a thirtieth of the concession each year. This need of a management plan does not envision any difference between the capacities of local communities, councils, logging companies, and private individuals to produce the required plans.

In a study on development and progress in the timber procurement policies of Cameroon, Richard Eba’a Atyi found that for an average concession size of 58,971 ha that would

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theoretically involve a harvest on 1,966 ha per year to produce approximately 13,762 m$^3$ of commercial logs annually, the company managing the forest has to invest an average of 147.4 million CFA (294,158 US$) to produce a management plan. It cost an additional 3.9 million CFA (7,666 US $) annually to obtain and manage a legality certificate. C. Julve et al. in a study of community forests in the country found that the development of a simple forest management plan costs 8,195,000 CFA (16,390 US$) and the operational cost will be 89,640 /m$^3$ (179.3 US$/m^3$). One cannot expect that villagers in a country with a United Nation’s Human Development Index value of 0.495 and a multidimensional poverty index of 0.287% will easily raise at least 8 million CFA to produce a forest management plan. Comparatively, logging companies that have sufficient capital can bear the cost of producing a forest management plan, and thereby fully possessing forest spaces more easily than local communities or villages.

**COH and Forest Management Control**

Forest Management control in the light of the COH in Cameroon can be analyzed from multiple perspectives. Here, one shall consider the zoning of forest in Cameroon as a way to create small forest units that can be controlled, and decentralization in forest management. The case of the coopting council forests into the national political alliance of the ruling CPDM is peculiar in the realities of the zoning of forest in the country.

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The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) examines the nature and intensity of poverty at the individual level, with poor people being those who are multiply deprived and the extent of their poverty being measured by the extent of their deprivations. The MPI creates a vivid picture of people living in poverty within and across countries, regions and the world. The MPI is calculated by multiplying the incidence of poverty (percentage of people who are poor) and the average intensity of MPI poverty across the poor (%).
Coopting Council Forests

According to the 1994 forest law and the implementation degree of 1995 that translates the COH into a legal framework, 50% of forest lands in the country have to be national forests, 40% have to be council forests, and 10% have to be community forests. A GIS based calculation (from attribute table) shows that the total area covered by national forest in 2013 was 71,151,751.017km$^2$; the total area of council forest was 9,340,062.938km$^2$; and the total area of community forests was 12,973,885.352km$^2$. Table 9 displays these areas in terms of percentages.

Table 9. A Comparison of the legal and actual percentages of the Cameroon’s National, Council, and Community forest zones in 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forest Zone</th>
<th>1994 Forest Law (% Area)</th>
<th>Actual (% Area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>76.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13.88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The data herein were calculated using Cameroon’s GIS forest sector data published by the World Resource Institute in 2013.

These data suggest that Cameroon prioritizes national forests over council forests. This is not unexpected, considering the political relationship between councils and the state or national government. In Cameroon, councils and national governments are headed executively by political parties, and the ruling CPDM party governs most councils. Jean-Paul Kouega suggests that under party allegiance, municipal councilors often forsake their rights of independent administration of council affairs to party hierarchy elites within the national executive.45 This

allegiance can be explained in terms of the elite theory of political science and the matching hypothesis proposed by social psychologists.

According to the elite theory that Gaetano Mosca posits, political classes or elites have “a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority” over those they govern.\footnote{Gaetano Mosca, \textit{The Ruling Class} (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 51.} Bringing together insights from psychology and sociology, Vilfredo Pareto observes that elites are adept at using such superiority in two modes of political rule, namely, force and persuasion.\footnote{Vilfredo Pareto, \textit{The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology} (New York: Dover, 1935), paras.2031-2034 and 2051.} Juan Linz points out Robert Michels’s contention that as elites use these modes to gain control of funds, promotion, and the flow of information, they concentrate organizational functioning power in their hands.\footnote{Juan Linz, \textit{Robert Michels, Political Sociology, and the Future of Democracy}, ed. H.E. Chehabi (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 86.} When this occurs, lower institutions of power within managerial structures become stooges who lose their power and rights to independent management of collective resources such as council forest lands. This elite theory can be corroborated by the matching hypothesis of social psychology. Spencer A. Rathus expressed this hypothesis in the proverb, birds of one feather flock together.\footnote{Spencer A. Rathus, \textit{Psychology: Concepts and Connections, Brief Version}, 8th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 515.} As “birds” do so “flock,” it is easy for the municipal councils under the ruling CPDM to ally with the national CPDM party and interests of high party officials within the state executive branch. This alliance puts potential council forests at the risk of being taken over easily by national interest without contest from the CPDM councilors. This deprives the councils of large scale ownership of forests.

On another note, there is a significant confusion in the forest zone designations. Council forests fall under the permanent forest zone. Under the non-permanent zone, one finds “commune”. What does this “commune” refer to, especially because it does not appear in
Cameroon’s territorial administration structure? A “commune,” writes Carol J. Pierce Colfer, is “a district, municipality, council, an administrative unit.” In this regard, it is redundant to make a commune a distinct forest zone because it can also be a council forest. This redundancy breeds uncertainty and confusion in the management of forest in Cameroon.

Decentralization

The 1993 forest policy, by including limitedly local populations in forest management, suggested that the Cameroon government to some extent valued the decentralization of forest management. The 1994 forest law laid out the legal framework for this decentralization by creating permanent forest controlled by the government and non-permanent forest controlled by different stakeholders such as councils, communities, “communes,” and private individuals. On a positive note, as has been indicated above, decentralization has increased the formal access (recognized under Cameroon law) of local peoples to forest resources. It has also weakened the prebendalistic clientelism in forest management, thereby saving forest management – to some extent – from the dominion of political elites.

Decentralization of forest management with respect to the COH needs to be understood within the context of the World Bank’s concept of “good governance”. Matthias Finger, Ludivine Tamiotti, and Jeremy Allouche avow that this is a concept that gives the World Bank the theoretical foundation to interfere in the political and social conditions of a country in a way that avoids confrontation with the government. In this concept, the Bank rejects misconceived

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50. Cameroon’s formal territorial administrative structure includes, in descending units order, state, regions, divisions, subdivisions, and councils. Villages are communities that identify themselves as cultural and traditional tribal units.


post-independence development models in Africa that “have failed” because they emphasized rapid-state led industrialization as modernization in Africa without insisting that African nations have to adapt Western type democracy.\textsuperscript{53} This is the sort of democracy, which in Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, asserts that “government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”\textsuperscript{54} The Bank suggests that this conceptualization of Western style democratic governance is not alien to traditional African society as the colonial development paradigm that sort the elimination of traditional African values from public life claimed on the basis that the beliefs and practices of African society were incompatible with Weberian bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{55} According to Max Weber’s bureaucracy, governments are representations of moral orders understood as “sets of authoritative rules and institutional arrangements – that impose certain obligations on their members, including the obligation to obey.”\textsuperscript{56}

Contrary to this colonial development paradigm that embraced absolute top-to-bottom administrative approach, good governance, says Pierre Landell-Mills, the Bank’s former Senior Policy Advisor for the African Region, affirms that there are “close links between governance, cultural relevance and the components of civil society.”\textsuperscript{57} Accordingly, the Bank posits that

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\textsuperscript{54} Majid Behrouzi, \textit{Democracy as the Political Empowerment of the People: The Betrayal of an Ideal} (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2005), 16.

\textsuperscript{55} World Bank, \textit{Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth}, 60

In the Bangwa tribe of Cameroon, there is a cultural dance in which the populace define their influence in the affairs of tribal governance. The dancers, in the musical act known as \textit{leke}, proclaim that there are twelve chiefs of the Bangwa land led by the Fon of the land; although the Fon is head, power is devolved to the different communities of the tribe headed by the chiefs who the Fon consults and listens to in matters of tribal administration. This sociological ontological narrative indicates that African traditional society involved popular participation in the affairs of villages, tribes and clans through small community institutions that had the powers to influence village, tribal and clan affairs through representatives who the tribal head consulted, and did not merely govern by a top-to-bottom approach.

\textsuperscript{56} Tompkins, \textit{Organization Theory and Public Management}, 43.

“each country has to devise institutions which are consonant with its social values.” Managerial institutions, adds the Bank, therefore, must “reflect national characteristics and be consistent with the country’s cultural values.”

These good governance affirmations are expressions of the Bank’s policy of ownership. The Bank also insists that good governance is the bedrock for positive outcome of aid conditionality for economic growth. Good governance, therefore, can be said to be a metaphor of the COH. The Bank’s thoughts in this metaphor ultimately imply that in a country as Cameroon in which the existence and legal recognition of traditional institutions that govern village life is part of the hidden transcript of the management of societal affairs, villages cannot be excluded from forest management. In as much as these institutions exist alongside a more publicly recognized state, the state cannot also be excluded from forest management. In this existential juxtaposition of the state and local communities, the power to manage forest has to be shared between state structures and local institutions. This participatory approach constitutes the decentralization of forest management in Cameroon. Decentralization has structural impact on forest management.

Norman Jones posits from an engineering viewpoint that structural impact looks at how structures and components behave within a large dynamic system that yields inelastic deformations. Inelastic deformations involve the stressing of materials beyond yield point or limits of permanent alterations. Analogically, and in managerial institutional terms, structural impact examines the behavior of structures and components of institutions within a dynamic

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managerial system characterized by abnormalities that have attained permanent status. An example of such abnormalities is ingrained corruption.

In 1998, Transparency International, which ranks countries according to the way citizens perceive corruption in their public sector, ranked Cameroon as the most corrupt country in the world. In 2007, the same agency list the forest sector of Cameroon as one of the highest “poles of corruption” in the country. How has the COH contributed in putting the forest sector (thus, forest management) in this pole?

The COH assumed that by putting in place independent observers who focus on transparency in the legal institutions and economic transactions associated with forest management, corruption in forest management will be eliminated. This assumption fails to consider an important point that has been raised by William Q. Judge, D. Brian McNatt and Weichu Xi. Corruption is not merely an economic phenomenon. It is also a moral problem that affects the socio-cultural norms and political outlook of a society. Considering that the bribery and corruption “scratch my back, I scratch your own” proverbial maxim of the ruling government in Cameroon expresses these norms and outlook, forest management in the country cannot be free from corruption based on a narrow economic and legal scope. In as much as the COH allows government officials with questionable moral integrity to make final decisions on the allocation of concessions, approval of forest management plans, collection and management

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63. “Scratch my back, I scratch your own” is a very common proverb that one hears from members of the ruling CPDM party in Cameroon in both the public and private arena. It is a hidden transcript by which they assert themselves in Cameroon’s sociopolitical landscape, and justify their *modus operandi* with respect to the administration of public goods. Coined in Pidgin English, one can literally translate the maxim into English as “If you scratch my back, then I will scratch yours.” Basically, it means that officials exercise their duties as favors returned for something given by he or she who needs their services. This “something given” often means bribe. Patrick Hanks,
of forest financial resources, and justice for defaulters on the forest management law, decentralized forest management remains under what Phil Rene Oyono terms, “captivity.”  

Oyono provides a phenomenon that exemplifies this captivity: administrative slowness. There is a long and slow path from the demarcation of community forest to when the Ministry of Environment and Forests approves the application. There is a disparity in the number of applications submitted for the demarcation of community forest in a year, and the number of applications that actually get approved for a management agreement to be signed. This long period of waiting results from a difference in the perception of time that characterizes the COH.

The COH seeks through conditionality to use classical economic models to manage forest resources so as to encourage investments and savings. These models involve a positive rate of time preference William A. McEarchen notes that in this per-second perception of time, the “now” is more valuable than the “then.” In the conception of time that the Cameroon government brings into the COH through the policy of ownership, however, time is not chronos, or, to use the words of “duration that affects the faith of the individual. It is the rhythm of the breathing of the social group.” In the African conception of time as social, what matters is not when one arrives for an event; value is rather in presence that exceeds – no matter when one arrived. In philosophical terms, chronos emphasizes when something happened, while social time centers on whether something happened. One focuses on the “when,” and the other stresses the “what”. To government officials in the Ministry, therefore, what is significant is approval or

rejection of the management plan and not when the approval or rejection decision is made. This social time value of the COH, therefore, introduces slowness and delays in the forest management process.

When the application is approved, there has to be the signing of the management agreement between the applicant and the government represented by the senior divisional officers and divisional officers who head the divisions and sub-divisions administrative levels of the Cameroon territorial governance structure. “This signature,” writes Oyono, “is generally marked by deep delays, primarily because administrative authorities . . . and officials of the Ministry of Forests ask for money.”68 In this corrupt system administrative authorities and the “external elite” of the villages maintain control of forest management. The dark face of the structural impact of decentralization, however, is tempered by transparency measures.

**COH and Forest Management Monitoring**

The COH has significantly fostered transparency and accountability in the management of forests in Cameroon. This has mainly been through independent observers and monitors that became part of the forest sector on account of the COH, because the disclosure and dissemination of public information were among the dramatic changes in the country’s forest sector between 1998 and 2008. Topa et al. observe that as information has become more available to the public, the political and financial risk associated with the old clientele system has been heightened. Forestry officials no longer allocate forest concessions according to their whims and caprices.69 Figure 13 shows the fines that have been paid to MINFOF by concessionaires because the IO pointed out their illegal logging acts to the government.

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69. Topa et al. The Rainforests of Cameroon, 79.
Years with low fines payment do not imply that there was a reduction in illegal logging within that year or that the independent observer failed in its duties. Rather, as Giuseppe et al point out, MINFEF’s decision to settle some of the illegal logging cases out of court whenever the defaulter accepts responsibility causes the government to loss much money. In 2003, MINEF caused the National Assembly to pass a financial law by which the former enforces forest management regulation on the basis of negotiation with defaulters such as forest enterprises that have national elites as shareholders. In this negotiation process, MINEF is often interested in generating state revenue (as the Bank desired), rather than enforcing punishment by measures such as imprisonment of the defaulters. In this option for money, MINEF secures the political interest of the ruling government with these elites. Thus, with regard to this option, Amariei says that “the provisions of the Financial Law of 2003 applied to illegal activities by

70. Topa et al. The Rainforests of Cameroon, 79.
MINEF neglect the provisions of the Forest Law concerning illegal activities, which stipulate the involvement of the judiciary system.” Liviu Amariei observes that because of this neglect, which is a failure in the monitoring responsibility of MINEF and MINFOF with respect to forest management, Cameroon losses between five to ten million US Dollars annually from illegal logging. In 2004, when transparency measures from the IO caused the government to act seriously against illegal logging, the government collected CFA 916,000,000 in fines.

Conditionality measures would have prevented this neglect because it insisted on enforcement of the forest management law; however, ownership opened up possibilities for the neglect of the law by refusing to give to an independent judiciary the powers to discipline stakeholders who engage in illegal logging. The COH, therefore, embraced an environmental management law that can be laid aside and not implemented by the Cameroon government whenever the executive branch of government prioritizes political and financial interests above environmental regulation. Thus, one can say that the COH creates a forest management system that can put environmental wellbeing at odds with government’s political and financial interests. This is also a system in which decentralization and transparent forest management can only be realized amidst bureaucratic bottlenecks.

Furthermore, Time Fomete and Paolo Cerutti observe that “the responsibility for the functioning and maintenance of control and verification systems still seems to lie excessively with external donors, and ownership by concerned ministries is still very limited.” The government does not allocate enough money for the Provincial Brigades who monitor forest

resource exploitation. Consequently, the Brigades rely on resources from logging companies to cover some of their cost. Poor staffing and lack of equipment continue to plague the monitors who often do not have access to basic data and transportation vehicles to monitor the forest.

These problems facing transparency and accountability in forest management in Cameroon reflect the complexity of and the interwoven nature of issues facing forest management in Cameroon. Garry Rodan and Caroline Hughes underline that in a nation where democratic institutions are weak and the economy is not very strong, transparency and accountability are not simply ethical virtues that can be fostered simply by some institutions labelled “independent”. These virtues, rather, become interwoven in the political, social, and economic fabrics of the nation. In fact transparency in public administration cannot even be fostered by mass media action alone that attempts to make information available to the public.  

There also needs to be political will, economic resources, and capacity building in order to equip those who are assigned to ensure transparency and accountability in the administration of national and natural resource

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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This study has focused on the way that the relationship between the World Bank’s policies of conditionality and ownership impacts forest management in Cameroon within the context of the international dependence development model. It began with a number of remarks: first, that the neocolonial, false-paradigm, and dualistic theses cannot fully explain the nature of the relationship between powerful international development institutions such as the World Bank and the countries that rely on the Bank for development assistance; second, inasmuch as this reliance exist, one cannot deny that there is international dependence development; rather, and third, one has to seek a different thesis to account for this model. World Bank’s development work in Cameroon was taken a case study to investigate what thesis today can explain the international dependence development model nowadays. After establishing that development today cannot be separated from environmental issues, this research sought to find and validate this thesis by investigating the way that conditionality and ownership has affected forest management in Cameroon. The implicit assumption here was that forest management in Cameroon has the signatures of both the World Bank and the Cameroonian government under the banners of conditionality and ownership wherein the two parties interact and their policies interact. The logical assumption to formulate this theory was:

- Inasmuch as there is international dependence development, there must be a theory to explain its nature today.
- Because one is dealing with international development, one needs to find a body that is concerned with international development and a country that receives the body’s assistance.
- The World Bank is an international development institution, and it assists the Cameroon government that relies on the Bank for development aid.

After selecting the subjects of attention, one needed a link or a case that will show how the subjects relate within the context of international development. The Cameroon’s forest sector provided this case. The recent nature of the reforms in the forest – reforms that are still ongoing – was a good foundation to understand international dependence development today. The study, therefore, had to focus on this case that exemplifies the nature of the international dependence development model today.

The complexity of the status questionis, and the nature of the chosen case pushed this study to adopt an interdisciplinary research approach that made use of theoretical insights and methodologies from disciplines such as geosciences, environmental studies, political science, economics, and sociology. The study could not aptly focus on the problematic without a theoretical framework. The nature of the reliance of developing countries on development aid and loans from international development institutions such as the World Bank creates a system of interactions between the provider and receiver of aid and loans. In this system, there are agreements and conflicts of both ideologies and power. The simultaneous existence of these agreements and conflicts leads to policy hybridization. Hybrids as resultants of this phenomenon of hybridization have synergized impacts on whatever they influence. Consequently, interaction, hybridity, and synergy constituted the triad in the framework of this study.

Focusing on this case study without an x-ray of the policies that frame the case would have been an attempt to walk without a foundation. Consequently, the study exposed the nature of conditionality and ownership. Considering the assumption that the case study has the hand of the Bank and the Cameroon government, the research had to investigate how these hands shake
each other within the case. This investigation showed that conditionality and ownership are related as hybrids in the international development model. This finding would have sufficed: the study could have simply stated that in the international dependence development model, there is a hybrid relationship between stakeholders and their policies. However, this statement needed validation. This led the research into the operationalization of the conditionality-ownership hybrid in Cameroon’s forest. To verify the truth of this thesis, the research needed to show that Cameroon’s forest today is affected by this hybrid. This is the path that this study has taken. Therefore, by way of conclusion, there is a hybrid relationship between policies in the international dependence development model today, as exemplified in the real effects that this hybrid has on resource management in countries such as Cameroon.

These effects are multifold. For example, the conditionality-ownership hybrid has caused the politicization and formalization of forest in Cameroon, fostered costly forest management practices, promoted both sustainable and unsustainable forest management, given room for logging companies to enrich themselves, ushered the reign of decentralized forest management that, nevertheless, still leaves much to be desired, allowed the government to retain some grip over forest management in the country amidst neoliberal political economy reforms, and improved transparency and accountability despite bureaucratic constraints. Some of these effects arise from conditionality and others from ownership. However, because these policies affect forest management ensemble, they are really the synergized effects of the COH.

This research finds and validates the hybrid relationship between the World Bank’s policies of conditionality and ownership in the international dependence development paradigm. This finding and validation positions policy hybridity within the international dependence development model. The study, therefore, proposes policy hybridity as a thesis that accounts for
international dependence development model. The neocolonial thesis over emphasizes power disparity in international dependence development, ultimately considering less-developed countries as powerless in this model, without considering the inherent and tactical power that developing countries have and exercise in international development issues. The policy hybridity thesis acknowledges that there is power disparity in the international dependence development model, but it emphasizes that this disparity does negate the power that less-developed countries have and exercise in ways that range from modification to outright rejection of development insights from western-based international development institutions. The false-paradigm thesis suffers from an untrue generalized categorization of development paradigms formulated in western countries as unsuitable for the development of less-developed countries. The policy hybridity thesis objects this generalization by contending that whereas some development policies from western countries are blind to local realities in less-developed countries and are therefore unsuitable for the development of these countries, other policies actually produce some good development results in less-developed nations. The dualistic model is limping because it fails to see that development policies in developed nations and in less-developed countries cannot be absolutely polarized in a globalized world today. The policy hybridity thesis resolves this problem by capitalizing the interaction between institutions and countries and their policies in today’s globalized world.

The research contributes to the deposit of knowledge in international development and it opens up two paths. The first is the need for further research to investigate whether there is policy hybridity in a large pool of international development activities. The second is a nouvelle way of beginning to frame policy hybridity as a thesis of the international dependence development model in an age of global interconnections.
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