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The Idea of 'Holy Islamic Empire' as a Catalyst to Muslims' Response to the Second Crusade

A thesis

presented to

the faculty of the Department of History

East Tennessee State University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts in History

by

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Key words: Islamic perspectives on the Crusades, The impact of the Second Crusade on Muslims, Jihad at the age of the Crusades, The Islamic Empire and the Crusades, Muslims' response to the Crusades

ABSTRACT

The Idea of ‘Holy Islamic Empire’ as a Catalyst to Muslims’ Response to the Second Crusade

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The oral traditions in the Islamic world presented only the moral benefits of Jihad. Yet, the fact is that, though the moral benefits continued to exist before and after the First Crusade, though the interest seemed to have been present and the necessary intellectual theories continued on, Muslims did not advance the practical Jihad. Nonetheless, the disastrous Second Crusade struck a powerful chord among Muslims. It forced Muslims to battle for their very survival, and to do so they would have to adapt, but equally they could only survive by drawing on their imperial inheritance built up over centuries. A number of concerns identified with the “golden age” of the Islamic empire influenced the Jihad movements for Muslims associated the imperial traditions with Islam itself. Given the examples of the First and Second Crusades, this study proposes that the idea of “Islamic Empire” constituted Muslims’ practical response to the crusades.

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It is important at this point to express my thankful feelings to the Society for the Study of the Crusades & the Latin East and the Medieval Academy of America for their publications, conferences, and, more decisively, the online library, which offer students and scholars the access to wide array of sources. I am, as always, deeply indebted to the libraries of East Tennessee State University, Princeton University, and the University of Chicago for allowing me to access most studies I needed for my research.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The impact and repercussions of the First Crusade unleashed brutal and harsh conditions on Muslims. Just as no other crusade was as victorious as this one, so too the Islamic world felt its effects more profoundly than any other crusading campaign. Notwithstanding the loss of Jerusalem and the Holy Land, and despite the campaign's brutality, Muslims accustomed themselves to the crusader presence in their lands. It is clear that although the Second Crusade was to follow, it did not result in any territorial losses or in any major damage to the Islamic world. In outcome, although the impact of the triumphant First Crusade imposed harsher conditions on Muslims that should have provoked Muslims to embrace the holy war concept of *Jihad*, it was the impact of the fiascoes of the Second Crusade that struck a powerful chord to the forces of Islam. Scholars tend to credit the suitable environment of retaking Jerusalem to the activities of Nur-ad-Din. Although vital, Nur-ad-Din's success lay in the newly interconnected practical and theoretical aspects of *Jihad* brought about by a new sense of pan-Islamism. This new sense was the direct result to the outcome of the Second Crusade revitalizing Muslims' nostalgia of 'Holy Islamic Empire.' In the case of both the First and Second Crusades, Muslim jurists provided religious theories to justify *Jihad* as a counter-response. Nonetheless, the impact of the Second Crusade encouraged Muslims of all social classes to unite their efforts under the state's authority. This step, coupled with aspirations to bring back the 'Mighty Islamic Empire', brought about the practicality to the *Jihad*.

The Second Crusade has fared poorly by contrast to the legendary First Crusade, which succeeded in taking Jerusalem from the Muslims and the thrilling Third Crusade, which was

dominated by the heroics of Richard the Lionheart and Saladin. The facts – that the First Crusade conquered Jerusalem and that the Third Crusade made wide progress in the recovery of the Holy Land – encouraged chroniclers to focus on these two campaigns. By comparison, due to the failure of the Second Crusade, narrative western chroniclers poorly served it. It seemed that chroniclers had no interest in recording the events of such a failure, with the exception of Otto of Freising's and Odo of Deuil's accounts. By contrast, Muslim's triumph in the Second Crusade encouraged chroniclers like Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Qalini to record the events of their success. Although the Second Crusade obtained less attention than the First and the Third Crusades, it marked significant developments in the organization of the crusades. For example, it was the first time that two European monarchs left their kingdoms and carried the cross toward the Holy Land. The Second Crusade witnessed also the issue of *Quantum Praedecessores*, which represented the most organized papal authorization of preaching the crusade.

The study of the holy war, in general, and its history appears to be in vigorous condition; numerous work, both academic and popular, are published each year and there is an ongoing and energetic debate concerning the extent and the definitions of 'crusading' and 'counter-crusading.' These studies are, after all, of direct relevance to a clearer understanding of the long-term perception of the holy war and they shed light on the relationship between the Islamic world and the West. This point, more decisively, indicates that political and ideological ethics concerning the holy war influenced scholars' approaches, above all, the legitimacy of using force to promote even worthy and legitimate causes.

From 1095 until the fourteenth century, scholars took an intrinsicist¹ approach to the phenomenon of crusading and counter-crusading. The constant tensions, threats, and religious fervor between western Christendom and the Islamic world influenced scholars' interest in promoting worthy and legitimate causes for the war. This approach criticizes the issue of the war from the viewpoint that there are certain acts that are good or bad in themselves, regardless of the consequences of these acts. Scholars who took this approach confirm the issue of *jus ad bellum* that war must have a just cause, legitimate authority and righteous intentions, in order to be moral, though each one chose a one-sided viewpoint concerning the issue of war morality.² Although written from different viewpoints and offered varying terminology and biblical passages, almost all Latin historians and chroniclers of the expeditions that were later called the First and Second Crusades considered them legitimate holy responses to the Muslim or the so-called infidels' threat to Christian holy places.³ On the other hand, almost all Muslim historians

The author translated documents in foreign languages into English.

¹ The philosophical definition 'intrinsic' points to a semiconductor in which the concentration of charge-carriers is characteristic of the material itself regardless of any content of impurities it contains.

² On the Just war theory in medieval western Christendom, see Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Vol. II, III vols. (New York: Benziger Brothers), Question 40; John Mark Mattox, *Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War* (New York: Continuum, 2006); On Just War theory in medieval Islam see John Kelsay, *Arguing the Just War in Islam* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 97-124; John Kelsay, "Religion, Morality, and the Governance of War: The Case of Classical Islam," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 18, no. 2 (1990): 123-139.

³ For ideas of Latin chroniclers and the ways they used to justify the act of using force against Muslims see Jonathan Riley-Smith, *What were The Crusades?*, 3rd (Bloomington, IN: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 12-37; C. Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. M. Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 8, 349; J. Flori, "Guerre sainte et rétributions spirituelles dans la 2e moitié du XIe siècle," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 85 (1990): 627-628; For examples of scholars attitude toward war against Muslims in the fourteenth-century see Don Juan Manuel, *Libro de los estados*, ed. R. B. Tate and I. R. MacPherson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 53; V. Cantarino, "the Spanish Reconquest: A Clunic Holy War Against Islam?," in *Islam and Medieval West: Aspects of Intercultural Relations*, ed. K. I. Semaan (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1980), 98.

and chroniclers viewed the crusades as an act of evil, although written from different viewpoints and for distinctive interests. While Latin scholars denied Muslims' legitimacy of using force, Muslim scholars elevated the act of war against the so-called polytheists' encroachments to the level of holy duties against evil.⁴ There is no doubt that both sides questioned the applications of war morality, although each side was concerned by the illegitimacy in the act of the opposite one, thus each side brought different ideologies to justify the legitimacy of its own war.

In the fifteenth-century, Muslims – specifically the Ottoman Turks – were a continuing threat to Western Europe and the defense of Christendom was seen as a pressing concern in the west. The fall of Byzantium in 1453, in addition to the continued expansions of the Turks at the expense of the purported Christian lands, influenced the constancy of the intrinsicist approaches in humanists' rhetoric. Literally, humanists regarded the illegitimacy in the Muslim Turks' act of war, thus they deliberated the legitimacy of Europeans using force in the form of a crusade against Muslims. Remarkably, secular discussions of culture and politics supplemented humanists' visions. This is not to imply that humanists rejected the religious rhetoric of the holy war completely. Given the Greek and Roman foundations, humanists addressed the topic of the Turks and crusade in classical terms. Rather than using the language of religion or chivalry, humanists justified European armed responses to the Turks' threat by drawing a new image of Muslims in the form of replicas of the ancient barbarians, nomadic and destructive hordes upon great civilizations only to destroy their western cultures. Like in ancient Rome, this image

⁴ See Ibn al-Athir referring to the Crusades as a form of Christian holy war aimed at Islam and urging a Muslim counter-crusade in Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir for The Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi'l-Taa'rikh*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. 1, III vols. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 13; see al-Sulami urging Muslims to elevate the concept of Jihad to the destruction of the polytheists (in referring to Crusaders) Emmanuel Sivan, "La genese de la contre-croisade," *Journal Asiatique* (La Societe Asiatique) 254 (1966): 199-204.

justified not only using force to promote legitimate reasons, or even denying Muslims' legitimacy in response, but also added a secular task on the crusade as a mission aimed at civilizing the barbarians.⁵

The Ottoman Turks, for their side, tended to move into the glorious past of the Islamic empire. From their perspective, the Ottomans aimed their counter-crusading propagandas at gaining solid ground of legitimate authority in the Muslim world, thus they tried to fit their struggle against Europeans in the image of that of Saladin or the Great Caliphs as defenders of Islam. They mobilized religious sentiments to their political expansion on the European continent, a holy mission against the crusades that transformed their status in the Muslim world from *gazis* 'conquerors' into *mujahedeen* 'holy warriors.' However, this came at a high cost on the Islamic world. During their struggle with western Christendom, and since Selim the Conqueror occupied Arab lands, the Arab world suffered from an extreme neglect. The Ottoman rule enforced a steady and general decline on Arab societies, a policy to protect their territories from future crusades. The result of this isolationism was extremely harmful to the Muslim world. Denied interactions with the outside world, the Middle East lacked the developing and

⁵ For examples of humanists' perception of the Ottoman Turks see Leonardo Bruni, *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*, trans. and ed. Gordon Griffith, James Hankins and David Thompson (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Society of America, 1987), 183; For Western reaction to the fall of Constantinople see Robert Schwoebel, *The Shadow of the Crescent: The renaissance Image of The Turks 1453-1517* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), chapter 1, 164-165; For humanist writing on crusade and the Turks see James Hankins, "Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mohmed II," *Dumbarton Oaks papers* 49 (1995): 111-207; see also Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274- 1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

the production of scholarship. Consequently, Middle Eastern studies on the Crusades suffered a standstill from the fifteenth-century down until the first light of the twentieth-century.⁶

Between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, Europe witnessed scholars' constancy in using the intrinsicist approaches toward the applications of war morality. During the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and down into the Civil War in England the issue turned into fierce controversies between Protestant and Catholic. While Catholics viewed the issue of the crusades as a force for good, Protestants regarded Catholic crusades as the evil arm of the papacy. They argued that the papacy had no legitimate authority to issue such a war. In return, Protestants branded Catholic wars as an immoral reaction to humanity. Although this argument would consider Muslims' legitimacy of using force against such illegitimate war, Protestants used some rhetoric polemics against the Turks. Protestants approached the issue of the war morality from their own side only. They saw themselves as soldiers of Christ fighting a holy, just, and legitimate war in defense of Christianity against the forces of evil, regardless of the consequences. As a result, each side promoted only its own use of force and denied the opposites' legitimacy of using force.⁷

⁶ Stanford Jay Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 55-111; Stephen Turnbull, *The Ottoman Empire, 1326- 1699* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing LTD, 2003), 22-67; Jane Hathaway and Karl K. Barber, *The Arab Land Under Ottoman rule, 1516- 1800* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan, 2008); see also Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1993), 72-84.

⁷ For Catholic and Protestant ideologies of each legitimacy of using force see P. Rousset, "L' id ologie de croisade dans les guerres de religion au XVIe si cle," *SZG* 31 (1981): 174-184; For an example of a Protestant scholar writing strongly anti-Catholic and anti-Turks see J. E. Baily, *The Life of Thomas Fuller D. D.* (Manchester, London: Unwin Brothers Printers, 1874), 173-181; For Catholic defense of crusading ideology see E. A. R. Brown, "A Sixteenth-Century Defense of Saint Louis' Crusades: Etienne le Blanc and the Legacy of Louis IX," in *Cross Cultural Convergences in the Crusader Period: Essays Presented To Aryeh Grabois on His*

Nonetheless, the end of the seventeenth-century witnessed the impact of a wave of secularism on European societies. This marked a new phase in western scholars' approach toward the applications of morality in wars, especially, religiously ones. For the first time, scholars started to observe the issue of religious violence as a part of history, which needs to be perceived, rather than a part of the history, which they live. It seems that the decline of Ottomans' threat brought about a state of self-confidence and ended the condition of perceiving the issue of Muslim responses under the hazard. In outcome, the age of secularism overlapped the age of religious violence. In return, new skeptic approaches overlapped the old intrinsic ones. Skeptical scholars would rather not engage in the quest of war morality. Thus, they prefer to use primary sources, but without any further interpretation to the events. Their doubts in the *bellum* itself brought a notion of disbelieving in any applications of morality or justification in wars. In return, their studies either favored to show sympathies to all victims of war or avoided engaging in the issue. For example, Thomas Fuller published an anti-Catholic *Historie de croisade* in 1670. In this publication Fuller provides a trace of a new skeptical attitude of perceiving the past, but with a tendency and favor toward his Christian 'Protestant' identity, which points to the intrinsicist approach. Meanwhile, his hesitation and enthusiasm toward the applications of violence in both sides confirms the new skeptical approach. Thus, it would be true to say that although Fuller's study tended to view Muslims as victims of crusaders' greed, his religious zeal denied Muslims' right to use force in respond to the crusades.⁸

In the eighteenth-century, a number of events had turned in Europe, which marked a new tide of scholarly opinions. The total decline of the Ottoman Empire marked the end of the so-

Sixty-fifth Birthday, ed. M. Goodich, S. Menache and S. Schein, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1995), 21-48.

⁸ Heinrich Von Sybel, *The History and Literature of the Crusades*, trans. L. D. Gordon (London: Chapman and Hall, 1861), 163-164.

called Muslims' threat to Europe. In retrospect, rationalist writers brought about a gradual shift into more liberal thinking in the age of enlightenment. They tended to view the war as immoral, worldly motivated enterprises, and inspired by religious zeal. At this stage, scholars doubted the existence of any form of morality or justifications in a war. In return, doubts in the legitimacy of using force fueled scholars' skeptical approaches. For example, in 1751, Voltaire commented on the crusades, "[the crusades were] the thirst for brigandage."⁹ Gibbon, as well, called the crusades, "savage fanaticism."¹⁰ In addition, the impact of the French revolution ideals influenced enlightenment scholars to associate the use of force with the illegitimate tyrannical authority.¹¹ Certainly, this idea applies not only on the crusades but also on Muslims' counter-crusades.

By this time the industrial revolution had widened the technological gap between Western Europe and the rest of the world, including the Middle East. This gap ushered in the late eighteenth-century and continued toward the early nineteenth-century, in which a new era of European colonization occurred. Influenced by secular ideals and a great enthusiasm toward medieval literature, rationalists and romanticists, secularly, associated the age of European colonization with the age of the crusades. In response, the memories of the crusades brought a sympathetic attitude toward the Middle East, yet in skeptical approaches. Instead of engaging into the argument of war morality, rationalists favored the depictions of the war in romantic literature, art, and music. In return, speaking of the crusades, romanticists and rationalists drew a

⁹ Voltaire, *Essai sur les moeurs*, in *Oeuvres complète de Voltaire*, ed. L. Moland, Vol. 54 (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1877-1885) 11:442.

¹⁰ E. Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. D. Womersley (London, 1994), chp. 61: 3:727.

¹¹ See Emerson comments in his journal that the crusades took their place among the monuments of folly and tyranny in W. Gilman and A. Ferguson ed., *The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson 1826-1900*, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), 18.

fantasy image of sympathies toward all war victims and heroes, especially Muslims, as rationalists considered Muslims, victims of the Crusaders' fanaticism, although rationalists placed no reference toward the rights of a victim to respond to aggressors. The best example of which sympathies toward the Middle East is seen in the novel of Sir Walter Scott, *The Talisman*, in which he described the piety and heroics of Saladin.¹²

In the early nineteenth-century, western studies started to consider the importance of Muslim accounts of the crusades, although these studies treated Muslim's accounts with a skeptical attitude. The publication of *The Recueil des historien des croisade* struck a more serious scholarly note. This publication includes editions of primary sources in Latin, Greek, and most importantly, Arabic entitled *Le Livre Des Deux Jardins, Histoire Des Deux Regnes, Celui De Nour Ed-Din Et Celui De Salah Ed-Din*.¹³ Although the study considered the importance of Muslim sources, it did not provide any further interpretation to the Islamic perspective of the crusade. No wonder, the major body of the early studies of the Muslim's part of the crusades tended to aim at the broad aspect of Saladin's part in Muslims' counter-crusading. The influence of rationalists – in addition to the heroics of Saladin and Richard the Lionheart during the Third Crusade – encouraged scholars to focus on Saladin's role of returning Jerusalem to the Muslims.

¹² Sir Walter Scott, *The Talisman*, ed. Dwight Holbrook (Boston: Ginn & Company Publishers, 1895); for more evidences of rationalists' sympathies toward the medieval literature and the Middle East see J. Dakyns, *The Middle Ages in French Literature, 1851-1900* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 1-28; see Gibbon and Mohammed in Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West*, 85-98.

¹³ *Receuil, Des Historiens des Croisades, Historians orientaux*, Vol. Tome V (Paris: Les Soins De L'Academie des Inscription et Belles-Littres, 1876); see also H. Deherain, "Les Origines du recueil des Historiens des croisades," *JSav*, n.s., 17 (1919): 260-266.

As a result, toward the eve of the twentieth-century, Muslims' perspective studies contributed more to the heroics of Saladin, yet still in skeptical attitude. In 1907, W. B. Stevenson published, *The Crusaders in the East*. In this study, Stevenson places his emphasis on the Muslims' side at the age of the Crusades. No wonder, Stevenson's study aimed heavily at the heroics of Saladin as a part of Muslims' reaction toward Crusaders' existence in the East. Although Stevenson's study attempted to use primary sources from both Europeans' and Muslims' sides, his study avoided emphasis to Muslims' counter-crusade movements. It seems that Stevenson's sympathetic attitude toward the Middle East at the peak of Western colonization influenced his engagement in the quest of war morality, though his study avoided criticizing the war ideology neither that of crusading nor Muslim counter-crusading.¹⁴

Skeptical approaches continued further throughout the twentieth-century, some times in the shadow of the Marxists theory. By which, scholars tended to evaluate Muslim' response to the crusades from the viewpoint of whether (or not) the response represented a Muslim leader whose reaction to the crusades favored the needs of the poorer class or in favor of the greedy needs of the nobility class. In 1967, N. Elisseff published the best example of this approach. Elisseff wrote a three-volume monograph in French entitled, *Nur-ad-Din: Un grand prince musulman de Syrie au temps des Croisades*. In this study, Elisseff provides a biographical work of Nur-ad-Din. Elisseff elevated the image of Nur-ad-Din from a Muslim warlord into the leader

¹⁴ William. B. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East: A Breif History of the Wars of Islam with the Latins of Syria during the twelfth and thirteenth centuaries* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1907; G. le Strange, Review of the Crusaders in the East by W. B. Stevenson, *The English Historical Review* (Oxford University Press) 23, no. 90 (Apr. 1908), 346-47.

who brought about the rights of the poor. Yet, Elisseeff's study did not offer a full assessment of the key figure of Muslims' counter-crusade.¹⁵

Certainly, religion provides a strong psychological motivation for wars. Human's search for insurance from the mysterious future propels one to establish a good relationship with the superpower. Above all, higher expectations of salvation fulfill human's psychological need. The ideology of the holy war, in return, combines the practical act of war and aims it at earning the needed salvation. By this ideology, an individual's worldviews prevail that the act of fighting grants godly salvation. The term '*Jihad*' stands to explain this ideology in Islamic beliefs. Therefore, utilitarian approaches that describe the holy war as one that starts with the premise of either 'primarily spiritual' or 'primarily materialistic' are over-simplifications. The holy war was rather a combination of both. Consequently, materialistic explanations – which were so influential in the 1950s – are less in evidence. It was actually liberal economic historians, not Marxist, who preferred materialistic approaches to interpret the holy war, striped of its ethic, in social and economic terms.¹⁶ They believed that crusading – and obviously counter-crusading – was an early example of colonialism and assumed that economic forces could only motivate such powerful movements. Ahead of the list, Joshua Prawer, for whom the portrayal of the Crusaders as forerunners of colonialism accorded with a Zionist reading of the history of the Promised Land since the Diaspora.¹⁷

¹⁵ Nikita Elisseeff, *Nur-ad-Din: Un grand prince musulman de Syrie at temps des Criosades (511 -569 A.H./1118-1174)*, III vols. (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damascus, 1967).

¹⁶ Norman Housley, *Contesting The Crusades* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 77-78.

¹⁷ See summarize of Prawer's approach in Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades, Chrestianity, and Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 3-4, 60-61; Joshua

When it comes to broader trends of economic and social changes, the picture is a little murkier. The argument that the prime causes for the practical crusading or *Jihad* were simply economic and that the prime motivating force was a desire for profit, or at least for an escape from dire financial circumstances, is vague. Neither imperialism nor Marxism existed in the medieval world, at least in theories. This might only account for the way critics of too much realism at the expense of avoiding engagements in the debate that religious ideal provides a strong motivation for the holy war. What this leaves us with is the pre-eminence of religious beliefs and values. One advantage of stressing the religious origins of crusading and counter-crusading is that it occurs with the picture presented in the sources. Yet, there is admittedly a danger in pursuing this line of argument of falling into the trap of assuming certain values are always necessarily paramount.

For example, Emmanuel Sivan published his work *L'Islam et La Croisade* in 1968. Although his analysis provides the earliest most important work regarding Muslims' counter-crusading, he took a utilitarian approach.¹⁸ By this approach, Sivan tended to deal pragmatically with the issue of the war. Sivan argues that the serious mobilization of *Jihad* as a Muslims' instrument in the war against the Crusades began in the time of Zengi.¹⁹ Practically, Sivan's argument holds strong, since Zengi's move is considered the first Muslim functional response against the crusades. However, Sivan's analysis assumed that Zengi's warfare against the crusades necessarily reflected religious values. To be sure, the term *Jihad* demonstrates two interconnected concepts, holy and war. The first of which, the concept 'holy' stands to explain

Prawer, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: European Colonialism in the Middle Ages* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Publishing, 1972).

¹⁸ Emmanuel Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade: ideologic et propagande dans les reaction musulmanes aux Croisades* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1968).

¹⁹ Emmanuel Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade*, 44.

the theoretical religious coating, which provides the psychological motivation for the general population to pick up the arms and be a part of the second, which is the practical worldly war. It seems that Sivan dealt with the relationship between the theory and the practice of *Jihad* as two different spheres, rather than as one interacting and mutual sphere.

Not all scholars accept the idealistic defensive practices of a holy war, and many writers have pointed out the failure of historians to take accounts of psychological and sociological theories in studying the motivations of the holy war. Psychologically, the ideology of a holy war stands as the way of resolving the tension, or endemic cognitive dissonance, between religious ideals and the worldly violence of medieval societies.²⁰ This ideology combines the theology of salvation with the practical action of the sword, by which it justifies the war and establishes the psychological needed good relation with the superpower (God). In sociological outcome, this sort of integration required Muslim jurists to provide logical theories, which offer salvation to those who decides to fight from the common people. In return, the practical warfare side – brought about by the political authorities of the state – takes a religious coating. This step alters the movement from a secular and political war into a combination of holy and just war. For example, the concept of *Jihad* at the time of the Crusades should have offered Muslims in general with the new reconciliation between the desire of salvation and the need to fight. This alteration shifts the tiny individual movements into a mass movement because it meets a widespread psychological need.²¹

²⁰ In referring to the First Crusade, quoted by J. R. E. Bliese, "The Motives of the First Crusade: A Social Psychological Analysis," *Journal of Psychohistory* 17 (1990): 400.

²¹ For further information on the association of Jihad's theory and practice in Islamic law, see Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964- 1986), 67-85.

The full, composite story of the holy war needs the drawing together of evidences from both sides of the conflict. Due to the negative impact of isolation for almost five centuries under Ottoman rule, the Muslim world has approached the phenomenon of the Crusades less globally.²² Once the Ottoman forces withdrew from the Middle East after their defeat in the First World War, the Middle East encountered European colonialism. In return, a wave of religious fervor influenced Middle Eastern approaches toward the phenomenon of the crusades. Western colonialism brought back to Muslims memories of massacres conducted by the crusades in the holy land, and the epic of endless battles with the crusaders. In outcome, Middle Eastern studies tended to move into the past and treated the issue of the crusade as a holy bond between the present generation and their ancestors. That explains why counter-crusading ideology remained consistence in the face of a new wave of crusading in referring to colonialists and imperialists. This attitude associated any form of modern western presence in the Middle East with the negative memories of the crusades.

That included affiliating the consequences of European colonialism, and the tension between western and Islamic societies, together with medieval crusading and counter-crusading propagandas. After all, these ideas shaped the minds of Middle Eastern scholars, who in return took the intrinsicist approach in the studies of the Crusades. This approach diminished completely from western scholarships since the end of the seventeenth-century. Fueled with rising religious fervor and nationalists' identity, Middle Eastern scholars dealt with the crusades as an act of evil and justified all forms of Islamic response. In 1972, the Syrian scholar Zakkar

²² For the Ottoman influence in forcing a policy of isolation on the Muslim world see Thomas Patrick Murphy, *The Holy War* (Columbos, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 198.

published a two-part work in Arabic entitled, *the Crusading wars (al-Hurub al-Salibiyya)*.²³ Rather than a scholarly work, the study provides an anachronistic nationalist viewpoint. It evaluated Muslims' counter-crusading phenomenon in the light of recent Middle-Eastern experiences, as far as Arab nationalism, the establishment of the State of Israel, the liberation of Palestine and the rise of the Islamic fundamentalism. Zakkar's study brought about the legitimacy of Muslims response to modern western encroachment, which he referred to by the definition, 'Crusade.'

Down into the late twentieth century in the Middle East, the rise of political Islamism – and the ideologies of justifying acts of extreme violence has on it the stamp of the early Middle Eastern twentieth century' association of crusading ideas and imperialism – has left a wary impact on Middle Eastern scholars of the crusades, perhaps until today. The spread of political Islamist's ideas raised an issue of suspicion in the Middle East. In retrospect, Middle Eastern scholars tended to avoid criticizing Muslims' response to the crusades because Islamists were likely to view any balanced study as an act of supporting western ideals, which they labeled as a crusade aimed at the destruction of Islamic ideals.²⁴ This, in return, brought about the skeptical approaches to Middle Eastern scholars who contributed to the topic in later time. Not long after Zakkar's study, in 1984, Amin Maalouf published another Middle-Eastern approach of the

²³ Suhayl Zakkar, *Madkhal ila Tarikh al-Hurub al-Salibiyya, An Insight into the History of the Crusader Wars* (Beirut: Dar al-Amana, 1972).

²⁴ See the statement of the radical Islamist Sayyid Qutb by which he justified acts of extreme violence, "Western blood carries the spirit of the crusades within itself. It fills the subconscious of the west." Quoted in Sylvia G. Haim, "Sayyid Qutb," *Asian and African Studies* 16 (1982): 154; For further reading about political Islamism and the West see William Shepard, "The Development of the Thought of Sayyid Qutb as Reflected in Earlier and Later Editions of 'Social Justice in Islam'," *Die Welt des Islams* 32, no. 2 (1992): 196-236; James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of A Radical Islamic Intellectual* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Crusades entitled, *The Crusades through Arab Eyes*.²⁵ Unfortunately, Maalouf's study lives up to its title, although it depends heavily on major Arabic sources, it contains a drawback of a general narrative to Muslims' counter-crusading movements but without furnishing new information or even new interpretation. Apparently, Maalouf's experience of a sectarian war in Lebanon, in addition to fundamental Islamists' suspicions influenced his doubts in the legitimacy of any form of war. Therefore, his study avoids his personal judgment on Muslims' counter-crusades movements.²⁶

Political and ideological concerns still influence interest in the crusades today, including the consequences of European colonialism, western imperialism, and East-West tensions. Over the last two decades, western scholars well regarded the phenomenon of the crusades and its Muslim counter-crusades. The major body of recent studies tended to look at the topic of the crusades and their Muslim counterpart with consequentist approaches. The rising tide of criticism influenced this approach. Given the difficulty to understand the morality of wars from one viewpoint, consequentist scholars aimed at criticizing the consequences, which led to the war, its results, all possible different arguments and interpretations related to it, and from both Muslim and Latin viewpoints. Beginning from the late twentieth century, the extensive increase in the studies of the crusades has led historians who aimed heavily to focus on the Western perspectives of the Crusades to start considering the Muslims' side.

In 1987, Riley-Smith published the first edition of *The Crusade, A History*. In this publication, Riley-Smith explains the political trends of the impact of the First Crusade's success

²⁵ Amin Maalouf, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, trans. London Al Saqi Books (New York, NY: Schocken Books Inc., 1984); James A. Brundage, Review of *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes* by Amin Maalouf, *Journal of The Near East Studies* 47, no. 2 (Apr. 1988): 149-150.

²⁶ On the impact of the civil war on Lebanese, see Paul Tabar and Jennifer Skulte-Ouais, *Politics, Culture and the Lebanese Diaspora* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010).

and the Second Crusade's failure on both European Christians and on Muslims. Riley-Smith noted the weak and divided Muslims' response to the First Crusade. Toward which, he emphasized that the success of the First Crusade depended on Muslims' political division. He also noted that the failure of the Second Crusade led to the growing power of Nur-ad-Din of Aleppo. In addition, the failure placed Muslims morals in the highest level and showed how dangerous a united Muslim Syria could be. Riley-Smith noticed that both crusaders and Muslims justified the use of force toward what they both considered a just war of liberation.²⁷ With a consequentist approach, Riley-Smith's study draws evidences from both Muslims and western perspectives to illuminate one another, and then places his own criticism on the image.²⁸

The growing intellectual appetite for work on the crusades encouraged scholars to focus more on Muslims' response to the crusades. In 1999, Carole Hillenbrand published a textbook concerned only with the Islamic perspectives on the Crusades. Hillenbrand's study examined the impact of the First and Second Crusades on Muslims. Rather than concerning with Muslims' justifications of the war, Hillenbrand's study provides an analysis to the causations and consequences of the counter-crusading movements. Hillenbrand noticed the absence of Muslims' political leadership at the eve of the First Crusades. Even after the impact of the First

²⁷ Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades, A History*, 2nd edition (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2005), 50-75, 121-136; see also Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and The Idea of Crusading* (Philadelphia, PA: The University of Pennsylvania, 2009) author's introduction; For western studies concerned with the consequences of European colonialism, western imperialism, and East-West tensions on the phenomenon of the crusade see Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades, Chrestianity, and Islam*, 45-80.

²⁸ For more western crusades' specialists with a consequentist' approach toward Muslims' response to the First and Second Crusades see Jonathan Phillips, *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom*, 270-279; Jonathan Phillips, *Holy Warriors, A Modern History of The Crusades* (New York: Random House Inc., 2009), 3-103; see Muslim revival in Christopher Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of The Crusades* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 268- 72, 329-38; see the Zengid threat and the rise of Nur-ad-Din in Thomas Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 2006), 49-71.

Crusade, Hillenbrand proposed that all Muslim's *Jihad* attempts seemed ill-assorted since freeing Jerusalem had no significance to such rulers in this period.²⁹ Hillenbrand's study of the Second Crusade proposes that, because of the Frankish siege of Damascus, the mood of Muslims within Damascus and thereafter elsewhere in Syria seems to have been changed, but without any further explanation to the incentives of that change. Furthermore, Hillenbrand's argument implies that the act of freeing Jerusalem represented the true Islamic *Jihad* at the age of the crusade. This implication, however, assumed that the whole struggle between the act of crusading and that of *Jihad* revolved around Jerusalem. In return, it fell short to explain such a plastic concept like the concept of *Jihad*, which can be deployed in many different ways, perspectives and for varying ends.³⁰

From a Theological approach, the ideal theory of Islamic law succeeded to impose itself on Muslims' practices of *Jihad*, which in return influenced Muslims response to the crusades in general, and to Second Crusade in particular. Toward this trend, in 2001, Roy Mottahedeh and Ridwan al-Sayyid provided another Islamic specialist study with a consequentist approach, since it aimed at understanding the causations and consequences of the theoretical field of Muslims' *jus in bellum*. The study concerns with the ideology of the holy war in the Islamic world before and during the impact of the Crusades. Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid's argument traces the different interpretations of *Jihad* in Islamic history, and the ways by which Muslim intellectuals treated the concept of *Jihad*. This study in particular offered an insight to the political influence on Islamic Intellectuals' interpretations of the term *Jihad* and its significances. On the other

²⁹ Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 89-117; for more western Islamic specialists studies see *Jihad and the crusades* in Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 137-144.

³⁰ R. S. Humphreys, "Ayyubids, Mamluks, and the Latin East in the thirteenth century," *Mamluk studies review* (MEDOC of The University of Chicago) 2 (1998): 4.

hand, the prime argument of the study proposes that the concept of *Jihad* as a holy and just war never seemed to be embraced entirely in practical terms during the Crusades.³¹ Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid noted that although the religious theories of *Jihad* existed before and after the impact of the Crusades, Muslims' practical response came too short and far away from the holy war theories, which would have offered the psychological fuel for Muslims toward a wide counter-Crusading movement.

By applying a sociological approach to Mottahedeh's and al-Sayyid's study, the study reveals an important aspect to the lack of Muslims' response to the Crusades. Apparently, the lack of Muslims' response to the impact of the Crusades was the outcome of the separated spheres of Muslims' social structure. The ideology of the holy war, as mentioned before, combines the theological theory of salvation with the practical action of the sword, by which it provides the image of justice on the war and establishes the psychological needed good relation with the superpower (God). This combination obliged a social integration amongst the religious class who provides the theories and the people who provides the practices: the political authorities, namely, the state and the general population. Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid's argument revealed that Muslim jurists contributed and continued to contribute intellectual theories regardless of the material conditions of the Islamic world. This meant that the theatrical field of *Jihad* witnessed no significant changes after the impact of the crusades. What this leaves us with is the practical field of the holy war, and certainly enough, the relationship between the human institution of the state and its subjects.

³¹ Roy P. Mottahedeh and Ridwan al-Sayyid, "The Idea of Jihad in Islam before the Crusades," in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and The Muslim World*, ed. A. Laiou and R. Mottahedeh (Washington D.C: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001), 23-30.

After all, it seems that all the various aspects of crusading and counter-crusading, its religious theories, traditions, philosophies, literature and laws, has been roughly investigated toward a better understanding of its manifold manifestations. There is, however one field that no substantial advances can yet be registered, and which remains greatly a *terra incognita*: a socioeconomic approach toward the ‘Holy War.’ Certainly, there is no direct connection between the two topics. Moreover, this approach contradicts the oral tradition of events in the Islamic world for all chroniclers considered only the religious perspective of the movements. In addition, there is relatively little consistency about what constituted the counter-crusading movements in the assortment of sources. Therefore, pursuing the traditional line of arguments will surely indicate that religious values were always paramount. However, the socioeconomic approach will reveal any transformation in the relationship between the state and its subjects. Above all, one major responsibility for the Islamic state was to consider both moral and material needs of its own subjects. Consequently, the aim and the major theme of the present work are to shed the light on the transformations and the developments of the relationship between the Islamic state and its Muslim subjects, which determined the magnitude and the extent of Muslims’ practical warfare (*Jihad*).

This is not to underestimate the pull of ideology. The motives of Muslims’ response to the crusaders have long intrigued historians, and, self evidently, faith lies at the heart of holy war. From a modern-day western perspective, extreme religious fervor is often synonymous with fanaticism, but in the Middle East, it was regarded as virtuous and positive at the age of crusading, because it provided a notion of godly legitimate domination and authority. It was a society saturated with religious beliefs in which faith provided the template and the boundaries for almost every aspect of behavior, and where recognition of divine will and fear of the afterlife

were universal. The fight against the enemies of God offered everyone in general and lay-people in particular, a way to evade the torment of hell and this is the one reason why counter-crusading movements became a fundamental feature of medieval Islam and perhaps until today.³²

For the Muslim East, and to an extent, the Second Crusade provided no such harm if compared to the First Crusade. Ironically, it struck a powerful chord with the forces of Islam. Muslims' *Jihad* in itself was not a new thought, but the scale of the movement after the Second Crusade gave it unprecedented impetus. Consequently, the psychological and sociological scopes of this study reflects a modern academic consensus on the duration and the extent of Muslims' *Jihad* movements from the Omayyad period, the First Crusade, the decades after the conquest of Jerusalem in 1099, and until the death of Nur-ad-Din. Nur-ad-Din's success depended on a new sense of pan-Islamism: an uneasy truth between the Islamic state and its subjects that drove wider numbers of Muslims to join forces against the crusaders. This new sense revived into the Muslim world in response to the Second Crusade. In return, the extent of Muslims practical warfare against the crusades became extremely wide.

³² For the importance of faith as a driving force in medieval societies see Norman Housley, *Contesting The Crusades*, 75-98; For Islamic medieval see Emmanuel Sivan, "The Crusaders Described by Modern Arab Historiography," *Asiatic and African Studies* 8 (1972): 104-149; for religious motivations that led both Latin and Muslims to respond violently to one another see Jonathan Phillips, "Why a Crusade Will Lead to a Jihad," *The Independent*, Sep. 2001.

CHAPTER 2

THE MYTH OF 'HOLY ISLAMIC EMPIRE' AND THE FIRST CRUSADE

The *Jihad* seems to be the very epitome of the phrase 'war of religion' in Islam. A duty provides Muslims with the fulfillment of their religious obligation. The ideas of earning martyrdom and paradise strongly fed the motivation for *Jihad*. Especially at the occasion of wars fought against unbelievers, *the Holy Koran* and the *prophet's hadiths* extolled the merits of fighting a *Jihad* and described the rewards waiting in the afterworld for those killed during holy fighting.³³ This strong psychological motive offered Muslims with the new reconciliation between the desire of salvation and the need to fight. Toward this ideology, Muslim jurists elaborated multiple logical theories of religious ideals aimed at providing a forceful motivation to all Muslims to be parts of a war. The main philosophy of these theories aimed at altering the war from a secular and political war into a combination of holy and just war. The main goal for such an amalgamation revolved around fulfilling the psychological need of the general population: the main force of all historical Islamic wars. Certainly, the motives that propelled Muslims toward embracing *Jihad* in practical terms were multifarious.

In the end, although war is a political means, the diversity of war goals determined distinctions in the motivations for each individual to be a part of a war. Therefore, the abundant of motives led to the constancy of war brutality. This step influenced Muslim legists to question the moral applications in such wars. Muslim legists attempted to set a tradition of mutually

³³ Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History*, 72-82; Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publisher, 2005), 1-7; Alfred Morabia, *Le Jihad dans L'Islam Medieval* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993), 256-257, 293-336; Malik Ibn Anas, *Al-Muwatta of Imam Malik Ibn Anas*, trans. Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley (London: Kagan Paul, 1989), 173.

agreed procedures of combat, which included arrays of shared values among Muslims. These values indicate the implicit (or the explicit) social agreement upon limits to their warfare. The procedures outlined in most studies established a notion of war as a means of pursuing goals considered legitimate. The nature of these procedures made it clear that war is not the first or primary goal. Legists prescribed fighting only when other means failed. This indicates that resort to war must follow an attempt to pursue legitimate goals by nonlethal means.

Consequently, the tradition of legists' *Sharia* reasoning provided an equivalent theory to the just war criteria: legitimate authority, just cause, and righteous intentions.³⁴ It is clear that this approach questioned the morality of the war in connection with broader issues of political ethics. Therefore, in the light of the just war theory, this chapter will attempt understanding the diverse interests, motives, and objects of Muslims' perception of the First Crusade, which put them at odds with one another.

In the just war thinking, the criterion of the legitimate authority serves a formal purpose in thinking about the use of lethal force. Therefore, the *Imam*, which then meant much the same thing as the Caliph, the supreme ruler and head over the entire Muslim community and polity, had the ultimate responsibility for military operation. It was his duty to call for *Jihad*, weighing its costs and benefits for the Muslims in any given circumstances, issues the summons and the declarations, which signals the presence of war.³⁵ At the eve of the crusades, political distinctions concerning the legitimacy of the authority influenced Muslim legists' interpretation to the concept of *Jihad*. Although jurists' interpretations drew on the same sources, their theories

³⁴ See translation of al-Shaybani's *Shari'a* reasoning about war in Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), 75-77; see also Malik Ibn Anas, *Al-Muwatta*, 183; John Kelsay, "Religion, Morality, and the Governance of War, 123-139.

³⁵ Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History*, 12-13; Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 1-7; Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations*, 104, 154-157.

did not take shape in a vacuum but rather in the social and political atmospheres in which each interpretation grew and developed. Thus, the divisions among Muslim's juries concerning the term of *Jihad* appeared by its nature to be more of a social expression to the issues of legitimacy, justice, and necessity of such a war.

For example, the two major Islamic legal schools of *Jihad*'s interpretation existed in the Islamic world at the eve of the First Crusade, the *Maliki* school of *Hejaz*³⁶ and the Syrian School of al-Shafi.³⁷ The *Maliki* School believed only in the defensive obligations of wars, and condemned every kind of aggressive war. Literally, Malik was a political opposition to the Omayyad; hence, he enforced a theoretical approach that doubted the way by which the Syrian Omayyad Caliphs usurped power.³⁸ In return, Malik raised the issue of the illegitimate authority of the Syrian Omayyad Caliphs. Consequently, Malik denied the legitimacy of a Muslim offering his service in any border warfare led by the Omayyad's Caliphs.³⁹ There is no doubt that this approach manipulated a wide audience among Muslims' general population, who tended to suspect the righteous intentions of their spiritual and political leadership. In return, Malik's audience viewed the deficiently of any wars that were led by the Omayyad Caliphs.

Meanwhile, Syrian jurists reflected the determination to make progress on the Byzantine frontier in the first half of the second Islamic century. Accordingly, the offensive approach of *Jihad* attracted Syrian jurists to support the legitimate authority of the Omayyad's wars against

³⁶ Higaz is the province of Western Arabia that contains Mecca and Medina.

³⁷ Keep in mind that the Muslim's world, although divided into principalities, it was considered one world, therefore, the location reflects only the foundation of each legal school, and it had nothing to do with the population or the spread of different ideologies, for example the major ground field of al-Maliki school turned to be North Africa.

³⁸ For political oppositions of the Omayyad Caliphate see Bernard Lewis, "Politics and War," *Studies in Classical and Ottoman Islam* (Variorum Reprints) 54 (1976): 164-66.

³⁹ Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 1-7; Roy P. Mottahedeh and Ridwan al-Sayyid, *The Idea of Jihad in Islam before the Crusades*, 23-29.

Byzantium. Al-Shafi's ideology presented the peak of the Syrian school's interpretation of *Jihad's* doctrine. Al-Shafi's version elevated the destruction of the atheism⁴⁰ to be the primary justification of *Jihad*.⁴¹ Similar to al-Maliki, there is no doubt that this approach manipulated a wide audience among Muslims' general population, who tended to consider the righteous intentions of their spiritual and political leadership and in response the war itself.

Although theoretically divided, Muslims went to war almost every year during the Omayyad period, and for most of the period, the extent of Muslim citizens' involvement in war was extremely wide.⁴² At which time, the proportionality of Muslims' regular warfare grew out. The social ethos and above all the glory and good repute supported the Islamic expansions. It seems that the Omayyad wars brought the different interests and motives of fairly all Muslims to a form of an agreement. Indeed, the Omayyad's expansions provided the Islamic world with reasonable defensive measures. On the other hand, although offensive form of wars caused a theoretical disagreement among Muslims, the Omayyad wars reflected the sense of a dominating religion and its community. That motivated the major body of Muslim general population to fight. The last point reveals, more decisively, the low-upper limit of shared motivation in the Islamic expansions. Thus, the emphasis on a system of social analysis with considerable psychological elements might bridge the gap between the war goals, social economics, and Muslims' enthusiasm toward the war.

⁴⁰ A common word used to identify the enemies of Islam regardless of their religious beliefs, in this particular case, Byzantium.

⁴¹ Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations*, translator's introduction; Michael Bonner, "Some Observations concerning the Early Development of Jihad on the Arab-Byzantine Frontier," *Studia Islamica* (Maisonneuve & Larose) 75 (1992): 5-31.

⁴² For further readings concerning Muslim/Byzantines war see Hugh Kennedy, *The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State* (New York: Routledge, 2001), author's introduction.

During the Omayyids, the military power locked economic growth to the Islamic State. The argument is dense, but it may be reasonably summarized in this way. The Omayyad wars brought to the Muslim world extensive territorial expansion, in addition to accumulation of booty, both essential processes for the growth of wealth in the Islamic empire. These expansions brought into the Islamic empire for the first time large tracts of lands overlooking the Mediterranean with access to waterways trade, together with larger tracts of inland territories with unlimited access to overland routes of trade and communication. It increased the extent of agricultural territory within the Islamic state. It boosted the Levy, the extent of serf-laborers, self-sufficiently on the large estates, peace and war and, more importantly, the changing role of the state with the development of the large territorial empires. More decisively, the large territorial empire changed the definition of the term 'Muslims' from a label of a religious community to an actual label of a political and imperial unity. This meant that the identity-term 'Muslims' became the badge of the empire and its dominating community. In addition, psychologically, the military expansions were useful for all Muslims, since it represented a way of resolving the dissonance of a society at the expense of a foreign state. This is not an exhaustive list, but it will suffice for later purposes in co-relating of bringing *Jihad's* theory and practices together to functionality.⁴³

The growing extension of unlimited resources brought about a case of social welfare into the Islamic world, although 'welfare' is not an eighth-century concept. For the army, the pay was mainly if not entirely to Muslim citizens. A long season of expansion probably meant active campaigning, and this gave greater hopes of booty.⁴⁴ The domination over trade routes created

⁴³ For the expansions of the Omayyad and early Abbasids, see Hugh Kennedy, *The Armies of the Caliphs*, 18-58, 96-117.

⁴⁴ For the payment of the military, see Hugh Kennedy, *The Armies of the Caliphs*, 59-95.

an extensive mine for employment in commercial businesses. The state assigned farmlands to its own subjects, especially from the poorer strata. Christian and Jew inhabitants had to pay tributes (*jizya*). This unlimited income financed more campaigns and brought into the empire more resources. The Islamic state enjoyed strong and expanding urban networks, growing consumer demands, increasing range of manufacturing activities, and highly commercialized economy. By this system, the state's administrators although motivated by gaining wealth, they created much wealth, which they shared with their subjects. More precisely, the institutions of the state manipulated the use of force for rational goals that benefited a whole community. Therefore, rational production triggered the aims of power politics within the Islamic state.⁴⁵ This is not to deny the religious perspective of the expansions.

Certainly, economic motivation can also be a catalyst to religious motivation. Based upon the Weberian theory, members of different social classes adapt different belief systems to explain their social situation. If true, then the growth of wealth in the Islamic world replaced the wide-gap among Muslims by a majority of middle-class citizens. This step indicates that Muslims, unequally, shared the economic privileges of a paramount citizenship, which the Islamic imperial expansions provided. In retrospect, Muslims, unequally, supported the imperial wars and coated it with *Jihad* theories. Weber proposed also that people understand themselves to be able to be in a right relationship with supernatural powers, by which prosperity echoes a blessing of God. By applying this approach to the Islamic society, it suggests that Muslims,

⁴⁵ For further information concerning the social economics in the Near East, see E. Ashtor, *A Social and Economic history of the Near East in the Middle Ages* (LA: The University of California Press, 1976); Abraham L. Udovitch, *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972); Abraham L. Udovitch, "Reflections on the Institutions of Credits and Banking in the Medieval Islamic East," *Studia islamica* XVI (1975): 5-21; Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of The Last 2000 Years* (NY: Scribner, 1995), 157-178.

regardless of their social class, viewed the act of war – which brought wealth for everyone within the Islamic empire – as an act that created a good relationship with God. This, in return, granted the psychological needed salvation. Furthermore, this development provided the senses of the legitimate causation and righteous intentions on the act of fighting. Consequently, Muslim general population viewed the Caliph who brought the entire God blessing wealth to his own community as the legitimate authority.⁴⁶ Above all, Muslim chroniclers attributed the expansions of the Islamic empire to the creation, establishment, and spread of a new religion.⁴⁷ This is not to engage in the debate of whether (or not) Muslims converted the submitted states into Islam. Better yet, this point indicates that the imperial conquests became a holy mission, and in return, the empire itself became a holy state.

In outcome, the economic growth – viewed as superpower’s blessings – created a set of mutually agreed rules of combat among Muslims, because it reflected a sense of a common identity in the Islamic society, more precise, solidarity between the state administration and its subjects. This sense combined the underlying secular and economic factors of the war with the inherent fulfillment of the religious obligations by which it turned the secular war into mass movements of holy and just war. In return, it met the general population’s psychological need in the form of reconciliation between the desire of salvation and the need to fight. Moreover, Muslim subjects viewed the empire’s authority in the form of the caliph and his administration that created the so-called godly blessing wealth as a legitimate authority. The issue of righteous intentions, therefore, coated the act of war. Hence, the relationship between the state and its citizens brought *Jihad*’s practices (the practical warfare) into action, because the empire

⁴⁶ See Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (LA: The university of California Press, 1978), 491-92.

⁴⁷ John L. Esposito, *The Straight Path*, I (New York: Oxford Publishing Press, 1988), 37-67.

succeeded to provide the necessary means for the large-scale warfare. Only under this term, the practical magnitude of *Jihad* turned into a totally mainstream activity, accepted and endorsed by an entire society. Given the fact that Muslims considered the empire a holy and sovereign state, the practical warfare met the religious motivation.

This is not to imply that Muslim participants dedicated themselves to *Jihad* for the reason that it brought them back the imperial wealth. That is over-simplicity. The point is that Muslims participants devoted themselves to *Jihad* with the thrust of their worldviews; and their Islamic identity bestowed the major force of their worldviews. To appreciate the significance of this fact, over time the definition ‘Muslims’ relatively described the mighty dominating community of the holy Islamic empire. Gradually, the golden age of the Islamic empire became the actual definition of the term ‘Muslims.’ Surely, Muslim chroniclers had no interest to define themselves with failures. In addition, this definition glossed as the thin layer of gregarious self-satisfaction, which combined both the religious and worldly powers together, namely the God-given authority to dominate and civilize the world. Therefore, Muslims viewed other nations’ submission to the Islamic empire as equal as submission to God himself.⁴⁸ This is not to admit that Muslims followed a theory of ‘special election.’ Although it is hard to dispute this line of argument, it would be more reasonable to state that the ascending imperial triumph created an ongoing belief among Muslims in the God-given ‘right of domination.’

Nonetheless, from the stabilization of Muslim’s frontiers with the outside world and the cessation of Islamic conquests in the ninth century, Muslim’s major cities enjoyed a case of

⁴⁸ For the religious coating of the early Islamic conquests, see Fred M. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); Ella Landau-Tasseron, "From Tribal Society to Centralized Polity: An Interpretation of Events and Anecdotes in The Formative Period of Islam," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 24 (2000): 180-216; John L. Esposito, *The Straight Path*, 1988, 37-67.

mutual peace and tolerance with the world outside their borders.⁴⁹ This step, however, ended the increase in landed wealth within the Islamic Empire. For centuries, landed wealth represented the main wealth and revenue in the Islamic empire, and new wealth came majorly from wars and politics not from enterprise. In the absence of economic innovations, the cessation of the conquests turned the Islamic empire into a standstill form of *pax Islamica*. Deprived from gaining access to more natural resources, the growing population began to outstrip the available resources.⁵⁰ In this process, the greatest military success, which locked economic growth to the Islamic state, destroyed the model military state. The widespread use of servants in the military severely restricted the scope for free indigenous Muslims, blocked their fair-share in previous booty organization and denied their influence over foreign policy.⁵¹

The shift among Muslims from reliance on Muslim subjects within to reliance on chattel servants from outside indicates that a wholly new social class of military elites emerged in the Islamic world. The *Atabegs* class⁵² became a cultural and linguistic distinctive feature in the Islamic societies. In a short period, the new military elites obtained political power over the state, which they used to acquire wealth rather than creating it. In essence, Muslims' foreign

⁴⁹ Bernard Lewis, *Politics and War*, 176.

⁵⁰ Although there are no records for the Islamic population, the population growth is obvious in the absence of major epidemics.

⁵¹ For introduction of the Turks as slave soldiers into the Islamic world, see on the merits of the Turks cited and translated in Charles Pellat, *The Life and Works of al-Jahiz* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 91-97; see also citation in Clifford Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1973), 209.

⁵² The Arab usage of the Turkish word *Atabeg* does not carry the complimentary connotations with which we use the word *governor* in English and its Arabic synonyms, *Hakim*. To the subjects, *Atabeg* meant literally a military governor; and was used figuratively for Muslim governors whose culture and language was different from that of traditional Arabs. Thus, the new concept reflects a form of alienation: See Jonathan Berkey, *The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in The Near East, 600-1800* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 209.

wars and expansion gradually ceased to be the occupation of Muslim general population.⁵³ This step, in retrospect, brought about the end to the positive relationship between the Islamic state and its subjects. Notably, that change had no significant impact on the intellectual works for Muslim jurists continued to provide logical theories of *Jihad*. However, if what follows has a static appearance on the practical field, it is because the relationship between Muslim leaders and their subjects witnessed a sharp negative turn.

For the leaders' class, political distinctions concerning the legitimacy of the authority – together with the lack of right intent – influenced their practical response to the crusaders. Between 1092- 1094, the Islamic world suffered a clean sweep of all major political leaders from Egypt eastwards. The murder of the greatest figure of the Seljuk Empire, the vizier Nizam al-Mulk, and then the death of the Seljuk's Sultan Malikshah, devastated the Seljuk's Sultanate. In Egypt, the death of the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir followed by the death of his vizier Badr al-Jamali brought about the end to the Fatimid's dynasty. The same year, 1094, witnessed the death of the Abbasside Sunni caliph, al-Muqtadi.⁵⁴ In the absence of rightful leadership, the military and bureaucratic elites shifted the role of the Islamic state into a state governed by status and civic ideologies. This policy disintegrated the Islamic empire into principalities over which wealth motivated members of ruling families to fight each other.

Ibn al-Athir perceived the state of affairs of the Islamic world in the statement:

⁵³ For the social demographic changes in the Islamic world, see Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Tenth Century* (Essex: Longman, 1986), 158-62; for the ideas of social economics, see M. I. Finley, *Economic and Society in Ancient Greece*, ed. Brented Shaw and Richard Saller (New York: Viking Press, 1982).

⁵⁴ For Arabic online edition, see Abu al-Mahasin Yusuf Ibn Taghribirdi, *al-Maktaba al-Islamia, al-Nujum al-Zahira fe Muluk al-Qahira*, August 12, 2004, <http://bookstree.com/books/130/viewchp.asp-BID=75.htm#s1> (accessed March 28, 2013), 75.

When the Franks – may God frustrate them – extended their control over what they had conquered of the lands of Islam and it turned out well for them that the troops and the kings of Islam were preoccupied with fighting each other, at that time opinions were divided among the Muslims, desires differed and wealth was squandered.⁵⁵

Ibn al-Athir's statement denoted the impact of the shocking defeat on a Muslim. It seems that he attempted to absorb the humiliating defeat. Hence, he claimed that Muslims no longer treated their land as a holy domain, but rather as merely wealth. Although this point indicates the gradual shift in Muslims' ideology of the role of the state, it illuminated Ibn al-Athir's divided attitude between the glorious past and the shocking present. For centuries, the House of Islam (the Islamic empire) meant something more to Muslims than a modern nation-state. It did not mean merely land or wealth. The Islamic state was a rational-driven holy and sovereign state. It made law within and outside its borders; it made war or peace as it saw fit.⁵⁶ The defeat, however, demythologized Muslims symbol divinely state. In addition, he portrayed the image of the Islamic state to the elites' class. According to Ibn al-Athir, the Islamic state meant wealth to the *Atabegs*. This ideology faded the existence of the righteous intentions away from wars led by the existed leadership.

The general thrust of a just war is that a nation waging war should be doing it for the cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest. On that account, Muslim subjects may counter that national interest is paramount. Therefore, the issue of intention raises the concern of practicalities for the reason that it induces wider number of citizens to support the war.

Consequentially, a leader's reaction to an expected aggression profoundly demonstrates the

⁵⁵ Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kamil Fi'l-tarikh*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Vol. X, XII vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1851-76), 256.

⁵⁶ See Bernard Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (New York: Schocken Books, 1998), 121-122.

possession of good intent. To the Fatimid, the appearance of the First Crusade was not a surprise. The Aleppan chronicler, al-Azimi, mentioned that the Byzantine Emperor had informed the Fatimid authorities early about the appearance of the Franks. The Fatimid, however, determined to use crusaders' army for their interest. In reality, the Crusaders inflicted damage into the Seljuk Empire, the political and sectarian rivals of the Fatimid. Therefore, it was not a coincidence that the Fatimid possessed Jerusalem, while the Seljuk's army battled the First Crusade in Anatolia.⁵⁷

On the other hand, the cessation of the Abbasside conquests substituted the strong Caliphate by an idle state. To the Sunni world, the first focus for any call to *Jihad* falls on the Abbasside Caliph in Baghdad. In just war thinking, the criterion of the legitimate authority serves a formal purpose to think about the use of lethal force. Thus, the Caliph – who was the supreme ruler and head over the entire Sunni-Muslim community – had the ultimate responsibility for military operations. It was his duty to call for *Jihad*, weighing its costs and benefits for the Muslims in any given circumstances, issues the summons and the declaration, which signals the presence of war.⁵⁸ In theory, the Abbasside Caliph al-Mustazhir had the legitimate authority to wage and promote such a holy war against the Franks.⁵⁹

Nonetheless, al-Mustazhir had lost much of his territories to the Turkic military elites. This process hindered the major source of income to the state. In return, al-Mustazhir lost the economic stimulus to wage wars against the crusades. Despite the envoys sent to Baghdad requesting the Caliph's support, the Caliph ignored all requests. Ibn al-Jawazi recorded somberly

⁵⁷ Al-Azimi, "La chronique abrègée d'Al-Azimi," *Journal Asiatique* 230 (1938): 371.

⁵⁸ M. Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History*, 12-13; R. Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 1-7; Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations*, 104, 154-157.

⁵⁹ See A. Noth, "Heiliger Kampf (Jihad) gegen die "Franken": Zur Position der Kreuzzüge im Rahmen der Islam-geschichte," *Saeculum* 37 (1986): 243.

the story of al-Harawi, a judge from Damascus, requesting the Caliph to send his troops to aid the Syrians. Nonetheless, it seems that al-Mustazhir disregarded the concern.⁶⁰ Although there is no evidence, it is my impression that the Caliph promoted his personal gain, since the crusader army inflicted damage to all the forces of his political rivalries including: the Turkic *Atabegs*, the Seljuk Empire, and the Fatimid Caliphate. I repeat this is merely an impression until properly researched.

To this concern, Hitti stated that, the crusaders were “a strange and unexpected enemy.”⁶¹ Perhaps it is true to refer to the crusaders as a strange enemy, but definitely, they were an expected one. News of the crusaders approaching the Islamic world had circulated among political leaders, who in return determined to use the forthcoming army for their personal interests. Hence, Muslim leaders’ reaction to the expected crusader army eliminated the presence of the right intent in their wars. Thus, after the Crusader States slotted into the political map of the Islamic world, the Turkic *Atabegs*, Fatimid, Seljuk, and perhaps even the Abbasids were willing to use them.⁶² For example, Ridawan, the governor of Aleppo maintained political alliance with Tancred of Antioch against the ruler of Mosul.⁶³ Similar arrangements took place between the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Fatimid Caliphate through Shams al-Khalifa, the governor of Ascalon who was mainly motivated by keeping the trade undisturbed.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Ibn al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazim fi Tarikh al-Muluk wa'l-Umam*, ed. F. Krenkow, Vol. X (Hyderabad: Mat'bat Da'irat al-Ma'arif al-Uthmaniyya, 1938-41), 108.

⁶¹ Phillip Hitti, *History of Syria* (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004), 589.

⁶² For Franks/Muslims alliances, see Michael Köhler, *Allianzen und Vertage zwischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vorderen Orient* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991).

⁶³ Köhler, *Allianzen und Vertage*, 83.

⁶⁴ Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, trans. H. A. R. Gibb (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 2002), 109-110.

According to Ibn al-Adim, the political elites of Aleppo were in favor of the Franks' existence because they helped perpetuate the independent status of their city.⁶⁵

The issue of right intent demonstrates the level of moral values that justifies the war. In return, the presence of moral values provides the religious perspective to the act of violence. This is not to underestimate the matter of necessity. That is to imply that in the presence of controversial intellectual works that justified the act of war, the concerns of necessity could possibly elevate any practical warfare to the level of *Jihad*. Hence, it is surely hard to determine what Muslim actions may (or may not) be called a *Jihad*. This step, however, depends on the extent of Muslims' support to the movement because it points to the level of shared motivations in a common society. By applying the former analysis on Zengi's movement, though his movement presented a necessity due to the pressure of the crusaders, it lacked the public support.

Sivan argued that the serious mobilization of *Jihad* as an instrument in the war against the crusaders began in the time of Zengi and reached its peak when Zengi sacked Edessa in 1144.⁶⁶ In practice, although Zengi's response represented the first serious Islamic practical warfare against the crusaders, Zengi's attack on Edessa offered another example of an opportunistic movement. Definitely, Zengi's attempts lacked the Syrian public's support, which was vital to the practical and moral magnitudes of his movement. To appreciate the significance of this fact, the religious class offered no support to Zengi, which was important to color his activities with Islamic zeal. Ibn al-Qalanisi stated on Zengi's attempt to acquire Damascus, "The amir Imad al-Din Atabek had long been desirous of it, ambitious to possess himself of it, and on

⁶⁵ Ibn al-Adim, *Zubdat al-Halab min tarikh Halab*, ed. Sami al-Dahhan, Vol. II, III vols. (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damascus, 1997), 173.

⁶⁶ Emmanuel Sivan, "La genese de la contre-croisade: Un traite Damasquin du XII siecle" *Journal Asiatique* (La Societe Asiatique) 254 (1966): 199-204.

the watch to seize any opportunity against it.”⁶⁷ This statement, in keeping with Zengi’s record, indicates a man following personal ambitions. Before taking Edessa, Zengi aimed at obtaining Damascus itself. Although he gained control of Homs and Baalbek, he failed to take Damascus. Zengi stood as a grave threat in Syria to both Muslims and Crusaders, not only because of his military skills, but also and majorly because of his exceptional brutality and cruel behaviors.⁶⁸ Ibn al-Qalanisi, who was an inhabitant of Damascus, described Zengi’s failure at Damascus, “There was a wholesale slaughter. Survivors were killed or imprisoned. Those who could, whether or not they were wounded, escaped the city. That day, but for God’s grace, the city would have fallen.”⁶⁹

Certainly, Zengi threatened the Damascenes more than the Franks. Ibn al-Qalanisi's thankful feelings towards Zengi’s disappointment at the walls of Damascus explain a Damascene’s relieve. This proves that the publics of Syria perceived Zengi’s movements as a man who aimed at conquering them. In return, his wars lacked their support. In addition, regarding Zengi’s threat to Damascus, the Damascenes signed a pact with the Franks to drive Zengi away.⁷⁰ Apparently, the Damascenes chose the safer path – though not proper – to shake hands with the crusaders than giving up to Zengi. There is no evidence that the Damascenes opposed their ruler when he decided to make an alliance with the Franks. It seems that Muslim subjects had no enthusiasm toward Zengi’s movements. Whether (or not) Zengi provided a leadership of *Jihad*, scholars are free to express their moral judgment. It is important to stress,

⁶⁷ Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, 266.

⁶⁸ Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, 256-262; see also Carole Hillenbrand, "Abominable Acts: The Career of Zengi," in *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences*, ed. Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 111-132.

⁶⁹ Francesco Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of The Crusades*, trans. E. I. Costello and Francesco Gabrieli (New York, NY: Barnes & Nobels, Inc., 1993), 44.

⁷⁰ Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, 260.

however, that some Muslims viewed Zengi in this light; and it is surely plausible to argue that his victory at Edessa raised Muslim hopes in the struggle with the Franks.⁷¹ Nonetheless, Zengi's ruthlessness disturbed his relationship with Muslim subjects. In return, Zengi's movements remained petite.

Behind this opportunistic Islamic leadership, the major force of the Islamic world in the form of Muslim subjects maintained a low-voice of pan-Islamism. There is no doubt that the loss of the Jerusalem provoked religious fervor among the general population.⁷² Although in reality, Muslim peasants might have viewed the idea of fighting for any of the warlords, who technically allied with the Franks against fellow Muslims, a deficient and an unjust war. This is not to imply that Muslim leaders' movements lacked the support of religious theories, eventually each warlord propagandized his personal campaigns against crusaders as a *Jihad*.⁷³ However, there is no evidence that Muslim subjects become members of any major military campaigns against the crusaders except for the defense of their own cities.⁷⁴ The dilemma occurs in peasants' conceptualizations of the holy war.

For centuries, Muslim called the Islamic empire, *Umma*. This concept meant 'community' and reflected the very identity of Muslims. In return, Muslims became members of wars to defend (or to expand the dominating power of) their identity. That is to consider all the moral and material rewards of these wars. Therefore, Muslim mythologized the idea of the Islamic state. In the end, Muslims fought for the Islamic state and not for a specific monarch.

⁷¹ For contemporary poets on Zengi's favor, see Imad al-Din al-Isfhani, *Kharidat al-Qasr* (Cairo: Dar al-Kutob, 1951), vol. I, 110.

⁷² For example, see the epic of al-Abiwardi quoted in Ibn al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazim fi Tarikh al-Muluk wa'l-Umam*, 108.

⁷³ See A. Noth, Heiliger Kampf (Jihad) gegen die "Franken, 248-254.

⁷⁴ For example, peasants of Antioch volunteered only to defend their own city, see Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kamil Fi'l-tarikh*, vol. X, 190.

Therefore, the Islamic state as a shared identity provided the moral justice for the *Jihad*. After the impact of the First Crusade, the choice to fight meant fighting for a specific leader rather than for the state itself. Therefore, the ideology of self-defense provided the moral justice in reference to the dogma of *Jihad*. This new ideology replaced the principle of fighting for the Islamic state. This is plausible in keeping with the social and economical transformation to the role of the Islamic state.

Above all, the invasion of the First Crusade demythologized Muslims high expectations regarding the mighty Islamic state. After centuries of literary works of mythologizing the invincible Islamic empire, the crushing defeat was a reality. In the eyes of its inhabitants, not only Muslim soldiers, but also God himself defended the Islamic empire. Not for nothing Muslims called their dominion, ‘House of Islam’ for within its territories exists the ‘true believers’⁷⁵ of god and the innumerable holy buildings. They ranged from Mecca to Jerusalem and from the ages of Moses and Jacob to Jesus, Mohamed, and the Great Caliphs. Nonetheless, the devastating defeat was a reality. In return, Muslims’ morals plummeted; and so too their enthusiasm to *Jihad*. On the other hand, the crusaders have never been more than a dominant minority of distinctive cultures in the Islamic world like the *atabegs*. These transformations deprived Muslim subjects of a way of serving the state.

In a case of limited natural resources, the economical and political rise of the Turkic military class led to the political decline of the general population’s influence on the state.⁷⁶ This

⁷⁵ Scholars are sharply divided regarding the concept ‘true believers.’ While some consider it a reference only to Muslims, others believe that it was a reference to Muslims, Christians, and Jews. For source of ‘true believers’ as Muslims only, see Holy Quran, 3:85. For source of ‘true believers’ as Muslims, Christians, and Jews, see Holy Quran, 2:62.

⁷⁶ See E. Ashtor, *A Social and Economic history of the Near East in the Middle Ages*, 168-331.

decline reduced the subjects' survival needs down to only the need to live and to subsist. Even in survival situations like the impact of the First Crusade, Muslim subjects needed to still care about few little things to keep their subsisting needs together with as much as possible of dignity. This psychological approach explains those who chose *modus vivendi* with the Crusaders. Thus, to understand the impact the First Crusade on Muslim subjects and its consequences, the starting point must surely be three facts. First, Muslim general population viewed the Islamic world as one world, even after the city-states' political division. In theory, the title city-state indicates the administrative definition of a territory, though the city-state in the Islamic empire was a province of the much larger Islamic state, whether the Abbasside or the Fatimid. Any territorial state which has a number of conglomerations within its border must necessarily define and distinguish among those conglomerations for the purposes of security, taxation, and all the other demands and services that social life entails.

Although after the fragmentation, the Islamic empire, which for centuries defined the term 'Muslims,' became just a theory: memory preservations of what once was a great empire, and in retrospect, memory preservation of what once characterized Muslims' identity. Ironically, all Muslim chroniclers of the crusades defined themselves and their communities as 'Muslims' regardless of their cultural diversities and political disintegrations. This definition brought back the memories of centuries of a political unity by which the Islamic empire became an identity and its community defined itself with the term 'Muslims.' Nonetheless, chroniclers continued to use the same term to define themselves. It seems plausible to state that Muslim chroniclers looked back to the glorious past of the Islamic empire to escape the straightjackets of present failures. Therefore, Muslim chroniclers tended to view themselves as members of the great and

successful empire.⁷⁷ Second, urbanization characterized the Islamic world more than any other society at this time. Third, the foundation of each social class – which has attained a certain degree of development and has been brought about by the exchange of commodities – is the separation of town from country. This is not an exhaustive list, but it will explain the reasons that deprived Muslim subjects away from wars and politics after the impact of the First Crusade.

Although neither geographers nor historians nor sociologists agreed on a standard definition for the term ‘city,’ in socioeconomic terms, cities arose because of the incapacity of the two forms of human associations, the household and the larger kinship grouping, to satisfy all legitimate needs of their members. Self-sufficiency was, therefore, the objective, and a properly structured city should be able to achieve that goal, save for the unavoidable lack of essential natural resources, for which foreign trade was admissible. The Islamic cities mainly were trading centers, where luxurious goods of the Far East found their way to the West. Before the foundation of the Crusader States, the rise of the *Atabegs* led to a spoils system. This development adversely affected the activities of the merchants, who suffered from the demands of the ruler and his military followers. In return, the increasing interest of the state changed the social status of Muslim subjects in the urban areas into servants to the *Atabegs*’ interest.⁷⁸ In Muslims’ trading cycle, coastal towns represented the outlet to the Mediterranean. For centuries,

⁷⁷ For a comparable case see, Paul Veyne, *Did The Greeks Believe in Their Myth? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination*, trans. Paula Wissing (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago, 1988); His central thesis explains that Greeks’ beliefs were born in a world outside time and space as a tradition bearing. Therefore, it is the history that confines the cultural program who provides the constitutive imagination to the existing consensus. Consequently, a set of traditions changes over time into beliefs.

⁷⁸ Ira Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 117-130; See also Charles Issawi, "The Decline of Middle Eastern Trade 1100-1850," in *Islam and Trade in Asia*, ed. D. S. Richards (London: B. Cassirer, 1970); Claude Cahen, "Quelques mots sur le declin commercial du monde musulman a la fin du moyen age," in *Studies of the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M. A. Cook, (Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 31-37.

the Islamic state provided high measures of protection and innovations that facilitated the trading cycles. Once the coastal towns fell to the crusaders, it was necessary for Muslim traders to find a way to keep the sufficiency of their trading business without any support from the Islamic state. Consequently, Muslim traders and sea captains enjoyed a safe-conduct from a king of Jerusalem, and by the thirteenth-century, there was an important Syrian trading community in Tyre.⁷⁹

For security purposes of city autonomy, cities granted higher levels of safety to the inhabitants due to the adequate fortifications. Thus, the majority of Muslim general population inhabited major cities like Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad. For the Islamic major cities, the impact of the First Crusade did not exceed the limits of stories, which the survivors mentioned. Although Muslim subjects could have encountered delegations from Syria visiting Baghdad to request the Caliph's military assistance, it seems that subjects in Muslim major cities adapted a form of politics isolationism. The long-term isolation of Muslim general population from being involved in foreign affairs and wars dominated the momentum. Hence, the general population viewed the problem of the crusader presence in Syria as a matter of high politics. In return, Muslim subjects left the matter to Muslim politicians, leaders, and military.⁸⁰

For the rural areas, the Islamic state distributed portions of the conquered lands amongst Muslim subjects in the form of semi-ownership in return for a regular payment during the age of Islamic expansions. Notably, Muslim citizens who took these lands were soldiers in the Islamic army, thus indigenous Christians or Jews remained working and living on the land in return for a

⁷⁹ For country and town in the Crusader Outmere, see Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades, A History*, 82-85.

⁸⁰ The introduction of slavery slammed the door shut for Muslim citizens to join the army services. By which Muslim peasants lost their access to foreign policy; See Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, 158-62; Ashtor, *A Social and Economic history of the Near East in the Middle Ages*, 168-331.

rental or payment to the landlords. Therefore, the majority of inhabitants in the Islamic country continued to be indigenous Christians and Jews. After the end of the expansion, the state failed to make payments to the new military class. Consequently, the state granted military officers the fiscal rights to collect the land revenues for their salaries. In practice, the grantee exercised economic and social *de facto* control. This process contributed to the depopulation of the rural parts of the Islamic Empire. Muslim subjects left the rural parts and resided in urban areas in search for other business.⁸¹

Therefore, very few Arabs were productive settlers of the land after the foundation of the Crusader States, especially in Palestine and Syria. A few were landlords who used native tenants to cultivate their estates. Generally, they were nomadic tribesmen, soldiers, and officials, all of whom lived off the poll tax.⁸² Although as well as the vicissitude, crusaders onslaught followed by a wave of Muslim internal migration. In 1100, Ibn Muyassar stated, "Many people from the Syrian territories came to Egypt fleeing from the Franks and famine."⁸³ There is also some evidence for refugee movements in Syria and Palestine.⁸⁴ Nonetheless, almost all Muslim chroniclers who recorded the native displacement activities portrayed references neither to the status nor to the nature of the refugees.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Ashtor, *A Social and Economic history of the Near East in the Middle Ages*, 168-331.

⁸² See Palestine under the Umayyad and the Arab Tribes in Micheal Hagg, *The Tragedy of The Templars: The Rise and Fall of The Crusader States* (NY: HarborCollins, 2013), 28-44.

⁸³ Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbar Misr: Annales d'Egypte*, ed. H. Massè (Cairo: Institute Francais d'Archeologie Orientale, 1919), 39.

⁸⁴ For further explanation on indigenous refugee displacements after the First Crusade see E. Sivan, "Rèfugiès Syro-Palestiniens Au Temps Des Croisades," *Revue des Etudes Islamique* (Librairie Oreintaliste) 25 (1967): 135-147.

⁸⁵ See Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, 47, 51; there are no evidences whether the reufgees were Muslims or *Dhimmi*s from the Eastern Christians and Jews.

Although religion provides an important psychological force, especially in the case of Jerusalem, it was not the sole driving force for counter-crusading movements. It seems that the gradual shift in the role of the Islamic state influenced Muslim subjects' understanding of politics. A political virtue gives men a sense of justice, and sufficient consideration for rights of the self and the others to make the civilized community.⁸⁶ This virtue makes civil peace possible because peasants would at least be able to insure their survival and subsistence needs. In return, this persuaded Muslim subjects to set a comparison between the truthful and the false man. For Muslim subjects, the idea of *Jihad* mirrored their perception to justice. This quest rejoins the interpretation that this step reflects peasants' attempt of *modus vivendi* with Crusaders. E. P. Thompson linked the notion of a new capitalist cultural mentality, which uses the economical resources for its own ends against peasants and their need for subsistence insurance from the mysterious future, especially in hard times; a concept which Thompson called 'moral economy'.⁸⁷

Thompson's argument revealed a social psychological approach to a ruling class that practices submissive policy against their subjects. This facet revealed a suppressed general population who lived in a society that does not suit their purposes. The issue implicit in the notion of how far the economy and power relations within a society influence the diverse moral understandings of justice, without which a society suffers the loss of the shared identity. The sense of shared identity, in retrospect, produces a strong and sufficient community against foreign threats because it reveals similar understandings of justice. By comparison, the growing sense of injustice between the authorities of the Islamic state and their subjects created an

⁸⁶ Referring to the Greek concept '*dike*', see I. F. Stone, *The Trial of Socrates* (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 46-48.

⁸⁷ Edward P. Thompson, *Customs in Common* (London: Merlin Press, 1993), 341.

underlying social crisis. This negative assessment altered the subjects' conceptualization of *Jihad* in response to foreign threats from as high as pan-Islamism down to the self and family members.

The religious class, however, promoted legal *Jihad*'s theories against the Franks. Few isolated voices spoke out in concentration at the loss of Jerusalem. The legal judge '*qadi*' Abu al-Fadl al-Kashshab of Aleppo represented an early model for the active participation of the religious class in the *Jihad* against the Franks. Abu al-Fadl preached the teaching of *Jihad* among the publics of Aleppo in an attempt to infuse Islamic fervor into the general population. His preaching said Ibn al-Adim on what he heard from one of the soldiers who were listening to the preaching of Abu al-Fadl, "we have come from our lands to follow a man in a turban."⁸⁸ This statement presented the image of a man of religion, identified by his turban, and preaching *Jihad* to the public. Although these sorts of attempts came to be very limited, only the religious class had the ability to deal with Muslim's social disorientation. The religious class represented the key-link to unite the efforts of the general population together with the authorities into a wide-scale *Jihad* against the Franks because they provide the religious coating on the act of fighting.⁸⁹

A similar turbulence took place in the Caliph's mosque of Baghdad. There, the religious class laid shame on their leadership by pressing the public against them. It seems that this movement did not amuse the *de facto* ruler of the Sunni Caliph, al-Mustazhir, as it challenged his legal authority.⁹⁰ Another outstanding exception to the activities of the religious class was the Syrian legist Ali Ibn Tahir al-Sulami. Al-Sulami preached publicly to the general population in

⁸⁸ Ibn al-Adim, *Zubdat al-Halab min tarikh Halab*, vol. II, 188-189.

⁸⁹ Ibn al-Adim, *Zubdat al-Halab min tarikh Halab*, vol. II, 185-190.

⁹⁰ Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, 111-112.

the Omayyad mosque of Damascus in the early years after the fall of Jerusalem. Al-Sulami urged his listeners – while preaching his *Kitab al-Jihad* – to take up arms against the Crusaders. He exerted all Muslim peasants in the region to unite in opposition to the Latin Christian invaders. In his preaching, he demonstrated the examples of the early Caliphs and their prosecution of *Jihad*. Thus, he proposed that the weakness and negligence of later caliphs led to the humiliating defeat of Muslims.⁹¹

To this concern, al-Sulami attempted to introduce Islamic fervor to the unconcerned Caliph. He aspired to use public opinion to urge the Caliph to practice *Jihad*. al-Sulami aimed his message, as well, at the *Atabeg*. He portrayed them as appointees from God to watch over and defend the land of Islam, rather than appointees from the Caliph.⁹² Most significant regarding al-Sulami's call for *Jihad*, he stated that the provincial rulers did not require the Caliph's authorization to wage defensive holy war (*Jihad*) against enemies.⁹³ The importance of this step reflects that the issue of necessity concerned al-Sulami's approach more than the issue of legitimacy. Although al-Sulami's call proved that he realized that his sense of self was now under assault from the crusaders,⁹⁴ it showed the tendency to minimize the distance between the glorious past and the current state of the Islamic world.⁹⁵

Al-Sulami's identification with the historical discipline of the Islamic Rightly Guided Caliphs that defined his texts discussed his relationship to the idea of pan-Islamism.⁹⁶ In

⁹¹ The Original manuscripts of Ali Ibn Tahir al-Sulami are located in al-Assad Library at Damascus; For Arabic version see Emmanuel Sivan, " La Genèse De La Contre-Croisade, F. 174a, F. 174b.

⁹² Sivan, La Genèse De La Contre-Croisade, f. 177a, 177b.

⁹³ Sivan, La Genèse De La Contre-Croisade, f. 188a.

⁹⁴ Sivan, La Genèse De La Contre-Croisade, f. 176a, f. 176b.

⁹⁵ Sivan, La Genèse De La Contre-Croisade, f. 173b, f. 174a, f. 174b, f. 175a.

⁹⁶ Sivan, La Genèse De La Contre-Croisade, f. 173 b, 174a.

addition, it demonstrated his connection to the history of the Islamic empire. All make clear that the process of self-identification with the past of the Islamic empire was a continuing one, not something fixed once and for all by the events. These memories constituted (if not a conscious critique of the Islamic history) at least an implicit questioning of its limits, more precisely, the limits of time and space. Al-Sulami placed the historical context of the Islamic empire into an unfit situation. The Abbasside Caliph, who stood as the legitimate leader of the Sunni Muslims, suffered a major weakness and the Turkic *Atabegs* promoted their personal interest. Muslim subjects, on the other hand, had no way to practice *Jihad* and serve the state. Consequently, all practical attempts of *Jihad* against the crusaders were ill affirmed, ill supported, and of no significance.

Indeed, in the latter half of the tenth century, Ibn Hawaqal condemned the absence of the *Jihad*.⁹⁷ The Arab geographer Al-Muqaddasi supported this criticism. Speaking about the province of Syria, al-Muqaddasi complained that, “the inhabitants have no enthusiasm for *Jihad* and no energy in the struggle against the enemy.”⁹⁸ Though the concept of *Jihad* was, is, and will always be an embedded pillar in the Islamic belief, this elastic concept carried different percepts to each individual. Nonetheless, Ibn Hawqal and al-Muqaddasi’s references to *Jihad* aimed at the practical warfare against the crusaders. Responsibilities for the practical performance of *Jihad* fell on the leaders and the subjects. Nonetheless, the socioeconomic and sociopolitical crisis pre-existed in the Islamic world had devastated the Islamic state. Although the idea of ‘mighty Islamic empire’ survived in the memories of Muslim citizens, Muslims attempted to absorb the new reality of the shocking defeat. It was during this period that Muslims chose different forms of ‘live and let live’ with the newcomers.

⁹⁷ Cited in Emmanuel Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade*, 13.

⁹⁸ Quoted in Emmanuel Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade*, 13.

Crusaders' invasion of the Islamic land was in a high sense among Muslims a religious war.⁹⁹ Such a concept should have provoked Muslims – who saw their lands as holy chosen domains – to wage a holy war against the invaders. Muslims, however, resented their variance with one another. Though the First Crusade was not a surprise, its success shocked Muslims who had the confidence that outbreaks of enemies of Islam would be at most temporary setbacks in a longer story of Islamic victories. When the humiliating defeat occurred, Muslims searched the depth of their memories to discover some vestige of the past, not the past of individual, faltering and ephemeral, but rather that of the community, which, though defeated, nonetheless represented that the defeat was a permanent instance in the lasting victories. This indicates that Muslims underestimated the strength of the First Crusade. Even after the defeat, Muslims failed to bridge the gap between the past and the present; and when they realized that the defeat was an avoidable fact, each division followed a procedure to insure a simple survival instinct.

In addition to Muslims' divided attitude between the past and the present, the invasion revealed that the Muslims' political disorientation brought about a socioeconomic crisis. It seems plausible to state that Muslims' deep confidence in the holy power of the Islamic state convinced them that even at the time of bewilderment, god protected the Islamic land. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that not long before the First Crusade, this social crisis prompted the Islamic legist, al-Ghazali, to develop a social economic hypothesis by which he urged the state's authorities to regulate the economic activities of individuals. Al-Ghazali recognized the fact that, although salvation bestowed the ultimate goal of human actions, the pursuit of a social welfare is a necessary part for achieving that goal because without it, the social unrest would devastate individuals' moralities. In return, it would devastate the example

⁹⁹ See Ibn al-Athir referring to the crusades as a holy war waged on Muslims, in Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir for The Crusading Period*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. 1, 13.

‘divinely state.’ Accordingly, he urged the state to ensure the proper functioning of the economy and the fulfillment of what he called the divinely ordained social obligations.¹⁰⁰

Al-Ghazali’s approach brought about an analogous premise to the Weberian philosophy that members of different social classes adopt different belief systems to express their social situation.¹⁰¹ This meant that the major body of Muslim general population shared different religious beliefs than those of the political authorities. In return, this step indicates that understandings of *Jihad* differed among Muslims. It is possible to characterize the developments in the Islamic world as a privatization of power where individual *Atabegs* successfully defied the residual power of the state. This implies that the *Atabegs* privatized the ideology of *Jihad* after the privatization of the Islamic state, regardless of the issues of legitimacy, causation, intention, and above all, the concerns of their subjects. As Henri Frankfort phrased it, “without oriental precedent in one respect: the gods and the universe were described by him as a matter of private interest.”¹⁰²

It is worth stressing at the point that there is no Marxism there, no theory, merely the direct result to the gradual cession of the power and domination of what once was a large human institution, namely the great Islamic empire. This step coupled with a conflicted attitude about Muslims self-identity. After the defeat, Muslims found themselves torn between the high expectations of the past and the present crisis. Unable to affirm any of them, Muslims absorbed the defeat as a fact and chose to live with the crusaders. It would be naive, however, to state that

¹⁰⁰ S. M. Ghazanfar and A. Azem Islahi, "Economic Thought of an Arab Scholastic: Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (AH450-505/1058-1111AD)," in *Medieval Islamic Thought*, ed. S. M. Ghazanfar and S. Todd Lowry, (NY: Taylor & Francis, 2004), 23-48.

¹⁰¹ See Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 491-92.

¹⁰² Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the gods* (Chicago: The University of Chicago press, 1948), 250.

without the arrival to more settled social relations and the revival of economics, Muslims failed to embrace *Jihad*. This rather implies that Muslim participants committed themselves to *Jihad* with the impetus of a worldview, above all the practical role of the human institution responsible for organizing Muslim efforts, the state.

In any case, it does not alter the important fact that the Islamic empire – which previously dominated the Near East – existed. Surely, all chroniclers referred to themselves as Muslims, regardless of their coherent diversity. Baghdad, though decayed, remained the center of politics, diplomacy, administration, and the source of the identity of the Islamic empire. It is worth stressing again that the Islamic empire in the seventh century, let alone the empire of the eighth century, was by the standards of the pre-industrial world, a powerful, well-organized, and wealthy state. Curiously enough, the Islamic empire – which played a large part in all *Jihad* campaigns before the presence of the Crusades – was the only one where men had evolved a constitution in which the individual was trained and disciplined to be subordinate. Driven out of Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, the empire could no longer be a great power. It was now battling for its very survival, and to do so it would have to adapt.

The impact of the First Crusade, however, revealed these realities. It revealed that the Islamic empire existed, but it was not the same empire of the seventh century. Though it survived two centuries of crisis, it was no longer the superpower of the Near East. The imperial domination was now a myth. Notably, Muslims preserved this fable in their memories. It revealed also that Muslims were indeed subjects, although not to a ‘Great Monarch’, but to the State itself, which for centuries fulfilled their moral and material needs. In reality, the Islamic empire was a completely different state when the First Crusade struck the Islamic world. The presence of the Islamic empire preserved a number of fundamental institutions including the

Caliph Court and Sunni orthodoxy. Nonetheless, the *Atabegs* privatized other important institutions like the army and taxation. Both institutions were important key-factors to the successful warfare of all historical Islamic victories. Therefore, Muslims lived in a community established in the seventh-century that did not match the state of reality in the ninth-century. This point stands to prove the lack of adaptability. It seems plausible to state that for the great Islamic empire existed only in theory, the concept ‘Muslims’, which for century defined the common identity of a whole community, was a theory as well. Unlike the age of expansion, the definition ‘Muslims’ described a religious, politic, and economic unite. Now, the definition ‘Muslims’ became a vague concept that described the broad-spectrum religious identity of distinctive communities.

The ideology of the holy war, though highly moral, it relies heavily on general population’s awareness that they share something in common: a belief in a paramount national cause to acknowledge loyalty to the state itself. This form of loyalty creates a sense of shared identity that offers the turbulent peasants with legitimate causations to fight. In the practical absence of the Islamic empire, Muslims lost the shared identity and the human institution that manage their *Jihad*’s efforts. Therefore, the shocking defeat convinced Muslims that their *Jihad*’s practices brought them back neither a better life nor the hopes of a better life nor the aspiration of salvation. In return, the extent of Muslim citizens’ involvement in war against the First Crusade was extremely short. Consequently, it is true to claim that although the sense of *Jihad* existed in theories,¹⁰³ the practical absence of the Islamic state influenced the lack of the practical *Jihad*.

¹⁰³ For legists’ interpretation of *Jihad* at the time of the Crusades, see R. Mottahedeh and R. al-Sayyid, *The Idea of Jihad in Islam before the Crusades*, 23-30.

CHAPTER 3

THE TURNING POINT

The whole of the Near East was on the move. So indeed must have seemed to some Muslim peasants, looking up bewildered from their patch of land, as a massive army surged past like a river in spate. Fifty years after the First Crusade, Latin's ambition and confidence in God's divine power influenced the call for the Second Crusade. The capture of Edessa in 1144 by Zengi of Mosul provoked the papacy to issue the charter of the Second Crusade. In 1145, Pope Eugenius III addressed *Quantum praedecessores* to King Louis VII and the French nobility. The Levant's leg of the campaign aimed at recapturing the city of Edessa from Zengi.¹⁰⁴ Despite the campaign's vast magnitude, the Second Crusade proved to be a disaster to Europeans. Rather than recapturing Edessa or taking Aleppo, the campaign broke at the gates of Damascus.

The invasion of Damascus, which was about to take place, marked a new phase toward the absence of *Jihad* in the Islamic world. Due to the Frankish siege of Damascus, Muslim's mood within Damascus and thereafter elsewhere in Syria seemed to have changed. Though almost every small area and city-state was at variance with the other, what Muslims resented after the Second Crusade was the desperate need for a strong leader to call himself the God-appointed ruler of all other men. Therefore, the impact of the Second Crusade united nearly all Muslims in the struggle. The invasion forced all Muslims to follow a simple survival instinct. Indeed, not since Muslim's humiliating experience of the First Crusade and the loss of Jerusalem, had the inhabitants of a major Muslim city felt the presence of the Franks within their

¹⁰⁴ Jonathan Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 208-227.

walls. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the impact of the Second Crusade on Muslims' social and moral disciplines, which led Muslims to embrace the practical *Jihad*.

Apart from detailing the campaign, the impact of the Second Crusade brought about the political unity to the Islamic Empire. A notable example of the formalistic approach is the point at which a voluntary association of independent Islamic states was converted into an Islamic Empire. The impact of the Second Crusade triggered an alliance among the governors of northern Syria: Saif-ad-Din, Nur-ad-Din, and Unur of Damascus. Ibn al-Athir, who wrote in northern Syria in the early thirteenth-century, indicated that Unur – the Atabeg of Damascus – appealed to Saif-ad-Din of Mosul, who joined Nur-ad-Din at Homs and was poised to march south to help lift the siege off Damascus.¹⁰⁵ The sense of Ibn al-Athir's writing is that Unur had appealed well before the siege began. At most, such an action was a symbol, a brutal statement of the reality, but not the reality itself. The word 'voluntary' is not even a good symbol, leading into remarkable verbal contortions. Before appealing to the Zengids,¹⁰⁶ Unur threatened the crusaders to hand over Damascus to the Zengids if the crusaders did not retreat.¹⁰⁷ This step indicates that a survival instinct guided Unur's decision. Meanwhile he attempted to maintain the independent status of Damascus through negotiation with the crusaders, he prepared a secondary plan of voluntary league with the *Atabegs* of Mosul and Homs.

In addition, the aftermath of the Second Crusade created the conditions for Nur-ad-Din to take control of Damascus and the whole of northern Syria in the name of uniting Muslim's powers.¹⁰⁸ The humiliating retreat of the campaign had evidently dealt an enormous blow to the

¹⁰⁵ Francesco Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of The Crusades*, 59-62.

¹⁰⁶ Saif-ad-Din of Mosul and Nur-ad-Din of Aleppo were the sons of Zengi.

¹⁰⁷ Francesco Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of The Crusades*, 61.

¹⁰⁸ Francesco Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of The Crusades*, 64-68.

cause of crusading in the West. Probably, the cumulative effect of fifty years of literary and architectural recordings of the First Crusade had contributed to a widespread European belief that God approved a new crusade and that it would be victorious. Hence, when the campaign collapsed so dismally, European morals plummeted too. As Europeans absorbed the outcome of the campaign, the papacy felt the consequences as well. Such feeling may have influenced the pope's caution over a new expedition. It seems certain that the failure of the Second Crusade had an impact upon Europeans' interest for crusading, notwithstanding repeated vocation support for the Holy Land. While European settlers of the Levant made numerous appeals for help in the decades after the Second Crusade and the Papacy issued bulls that called for new campaigns in 1157, 1165, 1166, 1169, 1173, 1181, 1184, and 1187, there was never enough political will to bring such bulls to life. The Second Crusade's failure led to a period in which for nearly forty years European Christian demoralization was reflected in a low level.¹⁰⁹

It was during this period that Nur-ad-Din consolidated his powers on wide partitions of the Islamic world with the assistance of the religious classes. Obviously, the absence of a strong Frankish threat, in the form of a new massive campaign, provided Nur-ad-Din with a valuable time toward the preparations of *Jihad* against the Crusaders, during which period, Nur-ad-Din focused on uniting Muslim's lands.¹¹⁰ As Kohler argued that after taking Damascus, Nur-ad-Din preferred to consolidate his powers in Syria rather than embarking *Jihad* against the Franks.¹¹¹ It seems possible to state that Kohler centered the phenomenon of *Jihad* on returning Jerusalem. Therefore, his analysis portrayed negative assessments on the fact that Nur-ad-Din

¹⁰⁹ Jonathan Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 269-279; Riley-Smith, *The Crusades, A History*, 131-136.

¹¹⁰ Following the Battle of Inab where Nur-ad-Din defeated and killed Prince Raymond of Antioch, see Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir for*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II, 31.

¹¹¹ Michael Kohler, *Allianzen und Vertage*, 239- 277.

concentrated his campaigns on conquering other Muslim territories rather than fighting the Crusaders over Jerusalem.

Certainly, neither Nur-ad-Din nor his allies anticipated all the consequences of the first step of association, in particular what would happen if a member-principality chose to secede. This league, however, was the first among Muslim leaders since the First Crusade to justify the hegemony and mastery of Nur-ad-Din over other Islamic principalities by proposing a common just cause, war against the Crusaders. Hope and aspiration do not imply a defined program, but their presence in the Islamic world is demonstrated by the rapid Islamic coating that enabled Nur-ad-Din to acquire the decision-making power on the league. In addition, it provided Nur-ad-Din with manpower and psychology to exert force in the strictest sense, to impose his decisions and to punish the recalcitrant principalities.

It seems possible to go farther and to state that though coercion of members of ruling families apparently was regarded as legitimate – and probably even compulsions against city-states and principalities that did not wish to join the league – the need to clear the Islamic lands, more precisely, Damascus, from the crusader forces influenced the popularity of the vengeance appeal. This public feeling made it impossible for Muslim leaders to collaborate with the Franks. By comparison, in the early decades of the twelfth-century, Muslim leaders persuaded a policy of collaboration with the Franks.¹¹² For example, at the peak of the First Crusade's battles against the Seljuk, the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt collaborated with the Franks against the Seljuk in order to break the Seljuk's power.¹¹³ For a short time in the history of mankind, it had been

¹¹² The Damascenes' cooperated with the Franks to drive Zengi away from Damascus; Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, 260.

¹¹³ Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kamil Fi'l-tarikh*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Vol. X, 186; see also Michael Kohler, *Allianzen und Vertage*.

proclaimed (even if not believed) that ‘might is not right.’ From this point on, the pattern of politics in the Islamic world was to alter, “all changed, changed utterly: a terrible beauty is born.”¹¹⁴ Common sense is right in that instance. The shock and horror of the vast campaign upon Damascus ended the Damascenes’ – and later on most Muslims – mutual peace with the outside world and harnessed a new appeal to unite Muslim’s powers in *Jihad* against the Franks.¹¹⁵

This is not to underestimate the league’s appeal, any more than the real fear of further Crusaders’ invasion. The pull of ideology is never to be underestimated, nor is it easy to untangle ideology and reality. In a conflict, there is no way to measure the exact respective balance of the two elements in determining the decision of an endangered nation. Muslim’s sources, for example, mentioned the painful experience of the Damascenes during the siege of Damascus. The sources seemed to have shed the light on the death of two members of Damascus’ religious class, the *Malikite imam* Yusuf al-Fandalawi and Abd al-Rahman al-Halhuli, who died as martyrs in defense of the city.¹¹⁶ There is no doubt that the religious class of Damascus offered an emotional impact on repulsing the Second Crusade. They exploited a real sense of Muslim’s need to embark *Jihad* against the Franks. No wonder, it was during the Second Crusade, Ibn Asakir gave public readings of Abd Allah al-Mubark’s *Kitab al-Jihad* (the book of the Holy War) in Damascus, which inspired Abu al-Hassan Ibn Munqidah, brother of the

¹¹⁴ Quoted from the poem of Yeats ‘Easter 1916,’ see W. B. Yeats, *The collected Poem of W. B. Yeats*, ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co. , 1989), Easter 1916.

¹¹⁵ Although Crusaders’ sack of Jerusalem had a spiritual impact on the Damascenes, Crusaders attack on Damascus provided a harsh physical impact on the Damascenes.

¹¹⁶ Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kamil Fi'l-tarikh*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Vol. I, 486; Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, 284; Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of The Crusades*, 56-63.

famous Usama, to volunteer to help raise the siege of Ascalon.¹¹⁷ Those revised theories of *Jihad*, in fact, offered nothing new to the previous ones. Yet that step at this momentum indicates that reality in the form of the Crusaders' threat to Damascus met the ideology of *Jihad*.

The same principle applies on the Baghdadis. Because Baghdad survived, the Islamic empire survived, at least in theory. However decayed the city became, however much of the population may have dwindled, it remained the center of politics, diplomacy, administration, and above all, the source of the Muslims' identity. If the Crusaders managed to take Damascus, Baghdad or Cairo would have been the next target. Certainly, that was an assumption, but it is an obvious one. The Second Crusade's hegemony on Damascus convinced Muslims that neither Jerusalem nor the Holy Land was the epitome of their conflict with the Crusaders. Part of the explanation contributed to the mystery of the Second Crusade's changing targets from Edessa to Damascus. In between the original call for the campaign and the expedition's arrival in the Latin East, the local population of Edessa attempted a revolt to recapture the city. This, however, turned out to be a disaster. The rebellion was crushed and the city was deserted.¹¹⁸ J. Phillips proposed that with Edessa in ruins, the crusaders had three options: to open a campaign on Aleppo, to move south and invest the Fatimid-held port of Ascalon, or to attack the city of Damascus.¹¹⁹ Out of three options, the Crusaders chose to aim their hegemony on Damascus. Although Damascus was the largest and most important city in Syria, that was the least

¹¹⁷ Quoted in Michael Bonner, Some observations concerning the Early development of Jihad on the Arab-Byzantine Frontier, 5-31.

¹¹⁸ Michael The Syrian, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien, patriarche jacobite d'Antioche (1166-1199)*, ed. J. B. Chabot, Vol. III, IV vols. (Paris, 1899-1910), 270-272; W. R. Taylor ed. And tr., "A New Syriac Fragment Dealing with Incidents in The Second Crusade," *Annual of The American School of Oriental Research* 11 (1929-30): 120-131.

¹¹⁹ Jonathan Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 217.

reasonable choice. Looking back, the Damascenes collaborated with the Franks to drive Zengi's forces.¹²⁰ Therefore, both the Damascenes and the crusaders shared the same enemy.

In any common sense, opening a campaign on the growing in power Nur-ad-Din of Aleppo or taking over the rich port of Ascalon would have made much more sense to the Muslims. The Crusaders' hegemony on Damascus, however, left the Muslims with one certain truth that collaborating with the Franks may save them from a certain particular battle, but it would not save them from the miseries of the war. In addition, Damascus and Baghdad meant much more than a survival situation to Muslims. Both cities were the core of Muslims' identity: an inheritance from the Islamic golden age. Therefore, the campaign on Damascus altered Muslims' struggle against the crusaders from battling for the Holy Land to battling for their very survival and identity. The growing sense of fear and intimidation in Damascus and thereafter in Baghdad influenced the rising call for *Jihad*. This step came in the form of the Abbasside Caliph's *Jihad* authorization to all the governors and fiefs of northern Syria. Ibn al-Qalanisi stated:

In the meantime there had arrived at Damascus the Sharif and amir Shams al-Din al-Husaini, the Naqib. He had come on from Saif al-Din Ghazi, son of the Atabek, having been debuted as an envoy from the Caliphate to all the governors and to the tribes of the Turkmens, to urge them to assist the Muslims and engage in a Holy War [Jihad] against polytheists [Crusaders].¹²¹

Regarding the Caliphal *Jihad*'s authorization, Köhler proposed that Nur-ad-Din and his league aimed their propaganda at acquiring the Caliphal legitimacy.¹²² Although it is hard to determine the exact balance of motives, which boosted the Abbasid Sunni Caliph at different stages, in reality, the Second Crusade's attack on a major Muslim city like Damascus was an

¹²⁰ See CHAPTER 2, 39-41.

¹²¹ Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, 288.

¹²² Michael Köhler, *Allianzen und Vertage*, 277.

extensive shift to counter-crusading movements. In hard times, certainly, fear impairs decision-making.¹²³ During which time the magnitude of the threat together with the public reaction impose interests on the ruler. In that situation, Nur-ad-Din and his league presented the last defensive mechanism to Baghdad, Baghdadis, and the Caliph. In addition, Nur-ad-Din's power emerged after the impact of the Second Crusade. Muslim sources, apparently, agreed on the fact that the Franks withdrew from the gates of Damascus once they realized that Nur-ad-Din mobilized his army and headed their way.¹²⁴ Hence, Nur-ad-Din gained no noteworthy activities in repulsing the Second Crusade. Accordingly, the Caliph's call came before the emerging power of Nur-ad-Din. As the Baghdadis absorbed the danger of the campaign, the Caliph felt the consequences as well. Such feeling may have influenced the Caliph's authorization. Hence, the authorization was, therefore, an inevitable matter on the Caliph who was under the pressure of his subjects.

Sprinkling Schuller's terminology of the Athenian empire may help to comprehend the last point. Indirect domination consists in the fact that it builds on, or attempts to evoke, an interest of the ruled in the process of being ruled.¹²⁵ The Second Crusade created a sense of reality among the Damascenes, the Muslims of northern Syria and Baghdad that the Crusaders did not aim their campaigns only at the liberation of Christian Holy Land, but rather at the invasion of the whole Islamic world. Therefore, the new league became an inevitable matter to Muslims. This analysis do not dispute that Muslim leaders welcomed the league when it was

¹²³ P. Winkeilman, B. Knutson, M. Paulus and J. Trujillo, "Affective Influence on Judgments and Decisions: Moving Core Mechanisms," *Review of General Psychology* 11, no. 2 (2007): 179-192.

¹²⁴ Francesco Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of The Crusades*, 56-63.

¹²⁵ See W. Schuller, *Die Herrschaft der Athener im Ersten Attischen Seebund* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), 3; His central thesis of 'two layers' in the structure of the later empires follow from his initial confusion between the psychological notion of 'an interest in being ruled' and the realities of power.

created.¹²⁶ However, self-defense of the Islamic states was the most obvious protective measure. The Crusaders twice invaded the Islamic lands, and Muslims had the strong confidence that they would try again. Therefore, the league remained in existence without a moment's faltering and its membership grew, willingly like the case with Damascus¹²⁷ or by compulsion like the case with Egypt.¹²⁸

In a conflict, a prudent state may 'voluntarily', out of a general and wide spread support of the cause, save itself from the frightful consequences of resistance and 'involuntary' subjection, but some states do not. This step depends heavily on the public support of the moral leadership, whether voluntary or involuntary. If the general public supports the moral authority of leadership, then they will be more likely to give support both voluntarily and with stronger commitment to the cause. In this case, lacking the data from the Islamic world with which to attempt a discussion of such moral sophistications, this next typology will focus on the outcome of Nur-ad-Din's expansions on the growing imperial powers of the Islamic state. This study does not imply by that concentration on economics that Muslims' religious ideologies do not merit analysis or that social economics as a worldview and religious theories were separable, autonomous aspects of the story. This rather meant that most Muslim participants committed themselves to *Jihad* with the incentive of worldviews that set a premium on their spiritual health. Difficult as it is in this case to reveal or even make a moral judgment on the complex motivations of the Muslims it is worth stressing in order to expose the worldviews that led to the revival of

¹²⁶ For example, the Atabeg of Damascus, Unur, threatened the crusaders to hand over Damascus to the Zengids if they did not retreat; See Francesco Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of The Crusades*, 61.

¹²⁷ The Damascenes surrendered willingly to Nur-ad-Din's troops to join his league, see Francesco Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of The Crusades*, 64-68.

¹²⁸ Nur-ad-Din sponsored two campaigns to take over Egypt from the Fatimid, see Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir* trans. D. S. Richards, 2010, Vol. II, 144-146.

Jihad's practices. The primary discussion here is how and why converting other Islamic principalities and city-states into Nur-ad-Din's league concerned the Muslim general population. In particular, what material benefits did the general population obtain from this endeavor? Did the imperial economy bring back the social justice to the Islamic world? Finally, did the power of an empire influence the practical magnitude of *Jihad*? Unfortunately, interference in internal affairs is less well understood, largely because of the inadequacy of the evidence and sources. Therefore, the emphasis on a system of social analysis might bridge the gap between Muslims' myth of the early Islamic empire and their enthusiasm toward *Jihad*.

In any study of the Islamic state, military service and tributes must be considered together, because the Islamic state, for the most, manipulated both.¹²⁹ The difference before the Second Crusade that the *Atabegs* privatized both objects for personal purposes.¹³⁰ Once Nur-ad-Din claimed leadership on the league, each principality or city-state that joined the league contributed either cash or soldiers. Ibn al-Qalanisi attributed on Nur-ad-Din's request from the Damascenes, "you support me with the Askar [army or soldiers] of Damascus, and we aid one another in waging the Holy War [Jihad]."¹³¹ As time went on, Nur-ad-Din whittled down members of the league until, his name became the sole political leader over roughly all Syrian and Egyptian provinces. In common sense, Nur-ad-Din's growing authority restricted the dominance of other Muslim ruling families. This step indicates that Nur-ad-Din's power came at the cost of other members of ruling families rather than at the expense of the subjects. In essence, Nur-ad-Din concentrated his wars and expansions, gradually, to reoccupy the Islamic

¹²⁹ For further information regarding the tributary system in the early Islamic state, see Abdul-Aziz Duri, "Notes on Taxation in Early Islam," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of The Orient* 17, no. 2 (May 1974): 136-144.

¹³⁰ See CHAPTER 2, 33-35.

¹³¹ Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, 303.

lands. If what follows, therefore, has a static appearance, that is because Muslims affiliated the accomplishments of the Islamic state under the leadership of Nur-ad-Din with that of the early Islamic empire. That is to consider moral and material endeavors.

Nonetheless, the oral tradition of events in the Islamic world focused heavily on the religious dimension of the movements, which Nur-ad-Din employed for his expansions. This is to imply that references to Nur-ad-Din in the Islamic sources are too skimpy, too unreliable, often regarded the Islamic zeal of Nur-ad-Din's activities only, and without underpins to the financial implications. One of the commonplaces of Islamic political rhetoric was that chroniclers often tended not to change the glorious past of the Islamic empire. Not only prudence, but also fairness, justice, glory, and, above all, self-affiliation with the community that once dominated the Near East defended this principle. For example, Ibn al-Athir stated on Nur-ad-Din, "I have read the histories of early kings before Islam, and in Islam until these time of ours, and I have not seen after the Rightly Guided Caliphs and Umar Ibn Abd al-Aziz, a king of better conduct than the just king Nur-ad-Din."¹³² The consideration of justice, glory, and historical victories surely explains why Ibn al-Athir liked to suppose the comparative between Nur-ad-Din and the early Islamic Caliphs.

In fact, the religious class depicted the patronage image, which Nur-ad-Din gained throughout his career. According to Elisseeff, after the capture of Damascus, Nur-ad-Din took each step in the name of *Jihad* against the Crusaders.¹³³ Elisseeff took this reverential tone directly from the chroniclers themselves. Ibn al-Adim stated, – probably more out of piety than

¹³² Ibn al-athir, *Al-tarikh al-Bahir fi dawlat al-Atabakiyya*, ed. Tullaymat and Ali Abd al-Salam (Cairo: Dar al-Kutob, 1963),163; Umar Ibn Abd al-Aziz was considered one of the greatest figures in the Islamic history, therefore, comparing Nur-ad-Din with him attributed an impressive figure and an Islamic coating to Nur-ad-Din.

¹³³ Nikita Elisseeff, *Nur-ad-Din: Un grand prince musulman*, vol. II, 426.

conceptions – “ from this point Nur-ad-Din dedicated himself to *Jihad*.”¹³⁴ Ibn al-Qalanisi attributed on the religious career of Nur-ad-Din, “I seek nothing but the good of the Muslims and to make war against the Franks.”¹³⁵ Al-Asfhani, the future advisor of Saladin as well, described Nur-ad-Din as ‘the most chaste, pious, sagacious, pure and virtuous of Kings.’ Al-Asfhani praised Nur-ad-Din for restoring ‘the splendor of Islam to the land of Syria.’¹³⁶ Furthermore, the later chronicler Abu Shama described Nur-ad-Din as the most zealous in raiding the Franks.¹³⁷ It is certainly possible to demythologize this picture of Nur-ad-Din. The German scholar Köhler argued that Nur-ad-Din’s efforts in the service of *Jihad* in the first half of his career was not impressive, and his usage of *Jihad*’s propaganda as an instrument was only for political purposes.¹³⁸

Meanwhile, this massive religious coating indicates to the growing aspirations and hopes of Muslims’ counter-crusading at the time of Nur-ad-Din, it demonstrates the social ethos, splendor, and justice. Though vital to the religious dimension of Nur-ad-Din’s military operations, examining the economic implications will indicate the limit of available stimulus for large-scale warfare. Economics were to the Muslims (and generally in the medieval world) an integral part of successful warfare and of the expansion of powers of a state or in this case, of merging a number of states into an empire.¹³⁹ Nur-ad-Din’s expansions, therefore, brought back into the Islamic world, the large-scale human institution, namely ‘the Empire.’ The argument is

¹³⁴ Ibn al-Adim, *Zubdat al-Halab min tarikh Halab*, vol. II, 291.

¹³⁵ Ibn Al-Qalanisi, *The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades*, 303.

¹³⁶ Imad al-Din al-Isfhani, *Sana al-Barq al-Shami*, ed. F. al-Nabarawi (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanji, 1979), 16.

¹³⁷ Abu Shama, *Kitab al-Rawdatayn*, ed. H. Ahmad, Vol. I, II vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Kotob, 1954), 175.

¹³⁸ Michael Köhler, *Allianzen und Vertage*, 277.

¹³⁹ On plundering in ancient societies, see H. Turney-High, *Primitive War* (Columbia , S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1949), 175-177.

intense, and suffers the lack of statistics from the Islamic sources, but comparisons and contrasts between Nur-ad-Din's expansions and the previous Omayyad expansions, will be illuminating. That is to mean that all broad classificatory terms 'Empire' embrace a wide spectrum of individual instance, which is the obvious analogy.

Consequently, it is important to consider the two offsetting of tributes and military services after the foundation of Nur-ad-Din's State. A tribute, in its narrow sense, is of course only one way that an imperial state drains funds from subject-states for its treasury. The shift among Muslims there that Nur-ad-Din's authority replaced that of the previous rulers of subjected principalities. Hence, Nur-ad-Din patronage ended the fiscal rights, which previously the Islamic state gave to members of ruling families over Muslim lands and businesses.¹⁴⁰ This is not to propose that Nur-ad-Din exempted subject-states from paying tributes. Instead, his administration took the tributes directly for the state institution as a replacement for wasting much of it on the middle-beneficiaries. In essence, this step boosted the levy of Nur-ad-Din's state at the expense of Muslim ruling families and reduced the financial burden on the peasants' class. The case of Nur-ad-Din's gradual occupation of Egypt is a decisive example. It started out when Nur-ad-Din made an agreement with the Fatimid to help protecting Egypt from the Frankish siege in return for a Fatimid payment of one million dinars. When the Franks intensified their pressure on the Fatimid government, Nur-ad-Din requested one-third of the

¹⁴⁰ For the system of fiscal rights, see Ashtor, *A Social and Economic history of the Near East in the Middle Ages*, 168-331.

revenues of Egypt.¹⁴¹ Shortly after, Nur-ad-Din ousted the Fatimid government and claimed the whole revenues for his state.¹⁴²

As for the large-scale military campaigns, engagements were both expensive and unpredictable, to the participants if not to later historians, even those with heavy advantages on one side. It required time and funds for Nur-ad-Din to subdue Egypt. Gradually, Egypt appeared to be a great tribute-paying possession. The Fatimid Empire, in general, had a reputation for being rich, which the massive constructions in Cairo confirmed it.¹⁴³ Egypt then became a major contributor to Nur-ad-Din's campaigns. Unfortunately, no budget for Nur-ad-Din's state has survived, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries, Egyptian revenues formed thirty to forty percent of the total Ottoman budget.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, Ibn al-Athir stated on Nur-ad-Din's campaign to Egypt, "Asad al-Din [the general of Nur-ad-Din's campaign] should dwell among them with an army and that their financial support should also come from Egypt."¹⁴⁵ This statement indicates that the expansion aimed at covering the campaign's costs and the soldiers' payments. A long season of expansion probably meant active campaigning, and this gave greater hopes of booty to offset expenditure. The domination over trade routes between Egypt and Syria created an extensive mine for employment in commercial businesses, especially, in the absence of trade interruptions by the Crusaders and other Muslim ruling elites.

¹⁴¹ Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 173.

¹⁴² Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 196-198.

¹⁴³ R. Ettinghausen, O. Grabar and M. Jenkins-Madina, *Islamic Art and Architecture 650-1250* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 187-200.

¹⁴⁴ See Michael F. Hendy, *Studies in The Byzantine Monetary Economy, C. 300-1450* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 613-618.

¹⁴⁵ Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 173.

By suppressing the piracy and brigandage of other Muslim military leaders, Nur-ad-Din brought back to the Islamic world the extensive territorial dominions. In addition, these expansions brought back into Nur-ad-Din's institution large tracts of lands with access to waterways trade, together with larger tracts of inland territories with unlimited access to overland trade routes and communication. It boosted the Levy and the self-sufficiency on the large estates, peace and war and, more importantly, the changing rule of the state with the development of the large territorial empires.¹⁴⁶ As Nur-ad-Din's empire expanded, mercantilism correspondingly expanded. Indeed, from the first Arab-Islamic empire of the seventh-century to the Ottomans – the last great Islamic empire – the rise and fall of imperial mercantilism was the story of the Near East and perhaps even further, the story of the universe.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, psychologically, the military expansions were useful for all Muslims, since they represented a way of resolving the tension of the Islamic societies at the expense of other *Atabegs* and the Crusaders, rather than on the poor strata class.

Nur-ad-Din's state enjoyed strong and expanding urban networks, growing consumer demands, increasing range of manufacturing activities, and highly commercialized economy.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ On the expansions of the Omayyad and early Abbasids, see Kennedy Hugh, *The Armies of the Caliphs*, 18-58, 96-117; see also William V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 58-104.

¹⁴⁷ On the role of mercantilism on the unification of culturally-diverse nations, see B. F. Haley, "Heckscher, Mercantilism," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 50, no. 2 (Feb. 1936): 347-354; For the early Islamic mercantilism, see Efraim Karsh, *Islamic Imperialism, A History* (Totton, Hampshire: Hobbs Ltd, 2007); S. Hamid argued that early Islamic economy was neither completely capitalist nor completely socialist, but rather a balance between the two systems, emphasizing both 'individual economic freedom and the need to serve common good, see Shadi Hamid, "An Islamic Alternative? Equality, Redistributive Justice, and Welfare State in the Caliphate of Umar," *Renaissance: Monthly Islamic Journal* 13, no. 8 (Aug. 2003).

¹⁴⁸ There is no trade records survived from the time of Nur-ad-Din, however, comparing it to the Mamluk Empire, which was almost the same in size, may bring similar assessments. See Walter J. Fischal, "The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt: A Contribution to the Economic History

More decisively, Nur-ad-Din used his military power to protect the trading business.¹⁴⁹ In return, the nobility class contributed cash to Nur-ad-Din's campaigns. Ibn al-Athir stated on the campaign Nur-ad-Din's campaign to Egypt, "they had been at Damietta, during which Saladin [Saladin was yet Nur-ad-Din's general] expended untold sums of money. I was told that he said, 'I have never seen anyone more generous than al-Adid; [an Egyptian nobleman] during the time the Franks were before Damietta he sent me a million dinars, apart from clothes and other things.'"¹⁵⁰ Regardless of the exaggerated sum, it seems that the more prosperous Muslims in the upper class supported the imperial advances of Nur-ad-Din. Concretely, how did the prosperous class benefit? There is a total silence in the literary sources of this question, but rational economic goals, certainly, were among the motivations of their contributions and support.

On the other hand, the common people, the poorer strata, were both the driving force behind, and the beneficiaries of, the imperial growth. At the head of the extensive list was the end of the *Atabegs'* fiscal rights over land and trade. Add to the work in farms and trade, the total cash benefits to poor Muslims, though not measurable, it was certainly there.¹⁵¹ Above all, the empire and its benefits brought back the centralization of power to the Islamic state. To explain the last point, Nur-ad-Din's state manipulated a disciplinary constitution that served a whole society. More precisely, Nur-ad-Din's institution of the state manipulated the use of force for rational economic objects. Therefore, rational production and commercial politics triggered

of Medieval Islam," *Journal of The Economic and Social History of The Orient* 1, no. 2 (Apr. 1958): 157-174.

¹⁴⁹ See Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 200; Ibn al-Athir documented that Nur-ad-Din led an expedition against the Franks to rescue two trade-vessels in the port of Lattakia.

¹⁵⁰ Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 183-184.

¹⁵¹ The growth of Nur-ad-Din's territory required more administrative jobs. For example, he hired men to maintain the use of homing pigeons for communications. See Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 201.

the aims of power politics within Nur-ad-Din's state.¹⁵² Beyond that, Nur-ad-Din's expansions managed to tame Muslims' military powers. The expansion process provided regular payments for the military elites, this time from the accumulations of booty and tributes. Ibn al-Athir stated on Nur-ad-Din's campaign to Egypt, "Nur al-Din gave every man with Asad al-Din twenty dinars as a bonus, not counted as part of his pay."¹⁵³ This point particularly marked Nur-ad-Din's success, because his campaigns administered the greatest military achievement to lock economic growth to his state, and in retrospect, to Muslim subjects.

To be sure, the Islamic world maintained a standing army before the impact of the First Crusade, and continued to do so. After the end of expansions, the Islamic state failed to provide regular payments to the army. Instead, it granted military officers the fiscal right to collect land revenues for their salaries. Nonetheless, the Islamic state failed to control the power of the army throughout this process. Similarly, the capstone structure of Nur-ad-Din's army remained from the Turkic elites and the *Atabegs*, an organization designed to bring about professional and discipline warriors.¹⁵⁴ Although there is no evidence of whether (or not) Muslim subjects chose to serve in Nur-ad-Din's army physically, the later experience demonstrated that, without the imperial income, it was impossible to pay so large a body of soldiers regularly. Fundamental measures require powerful stimuli and unprecedented necessary conditions. Taking trade for example, Muslims succeeded to maintain imports and exports even after the foundation of the

¹⁵² For further analogous information concerning the social economics in the Near East, see E. Ashtor, *A Social and Economic history of the Near East in the Middle Ages*; Abraham L. Udovitch, *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam*; Abraham L. Udovitch, *Reflections on the Institutions of Credits and Banking in the Medieval Islamic East*, 5-21; Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of The Last 2000 Years*, 157-178.

¹⁵³ Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 173-174.

¹⁵⁴ Jonathan Berkey, *The Formation of Islam*, 204-205.

Crusader States.¹⁵⁵ Nonetheless, it seemed comprehensible to everyone that the imperial power guaranteed higher levels of those imports as a strong and united army supported and protected it. For example, Ibn al-Athir documented the account of two Muslim merchandise-ships set out from Egypt to Syria and anchored at the port of Lattakia. There, the Franks seized the ships and the merchandise. In response, Nur-ad-Din conducted a military campaign towards the Frankish cities of Arqa and Tripoli until the Franks gave back the stolen goods.¹⁵⁶ This decisive fact indicates that the empire granted safer and higher trade measures. In retrospect, the imperial power provided both the necessary cash and the political means toward the practical warfare.¹⁵⁷

Apart from acquisitions of property among Muslims in Nur-ad-Din's empire, the imperial income enabled Nur-ad-Din to demonstrate the financial growth of his state without adding financial burden on Muslim subjects. He used the income to construct splendid public buildings in the form of religious monuments as a part of his aim to revitalize Islam to stimulate popular approach to *Jihad*. Such monuments – because their inscriptions often dated them precisely – provide an inevitable historical evidence of not only Nur-ad-Din's popular temptation to the Islamic zeal, but also to the financial strength of his state. Those colossal landmarks confirmed the popular image of Nur-ad-Din as the leader who stimulates his financial power for the good of Islam and the Muslims. More precise, this noteworthy shift indicates the religious dimension,

¹⁵⁵ See CHAPTER 2, 44-45.

¹⁵⁶ Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 200.

¹⁵⁷ Finley argued the similar approach regarding Roman and Greek imperial economics, see M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (Berkeley, LA: The University of California Press, 1973), 172-174.

which all chroniclers, though came from diverse cultures in the Islamic world and wrote from different perspectives, displayed on the image of Nur-ad-Din.¹⁵⁸

Furthermore, the patronage image and the religious dimension demonstrate how the religious class coated Nur-ad-Din's movements with right intent. This is not to reveal Nur-ad-Din true intent. Nonetheless, the gradual success of the imperial economy coated the power politics with an Islamic virtue. Not only did it secure Muslims' survival needs, but also it made the moral economy available. As for the issue of the Second Crusade, Muslims overcame the probability of defeat, but a charismatic leader arose to stir his people into fighting. The fight at this point seemed just in theory for at this point it required Muslims to fight for the state itself: the epitome of their identity. In practical terms, the fight seemed possible for the power of an empire provided the necessary means for such large-scale military campaigns.

One more facet to the ideological revival of justice in the time of Nur-ad-Din was his establishment of a 'House of Justice' in Damascus. The timing of this particular building was not a coincident. Certainly, this monument prevailed Nur-ad-Din's popular temptations toward the religious atmosphere of counter-crusading. Thus, in the House of Justice, Nur-ad-Din, or one of his appointed deputies, presided over sessions in which Muslim subjects brought their grievances to address them to the ruler.¹⁵⁹ Ibn al-Athir went further to claim that Nur-ad-Din himself used to set in the House of Justice two days a week, with the judges and the legists to

¹⁵⁸ The monuments of Nur-ad-Din have been studied closely in Y. Tabbaa, "Monuments with a message: Propagation of Jihad under Nur al-Din," in *The Meeting of Two Worlds*, ed. V. P. Goss and Kalamazoo (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Medieval Ins. Michigan University, 1986), 224-226; Terry Allen, *A Classical Revival in Islamic Architecture* (Wiesbaden: Ludwig Recihert Verlag, 1986), 1-6.

¹⁵⁹ N. Rabbat, "The Ideological Significance of the Dar al-Adl (House of Justice) in the Medieval Islamic Orient," *IJMES* 27 (1995): 3-28, 19.

listen to the people's grievances.¹⁶⁰ It seems that the continuous success of the empire gave Muslim subjects a sense of justice and made civil peace possible. It is not a surprise that both chroniclers and inscriptions attributed the image of Nur-ad-Din to the 'Just King'.¹⁶¹

Sprinkling the Weberian terminology, the imperial growth reflected a sense of shared identity in the Islamic society. This is not a surprise for Muslims' memories preserved an idealistic image of the glorious past of the Islamic empire; and as soon as it seemed possible, Muslims determined to fight for it. It is worth stressing that the Islamic empire was more to Muslims than a mere state, it was a holy and sovereign state: a community and a religion that once dominated the entire Middle East and an identity that marked Muslims' success for centuries. For that cause, the fight met the general population's psychological need of justice and provided the reconciliation between the desire of salvation and the need to fight. Moreover, Muslim subjects viewed Nur-ad-Din's administration that created the so-called godly blessing wealth as a legitimate authority. The issue of righteous intentions, therefore, coated the act of war. Hence, the social solidarity brought *Jihad's* religious theories together with the practices, because the power of a holy empire succeeded to unite the means, goals and efforts of its subjects for a common just cause. Only under this term, the practical magnitude of *Jihad* turned from the preserve of the noble elites into a totally mainstream activity, accepted and endorsed by an entire society. More accurately, it activates the practical concept of *Jihad* by the wide number of Muslim citizens who supported the wars.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Ibn al-athir, *Al-tarikh al-bahir fi dawlat al-atabakiyya*, 168.

¹⁶¹ Notice the shift from using the word Atabeg as a title to Nur-ad-Din to the word 'Just King', For example see, Ibn al-Qalanisi in Francesco Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of The Crusades*, 68; see also RCEA, IX, inscription no. 3281, 56-57; N. Elisseeff, "La titulature de Nur al-Din d'apres ses inscriptions," *BEO* 14 (1952): 163.

¹⁶² See Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 491-92.

To be sure, this approach does not imply any temptation to label Nur-ad-Din's expansions, 'wartime measures.' Although ambitious, it ignores the fact that the concept 'wartime measures' involves numerous campaigns and consistent warfare.¹⁶³ However, what this approach proposes is that such an aim was a direct result of dominating trade accumulations. Nur-ad-Din took that step in that direction as he was able and found it advantageous. Short of going to war, there was no more useful instrument for punishing enemies, rewarding 'friends', and persuading 'neutrals' to become friends; and if employment of the instrument meant going to war, *tant pis*. The rising imperial power implied that Nur-ad-Din could similarly control all independent Islamic provinces.¹⁶⁴ Potentially, the growth of his territory meant higher tributes; and with the backing of flowing resources, the religious class, the subjects, and a strong formidable army, he could deny any and every province in the Near East access to important trade routes.

Of course, Nur-ad-Din had the ability, but it is surly hard to determine whether the aim itself was (or was not) thinkable. That is to commit the hegemony-into-empire once again. This may explain the voluntary subjection of northern Syria. Certainly, many Islamic provinces together with the Crusader States had comparable needs to import. Nur-ad-Din, at this point, could block them partially if not completely. Furthermore, in the absence of genuinely commercial and competitive motives, Nur-ad-Din restricted Muslims' interference in the trading activities of one another, as those issues arose *ad hoc* in the growth of the empire. Only after the

¹⁶³ The campaign on Egypt was the only major military campaign for Nur-ad-Din. In addition, Nur-ad-Din sponsored few campaigns against the Franks, and the Seljuk; See Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 144-162, 184; Other than that, northern Syria volunteered into Nur-ad-Din's league.

¹⁶⁴ See Nur-ad-Din taking Qal'at Jabar, Mosul, the Seljuk lands in Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir*, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 171, 192-4, 213.

Second Crusade, which radically altered the scale of operations and the stakes, did it become necessary to make massive use of the trade-blocking instrument.

Although the Crusader States, surely, suffered from the growing imperial power of Nur-ad-Din, concretely, who in Nur-ad-Din's state benefited (or suffered) from the empire, how and to what extent? In what follows, this study shall remain within the narrow framework; to draw attentions to the way socioeconomic factors influenced the rise of counter-crusading movements.¹⁶⁵ It is clear that Muslims combined the history of the Islamic empire with Islam itself. Therefore, a Muslim pioussness and willingness to submit and defend the holy empire made the embrace of an all-consuming Islamic identity an attractive alternative to the all-encompassing socioeconomic factors of the Islamic empire. Nonetheless, economic factors not only facilitated the act of war but also revived Muslims memories of the great Islamic empire. Consequently, Nur-ad-Din's success minimized the distance between the glorious past and the actual present. More accurately, it minimized the distance between Muslims' shocking defeat of the First Crusade and their victory over the Second Crusade.

It seems compelling that the empire directly profited Muslim general population to an extent known in the Islamic world through memory preservations of the great Islamic empire at the ages of the Omayyad and the early Abbasid. There was a price, of course, the costs of constant warfare. Men were lost in engagements, most shatteringly in the Second Crusade and thereafter. Nonetheless, it seems possible to state that there is no direct connection between the empire and the theoretical *Jihad* for juries' contribution to provide legal theories of *Jihad* existed well before and after the First and Second Crusades without any significant changes in the

¹⁶⁵ Norman Housley drew attentions to the way socio-economic factors have become less significant to historians than religious ones in the treatment of motivation, which he preferred to call 'intentions', see Norman Housley, *Contesting The Crusades*, 24-47, 77.

methods. This is not to deny that the power of the Islamic empire boosted juries' motivation but rather to imply that juries' contribution continued regardless of the material conditions of the empire. On the other hand, the connection between the practical *Jihad* and the empire was obvious. War was an endemic justice: everyone accepted that as a fact, and therefore no one seriously argued, or believed, that giving up the empire would relieve Muslims of the miseries of war. It would merely relieve them of certain particular wars, and the loss of the empire and its moral and material benefits did not seem worth that dubious gain.

With the empire, Muslims morale remained buoyant to the end, reflecting their calculus of the moral and material profits and losses. Repeatedly, this is not to imply that economic factors motivated Muslims' holy war. In any common sense, the imperial profit appeared gradually years after the impact of the Second Crusade. The point is that the impact of the Second Crusade drove Muslims survival instinct to the level of necessity by which war became inescapable. Then, Muslims victory over the Second Crusade convinced Muslims that they were fighting for a holy cause. This step coupled with higher aspirations to bring back the great Islamic empire, which for centuries dominated the Near East, benefited all its citizens, and became affiliated to the very meaning of the definition 'Muslims.' To avoid definition's contortions, the holy cause changed rapidly; and with each success, Muslims believed that they were on the right track for God blessed their cause. Therefore, everyone tolerated the ideas of holy and just wars.

It is worth stressing at this point that there is no program of imperialism there, no theory, merely a reassertion of the universal medieval belief in the holy naturalness of domination.¹⁶⁶ In Aristotle words:

The free rules over the servile in one way, the male over the female in another, and the man over the child in yet another. All the partners possess the elements on the human mind, but they possess them in different ways. The slave does not have the faculty of deliberation at all. The female has it but in an indefinite form. The child has it but in an imperfect form.¹⁶⁷

The power of an empire boosted Muslims' hopes and aspirations in their struggle against the crusaders. Therefore, it was no surprise that the failure of the Second Crusade ushered in a period in which for the years following the Second Crusade Muslims' morale was reflected in a high level under the leaderships of Nur-ad-Din. Aspirations, gradually, went as high as Jerusalem itself. After the death of Nur-ad-Din, al-Isfhani stated, "by the light of his discernment the just prince Nur-ad-Din Mahmud Ibn Zengi had known in his time about the conquest of Jerusalem after him."¹⁶⁸ This is not to admit that the return of Jerusalem to the Islamic dominion motivated Nur-ad-Din's activities. Though the religious class's interpretations supported that approach, historians are free to make their ethical verdict. However, the power of the empire, surely, boosted the expectations.

Nur-ad-Din's dominion was of course an abstraction of the Islamic world, and to appreciate the significance of this point, the label 'empire' referred to an actual political state, not label on a religious community, namely 'Sunni State.' Although he conquered the most formidable Shi'ite institution, the Fatimid, the ideology remained incessant. Hillenbrand argued

¹⁶⁶ See Cary J. Nederman, "Nature, Sin and The Origins of Society," *Journal of The History of Ideas* 49, no. 1 (Jan. - Mar. 1988): 3-26.

¹⁶⁷ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1.1260a.

¹⁶⁸ Imad al-Din al-Isfhani, *Sana al-Barq al-Shami*, 314-315.

that, the ideological enmity between the Shi'ite and the Sunni was deeply entrenched and in practice it was almost unthinkable for them to form a united Islamic front against the Crusaders.¹⁶⁹ Despite the fact that sectarian divisions continued within Nur-ad-Din's state, the sense of freedom emerged. For centuries, scholars have exercised their minds in vain to find a workable definition of 'freedom.' This is not to add yet another attempt to the mountain of explanations, for in any normal sense, the term to be defined regarding each social perception to the antithesis of 'un-freedom.' The reason is that the rights recognized in a given society constitute a bundle of claims, privileges, powers, and immunities un-evenly distributed among the individual members, in other words, the unequal privileges of citizenship. Though unequal, citizens shared the at least standard of privileges that shapes a common identity.

For centuries under the imperial power, Muslim subjects shared the rights to survive, to subsist, to dominate, and to belong to a common community. This strong and dominating community characterized the epitome of the definition 'Muslims,' namely the great Islamic Empire; and to avoid running into conceptual contortions, the concept 'freedom' there brought back both moral and material privileges to the concept 'Muslims.' Given the long traditions of the concept 'Muslims,' the freedom there provided Muslims with a shared sense of insurance from the mysterious future regardless of their sectarian, social, and cultural diversity because it combined the fulfillment of their worldly needs with the fulfillment of their religious obligations.

Beyond that, it is surely hard to determine whether (or not) Nur-ad-Din's motivations represented a moral leader of *Jihad*. Looking back, historians are free to make their own moral judgments. However, Nur-ad-Din imperial approach employed all the forms of material

¹⁶⁹ On the First Crusade, see Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, 35-36.

exploitation that were available and possible in that society, and to the turbulent Muslims, his leadership provided very powerful motives to support his campaigns: hope, aspiration, honor, fear, general interest, and above all the sense of self-affiliation to a paramount holy and sovereign identity. In Ibn Khladun's words:

The end of social solidarity is sovereignty. This is because, as we have said before, it is solidarity, which makes men unite their efforts for common objects, defending themselves, and repulse or overcome the enemies. We have also seen that every human society requires a restraint, and a chief who can keep men from injuring themselves. Such a chief must command a powerful support, else he will not be able to carry out his restraining function.¹⁷⁰

The conclusion seems compelling. The impact of Second Crusade created a state of general panic in Damascus, which then extended to all the surrounding Islamic major cities. A single survival instinct pressed Muslims into alliance for the first time since the impact of the First Crusade. The panic triggered a call for sovereignty; anyone at this point could call himself, God's appointee on earth. Experience and practical judgments determined the choices and the limits. Nur-ad-Din was certainly fortunate that he started his career at this turning point. The religious class continued to offer the theological call for the *Jihad*, which gave the religious dimension to Nur-ad-Din's expansions. His expansions, in return, brought back the empire institution with all its benefits. Muslim subjects did nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human practice, in accepting an empire when it was offered to them, and then in refusing to give it up. After the Second Crusade, public opinion was reluctant to reverse itself once it has acknowledged the validity of an institution, the legitimacy of the practice and the exercise of

¹⁷⁰ Ibn Khladun, *An Arab Philosophy of History: selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun (1332- 1406)*, trans. Charles Issawi (London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1958), 108.

rights. In the just war thinking, Muslims acknowledged the presence of the legitimate authority, legitimate cause, and right intent.

As for the concept '*Jihad*', Humphereys' proposed that it is a plastic one, which can be deployed in widely varying ways for varying ends.¹⁷¹ Concretely, what Muslim actions reflected (or not) a true *Jihad* is imprecise. Hence, it is better to leave this subject to each historian's own moral tendency toward the argument. However, it looks now as though notions of vengeance played a relatively minor part. Perhaps vengeance existed in the *Jihad*'s theological approach, but the practices reflected a different cause, human's survival instinct. Materialism explanations may sound odd in correlation with religious issues, but how can one detach ideology from reality. Ideologies are the products of the complicated human organizations. That is something, but it is hardly enough to solve the puzzle. Be that as it may, ideologies thrive only when they meet the practices. To say this is not to deny the moral value of such ideology. *Jihad* will always be an important individual duty to Muslims. However, rotating the concept from an individual duty into a mass movement depends on the scale and the strength of the harmony between the human institution of the state and its subjects. Nur-ad-Din re-drew his dominion on Muslims' imperial inheritance, which for centuries institutionalized the important features of a community and its roles, more precise, the rule, the army and the general population.

¹⁷¹ R. S. Humphereys, *Ayyubids, Mamluks, and the Latin East in the thirteenth century*, 4.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

It is a common place to state that the major issue that hindered Muslims from embracing *Jihad* in practical terms was the lack of adaptability, above all, what about the imperial state? Potentially, it was a decisive consideration in itself. Its use was in the one process, production: a process of immense importance to society. Every rational argument suggests quick and widespread adaption. It would not be far wrong to say that from the seventh-century to the impact of the crusades, landed wealth represented the great wealth and revenue in the Islamic world, and that new wealth came majorly from wars and politics not from enterprise. Therefore, the role of the Islamic state carried a massive transformation in the centuries following the massive Islamic expansions. Materialistically, the expansions brought about all the interest of the imperial revenue. Muslims claimed great quantities of land, improved and extended the public capital, supported arts and sciences. Given the cessation of the expansions, Muslims did not develop new economic systems to use and innovate enterprise widely instead of wars. Consequently, this step transformed the role of the Islamic state once again. This time, the transformation brought negative assessments on Muslim subjects.

The oral tradition of events in the Islamic world, however, presented only the moral benefits of the Islamic empire. Islamic sources focused on the fact that the rise of the Islamic Empire was not simply an imperial conquest of the Near and Middle East; it was the creation, establishment, and spread of a new religion. This line of argument mythologized the history of the Islamic empire and turned the imperial traditions into deep beliefs affiliated with the religion itself. Given both approaches together, Muslims embraced *Jihad* practically, when the interest,

the available means, the domination, the necessary intellectual theories, and above all hopes and aspiration for salvation. Muslims, however, carried all within one umbrella, the imperial power. Yet, the fact is that, though the Islamic empire continued to exist before and after the First Crusade, though the interest seemed to have been present and the necessary intellectual theories continued on, Muslims did not advance the practical *Jihad*. A simple pointing out to alternative values cannot dismiss this question when one of those values was a very powerful desire for salvation that should meet the necessary means for the large-scale warfare.

However, in any common sense the Holy War is the attempt to bridge the gap between religious ideals and worldly violence, between morals and materials and between the theories and the practices. This is to imply that religious theories and practical warfare were not autonomous aspects of the story; they were actually a two-headed coin. There is no way to separate ideology from reality. Unquestionably, it is hard to dispute the argument in this particular instance that Muslims were able to embrace *Jihad* without both the revival of economic life and the arrival of more settled social relations. Like all generalizations, this one as well countered with exceptions. This meant that such a broad statement demands some qualifications. It does not amount to an adolescent acceptance of stated motivations, or to an attempt to evaluate religious thinking free of its social setting. This rather meant that most Muslim participants committed themselves to *Jihad* with the impetus of a worldview that set a premium on their spiritual health and above all their chances of salvation. The point is that for the majority of Muslim participants it is undeniable that *Jihad* proved to be a profoundly (though not obsessively) religious experience to express their worldviews. Therefore, it would be naive to underestimate the obvious addition of the 'right point', which provide the rational qualifications for the *Jihad*. This meant that at the 'right point' all participants' diverse

worldviews share one paramount identity, high cause and goal, which add a cover of legitimacy on the act of war, regardless of the multi-motivations.

To begin a terminology, it seems persuasive that the relationship between the theoretical and practical fields of *Jihad* showed a great assimilating power, the power of imposing its spiritual ascendancy even when it could not control the material conditions. For an active *Jihad*, however, a balance established itself between legal theories and legal practices and between morals and materials: an uneasy truce between Muslim jurists on a side and the political authorities (the state) and Muslim subjects on the other side. By applying this examination on the Islamic world between the First and Second Crusades, it appears compelling that Muslim jurists provided consistent legal theories in both cases, regardless of the material conditions. The aim of Muslim legists was, therefore, not to make wars, but rather to understand the nature of war, to tame it, and to promote it according to the necessity and the surrounding circumstances. The only significant point on the theoretical field came after the impact of the First Crusade when al-Sulami preached that provincial rulers did not require the Caliph authorization, perhaps concerned more by the desperate necessity rather than the legitimate one. The practices, however, witnessed a noteworthy change after the impact of the disastrous Second Crusade. This, certainly, indicates that the Second Crusade resembled the ‘right point’ to the practical field of *Jihad*. In return, it is obvious to state that the impact of Second Crusade was the ‘right point’ to the relationship between the human institution of the state and its Muslim subjects.

The second chapter stressed the power, prosperity and stability of the Islamic state throughout the foundation of the early Islamic Empire, and until the closing of the eighth-century. That empire was very different in a number of ways from the Islamic world at the age of the crusades, let alone conjures up image of marching armies, massive constructions, and

Arabic language. None of these characterized the Islamic world when the First Crusade struck the Near East. The striking forces of the Islamic world were now nomadic Turks. Every superpower seeks the last innovation of super-weaponry; and the nomadic Turks were the best innovation. Yet, arguably the indirect consequences were worse. The stateless nature of the nomadic societies was a particular problem for the Muslims in that it was impossible to control them by diplomacy. Such technique only works if there is an acknowledged leader with whom one can establish binding agreements. No one of the *Atabegs* had that kind of lasting authority.

Even so there is an underlying continuity behind its culture changes, and, despite fluctuation, it was still the Islamic Empire (Caliphate), and known as such to its citizens and enemies. Certainly, its subjects still called themselves Muslims and referred to Baghdad as ‘the Caliph city.’ All make clear that the process of Muslims’ self-identification with the empire was a continued one: an admiration nostalgia that grew into a myth. In reality, however, both the Islamic empire and the Caliph were merely memories. Nonetheless, it was still the same empire, which had dominated the Near East from the seventh-century; this time it was in fragments. This, however, give some indications of a divided attitude between the past and the present. Muslims voluntarily exchanged the present sense of separateness for a sense of belonging to the much larger and much stronger community. It seems possible to go further and to state that Muslims lived in a daydream state: a memory of an empire. Therefore, to understand what qualifications made the impact of the Second Crusade, the ‘right point’ for the practical *Jihad*, it was important to shed the light on the social economic changes in the Islamic Empire.

In the eighth century, Muslims, respectively, occupied far more territories. Sending the population out and bringing in additional means in the form of booty and tributes could absorb a rising population. Both, however, were stopgaps, not solutions, and to appreciate the

significance of this point, the term Muslims, in reality, changed over time from a label of an actual politic, religion, and economic unite (the empire) into abstractions, not labels on actual political state. They were merely the consequences of population outstripping the available means. The use of slaves created a new relative class in the Islamic world, and reordered the pre-existing social classes. Certainly, this reordering brought negative assessments on the general population. The pursuit of limited resources brought internal warfare to the Islamic world. Private capital, it is true, promotes and operates many of the possible innovations.

This, however, was not the case. There were enough individuals who possessed the resources, but not among the men whose interest lay in production. Add to the list the land-hunger of the *Atabegs*, which depopulated the productive rural areas at the expense of overpopulating the Islamic cities. The wide gap between production and consumption, surely, led to inflation. All these factors transformed the function of the Islamic state from serving a whole community to serving individual *Atabegs'* ideologies. Living in a state of social disorientation, Muslim subjects could not find a way to serve the state. These facts marginalized Muslim subjects and kept them from participating in politics and wars. Though disoriented, Muslims could not bridge the gap between the myth of Islamic empire and the reality that this empire was no longer a superpower.

Therefore, the first qualification for the impact of the Second Crusade over the First is, certainly, the psychological element. Although the impact of the First Crusade was not a surprise, Muslims seemed to have underestimated the crusader forces. Thus, Muslims' humiliating defeat had evidently dealt a blow to the cause of *Jihad* in the Islamic world. Probably, the cumulative effect of centuries of literary and architectural recordings of the glorious Islamic empire had contributed to a widespread Muslim belief that God approved their

domination and that they would always be victorious. Hence, when the First Crusade defeated the Muslims so dismally, Muslim morals plummeted too. It seems certain that the defeat had an impact upon Muslims' enthusiasm toward *Jihad*, notwithstanding repeated vocations in support of waging the holy war without any practical response. As Muslim subjects absorbed the outcome of the defeat, Muslim leaders ignored the fact. Such feelings contributed to *modus vivendi* with the crusaders; and while both Muslim leaders and subjects accepted the Crusader States as a reality, the impact of the Second Crusade re-stir the struggle once again. This time, Muslims over-estimated the campaign. The call for *Jihad* was fundamental. Armies from all over the Syrian provinces answered the appeal. Hence, Muslims' victory over the vast campaign demythologized the invincibility of the crusaders and re-bridged the gap between the myth of the Islamic empire and the victorious reality.

The second qualification is the hegemony on Damascus. Although Damascus had no such a religious significance to Muslims like Jerusalem, the impact escalated the counter-crusading movements. In Hillenbrand words, "Jerusalem always had its political price so long as the Franks still desired to possess it."¹⁷² Perhaps for Jerusalem denoted a religious significant, but it was not a case of surviving necessity to the general population. By contrast, Damascus implied a survival necessity to Muslims from the Damascenes, let alone, Damascus' religious significance as the Omayyad's city. It is worth stressing that Muslims survived the Second Crusade by drawing on their imperial inheritance. One aspect of that inheritance was the site of the former imperial capital (Damascus), and the land-walls built in the eighth-century. Nonetheless, the aggression on Damascus made it obvious to Muslims that neither Jerusalem nor the Holy Land was the center of their conflict with the crusaders, but rather, their own very

¹⁷² Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, 221.

existence. Therefore, Muslims – regardless of their sectarian, political and ideological differences – shared a survival instinct. Muslims were now battling for their very survival, and to do so they would have to adapt, but equally they could only survive by drawing on their imperial inheritance built up over centuries.

The third qualification stood in the formalistic league of Muslim provinces. This step reflected the strength of the appeal to oust the crusaders. Muslims had not called for a united Islamic force since the impact of the First Crusade. This specific step characterized the prime of the turning point. Indeed, the extent of fear from further crusades justified the leagues' hegemony on other Muslim leaders who refused to join the league. Although the impact of the Second Crusade provided a short momentum for the revival of Muslims' sense of *Jihad*, the gradual transformation of the league into an empire kept the momentum alive. Defeating the Second Crusade probably meant to Muslims that they were fighting for God's cause in that particular battle. However, the steady economic success followed Nur-ad-Din's expansions confirmed that message. Nur-ad-Din's reoccupation of the Islamic lands revitalized Muslims memories of the previous Islamic empire, which by the standards of the pre-industrial world was a powerful, well-organized and wealthy state. It had survived two centuries of political, cultural, administrative, social and economical crisis. Driven back into Egypt, Palestine and Syria, the empire could be again a great power. By the at least psychological standards, this step was enough to fuel hope and aspiration into Muslims.

The issue of the identity is, of course, the fourth qualification. Tracing Muslim sources, Muslims resented their identity variance with one another including the crusaders after the First Crusade. The analysis of Muslim sources of the First Crusade, though, it put them all at odd with one another, every single chronicler identified the self and the community to which he

belonged as ‘Muslims.’ That was not a surprise, but rather it was the inheritance of, first, centuries of a community that once dominated the Near East, second, two centuries of social and cultural crisis followed the gradual cession of the role of the state and the lack of adaptability. By contrast, it seems convincing from the massive harmony in Muslim sources that the impact of the Second Crusade reshaped Muslims identity. It spurred higher hopes and expectations among Muslims to bring back the great Islamic empire with all its spiritual and material meanings. This time, Muslims resented only their variance with the Franks; and to avoid definition contortions, the concept ‘Muslims’ meant the community of people who belonged to the superpower of the Near East. Muslims used this identity to differentiate themselves from Latin Christendom. Taking the Greeks as an analogous example, for centuries the Greeks resembled their variance with one another. Only after the massive Persian invasion when the definition ‘Greek’ defined all inhabitants of the Greek’s main lands: and it simply meant the super-strong community that defeated the Persians.¹⁷³ This step, in return, provided Muslims with one paramount identity to fight, for it united the state’s administration and the subjects into the struggle with the crusaders.

Beyond the process of simply getting the qualifications for the necessary force of men stands the formidable logistic problem of *Jihad*’s necessity. This quest meant to explain whether (or not) Muslims’ practical warfare implied a necessity for the constant hegemony against the Crusaders after defeating the Second Crusade. To answer this point, it is worth stressing the situation of the Crusader States after the Second Crusade. Certainly, the Crusader States suffered a major downfall without any further Islamic military campaigns. In the forty years followed the Second Crusade, the Crusader States underwent internal warfare, disintegration and above all

¹⁷³ Ernle Bradford, *Thermopylae: The Battle for The West* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1980), 21-22.

economical crisis.¹⁷⁴ This was the obvious result to Nur-ad-Din's domination over the Near East's fertile crescent (Egypt and Syria) and its trade routes. Without these prospects, the Crusader States increasingly decayed. Thus, Nur-ad-Din now forced the Crusader States to battle for its own survival, without neither Islamic military campaigns nor any Latin assistance from the West. According to Islamic legal theories of the *Jihad*, this step indicates that resort to war followed an attempt to pursue legitimate goals by nonlethal means.¹⁷⁵ It seems possible to state that in this particular case, the theory met the practice. This is neither to imply a moral judgment regarding Nur-ad-Din's intentions nor any temptations to center the *Jihad* ideology on peace. Instead, it explains the existence of the just war procedures, which brought about almost all Muslims into the struggle.

¹⁷⁴ Malcolm Barber, *The Crusader States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 262-288.

¹⁷⁵ See CHAPTER 2, 26-27.

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